IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(CAPE OF GOOD HOPE PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
CASE NO. 13704/08
In the matter between:
TREVOR ANDREW MANUEL APPLICANT
and
TERRY CRAWFORD-BROWNE RESPONDENT

NOTICE OF RESPONDENT’S AMENDMENTS
AND COUNTERCLAIM
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. In terms of a deed of settlement dated 12 June 2008 and approved by
the Acting Judge President in respect of cases 5156/08 and 9120/08,
agreement was reached that these cases would be combined and tried
together. It was also agreed verbally by the parties preliminary to that
agreement that a schedule would be drawn up by the applicant’s attorneys
before 25 July 2008 so that these matters could be settled before the
end of the year 2008. More than a month has elapsed since 25 July 2008.
Accordingly, the Respondent moves that both those cases, together with
the case 13704/08 now filed on 22 August 2008, be dismissed as an abuse
of the Court’s time and waste of its resources since, as the Applicant
is fully aware and acknowledges, there is no prospect of financial remedy.

2. Being so frustrated, and now being revealed by the Sunday Times
newspaper to have committed perjury in respect of a 2003 discovery
judgement in this Honourable Court, the Applicant has embarked upon an
outrageous attack on constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of expression.
These rights are enshrined in sections 16 (1) (a) and (b) of the Bill of
Rights in the Constitution, including “the freedom to receive or impart
information or ideas”. Accordingly, in his notice of motion the
Applicant spuriously seeks a contempt of court order in terms of an
interim order granted under case number 2471/2008 granted by Mr Justice
Le Grange on 6 March 2008 which order, it is submitted, has lapsed by
virtue of the Applicant’s failure to comply with the deed of settlement
negotiated on 12 June 2008.

3. The Respondent thus denies that he is in contempt of court but,
should it be held that he has inadvertently transgressed the order, he
submits that the criminal misconduct of perjury and of money laundering
by the Applicant far outweighs that inadvertent transgression, and
requests the Court’s to condone an unintended infraction.

4. The Sunday Times newspaper has alleged on 3 August 2008 that the
German company MAN Ferrostaal paid bribes of R30 million to President
Thabo Mbeki to secure the submarine contracts. Similarly, the German
magazine Der Spiegal has alleged that the German company Thyssen Krupp
paid bribes of DM 30 million to secure the frigate contracts, and that
these were laundered through a Swiss bank. Thyssen Krupp acknowledges
that it made these payments, but declares it was not then illegal under
German law. Company memos from the French company Thomson CSF in wide
public circulation on the internet confirm irregular behaviour by
President Mbeki. This company has already been confirmed by the
Constitutional Court to have conspired with Mr Schabir Schaik to bribe
former Deputy President Jacob Zuma, and is itself now also charged with
corruption relating to the arms deal. A former British Secretary for
Trade and Industry confirmed in 2003 that BAE had paid “commissions”
(for which read bribes) to secure its contracts with South Africa. The
British Serious Fraud Office confirmed to the Sowetan newspaper on 12
August 2008 that it is investigating these payments, estimated by
British investigators at £ 112 million (R1.7 billion) and laundered
through BAE front companies in the British Virgin Islands.

5. The Applicant, in his capacity as Minister of Finance, was
responsible for the affordability and financing of the arms deal. He
also bears particular responsibility to be vigilant against corruption,
especially in the arms industry which is internationally notorious for
bribery and corruption of politicians as its standard practice. In his
capacity as a senior member of the national executive council of the
African National Congress (ANC), he is similarly required to be vigilant
about bribery payments to the Party. Instead, the Applicant and his
colleagues, including President Mbeki, have repeatedly endeavoured to
thwart investigation of bribery allegations around the arms deal. A full
and thorough and independent judicial investigation into the arms deal
remains the proper forum and remedy for these matters. Accordingly, the
Respondent moves that the Court dismisses this renewed attempt by the
Applicant to squelch public disquiet about corruption in government and
the ANC.

6. The Respondent, as a South African citizen, is legally obligated in
terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (1998) to report even
suspicions of money laundering. In terms of section 8 (2) of that Act,
failure to report such suspicions renders a person liable to a fine and
or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years. The corollary
stands that a citizen who reports such suspicions cannot be sued for
defamation or contempt of court for meeting that legal obligation.

7. The Respondent was mandated by the Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane
during 1996 to represent the Anglican Church during the Defence Review
conducted in Parliament during 1996 to 1998. The inclusion of
faith-based and other civil society organisations in the Defence Review
was in keeping with section 195 of the Constitution that establishes the
basic values and principles governing public administration, including
section 195 (e) of policy-making. It was consequent to this involvement
that the Respondent was informed during 1998 of payments laundered by
BAE via Swedish trade unions to bribe Mr Tony Yengeni and other ANC
members of parliament to support the arms deal. It was also consequent
to this involvement that the Respondent was approached in June 1999 by
ANC intelligence operatives with information that culminated in the so-
called “De Lille dossier” which was released in September 1999. Ms De
Lille and the Respondent held a joint press conference in Parliament on
30 November 1999 at which it was announced that evidence of corruption
had been forwarded to Judge Willem Heath for his evaluation and action.

8. Mr Yengeni was subsequently sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Mr
Schabir Shaik was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
The trials for corruption relating to the arms deal of former Deputy
President Jacob Zuma and Thomson CSF are still pending. The arms deal
saga continues, most recently having even ensnared the now suspended
Judge President of the Cape High Court, Mr Justice John Hlope.

9. BAE and its methods of operation fully meet the definition of
organised crime as contained in the preamble of the Prevention of
Organised Crime Act (1998). The company is now under investigation for
corruption by authorities in Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria,
Czech Republic, Tanzania and the United States and, in addition, by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has
international oversight over the OECD Conventions Against Bribery Of
Foreign Officials. Bribes to secure BAE’s warplane contracts with South
Africa form part of these international investigations.

10. The Respondent, having in the public interest expended an estimated
R5 million of his own funds in exposing the arms deal scandal, seeks
reimbursement of those funds plus interest compounded at 15 percent per
annum from 23 August 1999, being the date upon which Archbishop Ndungane
called for a full and public judicial investigation into the arms deal.
It is submitted that actions of the Respondent since 1996, taken in the
public interest, voluntarily and without financial remuneration, have
been fully vindicated.

