In many ways, StratCom embodies the hidden architecture of U.S. militarism. The United States military dominates the globe through its operation of 10 Unified Combatant Commands. Composed of forces from two or more armed services, the Unified Commands are headed by four-star generals and admirals who operate under the direct authority of the Secretary of Defense, accountable only to the President. Six of the Commands are responsible for designated regions of the world, and the four others for various operations. It is a mind-numbing exercise just to list them all, but in order to comprehend the breadth and depth of U.S. militarism, it is absolutely essential to be aware of their existence.
areas of responsibility of the US Command
full operational capability of US Central Command
Introduction
The Encarta Encyclopedia describes militarism as 'advocacy of an
ever-stronger military as a primary goal of society, even at the cost of
other social priorities and liberties.'' And it relates militarism to
chauvinism, fascism, and national socialism. As uncomfortable as it may be
for many, this chilling definition accurately describes the historical
trajectory and current reality of U.S. national security policy. The
threatened first use of nuclear weapons remains at the heart of that policy,
and at the core of StratCom's mission.
In many ways, StratCom embodies the hidden architecture of U.S. militarism.
By architecture, I mean structural underpinnings and plans that provide
coherence. I include both policies and 'hardware'' (i.e. delivery systems
and manufacturing plants).
Much of this architecture is 'hidden in plain sight.'' All of the
information presented here is available from open sources. None of it is
classified, yet it is hidden from public view, barely mentioned in the
mainstream media, and the U.S. arms control establishment chooses largely to
ignore it because of the complexities it introduces into the short-term,
'pragmatic'' mindset prevalent in Washington, DC.
The Really Big Picture
Former Cold War hawk and CIA analyst, Chalmers Johnson, has written:
'As distinct from other peoples, most Americans do not recognize -- or do
not want to recognize -- that the United States dominates the world through
its military power. Due to government secrecy, our citizens are often
ignorant of the fact that our garrisons encircle the planet. This vast
network of American bases on every continent except Antarctica actually
constitutes a new form of empire -- an empire of bases with its own
geography not likely to be taught in any high school geography class.
Without grasping the dimensions of this globe-girdling Baseworld, one can't
begin to understand the size and nature of our imperial aspirations or the
degree to which a new kind of militarism is undermining our constitutional
order.
Our military deploys well over half a million soldiers, spies, technicians,
teachers, dependents, and civilian contractors in other nations. To dominate
the oceans and seas of the world, we are creating some thirteen naval task
forces built around aircraft carriers whose names sum up our martial
heritage. . . .We operate numerous secret bases outside our territory to
monitor what the people of the world, including our own citizens, are
saying, faxing, or e-mailing to one another.''
Johnson also explains how the U.S. military economy not only directly
profits private corporations and their sub-contractors, by developing and
producing weapons for the armed forces and servicing the needs of military
personnel, but also in more indirect and unexpected ways.
'On the eve of our second war on Iraq, for example, while the Defense
Department was ordering up an extra ration of cruise missiles and
depleted-uranium armor-piercing tank shells, it also acquired 273,000
bottles of Native Tan sunblock, almost triple its 1999 order and undoubtedly
a boon to the supplier,...and its subcontractor, Sun Fun Products of Daytona
Beach, Florida.''
Noting that 'official records on these subjects are misleading,'' Johnson in
2004 estimated that the Pentagon maintains more than 700 overseas bases in
about 130 countries, with an additional 6,000 bases in the United States and
its territories. He concludes:
'These numbers, although staggeringly large, do not begin to cover all the
actual bases we occupy globally.... If there were an honest count, the
actual size of our military empire would probably top 1,000 different bases
in other people's countries, but no one -- possibly not even the Pentagon --
knows the exact number for sure, although it has been distinctly on the rise
in recent years.''
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When establishment of the new United States Northern Command was announced
in April 2002, one of several changes to the Unified Command Plan, the
official press release declared, 'For the first time, commanders' areas of
operations cover the entire Earth.'' The United States military dominates
the globe through its operation of 10 Unified Combatant Commands. Composed
of forces from two or more armed services, the Unified Commands are headed
by four-star generals and admirals who operate under the direct authority of
the Secretary of Defense, accountable only to the President. Six of the
Commands are responsible for designated regions of the world, and the four
others for various operations. It is a mind-numbing exercise just to list
them all, but in order to comprehend the breadth and depth of U.S.
militarism, it is absolutely essential to be aware of their existence.
They are: [Stratcom Slide 4.jpg]
1. United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), at Peterson Air Force Base,
Colorado. Created in October 2002 in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
attacks, it is responsible for North American homeland defense and
coordinating homeland security with civilian forces.
2. United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), established February 7, 2007, in
Stuttgart, Germany. To be relocated to the African continent, it is
responsible for Africa excluding Egypt.
3. United States Central Command (CENTCOM), at MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida, is responsible for Egypt through the Persian Gulf region, into
Central Asia, and is handing over responsibility for the Horn of Africa to
AFRICOM.
4. United States European Command (EUCOM), in Stuttgart, Germany, is
responsible for Europe and Israel, and is handing over responsibility of
Africa to AFRICOM.
5. U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), on Oahu, Hawaii, is responsible for the
Asia-Pacific region including Hawaii.
6. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), in Miami, Florida, is responsible for
South and Central America and the surrounding waters.
7. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), at MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida,
provides special operations for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.
8. U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), at Naval Support Activity Headquarters
in Norfolk and Suffolk, Virginia, supports other commands as a joint force
provider.
9. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), at Scott Air Force Base,
Illinois, covers global mobility of all military assets for all regional
commands.
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10. Tying them all together is United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM),
at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, which describes itself as 'is a global
integrator charged with the missions of full-spectrum global strike, space
operations, computer network operations, Department of Defense information
operations, strategic warning, integrated missile defense, global C4ISR
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance), combating weapons of mass destruction, and specialized
expertise to the joint warfighter.... U.S. Strategic Command is part of a
rich history that spans both the interrelated strategic and space
communities.''
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee just last month,
StratCom Commander General Kevin Chilton testified:
'Increasingly, space-based capabilities enable all other war-fighting
domains. In the 21st Century, the mindset of space as purely an "enabler"
must change. We must view our activities in the space domain in the same way
we regard activities in the domains of land, sea, air, and cyberspace.''
And:
'In 2007 USSTRATCOM and our Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) led ISR planning
in support of the operational surge in Iraq.''
According to its own version of its history:
'On September 23, 1985, the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed the
ever-increasing value of military space systems by creating a new unified
command -- U.S. Space Command -- to help institutionalize the use of space
in U.S. deterrence efforts.
