“If, in willful or blind ignorance, we do not challenge our government to change the role of our troops from aggression to genuine peacekeeping and reconstruction, we are all responsible for the Afghan and Canadian lives about to be lost.”
It was 'unpatriotic' to criticize the Soviet occupation in the '80s, says ex-Russian soldier Nikolai Lanine who lives in Victoria. Today, it's the same story in Canada
--------------------------
I thought I had escaped my past, but Afghanistan caught up with me in Canada. Looking at the flag-draped casket of my wife's first cousin, Andrew Eykelenboom, a Canadian medic killed in Afghanistan, I was overwhelmed with feelings of grief and a surreal displacement of time and space.
I was born in Russia, drafted into the Soviet army at 18 and sent to Afghanistan in the 1980s. Attending Andrew's funeral, I stood with one foot in the present and one in the past. I remembered my Russian friends, living and dead. Friends like Andrei, who lost his legs in Kandahar near the road on which Andrew would die two decades later. I also remembered the suffering we visited on the people of that country.
I identified with the Canadian soldiers at the funeral mourning the loss of their friend. Like them, I went to Afghanistan believing in "fighting terrorism" and "liberating Afghans." During my first mission, we were protecting refugees escaping an area that was under attack by the mujahedeen. I was deeply affected by their misery, and by the poverty and suffering of the Afghan people in general. In my mind, our presence was "helping Afghans," particularly with educating women and children. My combat unit participated in "humanitarian aid" -- accompanying doctors and delivering food, fuel, clothing, school and other supplies to Afghan villages.
It was only later that I began to wonder: Did that aid justify our aggression?
It is hard to kill people without demonizing them. In 1988, my unit accidentally hit an Afghan wedding party. My friend, whose mortar shells had killed innocent people, was shocked when he learned of it. Some soldiers, however, were indifferent. "That village supports the resistance, anyway," they said. Like NATO now, we didn't count "their" casualties.
As another friend, Alexander, would later write: "We thought that all of them -- old and young -- were insurgents." Alexander, to save his unit, had called in artillery that destroyed a village from which the mujahedeen were attacking. People of the villages hit by our air strikes became hostile and turned to the resistance. More attacks by insurgents led to more Soviet strikes.
After 10 years of such a tragic cycle, more than a million Afghans were dead and millions more had fled their devastated country. Also, ignored by many, a powerful religious force of militant Islamic movements grew under the pressure of foreign aggression. In 1989, during negotiations between my regiment and the most radical militants from the area, a mujahed told my friend: "We'll take our revenge to your country." And they did. The backlash spilled out and hit not only the former Soviet Union and Afghans themselves in the 1990s, but also America on 9/11. The vicious cycle I witnessed in the 1980s -- violence causing violence -- is still continuing.
At Andrew's funeral, the shock and disbelief on the faces of his military friends were all too familiar. So were the official speeches. And the Canadian media coverage seemed like an echo of the Soviet press. "Positive changes are evident. However, it would be premature to say that Kandahar is not a 'hot spot' any more," the Soviets said in the 1980s. "Things have improved," one Canadian newspaper said now, yet "significant problems" remain. "Development is occurring" in Kandahar, the paper added, just like a Soviet journalist had observed in 1988.
Has anything changed?
When a Canadian soldier dies, I'm reminded how much a soldier's death fills people with respect, as perhaps it should. But it also makes them hesitant to question war. In 1989, I dug a grave for a Soviet medic killed in Afghanistan. He had dragged the wounded from the battlefield and was taking them to the hospital when his carrier hit a mine. Everyone was killed. "He gave his life trying to save others," said the official at the Russian cemetery. Andrew "dedicated his life to preserving the lives of others," came the Canadian echo 17 years later. And no one asked questions.
After 20 years of trying, I have failed to understand why my friends died in Afghanistan. Now I wonder what Canadians, too, are dying for.
At the memorial for Bombardier Myles Mansell in Victoria last May, the official statement told of a man who had put his life on the line "for the country he served" and that Canada would "never forget" its soldiers. But I have heard this all before. When my childhood friend Sergei was killed and then mutilated in Afghanistan, the military told his parents: "The memory of your son will live in our hearts forever." When my friend Aleksei was killed in 1989, our commander said: "He didn't die in vain." \
The similarities don't end there. Like the Soviet-Afghan war, this one is fought in the name of state security, a peaceful Afghanistan, and women's rights. Canadians fight the same people the Soviets fought between 1979 and 1989: "terrorists, extremists, insurgents, and bandits." This should make sense, except that, in the 1980s, today's Taliban were supported by the West as "freedom fighters."
So how do we stop the cycle?
I kept asking myself this question after Andrew's funeral. The Soviet people did not vote to send troops to Afghanistan. Neither did we in Canada. It was "unpatriotic" to criticize the Soviet role in Afghanistan. Questioning Canada's mission now means being unsupportive of our soldiers. The Soviet slogan "Support our troops!" that I heard in the 1980s has become a Canadian one.
