First, the heavy-handed school, which adopts military solutions to regional disagreements and conflicts. This school was initiated by the revisionist leader Ze¹ev Jabotinsky. In 1923 Jabotinsky published two articles headed 'Iron Wall'. In the papers Jabotinsky argues that the Arabs would never accept the existence of a Jewish state, hence, the Jews must 'erect an iron wall of Jewish military force'. According to this philosophy, Zionism must enjoy an overwhelmingly superior power base to reduce any Arabic tendency to resist.
The other school is the school of reconciliation presented by moderate Zionists such as Moshe Sharet. This school tends to believe that all the regimes and political forces in the region are capable of accepting the existence of the Jewish state. Therefore, according to Sharet, all available diplomatic efforts should be made in order to achieve reconciliation with the Arab world.

Soon after the declaration of the state of Israel these two conflicting ideologies turned into a harsh political debate. In practice, Ben Gurion, the first Israeli PM, clearly adopted Jabotinsky¹s 'Iron Wall' philosophy. On the surface, this appears to have been a bizarre political move since Jabotinsky¹s philosophy was very much in contrast with the political thoughts of Ben Gurion's party. An analysis of the Israeli maneuvers and mode of operation in the 1948 war provide us with a clear picture of the Israeli endorsement of a military option alongside a denial of any diplomatic solution.

In order to implement the military option that derived from the 'Iron Wall' philosophy, Ben Gurion instructed the IDF to adopt an offensive military doctrine, a doctrine which would provide the region with a mighty display of Israel's overwhelming military superiority. The doctrine was based on two basic presuppositions:
1. Any confrontation between Arabs and Israelis had to take place over Arab land. In other words, the Israeli offensive had to take the battle to the Arab territories before the battle even started.
2. Because of Israel's relatively limited financial means, any confrontation had to bring victorious results in the shortest possible time. In other words, the Israeli army had to impose the most devastating damage on its Arab enemies.

The Israeli military and political leaders were soon to define a criterion which measured the success of the Israeli armed forces' implementation of the offensive doctrine. This criterion was defined as the IDF's 'force of deterrence'. It was a scale that determined the Arabs unwillingness to fight. The less the Arabs were encouraged to fight, the higher the score on the scale.

For Ben Gurion and his followers it was necessary to demonstrate to the Arab world a clear Israeli determination for a military solution. Any given battle had to end with a clear-cut Israeli victory. Moreover, the Arabs had to regard any confrontation as futile. The success of the Israeli offensive mode was dependent on the reduction of the Arabs' willingness to fight. This mode of Israeli military pattern was evident from the early stages of 1948 war, a war in which Israel subjected the Palestinian civilian population to a clear violation of any human code. The war ended with more than 700,000 Palestinian refugees and an armistice between Israel and its neighbors that was regarded by the Arabs as a clear military defeat.

Already in the early fifties Israel had managed to take the offensive doctrine one stage further. I am referring here to the retaliation mode that was characterized by a severe lack of proportion. According to Ben Gurion, any loss of Jewish life had to be paid for heavily. Arabs had to learn that the value of Jewish blood was far higher than that of their own. In order to achieve the best possible results, a young, assertive, aggressive and ambitious commander named Ariel Sharon was called for action. He was asked to form a small special commando unit that would present the Arab enemy (innocent civilians usually) with the full force of Israeli conviction and determination to win under any circumstances.