The U.S.-led coalition's 1991 victory in the Persian Gulf War underscored,
and brought widespread recognition to, the value of military space
operations. U.S. operations in contingencies since the early 1990s,
including the Balkans, Southwest Asia, Afghanistan and Iraq have proven the
military's reliance on communications, intelligence, navigation, missile
warning and weather satellite systems. Space systems are considered
indispensable providers of tactical information to U.S. warfighters.''
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, On June 1, 1992, President
George H. Bush established U.S. Strategic Command, which for the first time
in U.S. history brought the planning, targeting, and wartime employment of
strategic (nuclear) forces under the control of a single commander, while
the day-to-day training, equipping and maintenance responsibilities for its
forces remained with the Air Force and Navy.
Again, according to its own history:
'Events of Sept. 11, 2001, vividly proved that the nation needed a new
strategic direction. The emergence of transnational global threats - state
and non-state actors such as terrorist organizations that operate across
state borders, increasingly in affiliation with others who oppose U.S.
interests - required a more integrated approach to our nation's defense.
Sept. 11 also illustrated the need to improve the nation's national command
and control architecture.''
On June 26, 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld announced that U.S. Space
Command would merge with U.S. Strategic Command. The activation of the new
StratCom took place on October 1, 2002.
Previously limited to nuclear weapons, STRATCOM's role was expanded,
consistent with provisions of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, to encompass
all aspects of assessing and responding to nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons worldwide. As military affairs analyst William Arkin warned at the
time, tearing down the firewall that has separated nuclear weapons from
other weapons lowers the threshold for U.S. nuclear use.
General Chilton underscored the continuing centrality of nuclear weapons in
StratCom's mission as he explained how that mission is expanding:
'While our nuclear capability remains vital, our ability to integrate
conventional long-range precision weapons is every bit as important...We
have a prompt global strike delivery capability on alert today, but it is
configured only with nuclear weapons, which limits the options available to
the President and may in some cases reduce the credibility of our
deterrence.''
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A 1993 Congressional Research Service (CRS) study of the U.S. Navy's Naval
Historical Center records identified '234 instances in which the United
States has used its armed forces abroad in situations of conflict or
potential conflict or for other than normal peacetime purposes'' between
1798 and 1993. As the author noted, 'The list does not include covert
actions or numerous instances in which U.S. forces have been stationed
abroad since World War II in occupation forces or for participation in
mutual security organizations, base agreements, or routine military
assistance or training operations.''
In a 2006 review of this study and two other surveys of U.S. military
interventions, journalist Gar Smith found that 'in our country's 230 years
of existence, there have been only 31 years in which U.S. troops were not
actively engaged in significant armed adventures on foreign shores.'' He
concluded:
'The arithmetic is daunting. Over the long course of U.S. history, fewer
than 14% of America's days have been marked by peace. The defining
characteristic of our nation's foreign policy for 86% of our existence would
appear to be a bellicose penchant for military intervention.
As of 2006, there were 192 member states in the United Nations. Incredibly
enough, over the past two centuries, the United State has attacked, invaded,
policed, overthrown or occupied 62 of them.''
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Nuclear weapons, still at the core of StratCom's mission, exist within - and
not apart from - this system of extended military bases and Unified
Combatant Commands, and the history it derives from. Other nations are aware
of this 'hidden architecture'' and it figures into their own security
calculations. If we are to develop effective strategies, we must understand
the larger context in which the United States is modernizing its nuclear
forces and developing its nuclear and conventional Prompt Global Strike
capabilities today.
The Hidden Architecture of Nuclear Weapons
In an essay written after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998,
Dr. Amulya Reddy, an eminent Indian scientist, described his visit in
September 1999 to the former Nazi concentration camps in Poland, and
compared these 'gigantic and horrific factories of death'' with the U.S.
nuclear weapons infrastructure.
'[W]ith regard to the scale of the killing, the recruitment of capable
minds, the harnessing of science and technology, the extent of organization,
the resort to efficient project management methods, and the choice of
targets to maximize annihilation of Japanese civilians - the Manhattan
project and its follow-up were like the concentration camps, in fact, even
more horrendous in their impact.
When talking about nuclear weapons we are not dealing with just a
particularly destructive type of weapon, but rather with what President
Dwight Eisenhower originally wanted to call the
Congressional-military-industrial complex, to which I would add the
category, 'academic.'' In a well-known line from the movie, 'Field of
Dreams,'' the protagonist declares, 'If you build it, they will come.'' He
was talking about a baseball field and the sports fans it would attract. In
the same way, as we're now seeing all too clearly, if you build a new
nuclear weapons infrastructure, it will produce new nuclear weapons.
The 'Reliable Replacement Warhead'' (RRW) and the policy of preventive
warfare didn't spring out of nowhere. They are predictable -- possibly even
inevitable -- results of policies and programs that have been in place since
1945, when President Harry Truman -- a Democrat -- ordered the first use of
nuclear weapons, on two Japanese cities. These policies and programs have
been reaffirmed by every administration since, whether Democratic or
Republican.
It was largely during the Clinton years, following the window of
unprecedented opportunity that appeared with the end of the Cold War that
the use of nuclear weapons to threaten nations suspected of possessing
nuclear biological or chemical weapons became a central part of U.S.
'counterproliferation'' policy. Presidential Decision Directive-60 (PDD-60),
signed by Bill Clinton in late 1997, recommitted the U.S. to nuclear weapons
as the 'cornerstone'' of its national security and reaffirmed the U.S.
policies of threatened first use and threatened massive retaliation. PDD-60
also further institutionalized a policy shift that had been underway for
some time: nuclear weapons would now be used to 'deter'' a range of threats
including not only nuclear, but also chemical and biological weapons,
another means of lowering the threshold for potential nuclear weapons use.
Clinton also brokered a deal with the nuclear weapons laboratories - the
direct descendents of the Manhattan Project - to massively invest in the
nuclear weapons research and production infrastructure, through the
euphemistically named 'Stockpile Stewardship'' program, in exchange for
dropping their opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the end,
the Lab directors hedged in their testimony to Congress and the Senate
refused to ratify the treaty. Today, under the existing Stockpile
Stewardship Program, the Livermore and Los Alamos Labs are working on
competing designs for so-called 'Reliable Replacement Warheads'' (the
subject of some controversy in Congress), and 'Life-Extension Programs'' to
render the U.S. nuclear arsenal reliable for decades to come are underway
for the B61 bomb and the W76 Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile. The W-76, in
fact, is being upgraded with an enhanced ground-burst capability, making it
more suitable for a first strike against a hardened or deeply-buried target.
