Dialogue No More
Internationalist Observer | 24.07.2013 14:34 | Analysis | Anti-Nuclear | Terror War | World
It was a long and painful death, and deservedly so by own achievement. Having been assigned the task of writing the obituary by historical circumstance and current necessity, this must be said before everything else. The patient we are talking about is the "EU 3" negotiation program over the Persian reactors. On Monday of this week in the streets of Brussels, the bipartisan centrepiece of European-American relations burned itself. The click of the lighter could be heard all over Europe: The regime declaration of war against the Hisballah network. Insiders had been expecting something like this to happen since the program doused itself in petroleum with accordingly targeted police raids two months ago, and warning signs had been echoed even by Nigerian exiles in Britain. This is an analysis of what might have triggered the Brussels incident and an explanation of the difference it makes. It has not made a chain reaction starting with attacks against the Persian reactors more likely, in the same sense as leaving the umbrella at home does not make rain more likely. But it might have made more likely the demise of the atomic state, respectively the military-industrial complex.
The "EU 3" were a construct with no other foundation than its single purpose, the negotiations with Persia, which in reciprocation had assigned negotiators with no other purpose than maintaining the contact. Neither is there any formally declared special role of Germany, France and Britain - the self-appointed "nuclear troika" - in the European Union, nor in the United Nations, and neither is the coincidence of the proportional influence of these regimes in Europe nor the partial overlapping with Security Council membership sufficient legitimation to assume one. The only mandate the "EU 3" ever received was from the Americans, who had chosen it as their proxy to answer Persian calls for dialogue. And since the Persians are interested to talk to the Americans to remind them to remove their military from their region, they maintained the contact.
The negotiations were without results and nothing has helped to change that, not even the calendar association of the meetings with the full moon, which hit an ironic sense in older statements that there was "no daylight" between the approaches of the two blocs. In Persia one of the negotiators who confronted the European-American troika is to take the presidency, and the Persian approach to the United Nations framework for the administration of reactors consistently has been the same as the American one to the "Kyoto Protocol," which made it difficult for the European negotiators to complain with an American mandate. And the post-Kyoto diplomacy has already dug its own grave by delaying decisions for a decade. The escalation of reactor use that is projected during the time span and beyond would shrink the meltdown interval to half of its current value.
On the basis of probability and manufacturer data, the list of Harrisburg, Chernobyl, Fukushima will grow longer quicker and soon is very unlikely to remain unamended for an entire decade. Just recently e. g. the Delhi regime announced the first of a large number of projected reactors. The theory that the Kundankoolam decision was the trigger that killed the "EU 3" negotiations is supported by the fact that the Brussels raids against the oil corporations coincided with their public relations activities in India. These are reactors entirely outside of any United Nations framework, unlike in hitherto meltdowns, which makes it appear infantile and ridiculous to rattle the sabres over reactors which are at least as safe as the "Kyoto Protocol," and received that status not as a result of but as a precondition for the "EU 3" approach.
Since the Americans chose proliferation to India over diplomacy, nothing of the entire issue of ending the proliferation of radioactive threats which had to serve as legitimation for the empty theatrics of the "EU 3" has remained to back it. To make the farce complete, Japan deprecated its role in the United Nations reactor control structure by doing the same, which can only surprise if its failure to use this structure to receive compensation from the Americans is not already be seen as an indication of its lack of sanity. Not only was Fukushima a wet meltdown in comparison to the earlier dry ones, it also was the first reactor meltdown in which the country having produced the reactor and the country hosting it were not the same.
Apparently no one told any of these regimes that it would have been wiser to offer India a Security Council veto in exchange for the freeze and transfer of its existing reactor and arms load into the United Nations framework. Then Persia would have had to argue why 60 million Shia Muslims there need additional reactors while a multitude thereof in India do not, but so would the hitherto Security Council members, just like over conventional climate disruptions, and they would not have had the possibility to postpone one issue for predictable disruption by the other. Or, if that option had been considered with conscious awareness, greed was the defining condition that led to the current proliferation, against which the assumed intentions of Persia can only appear as a minor threat.
If the Americans and the Europeans are so greedy to push their reactors, such as Germany does in Brazil, they have - not only for everyone else but now even in their own eyes - lost all credibility to try to persuade someone else to scale back on it. The other explanation, an expectation to conquer the Pakistani nukes, might be even less favourable since it would be legitimising reciprocation from the Western neighbour. If the American intention had been to avoid talking its military aberrations in the region with Persia then it now pompously failed, just like their warmongering, their oil policy and just about everything else they did in the last hundred years.
