The Norwegian-led Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission has been criticised after the killing of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, whose funeral was on 15 August. It has been claimed that concern over human rights violations have been ignored.
NORWEGIANS CRITICISED OVER MINISTER’S KILLING
The Norwegian government has been heavily criticised after the assassination of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. The Oxford-educated 73-year-old was shot dead at his home in Colombo on the night of 12 August.
Despite denials by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, there is little doubt that they were responsible. Though willing to enter into peace talks with them over their conflict with the state over control of the island’s north and east, he was one their most articulate critics. He also called into question the role of the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission which, as mediator, was supposed to be neutral but was widely viewed as siding with the Tigers. And he was especially vulnerable as a Tamil who did not accept that a single group could speak for a whole community.
From the late 1970s onwards, harsh repression and ethnic cleansing by the regime in power led many members of the Tamil ethnic minority to take up arms and fight for a separate state. A ‘prevention of terrorism act’ under which many young Tamils were held without trial and tortured or killed helped to fuel the violence. In a brutal and many-sided conflict, the security forces also battled youth in the majority Sinhalese community, many of whom ‘disappeared’, while Tamil nationalists fought one another. The Tigers wiped out many of their rivals to seize large areas, and also carried out ethnic cleansing, driving Muslims out of the northwest. An Indian peacekeeping force intervened, but trouble flared up again, and civilians were caught in the crossfire.
A new government took power in 1994, willing to reign in the security forces and bring in devolution. But by this time militarism had taken hold, there was widespread mistrust, and the Tigers were reluctant to risk the power they had gained by allowing the spread of democracy. They had become famous throughout the world for their tactic of suicide bombing, used against political leaders but also ordinary people such as bank staff and commuters. After a brief truce, fighting restarted.
International mediators managed to broker a ceasefire in 2002, to widespread relief. Yet their approach was controversial. They appeared to treat all Tamils as a bloc of whom the LTTE leadership were, or should be, in charge, while the two main southern parties should work together on behalf of the Sinhalese; smaller ethnic groups did not count. The deal on the table seemed to be that, in return for ceasing attacks in the south (containing the main commercial, tourist and manufacturing areas) except for the occasional killing of Tamil dissidents, the Tigers’ demand for absolute control over the north and east would be granted. The Sri Lankan authorities in turn would be offered greater stability and increased international investment.
Yet, apart from suspicion held by many in Sri Lanka that one side or the other was using the ceasefire to rebuild its military strength, there were other obstacles. The mediators perhaps assumed that non-European peoples could easily set aside their personal views and values and desire for freedom in return for increased security and recognition of their ethnic identity. With regard to the conscription of child soldiers, it might have seemed to some in the west that parents in the Third World were anyway used to losing their children and would not object too strongly.
But, both in Sri Lanka and abroad, many were unhappy with the situation. As Lakshman Kadirgamar explained in 2000 at an international conference, ‘It is an accepted principle of international law that criminal acts intended to provoke a state of terror are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature. Likewise, the use of children in war is utterly and totally unacceptable.’
Yet this continued. In 2004, Human Rights Watch reported that, ‘Despite an end to active hostilities and repeated pledges by the LTTE leadership to end its recruitment of children, the practice has continued not only in LTTE controlled areas, but now reaches into government areas in the North and East where the LTTE previously had little access…
‘The Norwegian government-brokered cease-fire between the government and the LTTE in February 2002 brought a very welcome end to active hostilities that have cost more than 60,000 lives over twenty years. However, the cease-fire may have exacerbated the LTTE’s recruitment of child soldiers from government-controlled areas. By the terms of the cease-fire, unarmed LTTE cadres may lawfully enter government controlled areas, known as “cleared” areas. In reality the LTTE dominates the administration and security of the major towns in the North and East, including Jaffna and Batticaloa. The LTTE has used this control to extend their recruitment of children to these Tamil population centers.
‘Throughout the cease-fire, the LTTE has sought new recruits for its forces. The LTTE may be trying to strengthen its hand during the peace talks, prepare for its control of the North and East in the event of a final peace agreement, or be militarily prepared in the event the peace talks collapse—or for all of these reasons.’
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was also criticised by human rights campaigners for allowing the Tigers to kill Tamils who disagreed with them. Amnesty International urged in 2003: ‘Any improvements in the human rights situation since the beginning of the ceasefire are now at risk of being undermined by the political killings occurring in the country. The use of political assassinations, abductions and other human rights abuses threatens to seriously undermine the moves made towards establishing a representative system of governance grounded in human rights principles. They are also a source of continuing insecurity and fear for a population that has already suffered years of extremely grave abuses to their human rights.
‘Amnesty International believes that to date there has been a lack of credible and timely investigations into these killings, and adequate measures to guarantee the safety of those who are most at risk have not been implemented. Amnesty International calls on the LTTE, SLMM and the police to act in accordance with their individual responsibilities in order to stop these human rights abuses, and hold to account those responsible for these abuses.’