11. Accordingly, the Court is requested to order the Applicant, in his
capacity of Minister of Finance, to reimburse these funds in light of
his responsibility for the affordability and financing of the arms deal,
and also in recognition that government officials are financially liable
for the consequences of their decisions.
DATED AT CAPE TOWN on the 28th day of AUGUST 2008.

--------------------------------------------
TERRY CRAWFORD-BROWNE
Sandown Crescent E105
Royal Ascot, Milnerton, Cape Town
TEL: 021-555-4059
c/o ST GEORGE’S CATHEDRAL
WALE STREET, CAPE TOWN
ATTN: MRS ANN COX
TO: THE REGISTRAR
HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN

AND TO: THE APPLICANT
TREVOR ANDREW MANUEL
C/O HIS ATTORNEYS
DCM GIHWALA/L BALDJIEV
2 LONG STREET, 21ST FLOOR
CAPE TOWN
TEL: 021-405-6000


IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(CAPE OF GOOD HOPE PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
CASE NO. 13704/08
In the matter between:
TREVOR ANDREW MANUEL APPLICANT
and
TERRY CRAWFORD-BROWNE RESPONDENT

RESPONDENT’S ANSWERING AFFIDAVIT
________________________________________________________________________
1. I am a retired international banker previously employed by Nedbank,
and presently resident at Sandown Crescent E105, Royal Ascot, Milnerton,
Cape Town. I am the author of Eye On The Money published in 2007 by
Umuzi, an imprint of Random House. I was appointed by Archbishop
Njongonkulu Ndungane in 1996 to represent the Anglican Church during the
1996-1998 Defence Review conducted in Parliament. It was then that
allegations first arose about bribes being paid by BAE to Tony Yengeni
and other politicians to secure their support for the “arms deal”.

2. I asked the British government to investigate, and the then Secretary
for Trade and Industry appointed the London Metropolitan Police to the
task. The eventual response was that it was not a crime in English law
to bribe foreigners, and therefore there was no crime to investigate.
That was in fact the case until December 2001, although it has for many
years been a crime in South Africa to accept bribes either from South
Africans or foreigners.

3. It has become evident over the past ten years that BAE is “organised
crime” on a scale that makes the Italian mafia seem like amateurs. BAE
holds unique influence within the British government which, inter alia
through its Defence Export Services Organisation and Export Credit
Guarantee Department, both heavily subsidises British arms exports and
assists with laundering of bribes through foreign middlemen to
politicians and political parties.

4. In June 1999 intelligence operatives from the African National
Congress (ANC) approached me with details of corruption around the then
Minister of Defence, the late Joe Modise and the leadership of
Umkhonto-we-Sizwe. A common denominator in these transactions –
including the arms deal, oil deals, tollroads, drivers licences,
taxi-recapitalisation, the Coega scheme, drugs and diamonds and weapons
trafficking, and money-laundering – was, the intelligence operatives
alleged, “kick-backs” averaging ten percent to the ANC in return for
political protection.

5. The operatives had approached me, they told me, specifically because
of my associations with both Archbishops Desmond Tutu and Njongonkulu
Ndungane and the Anglican Church. I reported these very serious
allegations to Archbishop Ndungane who in August 1999 with other leaders
of civil society called for an independent judicial investigation into
the arms deal.

6. When these appeals to our government were rebuffed, I introduced the
ANC operatives to Patricia de Lille, MP, and the so-called “De Lille
dossier” was released in September 1999. Evidence of corruption
supporting these allegations was then submitted to Judge Willem Heath
for his evaluation, as publicly announced by Ms De Lille on 30 November
1999. Ms de Lille and Archbishop Ndungane came under enormous pressure,
even death threats, to disclose the identities of the “whistleblowers.”
The identities of those ANC MPs who leaked their concerns about the arms
deal remain secret nine years later.

7. That the arms deal continues even after nine years to elicit huge
public concern and controversy is illustrated by the government’s
response and uproar to the Sunday Times exposés published on 3, 10 and
17 August 2008. These controversies will continue, despite massive
efforts by the government to squelch the scandal, until the arms deal is
fully and thoroughly exposed by, for instance, an independent judicial
commission of inquiry – as called for by Archbishop Ndungane on 23
August 1999.

8. The applicant, as Minister of Finance, was a pivotal player in the
arms deal’s cabinet sub-committee. His responsibilities were the
“affordability” of the arms deal acquisitions and financing by European
banks for periods up to 20 years. The other four members of that
committee were the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, and Ministers Alec
Erwin and the late Joe Modise and the late Stella Sigcau.

9. Despite vocal opposition from church leaders and others in civil
society, the cabinet persisted with the acquisition programme, and on 3
December 1999 the Secretary for Defence signed the supply contracts
subject to the finalisation of financing arrangements by the Minister of
Finance. It is therefore applicant’s signature as Minister of Finance
that gives effect to the arms deal.

10. Accordingly, I reiterate that my actions are not motivated by
personal malice against him, which he argues at huge length over 34
pages in paragraphs 15 to 128 of his founding 40 page affidavit dated 22
August 2008. I deny that I am “fixated” by the arms deal, or by any
personal malice against him. My motivation throughout this saga is
simply, as a citizen, to hold an unresponsive and indeed reckless
government minister to account. I have done so without financial
remuneration or thought of financial gain, albeit at considerable
financial and other costs to myself and to my family.

11. On the contrary, that the applicant is clearly “fixated” in this
respect is illustrated by a chance meeting at a coffee shop in Sandton
in August 2002 when he screamed at me in a public place – to the
astonishment of bystanders – “I will sue the pants off you, I will sue
the fucking pants off you. And there are witnesses here to that”. In
2004 he publicly described me as “the gorilla” on his back, an
unintended compliment I am happy to accept. In 2005 he tried twice and
failed twice to sequestrate me. And now six years after the Sandton
encounter, in the first eight months of 2008 he has already brought
three cases against me, namely case 5156/08, case 9120/08 and case 13704/08.