As Chalmers Johnson noted in a 2004 interview:
'[E]mpire has a much longer history than just the Bush administration, and I
would be the first to argue... that Bill Clinton was a better imperialist
than George Bush because he cleverly disguised what we were doing under
various rubrics that he invented.... For example, Clinton argued that our
attack on Serbia in 1999 was humanitarian intervention. In other cases, he
disguised our imperialism as part of a newly discovered ineluctable
[inevitable] process called `globalization'.''
The 'New'' Strategic Triad
The Pentagon's December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) - contemporaneous
with the establishment of the new StratCom - underlines the fundamental
policy and technological underpinnings for the Bush administration's
aggressive 'preventive war'' doctrine, and has served as the primary
justification for each subsequent annual nuclear weapons budget request as
well as the current 'Complex Transformation'' plan to modernize the nuclear
weapons laboratories and manufacturing plants.
The NPR expanded the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security
policy, including the possible use of nuclear weapons in 'immediate,
potential, or unexpected contingencies'' against a seven named countries
including Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and called for indefinite retention
of a large, modern, and diverse nuclear force. Significantly, the NPR also
elevated the weapons research and development infrastructure - including the
nuclear weapons laboratories - to one leg of the 'New Strategic Triad,''
intended to support both 'offensive'' and 'defensive'' nuclear and
non-nuclear high-tech weapons systems that will enable the U.S. to project
overwhelming global military power.
The NPR specifies: 'The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons
complex that will: ...be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture,
and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements.'' To
accomplish this, the NPR called for 'Transfer of warhead design knowledge
from the current generation of designers to the next generation'' through an
'Advanced Concepts Initiative.'' This initiative has been superceded by the
RRW program, an illustrative example of how programs which appear to be dead
one year reemerge the next year under different names and budget lines.
[Stratcom Slide 11.jpg]
In describing the transition to a 'new'' strategic triad, the NPR provides a
useful tool for understanding how the U.S. plans to carry out its global war
fighting strategy. In one corner of the new triad, new non-nuclear weapons
capabilities have been added to the 'old'' Cold War strategic triad,
consisting of submarine- based ballistic missiles, land-based
intercontinental missiles and strategic bombers - still very much there!
This category has been designated 'offensive strike systems.'' The other
legs of this new triad are 'defenses'' and a 'revitalized defense
infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to
meet emerging threats.'' These three elements are bound together by
'enhanced command and control'' and 'intelligence systems.
The three legs of the new strategic triad are designed to work together, to
enable the United States to project overwhelming military force. A 2000 Air
Force planning documents states that a long-term goal of the U.S. military
is to 'enable an affordable capability to swiftly and effectively deliver
highly effective weapons against targets at any required global location''
in order to 'affordably destroy or neutralize any target on earth.…'' This
objective is now referred to as 'Prompt Global Strike'' capability.
[Stratcom Slide 14.jpg]
Considered in this context, it becomes easier to understand that so-called
'defenses'' are not really to defend the United States from a surprise
attack. These systems include both 'national'' missile defense systems in
the form of ground-based interceptors, initially in Alaska and California,
and 'theater'' missile defenses, at foreign bases or on ships at sea. In
addition, research and development is underway on laser missile defense
systems, to be deployed, eventually, on airplanes and space-based vehicles.
These theater missile defenses are intended to work together with the
offensive weapons systems, like swords and shields, to protect U.S. troops
and bases and other U.S. 'strategic assets'' around the world. Admiral Ramu
Ramdas, the former head of India's navy and now a leading proponent of
nuclear abolition has described U.S. theater missile defenses as a 'net
thrown over the globe.''
An illustrative version of this concept can be found in a 2002 speech by the
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, who was promoting a program called 'Sea
Shield:''
'What Sea Shield does is extend homeland security to the fullest extent with
forward deployed forces, buying time and buying space for the detection and
tracking of threats headed toward our country...
As we look to the future, Sea Shield's littoral [shoreline] control
capabilities will build upon rich mix of manned and unmanned systems on,
over, and below the sea. This combination of platforms, sensors, and weapons
will assure access and provide the foundation of battlefield dominance.
Perhaps the most radical change embedded in Sea Shield will be the ability
to project defensive firepower deep over land. New technologies will allow
sea based missiles to engage enemy air targets far over the horizon, before
they can threaten joint and coalition forces operating ashore.''
One of the main goals of the policies and programs endorsed by the NPR is to
make U.S. threats of force, including nuclear threats, more credible: more
powerful conventional forces for use where nuclear weapons would be
untenable and more useable nuclear weapons where nothing else has sufficient
power to intimidate or destroy. Nuclear weapons are not segregated either
operationally or doctrinally from conventional weapons.
Delivering the Warheads to Their Targets
Too often, in nuclear weapons discourse, a disproportionate amount of
attention is focused on warhead modifications. Yet a nuclear warhead is
relatively benign by itself; it needs to be delivered to its target. Though
largely unreported by the media and unknown to the public, the United States
routinely conducts long-range missile tests. Between January 2000 and July
2006, the U.S. conducted at least 48 tests of intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles, including some
23 Minuteman III ICBMs, launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California. In a June 14, 2006 news release, the Air Force spokesman
explained:
'While ICBM launches from Vandenberg almost seem routine, each one requires
a tremendous amount of effort and absolute attention to detail in order to
accurately assess the current performance and capability of the Nation's
fielded ICBM force that is always on-alert in Montana, North Dakota,
Wyoming, Colorado and Nebraska. This specific test will provide key accuracy
and reliability data for on-going and future modifications to the weapon
system, which are key to improving the already impressive effectiveness of
the Minuteman III force.'' (emphasis added)
On July 20, 2006, less than a week after the United Nations Security Council
unanimously adopted a resolution condemning North Korea for test launching
several shorter-range ballistic missiles, the United States launched an
unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile from Vandenberg.
The missile, carrying three dummy warheads, was fired 4,200 miles across the
Pacific toward the missile test range at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall
Islands, with a flight time of about 30 minutes. All three of the dummy
warheads hit their pre-determined targets.
Meanwhile, also largely unnoticed, with StratCom's full support, the
Pentagon and its contractors are poised to begin development of a new
generation of long range delivery systems, capable of carrying either
conventional or nuclear warheads. Such systems, intended primarily to
increase the already formidable U.S. advantage in conventional weapons, may
in the long run be more dangerous than proposed improvements in nuclear
warheads. The U.S. government is also considering options for replacement of
the intercontinental ballistic missiles that are the core of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal. New delivery systems for nuclear weapons would involve many
of the same technologies that would be developed for long-range missiles
carrying non-nuclear payloads. These technologies could provide the building
blocks for new nuclear capabilities, particularly in combination with
warhead modifications now in progress or under consideration.
