Much like the rest of Africa, the black population of Zimbabwe is still suffering from structural underdevelopment. Socio-economic inequality is embedded, with a dispossession of access to a basic array of assets (such as land, access to credit) & general socio-economic dispossession historically a legacy of colonialism, but also due to locally and regionally determined corruption and economic mismanagement. It is a situation further ingrained by other factors contributing to socio-economic deprivation such as debt peonage, non-mutually beneficial international trade practices, enforcement of neoliberal policies which enforce narrowly-focused economic policies which have dogmatic attachment to privatisation and financial liberalisation, the monopolizing acts of transnational corporations, a lack of priority given to research and investment in smallholder agricultural development for domestic economic development, and a thin tapestry of infrastructural development related to essential services such as water, sewage, roads, transport, health and education.

While ZanuPF have mismanaged their economy and brutally supressed the opposition, they tightened their grip over the country through, as Simon Jenkins in the Guardian describes, by running the economy as "a basket case of pseudo-socialist kleptomania"(!); Mugabe had the chance to make Zimbabwe truly independent through slow transition and gradual land redistribution in 1998, but he blew it, and has been crashing the economy just to keep the politbureau's head above water ever since.
Doubts remain over the financing of the MDC by western backers and their enthusiasm for privatisation, with western financial capital looking to ride on the coat-tails of the installation of MDC into power. The extent of the accusation that the MDC is seeking to
facilitate the recolonisation of the country claimed by Mugabe sympathisers is, however, unsubstantiated, since much of the talk of privatisation and shrinking the amount of state employees is really all about reducing the nepotism and flabby bureaucracy familiar to
many post-independence bureaucratic-heavy "socialist" African states of which Zimbabwe is the last remaining. At the same time, consideration needs to be given to the fact that whilst the free competition promised by global capitalism only applies to rich and powerful countries, in Africa, nation states have to make commitments
to pro-Western standards of democracy measured by good governance, accountability and transparency - standards which some Western countries themselves do not meet. The hypocrisy of President Bush denouncing Zimbabwe's alleged election irregularities of 2002 was not lost on anyone.


this text is rather long (so save it and read later on if not now),
because it includes:
1). What the Western Media don't tell you
2).Zimbabwe: a history
3). Both sides of the equation:
Resumes of the record of ZanuPF and the MDC

************************************************************

1).
What the Western Media don't tell you:
The coverage of what is happening in Zimbabwe has consistently refrained from offering any in-depth analysis of the deeper historical situation in the country, the HIV crisis in Zimbabwe whereupon by 1997, 25% of the population was infected, the legacy of massive inequality and impoverishment, with news reporting back in 2000 only substantively concentrating upon the plight of the white farming community with hardly any recognition of the extent of unequal land distribution in the country and the long-standing socio-economic implications experienced by the majority of the black Zimbabwean population as a result of it, nor the IMF's austere, narrowly focused
neoliberal instruction which brought about the collateral damage of slow economic strangulation of the domestic economy during the 1990s, reversing the expansion of social and public services which the Zimbabwe government had embarked upon after independence.

The western media also do not give any analysis as to the background of the main opposition - the MDC, despite having had ample opportunity to do so over the years.

2).
Zimbabwe: a history:
In 1889, a Royal Charter was granted to the British South Africa Company to settle and administer what was to become Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The Company granted large tracts of land to the pioneer white settlers with no regard to the distribution of the native African population. As early as 1894, the Company started setting aside land in Matabeleland for exclusive occupation of Africans in areas that were dry and previously uninhabitated. The official view was that land of inferior quality was more suited to native than to European occupation. The policy marked the beginning of the setting up of 'reserves' for the exclusive occupation of Africans.

In 1925, a Land Commission chaired by Morris Carter concluded that "until the native had advanced very much further on the paths of civilisation, it is better that the points of contact ...should be reduced" (Land Commission Report, 1925, p 4-5). The Commission's recommendations were given legal effect by the Land Apportionment Act
(1930). The Act was to become the most contentious piece of legislation ever passed by a Rhodesian Government. The right of an African to land ownership anywhere in the country was rescinded. Under the provisions of the Act, no African could hold or occupy land in the designated European Area. The position regarding 'reserves' did not change except that they were increased to ninety-eight. The foundation was laid for a society divided into two sharply demarcated and virtually closed social sections. Land segregation based on race was complete with mutually exclusive legal occupation of whites and blacks in their respective areas. This blatantly discriminatory and palpably
unjust legislation condemned millions of blacks to 'reserves' that were unsuitable for commercial farming both in terms of agro-ecological conditions and remoteness from the market centres in towns and mines.