12. As a South African citizen, I am obligated by law to report even
suspicions of corruption. Section 8 of the Prevention of Organised Crime
Act (1998), as well as other legislation, provides that “failure to
report suspicions regarding proceeds of unlawful activities”… is
punishable by “a fine, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15
years.” Accordingly, my actions for the past ten years in drawing
national and international attention to the corruption associated with
the arms deal have met my obligations as a citizen, and have been fully
vindicated.

13. Both the British and South African governments were regularly kept
informed about the evidence of corruption relating to BAE that had been
referred to Judge Heath. My letter to British Minister Peter Hain dated
7 January 2000 informed him:
…the evidence is overwhelming and, most notably, that BAE is very
heavily implicated. Should, as we anticipate, the Heath Unit
substantiate the allegations of corruption, the contracts between BAE
and the South African government will be fraudulent and, consequently,
null and void. We and other members of civil society will then take
action to oblige the government to repudiate the contracts. Pending such
action, we again request the British government to meet its obligations
under the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, and to postpone conclusion
of the financing arrangements.

14. In addition, I verbally reminded the applicant on national radio
literally the day before he signed the loan agreements on 25 January
2000 that it would be fraudulent to proceed with these arrangements
pending Judge Heath’s investigations. Such warnings were brushed aside.

15. The BAE supply agreements and Barclays Bank loan agreements relating
to the BAE Hawk and BAE/Saab Gripen fighter aircraft acquisitions are in
my possession. The agreements have never been referred to Parliament,
yet their default clauses, in my judgement as a former international
banker, are a textbook example of “third world debt entrapment” by
European banks and governments.

16. It is these loan agreements (with similar agreements negotiated with
Commerzbank in respect of the German warships and a consortium of
Italian banks for the Italian helicopter contracts) signed by the
applicant, as Minister of Finance, which give effect to the arms deal.
He has signed “for and on behalf of the Republic of South Africa acting
through its Department of Finance,” thus again confirming his pivotal
role in the arms deal.

17. The consequence of the “De Lille dossier” and resultant
controversies over the arms deal was the appointment of the Joint
Investigation Team, from which in controversial circumstances Judge
Heath was excluded. The Joint Investigation Team Report into the
Strategic Defence Procurement Packages (the JIT report) was tabled in
Parliament on 14 November 2001. It found that every primary arms deal
contract was seriously flawed by tendering irregularities, yet one
contradictory paragraph (paragraph 14.1.1) in its executive summary
purportedly exonerated the government and cabinet from any improper or
unlawful conduct.

18. That key paragraph has been contested as having been irregularly
inserted by the President’s Office in mid October 2001 to divert
attention from presidential and ministerial culpability in the arms deal
debacle. It is irreconcilable from the rest of the 380 page JIT report.
Yet citing this one paragraph President Mbeki continues to reject
repeated civil society demands for a thorough and independent judicial
investigation.

19. Given my mandate from Archbishop Ndungane to represent the Anglican
Church at the Defence Review, I filed an application in the Cape High
Court (case 9987/2001) seeking the setting aside of the loan agreements
signed by the Minister. I did so in expectation that this would thereby
collapse the supply agreements with which the loan agreements are linked.

20. I submit that my criticisms of the applicant and his behaviour in
connection with the arms deal have been a) fair, b) accurate, and c)
have been made in the public interest.

Perjury:

21. Ms Maria Ramos, as Director General of the National Treasury and
against a confirmatory affidavit by the applicant responded to my
application on 6 March 2002, and in paragraph 53 affirmed, under oath:
The agreements he signed are self-standing loan agreements with binding
force and not dependent on any other agreement signed by government.

22. This was obviously a lie, and intended deliberately to mislead both
the court and me, and was thereby perjury. Perjury is defined in the
Principles of Criminal Law as:
Perjury consists in the unlawful and intentional making, upon oath,
affirmation or admonition and in the course of judicial proceedings
before a competent tribunal, of a statement which the maker knows to be
or foresees may be false.

23. All judicial systems rest upon presumptions that parties in a
dispute are telling the truth. That a Minister of Finance lies to a
court is therefore an exceedingly serious matter. It makes a mockery of
South Africa’s judicial system including the provisions of chapter 10 of
the Constitution that establishes the basic values and principles of
public administration.

24. The statement, under oath, was tantamount to declaring that the
mortgage loan on a house has nothing to do with an agreement to
purchase. Not only did it contradict the public statements in December
1999 that the supply agreements were conditional upon loan agreements
negotiated by the Minister of Finance, but the falsehood is confirmed by
page 12 of the Barclays Bank/Export Credit Guarantee Department loan
agreement signed on 25 January 2000 by “Trevor Manuel for and on behalf
of the Republic of South Africa acting through its Department of Finance.”

25. The purpose of the main loan agreement is clearly set out as the
purchase in five tranches of 24 BAE Hawk and 28 BAE/Saab Gripen fighter
aircraft, and associated equipment. The agreement is signed on page 47
by Trevor Manuel, and by Chris Leeds on behalf of the British government
and by Gabriel Buck on behalf of Barclays Bank PLC.

26. I informed the applicant that I had these documents during that
meeting in the Sandton coffee shop referred to in paragraph 10 above. He
obviously did not believe me at first, but his astonishing outburst and
threats confirmed that he would to go any lengths to prevent those
documents from becoming public. They have never been referred to
Parliament for requisite authority in terms of section 71 of the Public
Finance Management Act by way of a resolution of the National Assembly.

27. These loan agreements have been verified as authentic in the Cape
High Court before Judges Andre Blignaut and Dennis Davis. I am also in
possession of the BAE supply agreements. Although it was obvious to me
as a former banker that the Director General and Minister were lying, my
legal advisors insisted we should file for discovery of documents to
prove it (Case 5129/2002 filed on 5 July 2002).

28. Ms Ramos on behalf of Trevor Manuel objected in interlocutory
arguments that it was not in the national interest to disclose how the
government conducts its financial business. Judges Blignaut and Davis
considered and rejected these arguments, and in March 2003 awarded
discovery to me within ten days of the advice of the International
Offers Negotiating Team and Financial Working group papers.

