Last week the British armed forces left Basra Palace, their last base in the Southern Iraqi city, and moved to an airbase outside the city.
Their withdrawal will be followed by the official handover of Basra province sometime in the next few months. Once that is complete, the British will finally leave Iraq.
The British withdrawal has led to a classic propaganda battle over how effective the British were in their four years of occupation.
Their withdrawal will be followed by the official handover of Basra province sometime in the next few months. Once that is complete, the British will finally leave Iraq.
The British withdrawal has led to a classic propaganda battle over how effective the British were in their four years of occupation.
On the one side, the coalition is arguing that the British have achieved their military objective in Southern Iraq and are leaving victorious. On the other side are countless critics of the war and Iraqis who are saying that the British have been roundly defeated.
For example, last month the radical cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr , who sees the American and British as occupiers, claimed that the British Army had been defeated and had been left with no option but to retreat from Iraq.
“The British have given-up and they know they will be leaving Iraq soon,” Mr Sadr told the Independent newspaper. “They are retreating because of the resistance they have faced. Without that, they would have stayed for much longer, there is no doubt.”
Sadr’s military wing, the Mahdi army, has clashed repeatedly with British forces in southern Iraq, and Basra. An unknown number of British soldiers have been killed and wounded by Sadrist militants. “The British have realised this is not a war they should be fighting or one they can win,” Sadr said.
Comments such as this have provoked a fierce response from the British. Earlier this week, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, denied the withdrawal of British troops from Basra Palace was a “defeat”, saying it was a “pre-planned and organised move”.
A spokesperson for the British military, Major Mike Shearer said groups such as al-Sadrs wanted to claim victory, but it was not true. “The malign influences in the city, we have always predicted, would raise their game to create the false impression that they were driving us out,” he said. “That is not the case.”
So has Iraq ended in victory or defeat for the British? Shearer’s remarks came days after comments by the head of the British army, General Sir Richard Dannatt, that his forces were overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that the war in Afghanistan was now seen as the key military priority. "The army is certainly stretched. And when I say that we can't deploy any more battle groups at the present moment, that's because we're trying to get a reasonable balance of life for our people" he said.
Britain is now down to about 5,500 troops in Iraq compared to 7,000 a year ago. Its forces have withdrawn from three of the four provinces of Iraq and military bosses now wants their soldiers out of Iraq as soon as possible so some can be deployed to Afghanistan.
More importantly, there are four benchmarks or conditions that the British are supposedly trying to satisfy before they leave Southern Iraq. The first is a reduce threat level from insurgents, the second is an enhanced capability of the Iraqi security forces, the third is the capability of the provincial government and the fourth is the effectiveness of coalition forces to act as backup.
What the British won’t tell you though is that on all these benchmarks they look doomed to fail and so when the British tell you they have been victorious you know they are lying.
First is the threat level, which by all accounts has risen sharply over the last six months as intra-Shiite militias fight not only each other for control of Basra but also against the British.
In June this year the International Crisis Group (ICG) produced a damning report on the British legacy in Basra. “Far from being a model to be replicated” they concluded, “Basra is an example of what to avoid.”
Just as the Americans are currently involved in a surge in Baghdad, the British undertook their own surge a year ago. Between September 2006 and March 2007, the British surge, called Operation Sinbad, sought to rout out militias and hand security over to newly vetted and stronger Iraqi security forces while kick-starting economic reconstruction.
To start with there were results. According to the ICG “Criminality, political assassinations and sectarian killings, all of which were rampant in 2006, receded somewhat and – certainly as compared to elsewhere in the country – a relative calm prevailed. Yet this reality was both superficial and fleeting.”
By March–April 2007 this year, relentless attacks against British forces had increased again and in effect driven them off the streets into increasingly secluded compounds. “Basra’s residents and militiamen view this not as an orderly withdrawal but rather as an ignominious defeat” argues the ICG.
“Today, the city is controlled by militias, seemingly more powerful and unconstrained than before.” As the militias have gained strength, losses among British troops have accelerated. So far this year, 41 servicemen and women have died, compared to 29 in the whole of 2006.
The second benchmark is the effectiveness of the Iraqi security and police. The ICG is not alone in thinking that the British lost control of Basra a while ago. Dr. Michael Knights from the Olive group has recently helped train the Iraqi police on behalf of the Coalition. He argues that the city is already in a post-occupational state with the local police infiltrated by militias.
