Licensed to kill
John Rhys-Burgess | 18.12.2007 10:21 | Anti-militarism | Repression | Terror War
The Act also provides the statutory framework for the Government Communications Headquarters or “GCHQ”.
As far as GCHQ is concerned, to all intents and purposes, the legislation gives it the right (at least as far as UK law is concerned) to intercept any telephone calls, fax and Email messages whatsoever, anywhere in the world and allows it to decide afterwards, whether the “national security” or economic interests of the UK justifies what it has done. Spy first. Ask questions later.
Whilst the legislation does not allow the interests of any particular political party to be advanced by the actions of the security services, they are however, perfectly free to target and suppress any political party or group that they and/or their government paymasters think fit.
But the most terrifying provisions of this legislation arise under Section 7 of the Act, which on the face of it, allows the Foreign Secretary to authorise any member of the SIS (or GCHQ) to do absolutely anything considered necessary to the national security or economic interests of the UK. The legislation provides that if “…a person would be liable in the United Kingdom..." (whether under criminal or civil law) "...for any act done outside the British Islands, he shall not be so liable if the act is …”authorised by the Foreign Secretary.
Quite simply, if the Foreign Secretary authorises someone to bug your phone conversations, intercept your private correspondence, raid your offices and destroy your business, spread rumours about you, blackmail or threaten you or your family, have you arrested on a trumped up charge, burgle your home and in the course of which strangle your wife after raping her (say, to disguise the fact that the burgulary was the work of a spook), abduct and fly you out to Diego Garcia or some other secret CIA prison for interrgoation and torture... if the Foreign Secretary considers that any of these actions, no matter how steeped in criminality, can even be remotely justified by British defence, foreign policy or economic interests, then they are completely immune from prosecution or even proceedings in a civil court.
Theoretically, oversight of the security services is the responsibility of a parliamentary committee but the legislation does not state how the members of such a committee are to be appointed. It is moreover difficult to imagine how this committee can properly dicharge its responsibilities given that the head of SIS or GCHQ can refuse to give any information to the committee that is considered “sensitive”.
Any “information which might lead to the identification of, or provide details of, sources of information, other assistance or operational methods available to the Security Service, the Intelligence Service or GCHQ” and any “information about particular operations which have been, are being or are proposed to be undertaken in pursuance of any of the functions of those bodies” is regarded as "sensitive". This of course exempts from disclosure practically any information whatsoever that these agencies wish to conceal, even if criminal offences have been committed (since according to the Act, they will not be crimes if the Foreign Secretary has authorised them).
Information is also sensitive if “provided by, or by an agency of, the Government of a territory outside the United Kingdom where that Government does not consent to the disclosure of the information.” This would therefore make it very difficult for an individual or organisation to challenge any rumour, calumny or disinformation spread in order to discredit them by the security services of a foreign regime, even though this may well have been obtained from a third party by torture or other coercive methods.
For example, in the recent attempt to smear Leftist MP and anti-war campaigner, George Galloway, it transpired that the main source of "evidence" against him was a member of the former Ba’athist regime currently on trial for war crimes at Abu Grahib prison. These were ostensibly allegations against Mr. Galloway made by the U.S. government, yet it is patently obvious that the whole affair was initiated and orchestrated by Downing Street as an act of petty spite against Mr. Galloway and his strongly anti-government stance. Were an enquiry to be made into this affair, there can be little doubt that the security services would also have been implicated, yet thanks to the provisions of the exisiting legislation, we are unlikely ever to find out for certain.
Even if any of the heads of SIS or GCHQ agreed to provide information requested by the parliamentary Committee the Foreign Secretary would be able to override them.
Grievances against the security services can be brought before a Tribunal which decides in the first instance whether a complaint is “frivolous and vexatious.” If the Tribunal decides that there are legitimate grounds for complaint, it must firstly decide whether or not the complaint is reasonable and if so, it must then be referred to the Secret Service Commissioner.
The Commissioner then examines the circumstances under which any warrant authorising the conduct complained of, was justifiably granted by the Secretary of State and if so, he then refers it back to the Tribunal which in turn must refer “its findings” back to the Commissioner and the Secretary of State! Since the Tribunal does not appear to have to any independent investigative powers of its own and is required to refer complaints to the Commissioner, this seems positively kafkaesque.
Any documents that the Commissioner or the Tribunal considers in the course of any complaint, cannot be disclosed to the complainant (or to anyone else) without the consent of the author of or other person providing, the document in question, so that whilst the Tribunal is charged with this quasi-judicial function of dealing with complaints against MIS and/or GCHQ, the complainant is not entitled to see all of the evidence that the Tribunal is to consider in the determination of the complaint. This is a bare faced denial of a fundamental principle of natural justice.
Moreover, the Tribunal is entitled to determine its own way of proceeding and whilst if it finds in favour of a complainant, it has to state its reasons for so doing, where it decides to dimiss the complaint, it is not permitted to give any reasons at all.
And even though the Tribunal has the power to quash any warrant or authorisation which the Secret Service Commissioner has found to have been improperly issued and may direct the payment of damages by way of compensation to the complainant, the Foreign Secretary can take such action as he thinks fit, or presumably, do nothing at all.
It is precisely this kind of pernicious legislation that has helped to create the National Security State that Britain has become under both Conservative and New Labour administrations. Given that our present government has allied itself with a neo-fascist regime whose belligerent policies and notorious human rights abuses arguably represent the greatest threat to humanity since the Third Reich, indeed, a regime presided over by a man whose grandfathe helped to finance the Nazis, for a parliamentary democracy to have granted itself these powers is in itself little short of criminal.
The question we must all now ask ourselves is, how much longer will our parliament and Press continue to look the other way, whilst our governments continue to chip away at our rights and liberties with such repressive laws.
John Rhys-Burgess
e-mail:
cmss.info@gmail.com
Comments
Display the following comment