29. The applicant and Ms Ramos then deliberately sought to frustrate the
court judgement, and as he confirms in paragraphs 23 to 29 his founding
affidavit. A document by Ms Ramos accompanying the “affidavit of
compliance” stipulated that my legal advisors could neither copy nor
communicate the contents of the documents to me. I objected regularly
that she was in contempt of court, and two months elapsed before she
finally supplied about 20 pages to my senior counsel in May 2003.

30. Advocate Norman Arendse SC acknowledged that he could not understand
the contents without my expertise and, in violation of Ms Ramos’s
instructions, read a few paragraphs to me. I recognised immediately that
Ms Ramos had returned the executive summary of the affordability study
which Idasa had published in May 2001, and which I had appended to my
application 9987/2001. In short, she had returned my own document with
instructions to my legal advisors that they were not to communicate the
contents to me.

31. Advocate Arendse admitted to me at that meeting that in representing
me in this controversial matter he was jeopardising his much more
lucrative government business. A mutual friend had alerted me a few days
earlier that Arendse was now trying “to throw the case”. The “penny
dropped!” In colluding with Ms Ramos, he had placed himself in an
untenable and unethical position, so in May 2003 I dismissed him as
senior counsel. Meanwhile, my attorney had collapsed with a nervous
breakdown because of pressures brought against him, and withdrew from
legal practice.

32. A new legal team had to be assembled. Only after two applications to
court for contempt of court judgements against the applicant and Ms
Ramos in September and November 2003 I finally received 224 pages of the
51 page arms deal affordability study plus its appendices. This was
still far short of the documents ordered by the court in March 2003 and
which, in respect of the International Offers Negotiating Team are
listed in paragraph 8.3.2 of chapter eight of the JIT report as:
• Minutes of the meetings held by IONT
• Minutes of the meetings held by the Ministers’ Committee.
• The report submitted by the Affordability Team of IONT.
• Minutes of Cabinet meetings.
• The terms of reference of IONT.
• Reports by IONT to the Ministers’ Committee.
• The Special Review of the SDP by the Auditor General.
Also excluded were the Financing Working Group papers, which were the
subject of chapter nine of the JIT report.

33. In a memo dated 19 November 2003 to my new legal advisors (appendix
A), I noted:
The docs received yesterday are very uneven and incomplete. Of 224
pages, 51 relate to three steel projects – the opening paragraph of
which says South Africa doesn’t need another steel mill. After
comparison with chapters eight and nine of the JIT report, it is evident
that we’ve only got part of the IONT and Financial Working group
documents….The Cabinet most certainly did not approve of the arms deal
on the basis of the documents we’ve got, given the repeated and
unambiguous warnings they contain about the risks involved. If they did,
they most certainly did “not apply their minds”….Having ignored these
warnings and signed the loan agreements, Trevor Manuel should be facing
criminal charges (my emphasis).

34 My new legal team proved disastrous, Advocate Paul Eia being
disinterested in the issues involved and only in maximising his fees. I
was mentally and financially exhausted by February 2004, but was
restrained from dismissing Eia only because of the negative impressions
it would have created. Predictably, we lost the case albeit the
judgement failed to address the merits. Judges Blignaut and Yekiso
ruled, notwithstanding the State Liability Act and Defence Special
Accounts Act, that the Minister of Finance was only implementing a prior
cabinet decision, and that we had therefore sued the wrong party. We had
however, also cited the President and the government of the Republic of
South Africa.

35. In February 2008 the applicant began litigation against me for
defamation (case 5156/2008) because I had written letters to the Cape
Argus published on 24 December 2007, and had them posted on my blogsite.
An interim order was given against me in March 2008, which I believe has
lapsed following failure of the applicant’s attorneys to comply with a
deed of settlement negotiated on 12 June 2008 and approved by the Acting
Judge President.

36. To defend myself in this matter, I filed an urgent application (case
7390/2008) for delivery of the documents awarded to me in 2003 by the
Cape High Court. I continue to believe that these documents will lay a
trail for forensic auditors and financial investigators to track BAE
bribery payments and the collusion of the British government and various
middle men in South Africa in BAE’s money laundering operations.

37. Mr Justice Dlodlo dismissed my application because too long a period
had elapsed. More pertinently, paragraphs 29 and 30 of his judgement
confirm that he relied heavily on the affirmation by the applicant in
May 2008 that he had complied with the 2003 order by Judges Blignaut and
Davis.

38. The pagination of the affordability study documents, including pages
08236, 08237, 08238 and 08239 supplied to me, provides prima facie
evidence that this is not so. It is evident that I received less than
2.8 percent of the documents of which discovery was ordered by the court
in 2003. This contention is confirmed by pages 248 to 259 in chapter
nine of the JIT report. Paragraph 9.1.1.5 notes:
The assessment of the affordability of the SDP, involved devising
methods to increase affordability and assessing the budgetary and
financial implications and fiscal impact of the proposed
acquisition….The final affordability assessment was submitted to the
Ministers’ Committee in August 1999. It was a voluminous document that
dealt comprehensively with all the relevant issues. It also superseded
all previous reports and inputs that were submitted on the matter of
affordability. It sufficiently equipped the Ministers concerned to make
a properly informed decision, as far as issues of affordability were
concerned. Affordability is ultimately a question of political choice.
The task of the Affordability Team was not to make that choice, but to
enable the ultimate decision makers to make a well-informed choice about
what the country could and could not afford.

39. Whilst 08239 pages can rightly be described as voluminous, the 224
pages that I received in November 2003, and only after two court
applications, plainly do not meet that description. These documents
included a 51 page affordability study, the balance being annexures.

40. The exposés published on 3, 10 and 17 August 2008 by the Sunday
Times now confirm that the 51 page version of the affordability study
delivered to me in November 2003 was only a draft version of the final
57 page affordability study that went to Cabinet in August 1999. This is
confirmed by even the most cursory comparisons of annexures B
and C.

41. The 57 page final version now in my possession, thanks to the Sunday
Times, is even more damning that the draft version I received in
November 2003. This revelation compounds the applicant’s perjuries, as
recently as May this year that he complied with the March 2003 discovery
judgement. Both versions of the affordability study confirm that the
applicant, as Minister of Finance, and his cabinet colleagues were
warned that the arms deal was a highly risky proposition that could lead
the “government into mounting fiscal, economic and financial difficulties.”