The Future of Nuclear Weapons
Some argue that 'Stockpile Stewardship'' and 'Complex Transformation'' are
merely a 'make work'' program for scientists and engineers, or that the
nuclear weapons we already have are not 'useable.'' But, as documented by
author Joseph Gerson, every U.S. President, Republican and Democrat, has
prepared and threatened to initiate nuclear attacks. This has happened on
more than thirty occasions during international crises, confrontations and
wars, primarily to reinforce U.S. hegemony in the East Asia and the Middle
East. Consider also the following passage from an August 2006 Pentagon
planning document:
'Within Global Strike, US nuclear forces contribute uniquely and
fundamentally to deterrence -- through their ability to threaten to impose
costs and deny benefits to an adversary in an exceedingly rapid and
devastating manner. Nuclear weapons provide the President with the ultimate
means to terminate conflict promptly on terms favorable to the US.''
(emphasis added)
Very recently, StratCom Commander General Kevin Chilton told reporters:
'As we look to the future - and I believe we are going to need a nuclear
deterrent for this country for the remainder of this century, the 21st
century - I think what we need is a modernized nuclear weapon to go with our
modernized delivery platforms.'' (emphasis added)
[Stratcom Slide 15.jpg]
Follow the Money
Another not so hidden part of the architecture of U.S. militarism is the
incredible amount of money the U.S. has spent - and is spending - on its
military enterprise.
'Atomic Audit,'' a study by the Brookings Institution completed in 1998,
found that, as a conservative estimate, the United States spent $5.5
trillion dollars on nuclear weapons alone, from 1940-1996 (in constant 1996
dollars.) The Brookings study found that nuclear weapons spending during the
56 year period it examined exceeded the combined total federal spending for
education; training, employment, and social services; agriculture; natural
resources and the environment; general science, space, and technology;
community and regional development, including disaster relief; law
enforcement; and energy production and regulation. On average, the study
estimated, the United States spent $98 billion a year on nuclear weapons.
The NNSA's Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 budget request for nuclear weapons
research, development, and testing activities is $6.6 billion, more than 5%
over the prior year's appropriation, Even after accounting for inflation,
this is more than one-third higher than the average annual spending on
nuclear weapons during the Cold War. However, this figure does not include
delivery systems or command and control technologies, which are funded
separately through the DoD. Many of the Pentagon programs are 'dual use,''
meaning shared with conventional weapons systems, which complicates
assessment of the total budget.
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments estimates that the United
States currently spends approximately $54 billion annually on all
nuclear-related programs and activities including offensive and defensive
capabilities, Department of Defense and Department of Energy activities,
strategic and theater forces, as well as associated command, control and
communications capabilities. That is more than the entire military budget of
nearly every individual country in the world. In 2006, only China ($121.9
B), Russia ($70.B), the United Kingdom ($55.4B), and France ($54.B) spent
$54 billion or more in total on their militaries.
What else could $54 billion a year be used for? According to the 1998 United
Nations Development Program report, the additional cost of achieving and
maintaining universal access to basic education for all, basic health care
for all, reproductive health care for all women, adequate food for all, and
clean water and safe sewers for all would amount to roughly $40 billion a
year.
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On February 4, the Bush administration released its budget request for
Fiscal Year 2009, which begins Oct. 1, 2008. For FY 2009, the White House is
seeking $711 Billion for the military - $541 for the Pentagon and the
nuclear weapons-related activities of the DOE, and according to Defense
Secretary Robert Gates, at least $170 Billion for ongoing military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[Stratcom Slide 17.jpg]
Redefining Security
In its June 2006 report, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Arms, the Hans Blix-led Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission recommended, 'All states possessing nuclear weapons should
commence planning for security without nuclear weapons.'' But, while
advocating, 'preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint
practical and incremental measures…'' the Commission did not directly
address what 'security without nuclear weapons'' means.
One rather disquieting view of security without nuclear weapons was offered
last year by Robert Einhorn, a Clinton administration nuclear policy expert
and arms control advocate. 'We should be putting far more effort into
developing more effective conventional weapons,'' he said. 'It's hard to
imagine a president using nuclear weapons under almost any circumstance, but
no one doubts our willingness to use conventional weapons.'' This statement,
unfortunately, is all too true. But an even more overpowering conventional
U.S. military threat surely is not the desired outcome of the nuclear
disarmament process. Moreover, how practical would that approach be? How
would countries with fewer economic resources - especially those on the
'enemies'' list - respond? Wouldn't they have an incentive to maintain or
acquire nuclear weapons to counter overwhelming U.S. conventional military
superiority? And wouldn't that, in turn, even further entrench U.S.
determination to retain and modernize its own nuclear arsenal, thus
rendering the goal of nuclear disarmament nearly impossible? This conundrum
is one of the biggest challenges we face and it cannot be ignored.
To its credit, the Blix Commission ended its report by acknowledging: 'The
perspective of a world free of WMD must be supplemented by the perspective
of a world in which the arsenals of conventional weapons have been reduced
drastically.'' The Commission concluded:
'Tensions between rich and poor societies, the spread of diseases like HIV
and avian flu, environmental threats, competition over energy, the
functioning of international trade and financial markets, cross-border crime
and terrorism, and so forth, will be challenges for all. They will require
the development of an international society organized through cooperation
and law rather than one controlled by overwhelming military force, including
weapons of mass destruction.''
Conclusion
As an outspoken advocate for the abolition of nuclear weapons for more than
a quarter of a century, I have often been called idealistic. Yet I believe
that the case I've presented here for the necessity of placing nuclear
weapons in the broader context of the United States history of militarism
and its powerful entrenched nuclear weapons establishment is highly
realistic.
In May 2007, Western States Legal Foundation, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear
Policy and the Reaching Critical Will project of Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom released a book entitled, Nuclear Disorder or
Cooperative Security? U.S. Weapons of Terror, the Global Proliferation
Crisis and Paths to Peace, in response to the WMD Commission report.
In a chapter entitled, 'Redefining Security in Human Terms,'' I grappled
with the problem of relating abolition of nuclear weapons to
demilitarization and a new concept of security. My conclusion is that a
paradigm shift is called for; a fundamental reconceptualization of security,
from which a new system can emerge, from the bottom up. My recommendations:
· The concept of security should be reframed at every level of society and
government, with a premium on universal human and ecological security, a
return to multilateralism, and a commitment to cooperative, nonviolent
means of conflict resolution.
· Nuclear disarmament should serve as the leading edge of a global trend
towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet
human and environmental needs. The United States government has a special
responsibility to take leadership in this massive undertaking.
