The case for a military embargo against Indonesia
action | 03.07.2003 14:47 | Anti-militarism
[If you are a UK reader, we would encourage you to use this document
to lobby your MP and the Foreign Office for a military embargo against Indonesia. A formatted version of the document is available on the TAPOL website at
http://tapol.gn.apc.org/st030702.htm]
to lobby your MP and the Foreign Office for a military embargo against Indonesia. A formatted version of the document is available on the TAPOL website at
http://tapol.gn.apc.org/st030702.htm]
THE USE OF BRITISH MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN ACEH:
THE CASE FOR A MILITARY EMBARGO AGAINST INDONESIA
Chronology
8 May 2003
Jakarta Post reports plans by the Indonesian military (TNI) to deploy Scorpion tanks to Aceh (see also The Observer, 11 May).
19 May
Indonesia launches military offensive in Aceh and uses four Hawk-200 fighter jets to escort troop-carrying transport planes and to intimidate
people on the ground in low-flying 'shock-and-awe' operations.
A military spokesman says the Hawks '…could well be used [in a direct attack role] if we wanted to' [The Guardian, 20 May].
21 May
Armed forces Commander-in-Chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, says he is not concerned about promises made before the purchase of the Hawks: 'In order to cover the whole region and complete the job, I am going to use what I have. After all, I have paid already' [The Guardian, 22 May].
25 May
Unconfirmed report that Hawks used in bombing raids in three sub-districts of North Aceh [TAPOL source].
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) reports Hawks are used to attack villages near Lhokseumawe, North Aceh. The army's chief spokesman, General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, says there is no problem with the use of the Hawks: 'For us, we have already paid so there is no problem. We use fighters to defend our sovereignty…' [The Times, 26 May]
28 May
Air Force chief-of-staff, Marshall Chappy Hakim, says the aircraft would be used in the interests of the nation and state. He also says the possibility of using the Hawks in Aceh was discussed with British Ambassador two months previously and no objection had been raised. [Antara, Kompas, detik (Indonesian dailies), 28/29 May]
1 June
Unconfirmed report that Hawks took part in bombing raids in villages in East Aceh and North Aceh. Several homes are destroyed [TAPOL source].
3/4 June
Foreign Office Minister, Mike O'Brien, visits Jakarta to discuss the war in Aceh and the use of British equipment with President Megawati and Foreign Minister, Hasan Wirayuda. A foreign ministry spokesman denies the existence of any agreement concerning the use of the Hawks: '..we conveyed to (O'Brien) that there was no such agreement'. He said the main issue was whether a sovereign country that bought arms 'with good intention and using taxpayers' money will continue to be hassled by the selling country each time it uses those weapons. Furthermore any 'gentleman's agreement' over the use of the Hawks only existed 'for the East Timor case and not for the
Aceh case, which is totally different' [AFP, 3 June].
O'Brien says: 'I hope that we will not have to take a view that our relationships with the armed forces would be affected if this agreement is broken', but he also warns that future spare parts deals could be affected [AFP, 4 June].
5 June
An Air Force spokesman says the TNI 'reserved the right to use the Hawks in a combat role…' [Jakarta Post, 6 June]
12 June
In answer to parliamentary questions by Jeremy Corbyn, Mike O'Brien states:
'Before August 2002, the Indonesian government provided assurances that British-supplied military equipment would not be used in Aceh or be used anywhere in Indonesia against civilians to prevent the exercise of their rights of free expression, assembly and association or other international human rights standards. The Indonesian government added that if, against expectations, they were to contemplate the use of such equipment in Aceh at a later stage they would inform the British government in advance.
'In August 2002 the British government received advance notification
from the Indonesian government that they may deploy British-built military equipment to Aceh for casualty removal and logistics. Hawk jets do not perform these tasks. Ministers agreed in September 2002 to fresh assurances that British-built equipment would not be used to violate human rights anywhere in Indonesia nor would the equipment be used offensively. The assurances apply to all British-supplied military equipment. I emphasised the continuing importance we attach to the assurances during my recent visit to Indonesia.