In 1953, following a murderous attack of a mother and her two children by Palestinian infiltrators who passed the Israeli border near to the Jordanian village of Quibya, Sharon and his commando unit, now named 'the 101', were called for action. Sharon was ordered to penetrate the village of Quibya, to blow up as many houses and to inflict as many casualties on its inhabitants as possible. Sharon was the right man for the job. The raid was a complete success. Quibya was reduced to pile of rubble. More than 50 houses were destroyed. Sixty-one civilians, most of them women and children, had been killed. A UN observer who visited the site came to a clear conclusion that the villagers had been forced to stay in their houses while they were blown up. The Quibya massacre provoked international condemnation including an anti-Israeli resolution by the UN Security Council. In a debate within the Israeli government Moshe Sharet, the moderate foreign minister, called for the issue of an official statement expressing regret over the action. Ben Gurion, the PM, had a different idea. In a radio broadcast the following day, he denied IDF involvement in the raid, he lied and blamed the action on Israeli villagers who retaliated beyond measure. As we know, Sharon¹s military career was not at all harmed, as a matter of fact, very much the opposite. Sharon and 'the 101' came to represent the new Hebraic military man: a murderous soldier who attacks beyond the enemy line, a soldier who goes far beyond orders even if it means divorcing himself from any familiar concept of mercy and humanity. Not only was Sharon's career not adversely affected, but he was now seen as the most promising young Israeli officer. In military terms he became a shining meteor, his promotion within the army ranks was the fastest possible. It wouldn't be irrational to assume that this sort of swift promotion encouraged other young officers to follow the murderous example provided by Sharon and 'the 101'. The Quibya massacre was the first in a chain of retaliation raids conducted by the Israeli army. These raids shaped the Israeli offensive philosophy into a new form of murderous art: a pattern of thought that led to an endless confrontation with the Arab world but, furthermore, which contributed toward an ongoing transformation of the Israelis into an ignorant society, a society that is concerned solely with its own interest while denying that of others.

When we scrutinize Israeli political history, we can clearly see that from the perspective of Israel's internal politics, the offensive doctrine has two major advantages. First, it communicates with the Arabs in the only language the Arabs understand, i.e. violence. Second, it provokes strong condemnation from the international community, something that is translated within Israel into an immediate political gain.

With regard to the first of these advantages, incredibly the vast majority of Israeli people do believe that the Arabs understand violence only. Therefore, throughout the history of Israel there is little evidence of diplomatic efforts towards a peaceful solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even the Oslo negotiation was taking place within very specific historical circumstances in which the PLO was in ruin politically and financially (following the support of Sadam Hussein in the Gulf War). If this was not enough, it was clear that from the very first stages of the Oslo implementations the Israelis used the military threat to exert pressure against the Palestinian authority and Palestinian people. When we examine the personal biographies of the Israeli cabinet members, both past and present, we discover that the vast majority of them are ex-military men. It is clear that only a state which decides to live by the sword and deeply believes in military solutions can put so many generals into ministerial and prime ministerial seats.

Consideration of the second advantage might be a bit embarrassing. Evidently, Israeli prime ministers love to be condemned by the international community. It is obvious that Israeli leaderships have learned how to transform foreign condemnation into clear political gain. Undoubtedly, in Israel, any foreign criticism of Israel is conditionally interpreted as 'gentile pathological anti­semitic behavior'. Every leading Israeli politician learns how to use this tool during his first days in office. The main pattern was delivered by Ben Gurion: 'It doesn't¹t matter what the gentile says, what matters is what the Jews are doing.' With this ignorant statement the legendary Israeli PM managed to provide his voters with an instant reminder of the history of Jewish persecution, pushing the Jewish people deeper into their safe haven of complete segregation that leads toward the denial of the outer world. Moreover, since in Hebrew the word gentile (goy) is a devastating derogative, Ben Gurion¹s call to ignore the gentile clearly leads Israelis to celebrate their superiority over the rest of humankind. Ben Gurion's statement was a call for Israelis to unite behind their leadership and to reject any sort of foreign criticism. To conclude this point I would claim that in the case of Israel, the offensive doctrine leaves the international community completely helpless. On the one hand, lack of criticism is taken by the Israeli public as an approval or a sign of weakness. On the other hand, any international condemnation leads eventually to a growth of public support toward the political leadership. This fact might explain the continuous shift to the right within Israeli politics. Further, it explains the international community's impotence against Israeli oppression and atrocities.


If we review Sharon¹s military and political career we discover that he has followed his mentor, Ben Gurion, religiously. Clearly, Sharon single-mindedly adopted the offensive doctrine in both his political and military life. As mentioned before, Sharon was the leading figure in forming and shaping the Israeli retaliation raids and commando form of attack. This strategy led to Israel's deep commando penetration into the Sinai desert in the 'Suez Operation' (1956). Following Colonel Sharon's plans, Israeli paratroopers landed in the ŒMitle Pass¹ at the heart of the Sinai desert aiming to cause heavy losses to the Egyptian army. In practice, the battle cost too many Israeli lives. Thanks to some sever international pressure Israel had to pull back its forces. In military terms, the operation was regarded as a waste of human life. In the 1973 war, General Sharon led his brigade across the Suez Canal. Again, the battle cost too many Israeli lives. During the battle Sharon refused to allow his higher command to show restraint. Sharon believed that Israeli soldiers on the western bank of the Suez would bring the Egyptians to their knees. In practice it prompted heavy international pressure. Soon Israel had to withdraw its forces. Furthermore, the ceasefire talks led to peace talks (1977) which resulted in Israel 'losing' Sinai forever.

