The British are here with Arafats approval

 http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/405498.html

The British are here, with Arafat's approval
By Ze'ev Schiff

With grudging consent from the Americans, the British are now setting up two new operation control rooms, one in Ramallah and one in Gaza, for Palestinian security organizations. The money that Britain is spending is earmarked for the purchase of a new communications system, ancillary equipment and vehicles. The new operations room in Ramallah has already been completed and the facility in Gaza will be completed soon.
What is the reason for the British involvement? Aside from a desire to wield influence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the British are afraid that implementation of the disengagement plan could lead to Palestinian loss of control in the territories to be evacuated, and to ensuing chaos.

Essentially, the new installations are part of a comprehensive British-Palestinian security plan, of which construction of the operations control rooms is only part. While the Egyptians are hedging their bets on their involvement in the Gaza Strip in the event of an Israeli withdrawal, the British have jumped in. The Egyptians are ready to train Palestinian security forces if and when Israel pulls out. Conversely, the British are prepared to intervene even before the IDF withdraws or the settlements are evacuated.

The British involvement will go well beyond technical-operational aspects, and bears a diplomatic flavor. A British representative recently met with Yasser Arafat in order to report details of the plan to him. Arafat has his conditions, of course, which he has not been able to win from the Americans; he wants everything to be handled his way. When Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia visited London last week, the British-Palestinian security plan was one of the issues raised by Prime Minister Tony Blair at their meeting. Qureia was familiar with most of the operational details, as Palestinian representatives have been holding talks with the British on the subject for some time, except that Arafat forbade him from dealing with security matters. Qureia - as opposed to his predecessor, Mahmoud Abbas - is more disciplined, and avoided getting into any trouble with the boss.

The American go-ahead for British involvement was granted reluctantly and on a limited basis, and only after Blair's personal appeal to President Bush. At first, the British had a hard time getting an unequivocal answer from Israel, until the British Foreign Office submitted a semiformal application to Israel, through what is called in diplomatic language a "non paper." Israel then replied that it would not cooperate with a program directed by Arafat. The request related not only to the operations rooms but also to a more detailed security program. The reasons for the Americans' and the Israelis' unwillingness to cooperate with the Palestinians on this issue are basically identical: Arafat's direct involvement in implementing the plan, and his condition that nothing happen without his say-so.

Experts in Israel believe that the British have sincere intentions, but harbor immense suspicion of the Palestinians. It is strange that Britain is prepared to cooperate with Arafat on security matters, since he has declined to take a single step toward implementing reforms in the Palestinian security organizations (among other things, reducing the number of men under arms, and ensuring their genuine subordination to the prime minister or the interior minister). The fact that he is the boss and that everything has to go through him, including all security matters, does not justify cooperation with him under these conditions. If the postponed meeting between Qureia and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon takes place and Qureia raises the matter, he will presumably be met with a negative answer to the proposal for cooperation, in the same way that were he to request that he be consulted on the disengagement plan, this too would be turned down.

It is altogether possible that nothing will come of the current British or Egyptian attempts at involvement, before the implementation of Sharon's disengagement plan begins. But if and when the disengagement does begin, we will begin to see increasingly more involvement of foreign countries in the area. For example, the Americans head the international observers force - the MFO - that oversees demilitarization of the Sinai. At least in theory, the strip of land through which the "Philadelphi" route passes (at the southern edge of the Gaza Strip) lies within its jurisdiction. If Israel withdraws from the route, it would be only natural for the international force in the Sinai to be involved. Because the withdrawal is unilateral and not in the framework of an agreement, it is doubtful that Israel could prevent the Palestinians from steps such as inviting international representatives, unless the step could be considered as an act of war.