42. The only logical and rational conclusion to be reached is that the
applicant and his cabinet colleagues went to extreme measures:
• to ignore the warnings contained in the documents,
• to block public access to these documents, and
• to repeatedly and deliberately mislead the Court
because of huge bribes paid by the arms deal companies.

43 I have it on good authority that these documents amounting to some
770 000 pages remain in the custody of the Auditor General, and that a
lesser set of documents is still under the control of the Speaker of
Parliament. I believe that these documents will lay a trail to enable
forensic auditors and financial investigators to track the bribes that
motivated the arms deal.

44. I had already on 11 June 2008 requested the Cape High Court to
determine whether the applicant had committed perjury. Given the
subsequent Sunday Times exposés, on 20 August 2008 I filed criminal
charges of perjury and money laundering against the applicant with the
Specialised Crime Unit in Bellville. Superintendent Elizabeth L. de
Villiers has acknowledged receipt, albeit that the “unique reporting
reference number” required in terms of the Prevention and Combating of
Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 is given as 20/08/2008 – suspiciously just
the date.

45. The National Prosecuting Authority has been requested to investigate
these charges in conjunction with Acting Judge President Jeanette
Traverso, given the inter-relatedness of cases 5156/08, 9120/08 and
13704/08 brought against me by the applicant.

Money laundering:

46 The international civil society organisation, Transparency
International estimates that the international arms trade accounts for
approximately one percent of the world economy, yet is the root cause of
forty-five to fifty percent of world corruption. In the final analysis
only politicians and civil servants buy major weapons systems with
public tax funds, so the propensity for bribery and misallocation of
public moneys is huge.

47 The international notoriety of the German company, MAN Ferrostaal for
corruption was revealed by the Sunday Times exposé on 3 August 2008 that
a bribe of R30 million was paid to President Thabo Mbeki to secure the
submarine contracts with South Africa, of which R2 million was given to
former Deputy President Jacob Zuma and the balance of R28 million to the
ANC.
48. The German magazine Der Spiegel has revealed that Thyssen Krupp paid
“useful expenditures” of DM 30 million to secure the frigate contracts.
Thyssen Krupp doesn’t even deny these reports, but pleads that it was
then not illegal in German law and that such “useful expenditures” were
then even tax-deductible.

49. The payment of bribes by Thomson CSF (Thales) to Jacob Zuma is a
matter which for several years has dominated South Africa’s political
discourse. The saga and its documentation even include meetings between
then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and company executives regarding
“political guarantees”.

50. The malevolent consequences of the arms deal extend to the Cape High
Court and the current suspension of Judge John Hlope, and even to the
Constitutional Court. The checks and balances envisaged by the
Constitution have been shredded, and “chapter nine institutions” and
Parliament have been reduced to “rubber stamps”. So pervasive is the
scandal and the culture of corruption that it has unleashed that the
Institute For Democracy In South Africa (Idasa) describes the arms deal
as “the litmus test of South Africa’s commitment to democracy and good
governance”.

51. The corrupt practices of MAN Ferrostaal, Thyssen Krupp and Thomson
CSF are however, completely dwarfed by the venal influence of the
British armaments company, BAE. The preamble to South Africa’s
Prevention of Organised Crime Act (1998) declares:
There is a rapid growth of organised crime, money laundering and
criminal gang activities nationally and internationally, and organised
crime has been internationally identified as an international security
threat. Organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities
infringe of the rights of the people as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
It is usually very difficult to prove the direct involvement of
organised crime leaders in particular cases because they do not perform
the actual criminal activities themselves.

52. The involvement of then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in
1985 was pivotal in the negotiations for the £43 billion Al Yamamah arms
deal between BAE and Saudi Arabia. So notorious were kickbacks and
bribery associated with this transaction that a 1992 British National
Audit Office report into its irregularities remains suppressed even from
British parliamentarians. It is the only such report in British history
to be so suppressed because of the political embarrassments its release
would cause.

53. British civil society -- notably Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT),
the Corner House and the Guardian newspaper – have continued to demand
that successive British governments reveal the influence that BAE holds
over them. There are huge quantities of information available on their
respective websites, and which is accordingly in the public domain.

54. Prime Minister Tony Blair in December 2006 intervened to pressure
the British Serious Fraud Office (SFO) to squelch its investigation into
bribes BAE paid to members of the Saudi royal family. Mr Blair insisted
that the SFO investigation threatened British national security because
BAE and Saudi Prince Bandar had apparently implied “there would be blood
in the streets of London”.

55. CAAT and the Corner House took the SFO to court for unlawfully
yielding to Mr Blair’s pressure, and in April 2008 won their case. The
SFO then took the matter to the British House of Lords which on 30 July
2008 upheld the appeal on the basis that the SFO was within its rights
to decide that British national security was at stake.

56. Despite that setback, BAE bribes are also now under investigation by
authorities in Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Czech Republic, Tanzania
and the United States, as well as by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) which has international oversight
over implementation of the OECD Conventions Against Bribery of Foreign
Officials. The OECD in March 2007 censured the British government for
non-compliance with these conventions.

57. The United States Congress and the US Department of Justice are also
investigating, and in recent months the Federal Bureau of Investigation
has against subpoenas detained for questioning executives of BAE
including the Deputy Chairman of Barclays Bank as they transited
American airports. The Americans want to know why BAE, with collusion of
the British Ministry of Defence over a ten year period, laundered bribes
relating to the Al Yamamah deal of over £1 billion to Saudi Prince
Bandar through the defunct Riggs Bank in Washington DC.

58. Prince Bandar was the Saudi ambassador in Washington for 22 years.
He is the son of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and nephew of the
Saudi king, and is currently responsible for Saudi Arabian security
operations. A recent biography entitled The Prince by William Simpson
includes two curious forewords, one by Mrs Thatcher and the other by Mr
Nelson Mandela. Prince Bandar was a frequent visitor to South Africa at
the time the arms deal was being negotiated and, extraordinarily, was
the only “outsider” to be invited to witness Mr Mandela’s marriage to Ms
Graca Machel.

59. Mr Mandela has acknowledged that Saudis were major donors to
campaign funds for the ANC. President Mbeki also has a close
relationship with Prince Bandar who, at last, is being exposed as a
“bagman” both for BAE and the American Central Intelligence Agency.