Many Canadians choose not to educate themselves about this issue, and some still believe that our soldiers are peacekeepers in a country in which many Afghans see us as part of a U.S. occupation.
If, in willful or blind ignorance, we do not challenge our government to change the role of our troops from aggression to genuine peacekeeping and reconstruction, we are all responsible for the Afghan and Canadian lives about to be lost.
-------------------------------
REFERENCES FOR THIS ARTICLE:
See Here for Better Formatting
Globe and Mail: We're still dying in Afghanistan
Bracewell @ Livejournal
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Zbigniew Brzezinski on Occupying Armies:
Everyone who knows the history of occupying armies knows that foreign armed forces are not very effective in repressing armed resistance, insurgencies, national liberation movements, whatever one wants to call it. They are after all foreigners, do not understand the country and do not have access to the intelligence needed. That is the situation we are in.
Moreover, there is this vicious circle inasmuch as even professional occupying armies become demoralized in time, which leads to acts of violence against the civilian population and thus strengthens resistance. Iraqis can deal with religiously motivated violence in their country much better than Americans from several thousand kilometers away.
Zbigniew Brzezinski - Wikipedia
Henry Kissinger on: Value of Troops
“Military men are just dumb stupid animals to be used as pawns in foreign policy.”
BRACEWELL COMMENTS: Troops are firstly, responsible parents and children. Loved by their families. To abandon them to meritless sacrifice is a sign of profound evil.
U.S. Marine Brigadier General - Smedley Butler – writes: War is a Racket
WAR is a racket. It always has been.
It is possibly the oldest, easily the most profitable, surely the most vicious. It is the only one international in scope. It is the only one in which the profits are reckoned in dollars and the losses in lives.
A racket is best described, I believe, as something that is not what it seems to the majority of the people. Only a small "inside" group knows what it is about. It is conducted for the benefit of the very few, at the expense of the very many....
Butler Writes Again:
I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism.
I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National city Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street.
I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested."
BRACEWELL COMMENTS: It is worth noting that Butler prevented An attempted American coup d'etat: 1934
NOTES ON AFGHAN INVASION:
BBC: US 'planned attack on Taleban two months before 9-11
Niaz Naik, a former Pakistani Foreign Secretary, was told by senior American officials in mid-July that military action against Afghanistan would go ahead by the middle of October.
Director of FBI Says: Not One Piece of Paper Links 9-11
“In our investigation, we have not uncovered a single piece of paper – either here in the U.S. or in the treasure trove of information that has turned up in Afghanistan and elsewhere – that mentioned any aspect of the September 11th plot.”
--------------------------
I thought I had escaped my past, but Afghanistan caught up with me in Canada. Looking at the flag-draped casket of my wife's first cousin, Andrew Eykelenboom, a Canadian medic killed in Afghanistan, I was overwhelmed with feelings of grief and a surreal displacement of time and space.
I was born in Russia, drafted into the Soviet army at 18 and sent to Afghanistan in the 1980s. Attending Andrew's funeral, I stood with one foot in the present and one in the past. I remembered my Russian friends, living and dead. Friends like Andrei, who lost his legs in Kandahar near the road on which Andrew would die two decades later. I also remembered the suffering we visited on the people of that country.
I identified with the Canadian soldiers at the funeral mourning the loss of their friend. Like them, I went to Afghanistan believing in "fighting terrorism" and "liberating Afghans." During my first mission, we were protecting refugees escaping an area that was under attack by the mujahedeen. I was deeply affected by their misery, and by the poverty and suffering of the Afghan people in general. In my mind, our presence was "helping Afghans," particularly with educating women and children. My combat unit participated in "humanitarian aid" -- accompanying doctors and delivering food, fuel, clothing, school and other supplies to Afghan villages.
It was only later that I began to wonder: Did that aid justify our aggression?
It is hard to kill people without demonizing them. In 1988, my unit accidentally hit an Afghan wedding party. My friend, whose mortar shells had killed innocent people, was shocked when he learned of it. Some soldiers, however, were indifferent. "That village supports the resistance, anyway," they said. Like NATO now, we didn't count "their" casualties.
As another friend, Alexander, would later write: "We thought that all of them -- old and young -- were insurgents." Alexander, to save his unit, had called in artillery that destroyed a village from which the mujahedeen were attacking. People of the villages hit by our air strikes became hostile and turned to the resistance. More attacks by insurgents led to more Soviet strikes.
After 10 years of such a tragic cycle, more than a million Afghans were dead and millions more had fled their devastated country. Also, ignored by many, a powerful religious force of militant Islamic movements grew under the pressure of foreign aggression. In 1989, during negotiations between my regiment and the most radical militants from the area, a mujahed told my friend: "We'll take our revenge to your country." And they did. The backlash spilled out and hit not only the former Soviet Union and Afghans themselves in the 1990s, but also America on 9/11. The vicious cycle I witnessed in the 1980s -- violence causing violence -- is still continuing.