Historically, land has been for over a hundred years the soul of African politics in Zimbabwe. The bitterness towards the creation of 'reserves' intensified following the passage of the Land Apportionment Act, 1930. The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, the Bantu Voter's Association and the Matabele Home Society expressed their
hostility towards the acquisition of land by white settlers. They were deeply resentful of the fact that blacks had to be forced into the 'reserves' and would be allowed to buy land only in the marginally productive Native Purchase Areas. [1. Munjomo]

One of the most fiercely contested issues during the armed campaign in the 1970s was land. Chimurenga (the Liberation Struggle) was a war for land. The Patriotic Front (comprising Zanu-PF and PF-Zapu - the political wings of the guerilla movements) foresaw the need to acquire land to resettle people who had been displaced by the war and other landless people, numbering 162,000 families by 1980. Under the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement (1979), the Patriotic Front undertook to guarantee the existing property rights in return for the British Government agreeing to underwrite half the costs of the resettlement programme. Land for resettlement had to be acquired
on the basis of 'willing seller and willing buyer'. The agreement endured for ten years, expiring in 1990.

The Lancaster House Agreement was replaced by the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, which removed the "willing buyer, willing seller" clause, empowering the government to "buy land compulsorily for redistribution, and a fair compensation to be paid for land acquired". The act stipulated that landowners were given 30 days to submit written objections, which is what happened with about 500 of the farms which the government intended to acquire (landowners could also challenge in court the price set by the acquiring authority). However, Zimbabwe found itself increasingly cash-strapped as an economic structural adjustment programme (SAP) set by the IMF imposed a series
of austere measures on the economic management of the economy. Due in part also to resistance from the white farming community, between November 1987 and the start of 2000, only 78 farms totalling 166,415 hectares were acquired for the resettlement of 1685 families (Munjomo). Land which was brought forward for redistribution was
invaribly of marginal productivity.

Whilst some of the IMF's measures were designed to improve the efficiency and performance of the Zimbabwean economy such as a 40% devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar and the removal of price and wage controls, the IMF's SAP caused damage to socio-economic conditions in Zimbabwe. The SAP struck at the very heart of the political and economic programme followed by Mugabe's government since independence.
This was to expand social and public services while leaving the white settler community's share of the country's land, wealth and income intact. By cutting social provision, structural adjustment removed the very limited safety net for the nation's people at the same time as increasing the overall level of poverty. The IMF forced Zimbabwe to introduce tax breaks for foreign capital and reduce corporation tax to attract transnational corporations, whilst at the same time abolishing state-funded initiatives which supported agricultural smallholders and agricultural extension services - at best an authoritarian logic by the IMF, at worst an approach which sought to re-establish neocolonial relations and increase Zimbabwe's capitulation to the vagaries of western financial capital and transnational corporations. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) concentrated upon reducing government involvement in the production, distribution and marketing of agricultural inputs and commodities, which included the liberalisation of the Grain Marketing Board and grain prices in 1995. Liberalisation measures involved the dramatic reduction in the number of GMB collection points which rural smallholders and farmers traditionally sold to GMB depots, from where it had been distributed to retail outlets, with a reserve held as the country's Strategic Grain Reserve. The GMB reduced the number of depots in rural areas to zero by 1996, which coincided with the setting up of a regional trading team in Harare by global Transnational Grain Corporation Cargill in the same year).(3. source: SAPRI).

The IMF SAP was imposed as conditionalities to be implemented in return for repayments of a debt to the IMF which amounted to £5 billion by 2000, the source of which came originally from the intensification of conflict in the 1980s from Apartheid South Africa against Zimbabwe as well as Angola, Mozambique and Zambia (increased
debt resulted as the government borrowed to finance the growing defence budget and more resources were needed to ensure that the influx of refugees fleeing from Apartheid wars in Mozambique were housed).

During the 1990s students, trade unionists, and workers often demonstrated to express their discontent with the government. Students protested in 1990 against proposals for an increase in government control of universities and again in 1991 and 1992 when they clashed with police. Trade unionists and workers also criticised the government during this time. In 1992 police prevented trade unionists from holding anti-government demonstrations. In 1994 widespread industrial unrest weakened the economy. In 1996 civil servants, nurses, and junior doctors went on strike over salary issues.[4]

In 1997, the UK's new Labour government announced they would be changing the terms of an agreement related to the provision of a financial assistance package from the UK and other donors to support compensation and related aid assistance for land redistribution in Zimbabwe, subjecting it's terms to a review (the UK is said to have
contributed £44m between 1980 and 1990, though Timothy Stamps, Zimbabwe's British health minister, says only £17m was contributed by Britain; UK contributions in terms of aid to Zimbabwe stands at half a billion pounds since independence). The programme had expired in 1996 and the terms for this assistance were re-assessed to redress what the UK viewed as Zimbabwe's poor record on poverty and transparency, not convinced that Zimbabwe had a serious poverty eradication strategy or that it was giving priority to land reform to help the poor, though the impact of IMF structural adjustment had indirectly undermined measures to alleviate poverty. Awareness of a hypocritical process at play underlying what was a genuinely well-intentioned focus from the UK government likely gave Zanu PF legitimisation to ignore the logic of land sale compensation to white farms.