'I visited Indonesia on 3 - 4 June 2003, and raised the issue of British-supplied military equipment with President Megawati and senior members of the Indonesian government. I reminded them of the
assurances about the use of British-supplied military equipment in Aceh, and warned of the possible consequences for defence sales and defence relationships if there was a breach of the assurances. I also stressed that Indonesian military action in Aceh should be proportionate and in accordance with international standards on human rights.
'The Indonesian government confirmed that British-supplied Hawk aircraft were used in Aceh on 19 May but claimed that they were not used in violation of the assurances. We will be using all available sources of information to monitor the use of British-supplied equipment and will follow up all credible allegations on the misuse of British-supplied equipment.'
16 June
AFP reports that Hawks and US-made Bronco aircraft are used to
drop 'sonic bombs' in North Aceh to 'disturb the concentrations of GAM troops' [it is thought that the reference should not be to 'sonic bombs', but to 'sonic booms', which are being used as part of 'shock therapy' tactics].
17 June
Former Defence Minister and Indonesian Ambassador to the UK designate, Juwono Sudarsono, advises exporting countries not to expect Indonesia not to use equipment such as Hawks and Scorpions: 'As I see it, once the weapons have been sold, Indonesia should not be expected to abide by restrictive conditions on their use. Conditions should not be made binding, except as part of a gentleman's agreement' [Jakarta Post, 18 June].
23 June
Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, says it is not acceptable for the Indonesian people to spend money for the purchase of planes that could not them be used to defend their own country: 'Our people cannot agree to rigid conditions being imposed' [Waspada (Indonesian daily), 23 June].
23 June
36 Scorpion tanks deployed to Aceh. The senior military spokesman in Aceh, Colonel Ditya Sudarsono, says the tanks will be used offensively as 'a key part of our campaign to finish off the separatists' [The Guardian, 24 June]
I July
UK Government publishes its annual report on strategic exports for
2002. The value of licences to Indonesia increases from £2 million in 2000 to £15.5 million in 2001 to £41 million in 2002. Items covered by the 2002 licences include aircraft cannons; components for missile launching equipment; components for combat aircraft, combat helicopters, and tanks; and armoured all wheel drive vehicles.
The case for an embargo
When challenged on its policy on arms sales to Indonesia, the British
Government has over time variously stated - in replies to parliamentary questions and in letters from Ministers etc. - that Indonesia has given 'assurances' that British military equipment will not be used for 'for internal repression', 'in counter-insurgency operations', 'offensively' or 'to suppress human rights' anywhere in Indonesia.
The very deployment of the Hawks and Scorpions to Aceh is without
question a breach of these 'assurances'. The equipment is playing a key role in a major military offensive; it is not in Aceh for harmless display purposes.
TAPOL and others have long maintained that Indonesia's 'assurances'
are worthless given its record of repeatedly using imported equipment in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua and against its own citizens. It is clear from the statements quoted above that military chiefs do not intend to comply with any restrictions on the use of the equipment and that they regard the 'assurances' as either non-existent or non-binding. This makes the British Government's continued reliance on them untenable.
The Government's assertion that it will monitor the use of the equipment and follow up credible allegations of misuse smacks of complacency or, worse, a desperate desire to do nothing which will upset the lucrative arms trade with Indonesia. The huge increase in the value of exports in 2002, noted above, suggests that the latter is the primary motivating factor.
By indicating that it will only take action after the equipment has been
misused, the Government is effectively saying that it will wait until the
equipment is used to perpetrate human rights violations (most likely
the killing of civilians) before it will do anything more. The implication
that the onus is on people on the ground to produce 'credible' evidence of the misuse of equipment is an appalling abdication of responsibility by the British Government.
