At a conference in Paris on Thursday, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Mr. Javier Solana, said Iran’s stated ambitions concerning its enriched uranium output were inconsistent with its acquisition of the civilian nuclear technology that would justify it. He said: “It is a bit like if you were trying to make your own fuel before having purchased a car and learned how to drive,”
Unfortunately, Mr. Solana’s comment is misguided.
Unfortunately, Mr. Solana’s comment is misguided.
At a conference in Paris on Thursday, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Mr. Javier Solana, said Iran’s stated ambitions concerning its enriched uranium output were inconsistent with its acquisition of the civilian nuclear technology that would justify it [1]. He said: “It is a bit like if you were trying to make your own fuel before having purchased a car and learned how to drive,”
Unfortunately, Mr. Solana’s comment is misguided. One would like to give the benefit of doubt to Mr. Solana that he has not done his homework or does not have the technical background to render such a verdict. Of course, one could also say that he is not being honest about the facts on the ground regarding the Natanz enrichment plant.
The Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz which is now operating with 3000 centrifuges needs to be expanded to 54,000 centrifuges. Once all the centrifuges are installed, FEP is capable of producing the annual fuel for approximately two 1000 mega watts power plants, each similar in power generation capability to the one being built by Russians in Bushehr. Since Russia has a 10-year contract to supply Bushehr with nuclear fuel, it seems that Mr. Solana is correct to question the need for any enrichment activity at Natanz. Of course, there are plans in place for Iran to make electricity from twenty Bushehr size plants in the next 20 years. Let’s now examine when realistically FEP will be completed at Natanz.
Even if Iran installs 500 centrifuges per month, which is a staggering number given the past history of completion of the existing 3000 centrifuges and lack of key critical parts; it will be several years before FEP is completed. Former U.N. inspector, David Albright, claims that Iran has enough parts for about 5000 more centrifuges [2]. For the sake of argument suppose Mr. Aghazadeh who is the head of Atomic Energy of Iran (AEOI) is correct when he claims that all the 90 critical pieces of a centrifuge are fully manufactured in Iran without any help from the outside black market. With this assumed rate of installation, which amounts to 6000 centrifuges per year, it will take Iran 8.5 years to completely install all the (54,000) centrifuges. If we allocate roughly another 1.5 years for startup, testing, debugging, and fuel collection and storage, it will be ten years before Iran can provide fuel to any Bushehr size power plant. Therefore, any pause in completion of Natanz FEP will have a direct and detrimental impact on the future goals of providing fuel for Iran’s projected or currently under construction plants.
With all due respect, Mr. Solana, next time, please use the following driving example which is a more accurate metaphor: A person while is learning to drive, also is saving money to purchase a car and tries to find a way to run it on the “secure and reliable” source of fuel. Because he does not want to get stranded without any fuel in the middle of the road, on a cold winter day, when it is known that his neighbors are not to be trusted. These neighbors do not have a good track record; they left Ukraine shivering on a cold day of January 2006.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/world/middleeast/23nuke.html?ref=world
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_11/Albright.asp
Unfortunately, Mr. Solana’s comment is misguided. One would like to give the benefit of doubt to Mr. Solana that he has not done his homework or does not have the technical background to render such a verdict. Of course, one could also say that he is not being honest about the facts on the ground regarding the Natanz enrichment plant.
The Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz which is now operating with 3000 centrifuges needs to be expanded to 54,000 centrifuges. Once all the centrifuges are installed, FEP is capable of producing the annual fuel for approximately two 1000 mega watts power plants, each similar in power generation capability to the one being built by Russians in Bushehr. Since Russia has a 10-year contract to supply Bushehr with nuclear fuel, it seems that Mr. Solana is correct to question the need for any enrichment activity at Natanz. Of course, there are plans in place for Iran to make electricity from twenty Bushehr size plants in the next 20 years. Let’s now examine when realistically FEP will be completed at Natanz.
Even if Iran installs 500 centrifuges per month, which is a staggering number given the past history of completion of the existing 3000 centrifuges and lack of key critical parts; it will be several years before FEP is completed. Former U.N. inspector, David Albright, claims that Iran has enough parts for about 5000 more centrifuges [2]. For the sake of argument suppose Mr. Aghazadeh who is the head of Atomic Energy of Iran (AEOI) is correct when he claims that all the 90 critical pieces of a centrifuge are fully manufactured in Iran without any help from the outside black market. With this assumed rate of installation, which amounts to 6000 centrifuges per year, it will take Iran 8.5 years to completely install all the (54,000) centrifuges. If we allocate roughly another 1.5 years for startup, testing, debugging, and fuel collection and storage, it will be ten years before Iran can provide fuel to any Bushehr size power plant. Therefore, any pause in completion of Natanz FEP will have a direct and detrimental impact on the future goals of providing fuel for Iran’s projected or currently under construction plants.
With all due respect, Mr. Solana, next time, please use the following driving example which is a more accurate metaphor: A person while is learning to drive, also is saving money to purchase a car and tries to find a way to run it on the “secure and reliable” source of fuel. Because he does not want to get stranded without any fuel in the middle of the road, on a cold winter day, when it is known that his neighbors are not to be trusted. These neighbors do not have a good track record; they left Ukraine shivering on a cold day of January 2006.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/world/middleeast/23nuke.html?ref=world http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_11/Albright.asp 
Homepage:
Comments
Display the following comment