The new stipulations from the UK were the principles enshrined in the 'Land Reform and Resettlement Conference' of 1998 - commitments agreed to there by Zimbabwe to poverty reduction and transparency in the disposal of funds for land redistribution to ensure the continuation of the financial assistance package. The Conference was attended by 48 countries and international organizations, where there was unamimous
endorsement of a land programmme which entailed the compulsory purchase over 5 years of 50,000 km² from the 112,000 km² owned by commercial farmers (both black and white), public corporations, churches, non-governmental organizations and multi-national companies. The Land Reform and Resettlement Conference of 1998 had agreed a very sophisticated set of mechanisms within an institutional framework
involving both the Zimbabwe government in collaboration with the UNDP, funded by the donor assistance programme, involving state institutions and civil society bodies (including NGOs with technical expertise, farming & women organisations). Innovative approaches to land reform and resettlement were to be to piloted, with the Zimbabwe government in charge of the technical support unit responsible for delivery, supervised by an inter-ministerial of resettlement and rural development, with technical advisory services provided by a team of independent technical experts. [5]

As much as anything else, Zimbabwe may well have viewed such sophisticated arrangements with distrust, perceiving them as some kind of external colonial interference. However, most prominant was the fact that as the UK government started to exert these conditions, Zanu PF's political elite became aware that the principle of transparancy would see an end to the appropriation of some of this money which they
had been benefiting from for a number of years until 1996. Intriguingly, the 1998 deal which earmarked 50,000km-sq to be compulsorily purchased out of a total area of 112,000km-sq in the first 5 years suggests that if the 4500 mainly white commercial
farming community who owned 42.7% of the country - an area of 24 million acres or 97,124km-sq - was less than the 112,000 figure, this might suggest another reason why ZanuPF was against the deal, namely that land belonging to black capitalist farmers associated with ZanuPF was under threat within the very same deal.

Of course, the transparency stipulation also neccessarily would have made it difficult for ZanuPF to easily deliver land to all members of it's support-base, with pressure coming from Zanu-PF's knife wielding powerbase - Zanla ex-combatants, the war veterans - who were increasingly getting impatient with Mugabe and Zanu PF to deliver land redistribution. On December 9, 1997 a national strike had paralyzed the country. Mugabe was panicked by demonstrations by the war veterans, who had been the heart of incursions 20 years earlier in the Bush War. He agreed to pay them large gratuities and pensions, which proved to be a wholly unproductive and unbudgeted financial commitment (in 1998, the IMF rejected the government's application for a new
loan on the grounds that up to 3% of GDP was being given to the war veterans). The discontent with the government spawned draconian government crackdowns which in turn started to destroy both the fabric of the state and of society. This is turn brought with it further discontent within the population. Thus a vicious downward spiral
commenced.[6]

It was in this background that Mugabe then exploited the political capital out of resisting the whole arrangement with the UK just as Zanu PF's own domestic mandate was under threat from the resergent MDC.

The MDC's star had grown from the early 1990s onwards, from the growing movement of dissent amongst workers' movements against structural adjustment policies of the IMF, which fostered union-based, student and other smaller-scale resistance, eventually leading to the formation of the 'National Constitutional Assembly' and then the
'Movement for Democratic Change' (MDC). The dominant strategy of this accumulated resistance was bounded within a dominant constitutional and legal framework - i.e. to seek, through existing societal and state institutions, an expression of growing popular demands for changing the character and content of those institutions; ie, they set
about to campaign for a new constitution. [7]

In response to these moves by the National Constitutional Assembly, a group of academics, trade unionists and other political activists, the government drafted a new constitution. The draft was discussed widely by the public in formal meetings, and amended to include restrictions on presidential powers, limits to the presidential term of office, and an upper age limit of 70 years for presidential candidates. This was
not a suitable outcome for the government, so the proposals were amended to remove those clauses and insert new ones to compulsorily acquire land for redistribution without compensation, grant government officials immunity from prosecution, allow President Mugabe to seek two additional terms in office, and authorise government seizure of
white-owned land. The drafting stage of the constitution was largely boycotted by the opposition.