60. Evidence emerging in the United States suggests that the Al Yamamah
transactions also included the provision of a 600 000 barrel per day oil
fund administered by the Bank of England on behalf of BP and Royal Dutch
Shell, and that this fund is now estimated to be worth US$100 billion.
The purpose of the fund is alleged as finance for covert destabilisation
of the Middle East and Africa in pursuit of oil and other natural
resources. President George Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney are
alleged to be deeply involved, hence the belligerent United States
foreign policy interventions in the Middle East and Africa.

61. BAE now derives more than 50 percent of its sales in the United
States, and has been an enormous financial beneficiary of the war
launched against Iraq in 2003 by the British and US governments. In his
first six years in office, Prime Minister Tony Blair involved Britain in
five wars.

62 In addition, “Africa’s First World War” in the Democratic Republic of
Congo is estimated to have caused the deaths of between six and ten
million people. It is so named because of the plunder of natural
resources in the DRC on behalf of the “war business” which has such
high-level political influence in the “first world.” The United Nations
in 2001 named BAE agents, including Zimbabwean John Bredenkamp, as key
players in this tragedy which has reverberated into the political and
social catastrophe now unfolding in Zimbabwe.

63. For the present time, BAE through its influence in the House of
Lords, has successfully squelched the SFO investigation into bribes paid
to Saudi Arabia. The Sowetan newspaper on 13 August 2008 confirmed
however, after inquiry that the SFO investigations into bribes paid to
secure BAE’s contracts with South Africa are ongoing. This information
contradicts the declarations at a press conference on 6 August 2008 by
Ministers Essop Pahad and Alec Erwin and the Director General for the
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Menzi Simelane
that the SFO “has terminated the investigation.”

64. In addition to the SFO investigation into BAE bribes paid in South
Africa, there are other investigations into bribes paid in Chile,
Rumania, Czech Republic, Qatar, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and other countries.
In short, BAE’s massive international racketeering and money laundering
operations are at last being exposed, and the South African bribes are
the second in priority after those paid in Saudi Arabia.

65. The former British Secretary for Trade and Industry in 2003 admitted
in the British Parliament that “commissions” (for which read “bribes”)
had been paid to secure BAE warplane contracts with South Africa but,
she pleaded, “they were within reasonable limits.” British investigators
have determined that BAE had intended to pay bribes of £200 million to
secure these contracts but, following intervention by the British
government, these were scaled back to “only” £112 million (R1.7 billion
equivalent).

66. The Export Credit Guarantees Department (ECGD) underwrites British
arms exports, and falls under the jurisdiction of the Secretary for
Trade and Industry. BAE is by far the ECGD’s largest client, accounting
to between 35 and 50 percent of its business, and is notoriously
inclined to cast a blind eye to corruption in the promotion of major
British exports such as weapons, dam construction and power stations. It
is one of the vehicles through which the British government hugely
subsidises British arms exports. The loan agreements signed by the
applicant that give effect to the BAE Hawk and BAE/Saab Gripen fighter
aircraft contracts are underwritten by the ECGD, and were signed on
behalf of the British government by the director of the ECGD, Chris Leeds.

67. Another such organisation has been the Defence Export Services
Organisation (DESO) in the Ministry of Defence, and there is a notorious
“revolving door” between these governmental organisations and BAE. The
British Department of Trade and Industry seconded British officials to
the South African Department of Trade and Industry, purportedly to
ensure the success of the arms deal’s offset projects.

68. The former British Prime Minister Tony Blair exerted huge pressure
upon the South African government to buy the BAE warplanes that the SAAF
rejected as both too expensive and unsuited to South African
requirements. He made several trips to this country to lobby for BAE,
and it is noteworthy that his last official foreign visit before
retiring in 2007 was to South Africa.

69. As the Sunday Times and other investigations have confirmed, the
offset projects have proved to be a dismal failure. The arms deal was
driven by the economically-absurd proposition that expenditure of R30
billion on armaments would generate R110 billion in offsets to create
over 65 000 jobs, and thus stimulate South Africa’s economic
development. That this is the reality – notwithstanding subsequent
denials by Minister Alec Erwin and the applicant – is confirmed by the
late Minister of Defence’s last budget address to Parliament in 1999,
and by the JIT report.

70. Chapter four of the JIT report pertains to the BAE contracts. Our
government was informed by the South African Air Force as early as July
1997 that BAE’s proposals were unacceptable. BAE repeatedly subsequently
failed the tendering criteria until cost was removed from consideration,
and the late Joe Modise intervened on BAE’s behalf. The so-called
“non-costed option” – presumably bribes -- trumped all objections to the
BAE proposals.

71. The Auditor General in September 1999 complained to the cabinet that
BAE was being unduly favoured in the arms deal. His concerns expressed
to Parliament in September 2000, including the use of “non-costed”
options, led to the JIT investigation and report.

72. Chapter four of that report found that the South African Air Force
as early as July 1997 had rejected BAE proposals, and that the former
Minister of Defence – the late Joe Modise – had irregularly intervened
to change the tendering criteria so that cost was removed from
consideration. The former Secretary for Defence resigned rather than
take accounting responsibility for such blatant abuses of tendering
procedures.

73. Section 217 (1) of the Constitution regarding government
procurements explicitly requires that government procurements must be
conducted “in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable,
transparent, competitive and cost-effective”. In short, there is no way
that the BAE contracts meet this requirement. Yet both the late Mr
Modise’s last budget speech to Parliament and the JIT report confirm
unequivocally that both the Ministers of Trade and Industry and of
Finance enthusiastically supported this charade, and that offsets would
stimulate South African economic development:

74. British investigators have determined that of the £112 million in
bribes that BAE paid to secure its contracts with South Africa, over £70
million was paid through a BAE front company in the British Virgin
Islands styled Red Diamond Trading Company, and a further £6 million
through a BAE unit called HQ Marketing. An additional £10 million was
paid in 2003 through another front company, Kayswell Services to John
Bredenkamp whose Aviation Consulting Services is the Southern African
agent for both BAE and Italy’s Agusta company, the supplier of the 30
utility helicopters.