The United States government, however, will not take leadership in this
massive undertaking without a massive nonviolent demand from below. And we
Americans can't create that demand alone. We, the ordinary people of the
world, must recognize that we are all in this together!
The Encarta Encyclopedia describes militarism as 'advocacy of an
ever-stronger military as a primary goal of society, even at the cost of
other social priorities and liberties.'' And it relates militarism to
chauvinism, fascism, and national socialism. As uncomfortable as it may be
for many, this chilling definition accurately describes the historical
trajectory and current reality of U.S. national security policy. The
threatened first use of nuclear weapons remains at the heart of that policy,
and at the core of StratCom's mission.
In many ways, StratCom embodies the hidden architecture of U.S. militarism.
By architecture, I mean structural underpinnings and plans that provide
coherence. I include both policies and 'hardware'' (i.e. delivery systems
and manufacturing plants).
Much of this architecture is 'hidden in plain sight.'' All of the
information presented here is available from open sources. None of it is
classified, yet it is hidden from public view, barely mentioned in the
mainstream media, and the U.S. arms control establishment chooses largely to
ignore it because of the complexities it introduces into the short-term,
'pragmatic'' mindset prevalent in Washington, DC.
The Really Big Picture
Former Cold War hawk and CIA analyst, Chalmers Johnson, has written:
'As distinct from other peoples, most Americans do not recognize -- or do
not want to recognize -- that the United States dominates the world through
its military power. Due to government secrecy, our citizens are often
ignorant of the fact that our garrisons encircle the planet. This vast
network of American bases on every continent except Antarctica actually
constitutes a new form of empire -- an empire of bases with its own
geography not likely to be taught in any high school geography class.
Without grasping the dimensions of this globe-girdling Baseworld, one can't
begin to understand the size and nature of our imperial aspirations or the
degree to which a new kind of militarism is undermining our constitutional
order.
Our military deploys well over half a million soldiers, spies, technicians,
teachers, dependents, and civilian contractors in other nations. To dominate
the oceans and seas of the world, we are creating some thirteen naval task
forces built around aircraft carriers whose names sum up our martial
heritage. . . .We operate numerous secret bases outside our territory to
monitor what the people of the world, including our own citizens, are
saying, faxing, or e-mailing to one another.''
Johnson also explains how the U.S. military economy not only directly
profits private corporations and their sub-contractors, by developing and
producing weapons for the armed forces and servicing the needs of military
personnel, but also in more indirect and unexpected ways.
'On the eve of our second war on Iraq, for example, while the Defense
Department was ordering up an extra ration of cruise missiles and
depleted-uranium armor-piercing tank shells, it also acquired 273,000
bottles of Native Tan sunblock, almost triple its 1999 order and undoubtedly
a boon to the supplier,...and its subcontractor, Sun Fun Products of Daytona
Beach, Florida.''
Noting that 'official records on these subjects are misleading,'' Johnson in
2004 estimated that the Pentagon maintains more than 700 overseas bases in
about 130 countries, with an additional 6,000 bases in the United States and
its territories. He concludes:
'These numbers, although staggeringly large, do not begin to cover all the
actual bases we occupy globally.... If there were an honest count, the
actual size of our military empire would probably top 1,000 different bases
in other people's countries, but no one -- possibly not even the Pentagon --
knows the exact number for sure, although it has been distinctly on the rise
in recent years.''
[Stratcom Slide 3.jpg]
When establishment of the new United States Northern Command was announced
in April 2002, one of several changes to the Unified Command Plan, the
official press release declared, 'For the first time, commanders' areas of
operations cover the entire Earth.'' The United States military dominates
the globe through its operation of 10 Unified Combatant Commands. Composed
of forces from two or more armed services, the Unified Commands are headed
by four-star generals and admirals who operate under the direct authority of
the Secretary of Defense, accountable only to the President. Six of the
Commands are responsible for designated regions of the world, and the four
others for various operations. It is a mind-numbing exercise just to list
them all, but in order to comprehend the breadth and depth of U.S.
militarism, it is absolutely essential to be aware of their existence.
They are: [Stratcom Slide 4.jpg]
1. United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), at Peterson Air Force Base,
Colorado. Created in October 2002 in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
attacks, it is responsible for North American homeland defense and
coordinating homeland security with civilian forces.
2. United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), established February 7, 2007, in
Stuttgart, Germany. To be relocated to the African continent, it is
responsible for Africa excluding Egypt.
3. United States Central Command (CENTCOM), at MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida, is responsible for Egypt through the Persian Gulf region, into
Central Asia, and is handing over responsibility for the Horn of Africa to
AFRICOM.
4. United States European Command (EUCOM), in Stuttgart, Germany, is
responsible for Europe and Israel, and is handing over responsibility of
Africa to AFRICOM.
5. U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), on Oahu, Hawaii, is responsible for the
Asia-Pacific region including Hawaii.
6. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), in Miami, Florida, is responsible for
South and Central America and the surrounding waters.
7. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), at MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida,
provides special operations for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.
8. U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), at Naval Support Activity Headquarters
in Norfolk and Suffolk, Virginia, supports other commands as a joint force
provider.
9. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), at Scott Air Force Base,
Illinois, covers global mobility of all military assets for all regional
commands.
[Stratcom Slide 5.jpg]
[Stratcom Slide 6.jpg]
10. Tying them all together is United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM),
at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, which describes itself as 'is a global
integrator charged with the missions of full-spectrum global strike, space
operations, computer network operations, Department of Defense information
operations, strategic warning, integrated missile defense, global C4ISR
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance), combating weapons of mass destruction, and specialized
expertise to the joint warfighter.... U.S. Strategic Command is part of a
rich history that spans both the interrelated strategic and space
communities.''
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee just last month,
StratCom Commander General Kevin Chilton testified:
'Increasingly, space-based capabilities enable all other war-fighting
domains. In the 21st Century, the mindset of space as purely an "enabler"
must change. We must view our activities in the space domain in the same way
we regard activities in the domains of land, sea, air, and cyberspace.''
And:
'In 2007 USSTRATCOM and our Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) led ISR planning
in support of the operational surge in Iraq.''
According to its own version of its history:
'On September 23, 1985, the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed the
ever-increasing value of military space systems by creating a new unified
command -- U.S. Space Command -- to help institutionalize the use of space
in U.S. deterrence efforts.
The U.S.-led coalition's 1991 victory in the Persian Gulf War underscored,
and brought widespread recognition to, the value of military space
operations. U.S. operations in contingencies since the early 1990s,
including the Balkans, Southwest Asia, Afghanistan and Iraq have proven the
military's reliance on communications, intelligence, navigation, missile
warning and weather satellite systems. Space systems are considered
indispensable providers of tactical information to U.S. warfighters.''