The referendum was defeated. Shortly thereafter, the Government pushed through a constitutional amendment (to clause 57) through parliament, to allow compulsory acquisition of land without compensation. Although many whites had left Zimbabwe after independence, mainly for neighbouring South Africa, those who remained continued to wield disproportionate control of some sectors of the economy, especially agriculture. In the late-1990s whites accounted for less than 1% of the population but owned 70% of arable land. Twenty years after independence, a minority of 4000 white farmers were part of the 4500 strong commercial farming community who owned 42.7% of the country -
an area of 24 million acres, averaging 2500 hectares per unit, whilst conversely, the peasant sub-sector had more than 750,000 units averaging between 2 and 4 hectares of arable land plus common grazing). In 1999, the Commercial Farmers Union freely offered to sell the government 15,000 km² for redistribution. However, landowners continued to drag their feet. By 1999, fewer than 70,000 of the people of Zimbabwe had been resettled, most without the necessary infrastructure to work the huge commercial farms on the 12 hectare plots they had been allocated.

With the historical colonial legacy of massive inquality in Zimbabwe resulting in entrenched socio-economic deprivation for the majority of the population, further stretched to breaking point by IMF austerity measures, the stress of working-class revolt and the impatience of the war veterans combined to alter the political consensus of toleration for the white farming community's continued priviledge of gross concentrations of land ownership - increasingly viewed as an burdensome luxury and a boil that needed to be lanced. Mugabe and ZanuPF raised this issue of land ownership by white farmers for their political advantage. In a naive, but populist move, he began land redistribution, which brought the government into headlong conflict with the International Monetary Fund. Amid a severe drought in the region, the police and military were instructed not to stop the invasion of white-owned farms by the so-called 'war veterans' and youth militia. This led to a mass migration of White Rhodesians out of Zimbabwe.

Through a loosely organised group of war veterans and youth militias, an aggressive land redistribution programme spread around the country, often characterised by forced expulsion of white farmers and violence against both farmers and farm employees, as a means of consolidating power (especially in the rural areas) and covering the creeping
dictatorship in the cloak of an incomplete 'national democratic revolution'." As the "liberation" continued, the seizing began to take on a more aggressive aspect. They claimed to have "seized" the farmlands. A total of 110,000 km² of land was seized. It was these scenes which were widely denounced by the UK, US, Western media and
other Commonwealth nations, as white farmers retreated from what was what they previously considered to be their land. It is reported by independent sources other than the MDC or the western media that hundreds of expropriated white farms ended up in the hands of cabinet ministers, senior government officials and wealthy indigenous
businessmen.

By virtue of the war-state the country had already been in for several years, first beginning with IMF austerity and then the military intervention in the Congo, clearly land was a bargaining chip which Mugabe was forced to give out to his main fighting force (including the war veterans). The plain fact is, however noble it was for Zimbabwe to engage in wider political struggle in the Congo, to reject the UK's revised conditionality for the continuation of financial assistance was a needless folly, resulting in the dramatic reduction in export receipts and food producing capability as a result of a rushed land redistribution process. Prior to 2000, land-owning farmers, mostly white, had large tracts of land and utilized economies of scale to raise capital, borrow money when necessary, and purchase modern mechanised farm equipment to increase productivity on their
land. The reforms broke this land into smaller tracts (thereby destroying the economies of scale) and gave it to former black farmworkers and peasants, who had little knowledge of how to run the farms efficiently or raise productivity. The refusal of banks to lend
them money further limited their ability to purchase equipment or otherwise raise capital. As a result, the drop in total farm output was vast (made substantially worse during 2002 during the famine; Mugabe's expulsion of the international media prevented full analysis
of the scale of the famine and the resultant deaths). What is not in dispute is that a country once so rich in agricultural produce that it was dubbed the "bread basket" of Southern Africa, within a couple of years struggled to feed its own population. A staggering 45% of the population is considered malnourished. Furthermore, even though the main basis of the country's economic wealth had been cash-crop farming, ensuring the country was a neocolony for the west, the fact remains that Mugabe hadn't done enough to develop and prepare the country's domestic agricultural development and expertise prior to 2000. Whilst the IMF is partly responsible for the shrinkage in the
state's capability to invest for the future, the fact is that the Mugabe government's expenditure on agricultural development, having increased at independence, declined during the second half of the 1980s - well before the IMF measures came into play in 1990. Mugabe was ill-prepared to drag his country further into the war state because he'dd neglected to nurture the domestic economy and domestic food producing capability of his own country (he could have sought to find ways round stringent IMF rules, but instead his primary consideration was always to materially appease members of his patronage networks in and around Zanu PF).