75. MNET’s Carte Blanche programme on 11 November 2007 aired its
investigation of the arms deal, including an interview with the former
director of the SFO who confirmed BAE’s use of Red Diamond Trading
Company to transfer funds “to various middlemen around the globe to sway
government decisions”, and that bribes to South Africa are amongst those
being investigated. Andrew Feinstein and I were interviewed at length
for this Carte Blanche investigation.

76. The Mail and Guardian newspaper has been highly instrumental over
the years in focussing public attention on the arms deal. Many of its
articles focus on BAE, and its network of agents in South Africa.
Prominent amongst these agents is Basil Hersov, the former chair of
First National Bank as well as Anglo-Vaal.

77. Mr Hersov was closely involved in the apartheid era “Defence
Council,” and in 1992 became a consultant to BAE. Despite his apartheid
era involvements, he was appointed to the Airborne Trust linked to the
late Joe Modise and Umkhonto-we-Sizwe. In addition, Mr Hersov would
later become a member of President Mbeki’s Economic Advisory Panel.

78. First National Bank in 1992 acquired a London bank, Henry Ansbacher
which over a thirty year period had attracted a notorious reputation as
one of the world’s leading money laundering institutions. This
acquisition was in turn acquired by First Rand Bank in 1998. Ansbacher
included sham operations in the Cayman Islands and other offshore
banking centres and, together with First National Bank, was probably the
vehicle through which BAE bribes were transferred to South African
beneficiaries. It also became the vehicle through which via “loop
structures” wealthy South African residents were encouraged to breach
this country’s exchange control regulations.

79. Ansbacher was sold to Qatar National Bank in 2004 but, curiously,
the financial records of these transactions are alleged to have
“disappeared.” In 2007 First Rand Bank sought an urgent interdict in the
Cape High Court against Noseweek magazine to prevent disclosure of these
operations. Humiliatingly, First Rand Bank lost the case.

80. As Minister of Finance, the applicant has repeatedly thwarted
thorough investigations into the arms deal. This behaviour includes his
defiance during February 2001 of the parliamentary Standing Committee on
Public Accounts, on which Andrew Feinstein was then the senior member of
the African National Congress. As Minister of Finance, his
responsibility in the arms deal was its affordability and financing. Yet
he must also have been aware of the bribes that were being laundered by
the various arms deal companies. If he chose “to look the other way,” he
was criminally derelict in his duties.

81. As the political head of the National Treasury, it is inconceivable
that the applicant was unaware of money laundering operations conducted
by Henry Ansbacher and First National Bank. He not only enabled it to
happen, but allowed it to happen. Noseweek 97 in November 2007 revealed
that Ansbacher’s clients included Basil Hersov, the late Richard Charter
(another BAE agent in South Africa) and John Brownrigg, one of Brett
Kebble’s associates.

82. At best, the applicant was both criminally incompetent and
criminally negligent if he was blind to these developments. The public
record indicates however, that he was actively involved. The Carte
Blanche transcript records an extraordinary exchange in Parliament on 21
June 2005 between the applicant and Ms Patricia de Lille, MP after she
had named several people allegedly involved in arms deal corruption.
Trevor Manuel (Finance Minister): We didn’t go to a bargain basement
sale to find the cheapest aeroplane on the market. We wanted to equip
the air force with the best. So the fact that it [BAE] wasn’t the
cheapest is neither here nor there. The honourable De Lille has no idea
what she is talking about. She is a useful idiot in the hands of those
who failed in their bids to secure the contracts.
That the government “wanted to equip the air force with the best” has
however, been thoroughly disproved.

83. The logical conclusion is that the BAE Hawk and BAE/Saab Gripen
fighter aircraft – like the German warships were bought for the bribes,
and that Mr Manuel was fully aware of that reality. The Carte Blanche
transcript also notes that the ANC’s then Treasurer, Mendi Msimang
refused to participate in its programme.

84. Mr Msimang was South Africa’s High Commissioner in London at the
time that BAE was lobbying for the warplane contracts, and was thus in a
unique position before he became Treasurer of the ANC. Documents
relating to President Mbeki’s irregular involvement on behalf of Thomson
CSF record that Mr Msimang was also present at some of these meetings.
Why, one asks, would the Treasurer of the ANC be present at arms deal
meetings unless the agenda included the payment of bribes?

85. As noted in paragraphs 65 and 73, the bribes that BAE paid to secure
its contracts with South Africa are estimated by British investigators
at £112 million (R1.7 billion equivalent). Mr Feinstein, on page 177 of
his book After The Party, records a conversation with Trevor Manuel in
which Manuel pressured him to drop the parliamentary investigation into
the arms deal. A copy of his affidavit has already been filed with the
Court on 11 June 2008, and the original has been filed with Specialised
Crime Unit on 20 August 2008, and another copy is now included herewith
as (appendix D). It reads:
Sworn by Andrew Feinstein on the 10th of June 2008 in London.
This is to confirm that, as I state on page 177 of my book “After The
Party: A Personal and Political Journey Inside the ANC” (Jonathan Ball
Publishers, 2007), I had lunch with Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, at a
restaurant near Parliament in Cape Town called Speakers Corner while I
was an ANC MP trying to investigate the arms deal. Manuel said to me:

“We all know JM [as Joe Modise was known]. It’s possible there was some
shit in the deal. But if there was, no one will ever uncover it. They’re
not that stupid. Just let it lie. Focus on the technical stuff, which
was sound.” I responded that there were even problems with the technical
aspects, and warned that if we didn’t get to the bottom of the deal now,
it would come back to haunt us.

86. The implication is clear. The applicant knew, or at least suspected,
that Joe Modise was receiving bribes from arms deal companies. Yet he
did nothing about reporting his suspicions and, worse, has actively been
involved in the arms deal cover-up. Section 7 of The Prevention of
Organised Crime Act (1998) clearly requires any person who suspects such
unlawful activities to report his suspicions.

87. Whether the applicant did or did not personally benefit from such
bribes is immaterial. The penalties are set out in section 8:
8. (1) Any person convicted of an offence contemplated in section 4, 5
or 6 shall be liable to a fine not exceeding R100 million, or to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 30 years.
(2) Any person convicted of an offence contemplated in section 7 (7)
shall be liable to a fine, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding
15 years.