The nature of this failure is illustrated in the case of the Persian exile writer in Europe who received a death verdict from Tehran. At the time it might even have justified the reciprocation against the projected executioners, which now - a generation later - occurs as a farce. But if that writer had received fissile story material from NSA or the like, to dress up an otherwise unmarketable slur in targeted mimicry, that would put what appeared as an assault on the freedom of arts into an entirely different light, namely that the alleged artwork is part of the actual assault and the alleged assault part of an actual liberation. The untimely hostility against the Hisballah network might be an indication that something like this is the case. All reactors are inherently bad, not only due to their radioactivity, they also are the last pretexts for criminal regimes to exist. In that respect the rulers of Persia are similar to their European and American, Japanese, Indian and other counterparts. And the "EU 3" deception now is on the ash heap of history.
The "EU 3" were a construct with no other foundation than its single purpose, the negotiations with Persia, which in reciprocation had assigned negotiators with no other purpose than maintaining the contact. Neither is there any formally declared special role of Germany, France and Britain - the self-appointed "nuclear troika" - in the European Union, nor in the United Nations, and neither is the coincidence of the proportional influence of these regimes in Europe nor the partial overlapping with Security Council membership sufficient legitimation to assume one. The only mandate the "EU 3" ever received was from the Americans, who had chosen it as their proxy to answer Persian calls for dialogue. And since the Persians are interested to talk to the Americans to remind them to remove their military from their region, they maintained the contact.
The negotiations were without results and nothing has helped to change that, not even the calendar association of the meetings with the full moon, which hit an ironic sense in older statements that there was "no daylight" between the approaches of the two blocs. In Persia one of the negotiators who confronted the European-American troika is to take the presidency, and the Persian approach to the United Nations framework for the administration of reactors consistently has been the same as the American one to the "Kyoto Protocol," which made it difficult for the European negotiators to complain with an American mandate. And the post-Kyoto diplomacy has already dug its own grave by delaying decisions for a decade. The escalation of reactor use that is projected during the time span and beyond would shrink the meltdown interval to half of its current value.
On the basis of probability and manufacturer data, the list of Harrisburg, Chernobyl, Fukushima will grow longer quicker and soon is very unlikely to remain unamended for an entire decade. Just recently e. g. the Delhi regime announced the first of a large number of projected reactors. The theory that the Kundankoolam decision was the trigger that killed the "EU 3" negotiations is supported by the fact that the Brussels raids against the oil corporations coincided with their public relations activities in India. These are reactors entirely outside of any United Nations framework, unlike in hitherto meltdowns, which makes it appear infantile and ridiculous to rattle the sabres over reactors which are at least as safe as the "Kyoto Protocol," and received that status not as a result of but as a precondition for the "EU 3" approach.
Since the Americans chose proliferation to India over diplomacy, nothing of the entire issue of ending the proliferation of radioactive threats which had to serve as legitimation for the empty theatrics of the "EU 3" has remained to back it. To make the farce complete, Japan deprecated its role in the United Nations reactor control structure by doing the same, which can only surprise if its failure to use this structure to receive compensation from the Americans is not already be seen as an indication of its lack of sanity. Not only was Fukushima a wet meltdown in comparison to the earlier dry ones, it also was the first reactor meltdown in which the country having produced the reactor and the country hosting it were not the same.
Apparently no one told any of these regimes that it would have been wiser to offer India a Security Council veto in exchange for the freeze and transfer of its existing reactor and arms load into the United Nations framework. Then Persia would have had to argue why 60 million Shia Muslims there need additional reactors while a multitude thereof in India do not, but so would the hitherto Security Council members, just like over conventional climate disruptions, and they would not have had the possibility to postpone one issue for predictable disruption by the other. Or, if that option had been considered with conscious awareness, greed was the defining condition that led to the current proliferation, against which the assumed intentions of Persia can only appear as a minor threat.
If the Americans and the Europeans are so greedy to push their reactors, such as Germany does in Brazil, they have - not only for everyone else but now even in their own eyes - lost all credibility to try to persuade someone else to scale back on it. The other explanation, an expectation to conquer the Pakistani nukes, might be even less favourable since it would be legitimising reciprocation from the Western neighbour. If the American intention had been to avoid talking its military aberrations in the region with Persia then it now pompously failed, just like their warmongering, their oil policy and just about everything else they did in the last hundred years.