Horace Campbell and Eusi Kwayana : "It was only after the massive opposition from the working people in 1997 and after the loss of the referendum of February 2000 that the ZANU leadership opportunistically launched the Fast Track Land reform process. This opportunism has only been surmounted by the fact that the best land went to the political elite who were not real farmers. Opportunism and cronyism exposed the
reality that for land reform to be beneficial for the mass of the population, reform must involve the political empowerment of the poor, especially farm workers. The new black landowners did not treat the farm workers any better than the previous settlers. If anything, this experience exposed the reality that the issues of the health and safety of farm workers and their children are just as important as the question of land ownership. Farm workers whether working on farms owned by blacks or whites must be paid a living wage and must have adequate protection from pesticides. They must be accorded full
political and economical rights instead of being forced to live in a semi-slavery state. The experiences of land acquisition in Zimbabwe pointed to the reality that land reclamation by itself could not solve the problems of the Zimbabwean society. There had to be transformation of the credit, transportation, agricultural marketing, seed production, distribution of fertilizers, water management and all of the aspects of economic relations associated with agriculture." (8).

Furthermore, Mugabe government's mismanagement of the economy was traced to it's intransigence in maintaining an artificially stable currency, causing an acute shortage of hard cash and the emergence of a parallel market for foreign currency. Zanu PF's unswerving indignation that they knew best meant that even constructive, pragmatic choices of basic economic management in awareness of the basic economic fundamentals of the world market were ignored, viewing any external advice neoliberal or surrendering their independence to neocolonialism. It has been an misconceived vanguard that, in the absence of Soviet patronage which may have helped them to a limited extent in the 1980s, considered itself entirely independent of the world economy. This may have been possible if complete economic mismanagement had been avoided such as the excessive printing of currency which has created hyper-inflation and if the agricultural sector was producing enough food for it's own needs. The fact that ZanuPF
have been even unable to even maintain food self-sufficiency is a crippling indictment of their administration.

Thomas Munjomo: "In Zimbabwe, agriculture may be regarded as the engine of the economy, providing the impetus for growth. Land redistribution must, therefore, be implemented cautiously in order to limit any adverse effects on present levels of productivity. Wide pre-reform changes may be necessary and these may include
restructuring supporting services such as agricultural credit, marketing, research and extension, input supply and processing and storage. This could help to ensure increases in productivity without which redistribution alone achieves modest and/or temporary benefits. Land reform, therefore, must be regarded as a process and not an end
in itself. It is neither easy, nor costless; nor is it necessarily a complete panacea." (taken from "This Land of Africa", by Munjomo, 2000).

Basic economic management also means not printing excessive amounts of currency in relation to the value of underlying productive resources of the country. Patrick Bond: "According to Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono, 67 trillion Zimbabwean dollars (US$33 million at the effective exchange rate in January) were in circulation but could not be traced inside the financial system.The banks had only Z$2 trillion cash on hand. Said Gono, "The rest of the money is with cash barons who have opened mini-central banks at their houses. Unfortunately the people doing that are influential citizens with leadership positions."

It is clear that Mugabe and ZanuPF's socialist and anti-colonialist rhetoric does partially stand up to reasonable critique in his governments' subsequent resistance to the multilateral order of the IMF after 1998 (all debt was paid off by 2006), Zimbabwe's support to the anti-apartheid struggle, and of course, their role in the independence struggle. However, Zanu PF's hold on power, necessarily steadfast because of their foremost role in the independence struggle, subsequently led to their own concentration of political power. ZanuPF are described as having risen to the top after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 by being more centralised, conspiratorial and ruthless than
all its rivals (Julian Borger, The Guardian, 23/06/2008). This ruthless streak was exhibited in the civil war in Matabeleland in 1987 when ZanuPF went to war against it's main political rivals and former joint compatriots in the independence struggle - Zapu. In one operation known as the Gukurahundi (Shona for "the early rain that washes away the chaff"), atleast 10,000 Ndebele were killed, spearheaded by a notoriously brutal North-Korean trained army unit called the Fifth Brigade (Borger).

Fellow African nations' continued support for Zimbabwe was most voicefully put on record at the 2007 Extra-Ordinary Southern African Development Community Summit of Heads of State & Government, 28th -29th March 2007, on the political situation in Zimbabwe. This Extra-Ordinary Summit recalled that free, fair and democratic
Presidential elections were held in 2002 in Zimbabwe, reaffirmed its solidarity with the Government and people of Zimbabwe, and reiterated the appeal to Britain to honour its compensation obligations with regard to land reform made within the Lancaster House Agreement. Finally, the Summit appealed for the lifting of all forms of sanctions against Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe's fellow neighbours gave Mugabe and Zanu PF the benefit of the doubt before now by virtue of their unwavering support in solidarity with the anti-colonial movement and in recognition of Zanu PF's foremost role in it and the spirit (rather than the execution) of the land redistribution programme. However, events in 2008 have shown
that the abuse by the military and militia has been more brutal now more than ever and election procedures have been so clearly breached, and have led to condemnation from Zambia, Tanzania, Angola and Botswana. In Harare where the MDC won 45 of the 46 local council seats and Emmanuel Chiroto of the MDC was elected as Mayor of Harare by the councillors on June 15th, on the night of June 16th, Chiroto's house in the suburb of Hatcliffe was attacked and destroyed by ZANU-PF supporters. Ignatius Chombo, the Minister of Local Government, has not sworn in the new local administrations, and because the elected Harare councillors were not allowed to meet at Harare's Town House, they met elsewhere to elect Chiroto on the 16th June. Chiroto believed that
petrol bombs were used. Chiroto's wife and son were taken away by the attackers, although his son was delivered to a police station on June 16th.