We firmly believe it is intolerable for the Government to engage with
the TNI on a business-as-usual basis and we are urging it to:
1. Impose an embargo on the supply of military, security and police
equipment to Indonesia, to include contracts agreed before the entry into force of the embargo;
2. Insist on the withdrawal from Aceh of all military equipment supplied by Britain;
3. Suspend all forms of co-operation with the Indonesian military and police special forces to include training, participation in seminars
and conferences and all other exchanges; and
4. Press the European Union to impose similar restrictive
measures against Indonesia.
THE CASE FOR A MILITARY EMBARGO AGAINST INDONESIA
Chronology
8 May 2003
Jakarta Post reports plans by the Indonesian military (TNI) to deploy Scorpion tanks to Aceh (see also The Observer, 11 May).
19 May
Indonesia launches military offensive in Aceh and uses four Hawk-200 fighter jets to escort troop-carrying transport planes and to intimidate
people on the ground in low-flying 'shock-and-awe' operations.
A military spokesman says the Hawks '…could well be used [in a direct attack role] if we wanted to' [The Guardian, 20 May].
21 May
Armed forces Commander-in-Chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, says he is not concerned about promises made before the purchase of the Hawks: 'In order to cover the whole region and complete the job, I am going to use what I have. After all, I have paid already' [The Guardian, 22 May].
25 May
Unconfirmed report that Hawks used in bombing raids in three sub-districts of North Aceh [TAPOL source].
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) reports Hawks are used to attack villages near Lhokseumawe, North Aceh. The army's chief spokesman, General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, says there is no problem with the use of the Hawks: 'For us, we have already paid so there is no problem. We use fighters to defend our sovereignty…' [The Times, 26 May]
28 May
Air Force chief-of-staff, Marshall Chappy Hakim, says the aircraft would be used in the interests of the nation and state. He also says the possibility of using the Hawks in Aceh was discussed with British Ambassador two months previously and no objection had been raised. [Antara, Kompas, detik (Indonesian dailies), 28/29 May]
1 June
Unconfirmed report that Hawks took part in bombing raids in villages in East Aceh and North Aceh. Several homes are destroyed [TAPOL source].
3/4 June
Foreign Office Minister, Mike O'Brien, visits Jakarta to discuss the war in Aceh and the use of British equipment with President Megawati and Foreign Minister, Hasan Wirayuda. A foreign ministry spokesman denies the existence of any agreement concerning the use of the Hawks: '..we conveyed to (O'Brien) that there was no such agreement'. He said the main issue was whether a sovereign country that bought arms 'with good intention and using taxpayers' money will continue to be hassled by the selling country each time it uses those weapons. Furthermore any 'gentleman's agreement' over the use of the Hawks only existed 'for the East Timor case and not for the
Aceh case, which is totally different' [AFP, 3 June].
O'Brien says: 'I hope that we will not have to take a view that our relationships with the armed forces would be affected if this agreement is broken', but he also warns that future spare parts deals could be affected [AFP, 4 June].
5 June
An Air Force spokesman says the TNI 'reserved the right to use the Hawks in a combat role…' [Jakarta Post, 6 June]
12 June
In answer to parliamentary questions by Jeremy Corbyn, Mike O'Brien states:
'Before August 2002, the Indonesian government provided assurances that British-supplied military equipment would not be used in Aceh or be used anywhere in Indonesia against civilians to prevent the exercise of their rights of free expression, assembly and association or other international human rights standards. The Indonesian government added that if, against expectations, they were to contemplate the use of such equipment in Aceh at a later stage they would inform the British government in advance.
'In August 2002 the British government received advance notification
from the Indonesian government that they may deploy British-built military equipment to Aceh for casualty removal and logistics. Hawk jets do not perform these tasks. Ministers agreed in September 2002 to fresh assurances that British-built equipment would not be used to violate human rights anywhere in Indonesia nor would the equipment be used offensively. The assurances apply to all British-supplied military equipment. I emphasised the continuing importance we attach to the assurances during my recent visit to Indonesia.
'I visited Indonesia on 3 - 4 June 2003, and raised the issue of British-supplied military equipment with President Megawati and senior members of the Indonesian government. I reminded them of the
assurances about the use of British-supplied military equipment in Aceh, and warned of the possible consequences for defence sales and defence relationships if there was a breach of the assurances. I also stressed that Indonesian military action in Aceh should be proportionate and in accordance with international standards on human rights.