But the Norwegian peacekeepers, along with a Sri Lankan government which was eager to please western governments and investors, failed to act on these warnings. In May 2005, Human Rights Watch restated its concern. ‘Ongoing killings and abductions of Tamils throughout Sri Lanka have created a climate of fear among Tamils across the country, Human Rights Watch said today…
“The ceasefire between the government and LTTE is welcome, but some are using it as an opportunity to kill their opponents,” said Brad Adams, Asia director of Human Rights Watch. “Everyone hopes for a lasting peace, but this raises serious questions about what kind of peace it will be for Tamils who fall out of favor with the LTTE or other factions”…
‘“Government announcements of investigations are welcome, but each and every case must be vigorously investigated,” said Adams. “In all these years of killings, we have yet to see the government seriously investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for politically motivated killings of Tamils.”
’The international community, which is uniquely positioned to be heard in Sri Lanka, has also remained largely silent. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, responsible for monitoring and reporting on violations of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) between the government and the LTTE, only recently acknowledged that political killings of opposition Tamil activists by the LTTE are violations of the agreement, and therefore fall within its mandate. Disturbingly, it has stopped short of investigating any of the killings.’
Though seeking to be loyal to his government colleagues, Lakshman Kadirgamar publicly spoke out the following month. He urged the President to address ‘as vigorously as she has addressed the cause of promoting engagement with the LTTE, the task of making it clear to the LTTE, and to the Government of Norway, that the restoration of democracy, including the creation of space for dissent and the promotion of human rights in areas presently controlled by the LTTE, is a priority of the highest order…
‘The movement for democracy in certain districts of the North and East must begin to roll. If the Government of Norway is unable to plead this cause with the conviction and determination that it deserves it should stand aside and yield to other parties who could carry the flag of democracy into areas where darkness presently prevails.’
Others were even more outspoken. For example, an article in the Asian Tribune in early August quoted a political commentator as saying, ‘The lives of Tamils and political dissidents are in grave danger and Norway should be held responsible for all killings by the LTTE because they are the key ally of the LTTE. It is Norwegian collaboration with the LTTE to cover up the crimes against humanity that is primarily responsible for the LTTE to act with impunity.’ It reported that, despite representations to the Norwegian government, it had not used its influence to stop the killings, and that ‘LTTE cadres were caught videoing the residences of the Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, and other key places in Colombo yesterday.’ Less than a fortnight later, he was dead.
Thousands came to pay tribute to him, some of them in tears. At his funeral on 15 August, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim and Christian clergy addressed the mourners, and his pyre was lit. Though the smoke has died away, many members of the public remain sad and angry, and the Norwegian approach may no longer be feasible.
Savitri Hensman, 16 August 2005
The Norwegian government has been heavily criticised after the assassination of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. The Oxford-educated 73-year-old was shot dead at his home in Colombo on the night of 12 August.
Despite denials by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, there is little doubt that they were responsible. Though willing to enter into peace talks with them over their conflict with the state over control of the island’s north and east, he was one their most articulate critics. He also called into question the role of the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission which, as mediator, was supposed to be neutral but was widely viewed as siding with the Tigers. And he was especially vulnerable as a Tamil who did not accept that a single group could speak for a whole community.
From the late 1970s onwards, harsh repression and ethnic cleansing by the regime in power led many members of the Tamil ethnic minority to take up arms and fight for a separate state. A ‘prevention of terrorism act’ under which many young Tamils were held without trial and tortured or killed helped to fuel the violence. In a brutal and many-sided conflict, the security forces also battled youth in the majority Sinhalese community, many of whom ‘disappeared’, while Tamil nationalists fought one another. The Tigers wiped out many of their rivals to seize large areas, and also carried out ethnic cleansing, driving Muslims out of the northwest. An Indian peacekeeping force intervened, but trouble flared up again, and civilians were caught in the crossfire.
A new government took power in 1994, willing to reign in the security forces and bring in devolution. But by this time militarism had taken hold, there was widespread mistrust, and the Tigers were reluctant to risk the power they had gained by allowing the spread of democracy. They had become famous throughout the world for their tactic of suicide bombing, used against political leaders but also ordinary people such as bank staff and commuters. After a brief truce, fighting restarted.
International mediators managed to broker a ceasefire in 2002, to widespread relief. Yet their approach was controversial. They appeared to treat all Tamils as a bloc of whom the LTTE leadership were, or should be, in charge, while the two main southern parties should work together on behalf of the Sinhalese; smaller ethnic groups did not count. The deal on the table seemed to be that, in return for ceasing attacks in the south (containing the main commercial, tourist and manufacturing areas) except for the occasional killing of Tamil dissidents, the Tigers’ demand for absolute control over the north and east would be granted. The Sri Lankan authorities in turn would be offered greater stability and increased international investment.
Yet, apart from suspicion held by many in Sri Lanka that one side or the other was using the ceasefire to rebuild its military strength, there were other obstacles. The mediators perhaps assumed that non-European peoples could easily set aside their personal views and values and desire for freedom in return for increased security and recognition of their ethnic identity. With regard to the conscription of child soldiers, it might have seemed to some in the west that parents in the Third World were anyway used to losing their children and would not object too strongly.