On April 17th, the state-owned Zimbabwean newspaper The Herald published a letter said to be from British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to Tsvangirai, along with allegations that Tsvangirai was plotting "illegal regime change" with British assistance, Tsvangirai countered on that the allegations were "outrageous" (1). The letter purported to
be from Brown was dated April 9 and was said to have been sent in response to a letter from Tsvangirai on April 3; Brown's purported letter said that the United Kingdom would lobby SADC and the United Nations Security Council to impose further sanctions on Zimbabwe. The British Embassy denounced the letter as a forgery and said that
"faking documents for crude propaganda purposes" "reflects the regime's desperation".
Source: Sapa-AP and Hans Pienaar, "Tsvangirai reacts to plot allegations", The Star (IOL), April 18, 2008, page 1.

Mugabe's has honed his manipulation of half-truth's to a fine art, especially where he blames Britain for every problem in his midst, where it is clear many of his problems he brought upon hmself. Knowlng full well that hyper-inflation is crippling the economy, on March 5th, Mugabe said at a rally in Mahusekwa that some businesses were raising
prices with the intent of causing the people to suffer, hoping that they would blame the government for their suffering and vote for the opposition as a result. The timing of ZanuPF's passing of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill, which requires all businesses to be majority owned (at least 51%) by black Zimbabweans, was obviously more of a political gesture in view of this, as Mugabe warned that "profiteering" white-owned businesses would be taken over by the government. As in previous elections, Mugabe timed the playing of the race card in speeches, claiming that Tsvangirai and Makoni would reverse land reform and that "white farmers were poised to move back onto their old farms on the announcement of a MDC victory". Tsvangirai dismissed the reports as nonsense, but the post-election impact was successful for Mugabe in re-mobilising his support base, sparked into action by a new wave of paranoid state propaganda, with war veteran's occupying some farms.

Conclusion
Whereas before, in the same fashion as most fellow governments of African post-independence nation states, the evolution of ZANU-PF demonstrated the incapacity of the bourgeois national liberation movements to exert the slightest independence, operating in a world capitalist economy characterised by global integration and transnational production, with these movements transformed into direct instruments of finance capital (Shaoul, 08/1999), now Zanu PF, having capitulated to the fervour of their support base, neglecting a more holistic, sustainable transition which the UK, UNDP and other donor nations had drawn up with them in the 'Land Reform and Resettlement
Conference' of 1998, misconceived itself as having a self-sufficiency economic model able to exist independent of the world economy which left the country economically stranded with a woefully negligent attitude to the plight of it's own people. Hunger, starvation, severe economic hardship, financial competence and basic rule of law were all expendable to Mugabe and Zanu PF's remorseless desire to hold onto power withever the cost and right the wrongs of colonial injustice, irrespective of the consequences to the long-term health of the country. Zimbabwe's plight may well have been made far worse because of sanctions, but it primarily came about because of the collapse in
agricultural production - the heart of the economy, and which directly came about as a result of the way Mugabe's government handled the land reform process. Mugabe government's inadequate investment and preparation of the domestic agricultural economy meant Zanu PF's alternative largely-self sufficient economic model had absolutely no foundation, leaving Zimbabwe subject to the vagaries of the world
economy with drastically reduced foreign-exchange earning capacity while still paying off the IMF, meaning bankrupcy. A combination of economic mis-management, and the onset of sanctions has severely worsened the situation in the country. And this rushed land redistribution took place as a result of ZanuPF's capitulation to their tribal support base/patronage network - the war veterans and army - who had become impatient for material advancement and land, and to retain power, he was forced to capitulate to their demands at the expense of taking a position which had more consideration for the
long-term economic management of the economy which would have meant reaching a compromise with the UK however unsavoury that would have been in the short-term

The plain truth is that Zanu PF primarily represent an elitist black bourgeois and petite bourgeois and that Mugabe's regime is exposed as being primarily focused upon the protection of patronage networks predominantly within the ruling Zanu PF party, such as the war veterans. As in Guyana, anti imperialism and vanguardism has been used
to cover up the repression of it's own citizens. The political leaders have accumulated wealth in such a conspicuous manner that their consumption of luxury goods stands out in a country where more than 80% of the eligible workers are unemployed. Millions more Zimbabweans have been rendered as economic refugees in Africa and beyond.