'The Indonesian government confirmed that British-supplied Hawk aircraft were used in Aceh on 19 May but claimed that they were not used in violation of the assurances. We will be using all available sources of information to monitor the use of British-supplied equipment and will follow up all credible allegations on the misuse of British-supplied equipment.'
16 June
AFP reports that Hawks and US-made Bronco aircraft are used to
drop 'sonic bombs' in North Aceh to 'disturb the concentrations of GAM troops' [it is thought that the reference should not be to 'sonic bombs', but to 'sonic booms', which are being used as part of 'shock therapy' tactics].
17 June
Former Defence Minister and Indonesian Ambassador to the UK designate, Juwono Sudarsono, advises exporting countries not to expect Indonesia not to use equipment such as Hawks and Scorpions: 'As I see it, once the weapons have been sold, Indonesia should not be expected to abide by restrictive conditions on their use. Conditions should not be made binding, except as part of a gentleman's agreement' [Jakarta Post, 18 June].
23 June
Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, says it is not acceptable for the Indonesian people to spend money for the purchase of planes that could not them be used to defend their own country: 'Our people cannot agree to rigid conditions being imposed' [Waspada (Indonesian daily), 23 June].
23 June
36 Scorpion tanks deployed to Aceh. The senior military spokesman in Aceh, Colonel Ditya Sudarsono, says the tanks will be used offensively as 'a key part of our campaign to finish off the separatists' [The Guardian, 24 June]
I July
UK Government publishes its annual report on strategic exports for
2002. The value of licences to Indonesia increases from £2 million in 2000 to £15.5 million in 2001 to £41 million in 2002. Items covered by the 2002 licences include aircraft cannons; components for missile launching equipment; components for combat aircraft, combat helicopters, and tanks; and armoured all wheel drive vehicles.
The case for an embargo
When challenged on its policy on arms sales to Indonesia, the British
Government has over time variously stated - in replies to parliamentary questions and in letters from Ministers etc. - that Indonesia has given 'assurances' that British military equipment will not be used for 'for internal repression', 'in counter-insurgency operations', 'offensively' or 'to suppress human rights' anywhere in Indonesia.
The very deployment of the Hawks and Scorpions to Aceh is without
question a breach of these 'assurances'. The equipment is playing a key role in a major military offensive; it is not in Aceh for harmless display purposes.
TAPOL and others have long maintained that Indonesia's 'assurances'
are worthless given its record of repeatedly using imported equipment in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua and against its own citizens. It is clear from the statements quoted above that military chiefs do not intend to comply with any restrictions on the use of the equipment and that they regard the 'assurances' as either non-existent or non-binding. This makes the British Government's continued reliance on them untenable.
The Government's assertion that it will monitor the use of the equipment and follow up credible allegations of misuse smacks of complacency or, worse, a desperate desire to do nothing which will upset the lucrative arms trade with Indonesia. The huge increase in the value of exports in 2002, noted above, suggests that the latter is the primary motivating factor.
By indicating that it will only take action after the equipment has been
misused, the Government is effectively saying that it will wait until the
equipment is used to perpetrate human rights violations (most likely
the killing of civilians) before it will do anything more. The implication
that the onus is on people on the ground to produce 'credible' evidence of the misuse of equipment is an appalling abdication of responsibility by the British Government.
We firmly believe it is intolerable for the Government to engage with
the TNI on a business-as-usual basis and we are urging it to:
1. Impose an embargo on the supply of military, security and police
equipment to Indonesia, to include contracts agreed before the entry into force of the embargo;
2. Insist on the withdrawal from Aceh of all military equipment supplied by Britain;
3. Suspend all forms of co-operation with the Indonesian military and police special forces to include training, participation in seminars
and conferences and all other exchanges; and
4. Press the European Union to impose similar restrictive
measures against Indonesia.
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