The nature of this failure is illustrated in the case of the Persian exile writer in Europe who received a death verdict from Tehran. At the time it might even have justified the reciprocation against the projected executioners, which now - a generation later - occurs as a farce. But if that writer had received fissile story material from NSA or the like, to dress up an otherwise unmarketable slur in targeted mimicry, that would put what appeared as an assault on the freedom of arts into an entirely different light, namely that the alleged artwork is part of the actual assault and the alleged assault part of an actual liberation. The untimely hostility against the Hisballah network might be an indication that something like this is the case. All reactors are inherently bad, not only due to their radioactivity, they also are the last pretexts for criminal regimes to exist. In that respect the rulers of Persia are similar to their European and American, Japanese, Indian and other counterparts. And the "EU 3" deception now is on the ash heap of history.
The "EU 3" were a construct with no other foundation than its single purpose, the negotiations with Persia, which in reciprocation had assigned negotiators with no other purpose than maintaining the contact. Neither is there any formally declared special role of Germany, France and Britain - the self-appointed "nuclear troika" - in the European Union, nor in the United Nations, and neither is the coincidence of the proportional influence of these regimes in Europe nor the partial overlapping with Security Council membership sufficient legitimation to assume one. The only mandate the "EU 3" ever received was from the Americans, who had chosen it as their proxy to answer Persian calls for dialogue. And since the Persians are interested to talk to the Americans to remind them to remove their military from their region, they maintained the contact.
The negotiations were without results and nothing has helped to change that, not even the calendar association of the meetings with the full moon, which hit an ironic sense in older statements that there was "no daylight" between the approaches of the two blocs. In Persia one of the negotiators who confronted the European-American troika is to take the presidency, and the Persian approach to the United Nations framework for the administration of reactors consistently has been the same as the American one to the "Kyoto Protocol," which made it difficult for the European negotiators to complain with an American mandate. And the post-Kyoto diplomacy has already dug its own grave by delaying decisions for a decade. The escalation of reactor use that is projected during the time span and beyond would shrink the meltdown interval to half of its current value.
On the basis of probability and manufacturer data, the list of Harrisburg, Chernobyl, Fukushima will grow longer quicker and soon is very unlikely to remain unamended for an entire decade. Just recently e. g. the Delhi regime announced the first of a large number of projected reactors. The theory that the Kundankoolam decision was the trigger that killed the "EU 3" negotiations is supported by the fact that the Brussels raids against the oil corporations coincided with their public relations activities in India. These are reactors entirely outside of any United Nations framework, unlike in hitherto meltdowns, which makes it appear infantile and ridiculous to rattle the sabres over reactors which are at least as safe as the "Kyoto Protocol," and received that status not as a result of but as a precondition for the "EU 3" approach.
Since the Americans chose proliferation to India over diplomacy, nothing of the entire issue of ending the proliferation of radioactive threats which had to serve as legitimation for the empty theatrics of the "EU 3" has remained to back it. To make the farce complete, Japan deprecated its role in the United Nations reactor control structure by doing the same, which can only surprise if its failure to use this structure to receive compensation from the Americans is not already be seen as an indication of its lack of sanity. Not only was Fukushima a wet meltdown in comparison to the earlier dry ones, it also was the first reactor meltdown in which the country having produced the reactor and the country hosting it were not the same.
Apparently no one told any of these regimes that it would have been wiser to offer India a Security Council veto in exchange for the freeze and transfer of its existing reactor and arms load into the United Nations framework. Then Persia would have had to argue why 60 million Shia Muslims there need additional reactors while a multitude thereof in India do not, but so would the hitherto Security Council members, just like over conventional climate disruptions, and they would not have had the possibility to postpone one issue for predictable disruption by the other. Or, if that option had been considered with conscious awareness, greed was the defining condition that led to the current proliferation, against which the assumed intentions of Persia can only appear as a minor threat.
If the Americans and the Europeans are so greedy to push their reactors, such as Germany does in Brazil, they have - not only for everyone else but now even in their own eyes - lost all credibility to try to persuade someone else to scale back on it. The other explanation, an expectation to conquer the Pakistani nukes, might be even less favourable since it would be legitimising reciprocation from the Western neighbour. If the American intention had been to avoid talking its military aberrations in the region with Persia then it now pompously failed, just like their warmongering, their oil policy and just about everything else they did in the last hundred years.