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, On June 1, 1992, President
George H. Bush established U.S. Strategic Command, which for the first time
in U.S. history brought the planning, targeting, and wartime employment of
strategic (nuclear) forces under the control of a single commander, while
the day-to-day training, equipping and maintenance responsibilities for its
forces remained with the Air Force and Navy.
Again, according to its own history:
'Events of Sept. 11, 2001, vividly proved that the nation needed a new
strategic direction. The emergence of transnational global threats - state
and non-state actors such as terrorist organizations that operate across
state borders, increasingly in affiliation with others who oppose U.S.
interests - required a more integrated approach to our nation's defense.
Sept. 11 also illustrated the need to improve the nation's national command
and control architecture.''
On June 26, 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld announced that U.S. Space
Command would merge with U.S. Strategic Command. The activation of the new
StratCom took place on October 1, 2002.
Previously limited to nuclear weapons, STRATCOM's role was expanded,
consistent with provisions of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, to encompass
all aspects of assessing and responding to nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons worldwide. As military affairs analyst William Arkin warned at the
time, tearing down the firewall that has separated nuclear weapons from
other weapons lowers the threshold for U.S. nuclear use.
General Chilton underscored the continuing centrality of nuclear weapons in
StratCom's mission as he explained how that mission is expanding:
'While our nuclear capability remains vital, our ability to integrate
conventional long-range precision weapons is every bit as important...We
have a prompt global strike delivery capability on alert today, but it is
configured only with nuclear weapons, which limits the options available to
the President and may in some cases reduce the credibility of our
deterrence.''
[Stratcom Slide 8.jpg]
[Stratcom Slide 9.jpg]
A 1993 Congressional Research Service (CRS) study of the U.S. Navy's Naval
Historical Center records identified '234 instances in which the United
States has used its armed forces abroad in situations of conflict or
potential conflict or for other than normal peacetime purposes'' between
1798 and 1993. As the author noted, 'The list does not include covert
actions or numerous instances in which U.S. forces have been stationed
abroad since World War II in occupation forces or for participation in
mutual security organizations, base agreements, or routine military
assistance or training operations.''
In a 2006 review of this study and two other surveys of U.S. military
interventions, journalist Gar Smith found that 'in our country's 230 years
of existence, there have been only 31 years in which U.S. troops were not
actively engaged in significant armed adventures on foreign shores.'' He
concluded:
'The arithmetic is daunting. Over the long course of U.S. history, fewer
than 14% of America's days have been marked by peace. The defining
characteristic of our nation's foreign policy for 86% of our existence would
appear to be a bellicose penchant for military intervention.
As of 2006, there were 192 member states in the United Nations. Incredibly
enough, over the past two centuries, the United State has attacked, invaded,
policed, overthrown or occupied 62 of them.''
[Stratcom Slide 10.jpg]
Nuclear weapons, still at the core of StratCom's mission, exist within - and
not apart from - this system of extended military bases and Unified
Combatant Commands, and the history it derives from. Other nations are aware
of this 'hidden architecture'' and it figures into their own security
calculations. If we are to develop effective strategies, we must understand
the larger context in which the United States is modernizing its nuclear
forces and developing its nuclear and conventional Prompt Global Strike
capabilities today.
The Hidden Architecture of Nuclear Weapons
In an essay written after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998,
Dr. Amulya Reddy, an eminent Indian scientist, described his visit in
September 1999 to the former Nazi concentration camps in Poland, and
compared these 'gigantic and horrific factories of death'' with the U.S.
nuclear weapons infrastructure.
'[W]ith regard to the scale of the killing, the recruitment of capable
minds, the harnessing of science and technology, the extent of organization,
the resort to efficient project management methods, and the choice of
targets to maximize annihilation of Japanese civilians - the Manhattan
project and its follow-up were like the concentration camps, in fact, even
more horrendous in their impact.
When talking about nuclear weapons we are not dealing with just a
particularly destructive type of weapon, but rather with what President
Dwight Eisenhower originally wanted to call the
Congressional-military-industrial complex, to which I would add the
category, 'academic.'' In a well-known line from the movie, 'Field of
Dreams,'' the protagonist declares, 'If you build it, they will come.'' He
was talking about a baseball field and the sports fans it would attract. In
the same way, as we're now seeing all too clearly, if you build a new
nuclear weapons infrastructure, it will produce new nuclear weapons.
The 'Reliable Replacement Warhead'' (RRW) and the policy of preventive
warfare didn't spring out of nowhere. They are predictable -- possibly even
inevitable -- results of policies and programs that have been in place since
1945, when President Harry Truman -- a Democrat -- ordered the first use of
nuclear weapons, on two Japanese cities. These policies and programs have
been reaffirmed by every administration since, whether Democratic or
Republican.
It was largely during the Clinton years, following the window of
unprecedented opportunity that appeared with the end of the Cold War that
the use of nuclear weapons to threaten nations suspected of possessing
nuclear biological or chemical weapons became a central part of U.S.
'counterproliferation'' policy. Presidential Decision Directive-60 (PDD-60),
signed by Bill Clinton in late 1997, recommitted the U.S. to nuclear weapons
as the 'cornerstone'' of its national security and reaffirmed the U.S.
policies of threatened first use and threatened massive retaliation. PDD-60
also further institutionalized a policy shift that had been underway for
some time: nuclear weapons would now be used to 'deter'' a range of threats
including not only nuclear, but also chemical and biological weapons,
another means of lowering the threshold for potential nuclear weapons use.
Clinton also brokered a deal with the nuclear weapons laboratories - the
direct descendents of the Manhattan Project - to massively invest in the
nuclear weapons research and production infrastructure, through the
euphemistically named 'Stockpile Stewardship'' program, in exchange for
dropping their opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the end,
the Lab directors hedged in their testimony to Congress and the Senate
refused to ratify the treaty. Today, under the existing Stockpile
Stewardship Program, the Livermore and Los Alamos Labs are working on
competing designs for so-called 'Reliable Replacement Warheads'' (the
subject of some controversy in Congress), and 'Life-Extension Programs'' to
render the U.S. nuclear arsenal reliable for decades to come are underway
for the B61 bomb and the W76 Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile. The W-76, in
fact, is being upgraded with an enhanced ground-burst capability, making it
more suitable for a first strike against a hardened or deeply-buried target.
As Chalmers Johnson noted in a 2004 interview:
'[E]mpire has a much longer history than just the Bush administration, and I
would be the first to argue... that Bill Clinton was a better imperialist
than George Bush because he cleverly disguised what we were doing under
various rubrics that he invented.... For example, Clinton argued that our
attack on Serbia in 1999 was humanitarian intervention. In other cases, he
disguised our imperialism as part of a newly discovered ineluctable
[inevitable] process called `globalization'.''