He raises a question that no one can answer that “Police training in Iraq has achieved some notable short-term successes but the real question is whether the police personnel that we have trained will remain loyal to the Police service or whether they will revert to their traditional militia associations as soon as we are not training them anymore.”
Assistant chief constable Mike Colbourne, who is seconded from the British Police force, is still training the Iraqi Police. He confirms that that many of the militia groups have members inside the Basra police. “There are a number of Iraqi police officers who are clearly aligned to the militias”, he says.
He also concedes that the Basra police are involved in sectarian violence. Colbourne argues that the “militia influence is not benign”. Corruption within the police is still is a serious problem, he says, including financial corruption, murder and kidnap.
Thirdly, just as the power of the militias is increasing the effectiveness of the provincial government is declining. The ICG called this Britain’s “most glaring failing of all: the inability to establish a legitimate and functioning provincial apparatus capable of redistributing resources, imposing respect for the rule of law and ensuring a peaceful transition at the local level.”
Last month, the assassination of two provincial governors was yet another indication of the vulnerability of the local government. Both the governor of the southern Muthanna province, the first province to be handed to Iraqi control and the governor of Qadasiyah have been killed by Shiite militias.
Both governors were members of the influential Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, a group led by Shiite politician Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim who is locked in a bitter struggle for power with the Mahdi Army for control of the oil-rich south. According to Michael Knights from the Olive Group: “In the last month the assassination of two governors tells you that the institutions of local and central governance are of decreasing relevance in Southern Iraq. The factions are fighting for control of individual cities and the violence used is extreme.”
The final condition is the effectiveness of Coalition forces. The British are now conducting “Overwatch” where the 5,000 British troops will stay at Basra airfield and act as a reassurance to the Iraqi government if and when needed. Many argue this is a forlorn hope and basically a waste of time. “5,000 troops can’t do much more then defend themselves and supply themselves, so clearly it isn’t very sustainable” argues the BBC’s respected Middle East correspondent Jeremy Bowen.
What the British won’t admit is that they lost control two of Basra years ago. What they won’t admit is that effectively Basra is in the hands of the militia. What they won’t admit is they have systematically failed to build up a functioning government that protects the local people and so they look to militias for security and support.
What no one knows is whether those militias will fight each other once the British finally leave Iraq or they will work together peacefully. But one thing we can be certain of. By their own bench-marks or “conditions” the British have failed. They lost their own war. They have suffered a rather ignominious defeat. It Was Britain's Saigon moment.
For example, last month the radical cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr , who sees the American and British as occupiers, claimed that the British Army had been defeated and had been left with no option but to retreat from Iraq.
“The British have given-up and they know they will be leaving Iraq soon,” Mr Sadr told the Independent newspaper. “They are retreating because of the resistance they have faced. Without that, they would have stayed for much longer, there is no doubt.”
Sadr’s military wing, the Mahdi army, has clashed repeatedly with British forces in southern Iraq, and Basra. An unknown number of British soldiers have been killed and wounded by Sadrist militants. “The British have realised this is not a war they should be fighting or one they can win,” Sadr said.
Comments such as this have provoked a fierce response from the British. Earlier this week, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, denied the withdrawal of British troops from Basra Palace was a “defeat”, saying it was a “pre-planned and organised move”.
A spokesperson for the British military, Major Mike Shearer said groups such as al-Sadrs wanted to claim victory, but it was not true. “The malign influences in the city, we have always predicted, would raise their game to create the false impression that they were driving us out,” he said. “That is not the case.”
So has Iraq ended in victory or defeat for the British? Shearer’s remarks came days after comments by the head of the British army, General Sir Richard Dannatt, that his forces were overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that the war in Afghanistan was now seen as the key military priority. "The army is certainly stretched. And when I say that we can't deploy any more battle groups at the present moment, that's because we're trying to get a reasonable balance of life for our people" he said.
Britain is now down to about 5,500 troops in Iraq compared to 7,000 a year ago. Its forces have withdrawn from three of the four provinces of Iraq and military bosses now wants their soldiers out of Iraq as soon as possible so some can be deployed to Afghanistan.
More importantly, there are four benchmarks or conditions that the British are supposedly trying to satisfy before they leave Southern Iraq. The first is a reduce threat level from insurgents, the second is an enhanced capability of the Iraqi security forces, the third is the capability of the provincial government and the fourth is the effectiveness of coalition forces to act as backup.