At Andrew's funeral, the shock and disbelief on the faces of his military friends were all too familiar. So were the official speeches. And the Canadian media coverage seemed like an echo of the Soviet press. "Positive changes are evident. However, it would be premature to say that Kandahar is not a 'hot spot' any more," the Soviets said in the 1980s. "Things have improved," one Canadian newspaper said now, yet "significant problems" remain. "Development is occurring" in Kandahar, the paper added, just like a Soviet journalist had observed in 1988.
Has anything changed?
When a Canadian soldier dies, I'm reminded how much a soldier's death fills people with respect, as perhaps it should. But it also makes them hesitant to question war. In 1989, I dug a grave for a Soviet medic killed in Afghanistan. He had dragged the wounded from the battlefield and was taking them to the hospital when his carrier hit a mine. Everyone was killed. "He gave his life trying to save others," said the official at the Russian cemetery. Andrew "dedicated his life to preserving the lives of others," came the Canadian echo 17 years later. And no one asked questions.
After 20 years of trying, I have failed to understand why my friends died in Afghanistan. Now I wonder what Canadians, too, are dying for.
At the memorial for Bombardier Myles Mansell in Victoria last May, the official statement told of a man who had put his life on the line "for the country he served" and that Canada would "never forget" its soldiers. But I have heard this all before. When my childhood friend Sergei was killed and then mutilated in Afghanistan, the military told his parents: "The memory of your son will live in our hearts forever." When my friend Aleksei was killed in 1989, our commander said: "He didn't die in vain." \
The similarities don't end there. Like the Soviet-Afghan war, this one is fought in the name of state security, a peaceful Afghanistan, and women's rights. Canadians fight the same people the Soviets fought between 1979 and 1989: "terrorists, extremists, insurgents, and bandits." This should make sense, except that, in the 1980s, today's Taliban were supported by the West as "freedom fighters."
So how do we stop the cycle?
I kept asking myself this question after Andrew's funeral. The Soviet people did not vote to send troops to Afghanistan. Neither did we in Canada. It was "unpatriotic" to criticize the Soviet role in Afghanistan. Questioning Canada's mission now means being unsupportive of our soldiers. The Soviet slogan "Support our troops!" that I heard in the 1980s has become a Canadian one.
Many Canadians choose not to educate themselves about this issue, and some still believe that our soldiers are peacekeepers in a country in which many Afghans see us as part of a U.S. occupation.
If, in willful or blind ignorance, we do not challenge our government to change the role of our troops from aggression to genuine peacekeeping and reconstruction, we are all responsible for the Afghan and Canadian lives about to be lost.
-------------------------------
REFERENCES FOR THIS ARTICLE:
See Here for Better Formatting
Globe and Mail: We're still dying in Afghanistan
Bracewell @ Livejournal
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Zbigniew Brzezinski on Occupying Armies:
Everyone who knows the history of occupying armies knows that foreign armed forces are not very effective in repressing armed resistance, insurgencies, national liberation movements, whatever one wants to call it. They are after all foreigners, do not understand the country and do not have access to the intelligence needed. That is the situation we are in.
Moreover, there is this vicious circle inasmuch as even professional occupying armies become demoralized in time, which leads to acts of violence against the civilian population and thus strengthens resistance. Iraqis can deal with religiously motivated violence in their country much better than Americans from several thousand kilometers away.
Zbigniew Brzezinski - Wikipedia
Henry Kissinger on: Value of Troops
“Military men are just dumb stupid animals to be used as pawns in foreign policy.”
BRACEWELL COMMENTS: Troops are firstly, responsible parents and children. Loved by their families. To abandon them to meritless sacrifice is a sign of profound evil.
U.S. Marine Brigadier General - Smedley Butler – writes: War is a Racket
WAR is a racket. It always has been.
It is possibly the oldest, easily the most profitable, surely the most vicious. It is the only one international in scope. It is the only one in which the profits are reckoned in dollars and the losses in lives.
A racket is best described, I believe, as something that is not what it seems to the majority of the people. Only a small "inside" group knows what it is about. It is conducted for the benefit of the very few, at the expense of the very many....
Butler Writes Again:
I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism.
I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National city Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street.
I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested."
BRACEWELL COMMENTS: It is worth noting that Butler prevented An attempted American coup d'etat: 1934
NOTES ON AFGHAN INVASION:
BBC: US 'planned attack on Taleban two months before 9-11
Niaz Naik, a former Pakistani Foreign Secretary, was told by senior American officials in mid-July that military action against Afghanistan would go ahead by the middle of October.
Director of FBI Says: Not One Piece of Paper Links 9-11
“In our investigation, we have not uncovered a single piece of paper – either here in the U.S. or in the treasure trove of information that has turned up in Afghanistan and elsewhere – that mentioned any aspect of the September 11th plot.”
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