The 'New'' Strategic Triad
The Pentagon's December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) - contemporaneous
with the establishment of the new StratCom - underlines the fundamental
policy and technological underpinnings for the Bush administration's
aggressive 'preventive war'' doctrine, and has served as the primary
justification for each subsequent annual nuclear weapons budget request as
well as the current 'Complex Transformation'' plan to modernize the nuclear
weapons laboratories and manufacturing plants.
The NPR expanded the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security
policy, including the possible use of nuclear weapons in 'immediate,
potential, or unexpected contingencies'' against a seven named countries
including Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and called for indefinite retention
of a large, modern, and diverse nuclear force. Significantly, the NPR also
elevated the weapons research and development infrastructure - including the
nuclear weapons laboratories - to one leg of the 'New Strategic Triad,''
intended to support both 'offensive'' and 'defensive'' nuclear and
non-nuclear high-tech weapons systems that will enable the U.S. to project
overwhelming global military power.
The NPR specifies: 'The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons
complex that will: ...be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture,
and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements.'' To
accomplish this, the NPR called for 'Transfer of warhead design knowledge
from the current generation of designers to the next generation'' through an
'Advanced Concepts Initiative.'' This initiative has been superceded by the
RRW program, an illustrative example of how programs which appear to be dead
one year reemerge the next year under different names and budget lines.
[Stratcom Slide 11.jpg]
In describing the transition to a 'new'' strategic triad, the NPR provides a
useful tool for understanding how the U.S. plans to carry out its global war
fighting strategy. In one corner of the new triad, new non-nuclear weapons
capabilities have been added to the 'old'' Cold War strategic triad,
consisting of submarine- based ballistic missiles, land-based
intercontinental missiles and strategic bombers - still very much there!
This category has been designated 'offensive strike systems.'' The other
legs of this new triad are 'defenses'' and a 'revitalized defense
infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to
meet emerging threats.'' These three elements are bound together by
'enhanced command and control'' and 'intelligence systems.
The three legs of the new strategic triad are designed to work together, to
enable the United States to project overwhelming military force. A 2000 Air
Force planning documents states that a long-term goal of the U.S. military
is to 'enable an affordable capability to swiftly and effectively deliver
highly effective weapons against targets at any required global location''
in order to 'affordably destroy or neutralize any target on earth.…'' This
objective is now referred to as 'Prompt Global Strike'' capability.
[Stratcom Slide 14.jpg]
Considered in this context, it becomes easier to understand that so-called
'defenses'' are not really to defend the United States from a surprise
attack. These systems include both 'national'' missile defense systems in
the form of ground-based interceptors, initially in Alaska and California,
and 'theater'' missile defenses, at foreign bases or on ships at sea. In
addition, research and development is underway on laser missile defense
systems, to be deployed, eventually, on airplanes and space-based vehicles.
These theater missile defenses are intended to work together with the
offensive weapons systems, like swords and shields, to protect U.S. troops
and bases and other U.S. 'strategic assets'' around the world. Admiral Ramu
Ramdas, the former head of India's navy and now a leading proponent of
nuclear abolition has described U.S. theater missile defenses as a 'net
thrown over the globe.''
An illustrative version of this concept can be found in a 2002 speech by the
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, who was promoting a program called 'Sea
Shield:''
'What Sea Shield does is extend homeland security to the fullest extent with
forward deployed forces, buying time and buying space for the detection and
tracking of threats headed toward our country...
As we look to the future, Sea Shield's littoral [shoreline] control
capabilities will build upon rich mix of manned and unmanned systems on,
over, and below the sea. This combination of platforms, sensors, and weapons
will assure access and provide the foundation of battlefield dominance.
Perhaps the most radical change embedded in Sea Shield will be the ability
to project defensive firepower deep over land. New technologies will allow
sea based missiles to engage enemy air targets far over the horizon, before
they can threaten joint and coalition forces operating ashore.''
One of the main goals of the policies and programs endorsed by the NPR is to
make U.S. threats of force, including nuclear threats, more credible: more
powerful conventional forces for use where nuclear weapons would be
untenable and more useable nuclear weapons where nothing else has sufficient
power to intimidate or destroy. Nuclear weapons are not segregated either
operationally or doctrinally from conventional weapons.
Delivering the Warheads to Their Targets
Too often, in nuclear weapons discourse, a disproportionate amount of
attention is focused on warhead modifications. Yet a nuclear warhead is
relatively benign by itself; it needs to be delivered to its target. Though
largely unreported by the media and unknown to the public, the United States
routinely conducts long-range missile tests. Between January 2000 and July
2006, the U.S. conducted at least 48 tests of intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles, including some
23 Minuteman III ICBMs, launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California. In a June 14, 2006 news release, the Air Force spokesman
explained:
'While ICBM launches from Vandenberg almost seem routine, each one requires
a tremendous amount of effort and absolute attention to detail in order to
accurately assess the current performance and capability of the Nation's
fielded ICBM force that is always on-alert in Montana, North Dakota,
Wyoming, Colorado and Nebraska. This specific test will provide key accuracy
and reliability data for on-going and future modifications to the weapon
system, which are key to improving the already impressive effectiveness of
the Minuteman III force.'' (emphasis added)
On July 20, 2006, less than a week after the United Nations Security Council
unanimously adopted a resolution condemning North Korea for test launching
several shorter-range ballistic missiles, the United States launched an
unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile from Vandenberg.
The missile, carrying three dummy warheads, was fired 4,200 miles across the
Pacific toward the missile test range at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall
Islands, with a flight time of about 30 minutes. All three of the dummy
warheads hit their pre-determined targets.
Meanwhile, also largely unnoticed, with StratCom's full support, the
Pentagon and its contractors are poised to begin development of a new
generation of long range delivery systems, capable of carrying either
conventional or nuclear warheads. Such systems, intended primarily to
increase the already formidable U.S. advantage in conventional weapons, may
in the long run be more dangerous than proposed improvements in nuclear
warheads. The U.S. government is also considering options for replacement of
the intercontinental ballistic missiles that are the core of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal. New delivery systems for nuclear weapons would involve many
of the same technologies that would be developed for long-range missiles
carrying non-nuclear payloads. These technologies could provide the building
blocks for new nuclear capabilities, particularly in combination with
warhead modifications now in progress or under consideration.