What the British won’t tell you though is that on all these benchmarks they look doomed to fail and so when the British tell you they have been victorious you know they are lying.
First is the threat level, which by all accounts has risen sharply over the last six months as intra-Shiite militias fight not only each other for control of Basra but also against the British.
In June this year the International Crisis Group (ICG) produced a damning report on the British legacy in Basra. “Far from being a model to be replicated” they concluded, “Basra is an example of what to avoid.”
Just as the Americans are currently involved in a surge in Baghdad, the British undertook their own surge a year ago. Between September 2006 and March 2007, the British surge, called Operation Sinbad, sought to rout out militias and hand security over to newly vetted and stronger Iraqi security forces while kick-starting economic reconstruction.
To start with there were results. According to the ICG “Criminality, political assassinations and sectarian killings, all of which were rampant in 2006, receded somewhat and – certainly as compared to elsewhere in the country – a relative calm prevailed. Yet this reality was both superficial and fleeting.”
By March–April 2007 this year, relentless attacks against British forces had increased again and in effect driven them off the streets into increasingly secluded compounds. “Basra’s residents and militiamen view this not as an orderly withdrawal but rather as an ignominious defeat” argues the ICG.
“Today, the city is controlled by militias, seemingly more powerful and unconstrained than before.” As the militias have gained strength, losses among British troops have accelerated. So far this year, 41 servicemen and women have died, compared to 29 in the whole of 2006.
The second benchmark is the effectiveness of the Iraqi security and police. The ICG is not alone in thinking that the British lost control of Basra a while ago. Dr. Michael Knights from the Olive group has recently helped train the Iraqi police on behalf of the Coalition. He argues that the city is already in a post-occupational state with the local police infiltrated by militias.
He raises a question that no one can answer that “Police training in Iraq has achieved some notable short-term successes but the real question is whether the police personnel that we have trained will remain loyal to the Police service or whether they will revert to their traditional militia associations as soon as we are not training them anymore.”
Assistant chief constable Mike Colbourne, who is seconded from the British Police force, is still training the Iraqi Police. He confirms that that many of the militia groups have members inside the Basra police. “There are a number of Iraqi police officers who are clearly aligned to the militias”, he says.
He also concedes that the Basra police are involved in sectarian violence. Colbourne argues that the “militia influence is not benign”. Corruption within the police is still is a serious problem, he says, including financial corruption, murder and kidnap.
Thirdly, just as the power of the militias is increasing the effectiveness of the provincial government is declining. The ICG called this Britain’s “most glaring failing of all: the inability to establish a legitimate and functioning provincial apparatus capable of redistributing resources, imposing respect for the rule of law and ensuring a peaceful transition at the local level.”
Last month, the assassination of two provincial governors was yet another indication of the vulnerability of the local government. Both the governor of the southern Muthanna province, the first province to be handed to Iraqi control and the governor of Qadasiyah have been killed by Shiite militias.
Both governors were members of the influential Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, a group led by Shiite politician Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim who is locked in a bitter struggle for power with the Mahdi Army for control of the oil-rich south. According to Michael Knights from the Olive Group: “In the last month the assassination of two governors tells you that the institutions of local and central governance are of decreasing relevance in Southern Iraq. The factions are fighting for control of individual cities and the violence used is extreme.”
The final condition is the effectiveness of Coalition forces. The British are now conducting “Overwatch” where the 5,000 British troops will stay at Basra airfield and act as a reassurance to the Iraqi government if and when needed. Many argue this is a forlorn hope and basically a waste of time. “5,000 troops can’t do much more then defend themselves and supply themselves, so clearly it isn’t very sustainable” argues the BBC’s respected Middle East correspondent Jeremy Bowen.
What the British won’t admit is that they lost control two of Basra years ago. What they won’t admit is that effectively Basra is in the hands of the militia. What they won’t admit is they have systematically failed to build up a functioning government that protects the local people and so they look to militias for security and support.
What no one knows is whether those militias will fight each other once the British finally leave Iraq or they will work together peacefully. But one thing we can be certain of. By their own bench-marks or “conditions” the British have failed. They lost their own war. They have suffered a rather ignominious defeat. It Was Britain's Saigon moment.
Homepage:
Comments
Hide the following comment
Basra Orange Parade
10.09.2007 15:37
Christian militia
Whistlin in the wind
For the rest of the year they are Loyalist protestors pretending to be soldiers.
scheme