Mugabe's government is a dictatorship through it's manipulation of poll votes, selective delivery/non-develivery of food aid and brutal suppression. The upper echlons of Zanu PF represent a cowardly bourgeois and petite bourgeois. Mugabe has, infact, only held onto
power so long because there are some army generals who are afraid of Morgan Tsvangarai's pronouncements that he will form a commission which could convict generals if they were to be found guilty of human rights abuses, going right back to the civil war in Maatabaleland.

Sources:
1). This Land of Africa, by Thomas Munjomo Bsc, Dip.L.E., M.L.E, Phd, Department of Land Economy, St Mary's Kings College, University of Aberdeen (2000).
2). IMF tightens the screws on Zimbabwe
By Jean Shaoul, 18th August 1999
www.wsws.org/articles/1999/aug1999/zimb-a18.shtml

3). ZIMBABWE LIBERALISATION OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETS, by SAPRI
Ref:  http://www.saprin.org/zimbabwe/research/zim_agriculture.pdf

4). "HISTORY OF ZIMBABWE", History World, 4 May 2007.

5). Land reform & resettlement in Zimbabwe: A proposal for a Cooperative agreement with the Land Tenure Centre
 http://www.ies.wisc.edu/ltc/live/zimbabwe/project_proposals/bruce&roth_99.pdf

6). "From Corporatism to Liberalization in Zimbabwe: Economic Policy, Regimes and Political Crisis, 1980–97", International Political
Science Review, Vol. 26, No. 1, 91-106 (2005).

7). "Zimbabwe and the strategy of resistance" by Dale T. McKinley*

8). Pan-Africanists: Our Collective Duty to Zimbabwe
by Horace Campbell and Eusi Kwayana
Ref:
 http://zeleza.com/blogging/african-affairs/pan-africanists-our-collective-duty-z\
imbabwe-horace-campbell-and-eusi-kwaya

9). Julian Borger, The Guardian, 23/06/2008

10). Sapa-AP and Hans Pienaar, "Tsvangirai reacts to plot allegations", The Star (IOL), April 18, 2008, page 1.

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3).
Both sides of the equation:


Record of ZanuPF:

ZanuPF represent a ethnic (Shona) capitalist bourgeois elite, propped up by their tribal support base, that have:
- successfully led the independence struggle alongside Joshua Nkomo's mainly Ndebele PFZapu against Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front, also known as The Second Chimurenga, or as Zimbabwe's liberation war, resulting in a negotiated settlement through British initiated negotiations culminating in the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement in 1979.
- Involvement in border clashes against South African Afrikaner forces in the Border Wars of the 1980s
- committed war crimes within an internal civil war between ZanuPF forces and Zapu guerillas in Matabeleland during the 1980s, when the 5th brigade killed 10,000 Ndebele
- corrupted the land redistribution process, and in turn, sacrificed the long-term food producing and currency earning capability of the country, destroying the central dynamic of the Zimbabwean economy
- Completely mismanaged the economy by allowing cash-baron beneficiaries of Zimbabwe's patronage networks to print loads and loads of extra currency, so that the total currency in circulation was vastly in excess of the underlying productive resources of the country, leading to hyper-inflation
- financially enriched a priviledged elite and maintaining high salaries for the military, state police and civil service whilst neglecting public sector workers and allowing the mass of the population to endure hunger, starvation and severe economic hardship,
- hoarded land amongst their patronage networks and cronies, at the expense of the majority of the rural poor during the 1990s, when financial constraints meant the land redistribution process even after the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, was always going to be limited under the shadow of IMF austerity
- allowed the new capitalist farming entrants to treat the farm workers no better than the previous settlers
- and exhibited a woeful record on investment in agricultural infrastructure such as credit facilities, transportation, agricultural marketing, seed production, distribution of fertilizers and water management
- alleged suppresion of opponents and election irregularities in the 2000 and 2002 election in Zimbabwe
- The paying off of all outstanding debts to the IMF in 2006
- The introduction of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill, legislation which stipulates that every company operating in the country must have at least 51% of its shares owned by indigenous Zimbabweans, in 2008
- election irregularities and brutal suppression of Zanu PF's political opponents in the run-off election has been so severe that even countries within SADC such as Zambia, Tanzania and Angola have broken ranks from the previous "benefit-of-the-doubt" consensus afforded to Zimbabwe, criticising the manner in which the election run-off has been handled in recognition that the excesses of the Zimbabwean state's brutality now have no bounds under Mugabe



Record of MDC:
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is a Zimbabwean political party. It was founded in 1999 as an opposition party to the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party led by President Robert Mugabe. The MDC was formed from many members of the broad coalition of civic society groups and individuals that
campaigned for a "No" vote in the 2000 constitutional referendum, in particular the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