Before the Lebanese war (1982), Sharon, then minister of defense, led the cabinet to believe that the Palestinian issue could be grounded forever by a military assault against the PLO in Lebanon. Clearly, he was determined to generate a light conflict, a mini war, with the Syrians in order to remove their forces from southern Lebanon. As we already know, the Israeli offensive doctrine does not differentiate between Arabs. According to the 'Iron Wall' philosophy, Arabs are all the same, you kill as many as you can.
>From very early on in the Lebanese campaign it was evident that Israel had been drawn into a vicious civil war between the different Lebanese ethnic and religious groups. As predicted by some Israeli intelligence experts, within a short time of the invasion of Lebanon the most terrible massacre of Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Shatila took place. The devastating massacre was carried out by Christian militias who got the approval to enter the refugee camps from the Israeli high command. While Israeli forces were not involved directly in the massacre itself, Israel was clearly considered responsible for the atrocities taking place within the invaded territory. As expected, the massacre was strongly condemned by the international community. In Israel, the left-wing movement 'Peace Now' managed to bring thousands of people to the street to demonstrate against the government. In a speech to the Israeli parliament, reflecting upon the left's opposition to the Lebanese campaign, Menachem Begin, the PM at the time, complained that 'gentiles kill gentiles and the Jews are blaming each other'. Again we confront the same Israeli right-wing pattern: a clear abuse of the outraged international reaction in order to delegitimate the Israeli left. In other words, Menachem Begin blamed the Israeli left for collaboration with the anti-Semitic 'gentiles' against the ŒJewish¹ Sharon. Again we can see an Israeli offense that generated outrage in the international community being turned within Israel into a political weapon against any opposition from the left or humanitarian voices. It is important to mention that following the international condemnation as well as the left's campaign, Menachem Begin eventually agreed to appoint a commission for inquiries under the supreme court justice, Yitzchak Kahan. The commission found Sharon indirectly responsible for the massacre and recommended his removal from the ministry of defense. While in the short term this was regarded as a victory for the moderate school of thought, in the long term, in the eyes of the right wing, it proved Sharon's devotion to the 'Iron Wall' philosophy. In other words, it prepared him for his later role as Israeli prime minister.
The results of the Lebanese war are not yet clear since the war is not completely over. What we can say for sure is that it took the Israeli forces almost 20 years to get out of Lebanon. Undoubtedly, while in Lebanon, the Israeli army has managed to lose its 'power of deterrence'. The Israeli army, the most equipped army in the Middle East, found itself completely defeated by the Hizbulah, a small devoted group of gorilla fighters. In the shades of the growing Israeli defeat in Lebanon, the Palestinian people within the occupied territories started to redevelop their nationalistic aspirations. Eventually in 1987 these aspirations had matured into a Palestinian uprising, the first Intifada.

Since the second week of the Lebanese war the Israeli 'power of deterrence' has deteriorated continuously. Clearly, the IDF never managed to establish successful fighting skills with which to confront the Lebanese civil resistance. Furthermore, following the Oslo accord Israeli civilians faced a growing threat of terror within Israel. For the first time in Israel's history, the Israeli civilian population found itself within a war zone. This fact is of crucial importance. According to Israel's self-image, it is the Arab civilians who are supposed to die, definitely not the Israeli ones. In Israeli eyes, Jewish civilians are not supposed to die in any conflict for two main reasons: 1. It reminds them of the holocaust in which Jews were dying simply because they were Jews. 2. It is very much against the idea of an 'offensive doctrine'. Israel had got used to the fact that any confrontation with the Arab world was to take place over Arab land. Suddenly, the confrontations had started to take place in the center of Israeli cities. This fact was regarded by most Israelis as a catastrophe and completely unacceptable. In the light of the Palestinian terror, a very strong right-wing slogan was introduced - 'Let the IDF win' - which meant - let us raise the 'power of deterrence' - let us get back into our offensive doctrine - let us move the war from our city centers into Palestinian towns - let us make sure that we destroy the Palestinian will to fight - let us get out of control, let us get mad - let us re-erect the 'Iron Wall'. Who was the right man for the job? No doubt, Mr Ariel Sharon. The master of offensive doctrine. Israel's most celebrated war criminal. Arik, who had proved himself to be the man who knows no mercy. We have to admit the Israelis were right: it took Sharon, as prime minister, just about a year in office to commit the great massacre in Jenin.