But, both in Sri Lanka and abroad, many were unhappy with the situation. As Lakshman Kadirgamar explained in 2000 at an international conference, ‘It is an accepted principle of international law that criminal acts intended to provoke a state of terror are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature. Likewise, the use of children in war is utterly and totally unacceptable.’
Yet this continued. In 2004, Human Rights Watch reported that, ‘Despite an end to active hostilities and repeated pledges by the LTTE leadership to end its recruitment of children, the practice has continued not only in LTTE controlled areas, but now reaches into government areas in the North and East where the LTTE previously had little access…
‘The Norwegian government-brokered cease-fire between the government and the LTTE in February 2002 brought a very welcome end to active hostilities that have cost more than 60,000 lives over twenty years. However, the cease-fire may have exacerbated the LTTE’s recruitment of child soldiers from government-controlled areas. By the terms of the cease-fire, unarmed LTTE cadres may lawfully enter government controlled areas, known as “cleared” areas. In reality the LTTE dominates the administration and security of the major towns in the North and East, including Jaffna and Batticaloa. The LTTE has used this control to extend their recruitment of children to these Tamil population centers.
‘Throughout the cease-fire, the LTTE has sought new recruits for its forces. The LTTE may be trying to strengthen its hand during the peace talks, prepare for its control of the North and East in the event of a final peace agreement, or be militarily prepared in the event the peace talks collapse—or for all of these reasons.’
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was also criticised by human rights campaigners for allowing the Tigers to kill Tamils who disagreed with them. Amnesty International urged in 2003: ‘Any improvements in the human rights situation since the beginning of the ceasefire are now at risk of being undermined by the political killings occurring in the country. The use of political assassinations, abductions and other human rights abuses threatens to seriously undermine the moves made towards establishing a representative system of governance grounded in human rights principles. They are also a source of continuing insecurity and fear for a population that has already suffered years of extremely grave abuses to their human rights.
‘Amnesty International believes that to date there has been a lack of credible and timely investigations into these killings, and adequate measures to guarantee the safety of those who are most at risk have not been implemented. Amnesty International calls on the LTTE, SLMM and the police to act in accordance with their individual responsibilities in order to stop these human rights abuses, and hold to account those responsible for these abuses.’
But the Norwegian peacekeepers, along with a Sri Lankan government which was eager to please western governments and investors, failed to act on these warnings. In May 2005, Human Rights Watch restated its concern. ‘Ongoing killings and abductions of Tamils throughout Sri Lanka have created a climate of fear among Tamils across the country, Human Rights Watch said today…
“The ceasefire between the government and LTTE is welcome, but some are using it as an opportunity to kill their opponents,” said Brad Adams, Asia director of Human Rights Watch. “Everyone hopes for a lasting peace, but this raises serious questions about what kind of peace it will be for Tamils who fall out of favor with the LTTE or other factions”…
‘“Government announcements of investigations are welcome, but each and every case must be vigorously investigated,” said Adams. “In all these years of killings, we have yet to see the government seriously investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for politically motivated killings of Tamils.”
’The international community, which is uniquely positioned to be heard in Sri Lanka, has also remained largely silent. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, responsible for monitoring and reporting on violations of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) between the government and the LTTE, only recently acknowledged that political killings of opposition Tamil activists by the LTTE are violations of the agreement, and therefore fall within its mandate. Disturbingly, it has stopped short of investigating any of the killings.’
Though seeking to be loyal to his government colleagues, Lakshman Kadirgamar publicly spoke out the following month. He urged the President to address ‘as vigorously as she has addressed the cause of promoting engagement with the LTTE, the task of making it clear to the LTTE, and to the Government of Norway, that the restoration of democracy, including the creation of space for dissent and the promotion of human rights in areas presently controlled by the LTTE, is a priority of the highest order…
‘The movement for democracy in certain districts of the North and East must begin to roll. If the Government of Norway is unable to plead this cause with the conviction and determination that it deserves it should stand aside and yield to other parties who could carry the flag of democracy into areas where darkness presently prevails.’
Others were even more outspoken. For example, an article in the Asian Tribune in early August quoted a political commentator as saying, ‘The lives of Tamils and political dissidents are in grave danger and Norway should be held responsible for all killings by the LTTE because they are the key ally of the LTTE. It is Norwegian collaboration with the LTTE to cover up the crimes against humanity that is primarily responsible for the LTTE to act with impunity.’ It reported that, despite representations to the Norwegian government, it had not used its influence to stop the killings, and that ‘LTTE cadres were caught videoing the residences of the Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, and other key places in Colombo yesterday.’ Less than a fortnight later, he was dead.
Thousands came to pay tribute to him, some of them in tears. At his funeral on 15 August, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim and Christian clergy addressed the mourners, and his pyre was lit. Though the smoke has died away, many members of the public remain sad and angry, and the Norwegian approach may no longer be feasible.
Savitri Hensman, 16 August 2005
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