88. It is now for the National Prosecuting Authority to investigate
these matters, and to take appropriate action. In addition, the
applicant has been and remains a senior member of the ANC’s National
Executive Council. Again, he is expected to “keep his eyes open” to the
prospects of bribery and corruption, and to take appropriate action. Mr
Feinstein then recounted on the same page in his book that another
senior member of the ANC’s NEC invited him to his house one Sunday:.
Sitting outside in the sunshine he explained to me that I was never
going to “win this thing’.
‘Why not,’ I demanded.
‘Because we received money from some of the winning companies. How do
you think we funded the 1999 election’?

89. That revelation is highly pertinent since it is public knowledge
that the ANC has been financially insolvent for most of the past 18
years since it was unbanned in 1990. As affirmed in paragraph 4 above,
the ANC intelligence operatives informed me back in June 1999 that the
arms deal was just the tip of the corruption iceberg, the common
denominator was kickbacks to the ANC in return for political protection.

90. The Institute for Security Studies and the Mail and Guardian have
exposed the Chancellor House as yet another vehicle for ANC corruption.
Mr Msimang announced at the ANC Congress in Polokwane in December 2007
that the ANC is no longer insolvent and, miraculously, that it now
boasts assets of R1.75 billion. This, apparently, makes the ANC one of
the richest political parties anywhere in the world, yet the ANC until
now has refused to open its books to public scrutiny on the spurious
excuse that it is a private entity.

91. The implications for South Africa’s democracy are dire, hence my
requests to both the National Prosecuting Authority and the Court that
the provisions of The Prevention of Organised Crime Act (1998) are
applied to the ANC, and also that both “bribors” and “bribees” are
prosecuted.

Claim for Reimbursement:

92. I have throughout the years of the arms deal scandal endeavoured to
be completely transparent, precisely because I have deemed that I have
been acting in the public interest. The information that has accrued to
me followed my involvement in representing the Anglican Church at the
Defence Review conducted in Parliament during 1996 to 1998. In this
respect, I wish to pay tribute to members of the media who have kept the
arms deal scandal on the front pages throughout this long and sorry saga.

93. It is consequently not coincidental that the applicant now wishes to
destroy the fundamental guarantees of freedom of expression contained in
section 16 (1) (a) and (b) of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. He
spuriously attempts to “dress up” his complaint against me as an issue
of contempt of court, and outrageously seeks a jail sentence which
unctuously, he suggests, should be suspended. He claims that he does not
wish to be “vindictive”.

94. The applicant is an arrogant politician, who has failed in his
constitutional obligations to the people of South Africa, and who now
further abuses the powers of political office in a desperate attempt to
block public exposure of his complicity in the corruption of the arms
deal. Had he done his job properly in 1998 and 1999, South Africa would
have been spared the social, economic and political crises that threaten
our country’s hard-won struggle for democracy. The security priority of
social upliftment of the poor, which was identified in the 1995 Defence
White Paper and by faith-based representatives at the Defence Review,
was abandoned in the face of huge bribes paid by European arms companies
with collaboration of their governments.

95. Instead of refusing to append his signatures to the foreign loan
agreements that give effect to the arms deal, the applicant
“prostituted” himself for the perks and powers of public office. In so
doing, he has made a mockery of constitutional commitments of
accountable and transparent public administration.

96. In the public interest, I have repeatedly pleaded with the President
and ministers to “come clean” on the arms deal. The applicant’s lawyers
and I on 12 June 2008 came to a “Deed Of Settlement”, which was approved
by the Acting Judge President of the Court. The background to that
agreement was hope that a settlement would be reached before 25 July
2008, failing which the applicant’s attorneys would schedule the court
processes so that cases 5156/08 and 9120/08 could be completed before
the end of 2008. That date of 25 July 2008 is clearly set out in my
letter dated 12 June 2008 to Mr D Gihwala (appendix E).

97. No settlement was reached by 25 July 2008, nor did the applicant’s
attorneys make any attempt to schedule the court processes so that cases
5156/08 and 9120/08 could be completed by year-end. Failing any such
attempts, I contend that the interim order against me of 6 March 2008
thereby lapsed on 25 July 2008. Accordingly, I can not be construed as
being in contempt-of-court for any communications with the Sunday Times
or other media after 25 July 2008.

98. In paragraphs 100 to 105 of his founding affidavit, the applicant
makes the claim of my alleged mala fides that I have attempted to extort
money from him, failing which I threatened to institute criminal charges
of perjury and money laundering. My letter to his attorneys dated 12
August 2008 is appended herewith (appendix F).

99. As noted in paragraph 44 above, I filed such charges against the
applicant on 20 August 2008 with the Specialised Crime Unit in
Bellville. As the applicant should know by now, I do not issue idle
threats. I reject, with disgust, his insinuations that I have attempted
to extort money from him.

100. As set out in paragraph 10 above, my motivation throughout this ten
year saga is simply, as a citizen, to hold an unaccountable and indeed
reckless government minister to account. I have done so without
financial remuneration or thought of financial gain, albeit at
considerable financial and other costs to myself and to my family.

101. In paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Notice of Respondent’s Amendments
and Counterclaim, I set out the request to the Court that it orders the
applicant to reimburse me the sum of R5 million plus interest at 15 per
annum since 23 August 1999. This is not a matter of extortion, but the
fundamental principle of holding the applicant and other government
officials accountable and financially liable for the consequences of
their conduct and decisions.

102. Again, I reject the applicant’s insinuations of extortion and/or of
money-grubbing. If any settlement is to be reached, I insist that there
will be no suggestion now or in future that the applicant withdrew his
litigation against me for any altruistic reasons. Reimbursement of my
costs will prove that point.

______________________________
TERRY CRAWFORD-BROWNE

I certify that:
1. the deponent has acknowledged that:
1.1 he knows and understands the contents of this declaration;
1.2 he has no objection to taking the prescribed oath;
1.3 he considers the oath binding on his conscience.
2. the deponent thereafter uttered the words “I swear that the contents
of this declaration are true, so help me God”.
3. the deponent signed this declaration in my presence at the address
set out on this 28th day of August 2008.

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COMMISSIONER OF OATHS