The Future of Nuclear Weapons
Some argue that 'Stockpile Stewardship'' and 'Complex Transformation'' are
merely a 'make work'' program for scientists and engineers, or that the
nuclear weapons we already have are not 'useable.'' But, as documented by
author Joseph Gerson, every U.S. President, Republican and Democrat, has
prepared and threatened to initiate nuclear attacks. This has happened on
more than thirty occasions during international crises, confrontations and
wars, primarily to reinforce U.S. hegemony in the East Asia and the Middle
East. Consider also the following passage from an August 2006 Pentagon
planning document:
'Within Global Strike, US nuclear forces contribute uniquely and
fundamentally to deterrence -- through their ability to threaten to impose
costs and deny benefits to an adversary in an exceedingly rapid and
devastating manner. Nuclear weapons provide the President with the ultimate
means to terminate conflict promptly on terms favorable to the US.''
(emphasis added)
Very recently, StratCom Commander General Kevin Chilton told reporters:
'As we look to the future - and I believe we are going to need a nuclear
deterrent for this country for the remainder of this century, the 21st
century - I think what we need is a modernized nuclear weapon to go with our
modernized delivery platforms.'' (emphasis added)
[Stratcom Slide 15.jpg]
Follow the Money
Another not so hidden part of the architecture of U.S. militarism is the
incredible amount of money the U.S. has spent - and is spending - on its
military enterprise.
'Atomic Audit,'' a study by the Brookings Institution completed in 1998,
found that, as a conservative estimate, the United States spent $5.5
trillion dollars on nuclear weapons alone, from 1940-1996 (in constant 1996
dollars.) The Brookings study found that nuclear weapons spending during the
56 year period it examined exceeded the combined total federal spending for
education; training, employment, and social services; agriculture; natural
resources and the environment; general science, space, and technology;
community and regional development, including disaster relief; law
enforcement; and energy production and regulation. On average, the study
estimated, the United States spent $98 billion a year on nuclear weapons.
The NNSA's Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 budget request for nuclear weapons
research, development, and testing activities is $6.6 billion, more than 5%
over the prior year's appropriation, Even after accounting for inflation,
this is more than one-third higher than the average annual spending on
nuclear weapons during the Cold War. However, this figure does not include
delivery systems or command and control technologies, which are funded
separately through the DoD. Many of the Pentagon programs are 'dual use,''
meaning shared with conventional weapons systems, which complicates
assessment of the total budget.
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments estimates that the United
States currently spends approximately $54 billion annually on all
nuclear-related programs and activities including offensive and defensive
capabilities, Department of Defense and Department of Energy activities,
strategic and theater forces, as well as associated command, control and
communications capabilities. That is more than the entire military budget of
nearly every individual country in the world. In 2006, only China ($121.9
B), Russia ($70.B), the United Kingdom ($55.4B), and France ($54.B) spent
$54 billion or more in total on their militaries.
What else could $54 billion a year be used for? According to the 1998 United
Nations Development Program report, the additional cost of achieving and
maintaining universal access to basic education for all, basic health care
for all, reproductive health care for all women, adequate food for all, and
clean water and safe sewers for all would amount to roughly $40 billion a
year.
[Stratcom Slide 16.jpg]
On February 4, the Bush administration released its budget request for
Fiscal Year 2009, which begins Oct. 1, 2008. For FY 2009, the White House is
seeking $711 Billion for the military - $541 for the Pentagon and the
nuclear weapons-related activities of the DOE, and according to Defense
Secretary Robert Gates, at least $170 Billion for ongoing military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[Stratcom Slide 17.jpg]
Redefining Security
In its June 2006 report, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Arms, the Hans Blix-led Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission recommended, 'All states possessing nuclear weapons should
commence planning for security without nuclear weapons.'' But, while
advocating, 'preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint
practical and incremental measures…'' the Commission did not directly
address what 'security without nuclear weapons'' means.
One rather disquieting view of security without nuclear weapons was offered
last year by Robert Einhorn, a Clinton administration nuclear policy expert
and arms control advocate. 'We should be putting far more effort into
developing more effective conventional weapons,'' he said. 'It's hard to
imagine a president using nuclear weapons under almost any circumstance, but
no one doubts our willingness to use conventional weapons.'' This statement,
unfortunately, is all too true. But an even more overpowering conventional
U.S. military threat surely is not the desired outcome of the nuclear
disarmament process. Moreover, how practical would that approach be? How
would countries with fewer economic resources - especially those on the
'enemies'' list - respond? Wouldn't they have an incentive to maintain or
acquire nuclear weapons to counter overwhelming U.S. conventional military
superiority? And wouldn't that, in turn, even further entrench U.S.
determination to retain and modernize its own nuclear arsenal, thus
rendering the goal of nuclear disarmament nearly impossible? This conundrum
is one of the biggest challenges we face and it cannot be ignored.
To its credit, the Blix Commission ended its report by acknowledging: 'The
perspective of a world free of WMD must be supplemented by the perspective
of a world in which the arsenals of conventional weapons have been reduced
drastically.'' The Commission concluded:
'Tensions between rich and poor societies, the spread of diseases like HIV
and avian flu, environmental threats, competition over energy, the
functioning of international trade and financial markets, cross-border crime
and terrorism, and so forth, will be challenges for all. They will require
the development of an international society organized through cooperation
and law rather than one controlled by overwhelming military force, including
weapons of mass destruction.''
Conclusion
As an outspoken advocate for the abolition of nuclear weapons for more than
a quarter of a century, I have often been called idealistic. Yet I believe
that the case I've presented here for the necessity of placing nuclear
weapons in the broader context of the United States history of militarism
and its powerful entrenched nuclear weapons establishment is highly
realistic.
In May 2007, Western States Legal Foundation, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear
Policy and the Reaching Critical Will project of Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom released a book entitled, Nuclear Disorder or
Cooperative Security? U.S. Weapons of Terror, the Global Proliferation
Crisis and Paths to Peace, in response to the WMD Commission report.
In a chapter entitled, 'Redefining Security in Human Terms,'' I grappled
with the problem of relating abolition of nuclear weapons to
demilitarization and a new concept of security. My conclusion is that a
paradigm shift is called for; a fundamental reconceptualization of security,
from which a new system can emerge, from the bottom up. My recommendations:
· The concept of security should be reframed at every level of society and
government, with a premium on universal human and ecological security, a
return to multilateralism, and a commitment to cooperative, nonviolent
means of conflict resolution.
· Nuclear disarmament should serve as the leading edge of a global trend
towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet
human and environmental needs. The United States government has a special
responsibility to take leadership in this massive undertaking.
The United States government, however, will not take leadership in this
massive undertaking without a massive nonviolent demand from below. And we
Americans can't create that demand alone. We, the ordinary people of the
world, must recognize that we are all in this together!
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