Allegation about the MDC:
(source:  http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004.html#10 ):
' The establishment of a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), in September 1999, found instant support from Western leaders. Significant funding from Western sources enabled the party to rapidly grow to the point where it won 57 out of 120 seats in the June 24-25 2000 parliamentary election, less than one year after its creation. Ostensibly based in the labor movement, the programme of the MDC reads like a call for a return to ESAP. A policy paper issued by the party spelled out its plans for privatization. Upon taking power, the party plans to appoint a "fund manager to dispose of government-owned shares in publicly quoted companies." The boards of
all public enterprises would be "reconstituted," and the new boards would be "required to privatize their enterprises within specified timetables...with an overall target of privatizing all designated parastatals [public companies] within two years." The interests of
Western capital would not be ignored. "In areas where a high level of technical skill is required, foreign strategic investors will be encouraged to bid for a majority stake in the enterprises being privatized." A primary principle of the program would be that "all
sales of major state assets will be conducted through open, international [that is, Western], competitive bidding." In order to counter opposition from workers made redundant, the National Privatization and Procurement Agency would be instructed to "carry out public awareness campaigns regarding the privatization program in
order to generate public awareness and support for the exercise." Implementation of its program, the MDC feels, will mean "that foreign direct investment will take place on a substantial scale." (1) As a further incentive for Western investors, the MDC plans to review income and corporate tax levels "for regional competitiveness." (2)

The MDC appointed an official of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, Eddie Cross, as its Secretary of Economic Affairs. In a speech delivered shortly after his appointment, Cross articulated the MDC economic plan. "First of all, we believe in the free market. We do not support price control. We do not support government interfering in the way people manage their lives. We are in favor of reduced levels of taxation. We are going to fast track privatization. All fifty government parastatals will be privatized within a two-year frame, but we are going far beyond that. We are going to privatize many of the
functions of government. We are going to privatize the Central Statistics Office. We are going to privatize virtually the entire school delivery system. And you know, we have looked at the numbers and we think we can get government employment down from about 300,000 at the present time to about 75,000 in five years." (3) ''The MDC party split in 2005 due to disagreements over participation in the senate elections of that year.

One faction was led by Morgan Tsvangirai, and another by his deputy Gibson Sibanda with the support of Welshman Ncube, Gift Chimanikire and spokesperson Paul Themba Nyathi (now led by Professor Arthur Mutambara).

Since the split there have been allegations of intra-party violence.

The party split of 2005 was blamed on acts of violence perpetrated by MDC-T. David Coltart decided to join the Mutambara faction of the MDC citing `deep concerns about violence in the MDC-T faction.

"I was so concerned about our failure to get to the bottom of the violence that I prepared a statement that was tabled at the next meeting of the National Executive held on the 15th July", said Coltart in 2006.

MDC-T thugs were also blamed for an attack on Trudy Stevenson, then an MDC-M legislator. She was attacked with a machete and hospitalized with four other MDC-M members in 2005.

According to Paul Themba Nyathi, of the MDC-Mutambara, the thuggish behaviour of Tsvangirai's supporters has largely escaped the attention of observers and the press because the big prize is still to rid the country of Mugabe.'

 http://www.talkzimbabwe.com/news/117/ARTICLE/2271/2008-05-01.html

The two factions reunited for the 2008 elections.

References for the above:
1). "The MDC Privatisation & Outsourcing Policy for Zimbabwe," MDC policy paper, undated. (back)

2). "Social and Economic Policies for a New Millennium," MDC policy paper, May 26, 2000. (back)

3). Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe's Plunge - Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice, Merlin Press, 2002.

Recent News:

MDC-T DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE COMMITTEES BEHIND VIOLENCE – CHIHURI

by Floyd Nkomo
Sat, 21 Jun 2008
Ref:  http://www.talkzimbabwe.com/news/117/ARTICLE/2755/2008-06-21.html

THE Movement for Democratic Change’s Democratic resistance Committees are behind the recent spate of violence in the country which is meant to discredit the electoral process in the country and delegitimise a Zanu PF victory in the run-off presidential election, says the commissioner general of police.

Police Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri who was addressing the press in the capital yesterday said that the opposition MDC-T party formed what they termed Democratic Resistance Committees which aimed to intimidate voters in the run-up to the election and thereby delegitimize the electoral process.

"I wish to put the record straight on the political violence in Zimbabwe. It is without doubt that between the two political parties, MDC-T and Zanu PF, MDC-T is the main culprit in the political violence that we are currently witnessing in the country," Comm-Gen Chihuri told journalists...


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Further information:

We've done enough damage. All we can do is send food

Mugabe has a point on imperialism. Britain has no option but to sit
out the Zimbabwean tragedy, impotent on the sidelines

by Simon Jenkins
The Guardian
Date: Wednesday June 25, 2008
Ref: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/25/zimbabwe.foreignpolicy