The nature of this failure is illustrated in the case of the Persian exile writer in Europe who received a death verdict from Tehran. At the time it might even have justified the reciprocation against the projected executioners, which now - a generation later - occurs as a farce. But if that writer had received fissile story material from NSA or the like, to dress up an otherwise unmarketable slur in targeted mimicry, that would put what appeared as an assault on the freedom of arts into an entirely different light, namely that the alleged artwork is part of the actual assault and the alleged assault part of an actual liberation. The untimely hostility against the Hisballah network might be an indication that something like this is the case. All reactors are inherently bad, not only due to their radioactivity, they also are the last pretexts for criminal regimes to exist. In that respect the rulers of Persia are similar to their European and American, Japanese, Indian and other counterparts. And the "EU 3" deception now is on the ash heap of history.
The negotiations were without results and nothing has helped to change that, not even the calendar association of the meetings with the full moon, which hit an ironic sense in older statements that there was "no daylight" between the approaches of the two blocs. In Persia one of the negotiators who confronted the European-American troika is to take the presidency, and the Persian approach to the United Nations framework for the administration of reactors consistently has been the same as the American one to the "Kyoto Protocol," which made it difficult for the European negotiators to complain with an American mandate. And the post-Kyoto diplomacy has already dug its own grave by delaying decisions for a decade. The escalation of reactor use that is projected during the time span and beyond would shrink the meltdown interval to half of its current value.
On the basis of probability and manufacturer data, the list of Harrisburg, Chernobyl, Fukushima will grow longer quicker and soon is very unlikely to remain unamended for an entire decade. Just recently e. g. the Delhi regime announced the first of a large number of projected reactors. The theory that the Kundankoolam decision was the trigger that killed the "EU 3" negotiations is supported by the fact that the Brussels raids against the oil corporations coincided with their public relations activities in India. These are reactors entirely outside of any United Nations framework, unlike in hitherto meltdowns, which makes it appear infantile and ridiculous to rattle the sabres over reactors which are at least as safe as the "Kyoto Protocol," and received that status not as a result of but as a precondition for the "EU 3" approach.
Since the Americans chose proliferation to India over diplomacy, nothing of the entire issue of ending the proliferation of radioactive threats which had to serve as legitimation for the empty theatrics of the "EU 3" has remained to back it. To make the farce complete, Japan deprecated its role in the United Nations reactor control structure by doing the same, which can only surprise if its failure to use this structure to receive compensation from the Americans is not already be seen as an indication of its lack of sanity. Not only was Fukushima a wet meltdown in comparison to the earlier dry ones, it also was the first reactor meltdown in which the country having produced the reactor and the country hosting it were not the same.
Apparently no one told any of these regimes that it would have been wiser to offer India a Security Council veto in exchange for the freeze and transfer of its existing reactor and arms load into the United Nations framework. Then Persia would have had to argue why 60 million Shia Muslims there need additional reactors while a multitude thereof in India do not, but so would the hitherto Security Council members, just like over conventional climate disruptions, and they would not have had the possibility to postpone one issue for predictable disruption by the other. Or, if that option had been considered with conscious awareness, greed was the defining condition that led to the current proliferation, against which the assumed intentions of Persia can only appear as a minor threat.
If the Americans and the Europeans are so greedy to push their reactors, such as Germany does in Brazil, they have - not only for everyone else but now even in their own eyes - lost all credibility to try to persuade someone else to scale back on it. The other explanation, an expectation to conquer the Pakistani nukes, might be even less favourable since it would be legitimising reciprocation from the Western neighbour. If the American intention had been to avoid talking its military aberrations in the region with Persia then it now pompously failed, just like their warmongering, their oil policy and just about everything else they did in the last hundred years.
The nature of this failure is illustrated in the case of the Persian exile writer in Europe who received a death verdict from Tehran. At the time it might even have justified the reciprocation against the projected executioners, which now - a generation later - occurs as a farce. But if that writer had received fissile story material from NSA or the like, to dress up an otherwise unmarketable slur in targeted mimicry, that would put what appeared as an assault on the freedom of arts into an entirely different light, namely that the alleged artwork is part of the actual assault and the alleged assault part of an actual liberation. The untimely hostility against the Hisballah network might be an indication that something like this is the case. All reactors are inherently bad, not only due to their radioactivity, they also are the last pretexts for criminal regimes to exist. In that respect the rulers of Persia are similar to their European and American, Japanese, Indian and other counterparts. And the "EU 3" deception now is on the ash heap of history.
Internationalist Observer