It is necessary to scrutinize the events in Jenin from the perspective of the offensive doctrine. The operation in the refugee camp was, Œmore or less¹, the embodiment of what offensive doctrine is all about. It took place on, more or less, enemy land. It was, more or less, very fast and it was, more or less, a 'clear-cut' victory. Apparently, the Œmore or less¹ is crucial. Jenin is not really an enemy land. It is an Israeli invaded territory. Strangely enough, it appears as if the Israeli colonial forces are the first colonialists to have demolished their own colonies. Clearly, it took the Israelis a bit too long to confess that the battle in Jenin was over. Evidently, the might of the Israeli armed forces was not enough to break the spirit of the very few determined Palestinian freedom fighters. Last but not least, if it was a clear victory, it is very unclear who the winner was. Was it the Israelis? I would doubt it very much. As T. Larsen, the UN envoy to the Middle East, put it: 'in Jenin Israel has lost its moral ground'. As a result of this statement, Mr Larsen became a persona non grata in the Jewish state. As a result of this statement, Israel demanded that Mr Larsen not participate in the UN inquiry into the events in Jenin. As a result of this statement the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has become an anti-Semite in Israeli eyes and the entire investigation has been jeopardized by Israel. If anything, it is clear that after Jenin, after presenting the Israelis with real fierce fighting, the Palestinians are determined to fight beyond what it would take to achieve their liberation.

I will try to describe the Jenin battle and to analyze the Israeli decision-making process in the light of the offensive paradigm. On the morning of April 3rd Israeli ground forces entered into the Jenin refugee camp. From very early on it was clear that this time they would encounter some fierce Palestinian fighting. The Israeli high command naturally provided extra support. More tanks and helicopter gunships were sent to support the battling ground forces. At this point it is important to mention that it is very unusual to use tanks and helicopter gunships in highly populated areas, however, within the IDF offensive doctrine, the end (victory) is far more important than the means (war crimes). In the meantime, Israeli commanders on the ground were under severe pressure to complete their mission. They began to use far heavier weaponry (air-to-ground missiles as well as tank shells), they cared less and less about who was getting killed as long as they were Arabs. Clearly, as a result, more civilians were hit. The scene on the ground started to look a bit unaesthetic. The Israeli high command decided to seal the area. Press and rescue forces were not allowed in. Now the forces on the ground were working against time. They had to provide a clear-cut conclusion. Naturally, they decided to wipe out the entire center of the camp that was suspected of being a 'pocket of resistance'. In doing so they killed many civilians, mainly old and disabled people who could not run away. When the battle was over Jenin had become a slaughter house, the streets were the most horrifying sight imaginable. Civilian bodies were all over the place, many Palestinians were wounded, bleeding to death. Still, the Israelis showed no mercy, the Red Cross and other rescue forces were not allowed in. The Israelis had to decide whether to show some mercy, to be human and to save those who could be saved or whether to try to conceal the evidence of an unacceptable, shocking and inhuman crime. Naturally, following Sharon¹s overwhelming history of crimes against humanity, the decision was fairly simple. The Israelis decided to bulldoze the center of the Jenin refugee camp. They turned the Jenin camp into a 'Palestinian Ground Zero'. Occupied houses were destroyed over their habitants. Sharon had committed a crime comparable to the Quibya massacre of 50 years earlier. Although the similarities are very obvious, there are slight differences that should be identified. In Quibya Sharon was a platoon commander, in Jenin he had become an elected prime minister and had committed his crime in the name of all Israeli people. As expected, as soon as international criticism was heard, Sharon defined the current battle as the 'existential war of the all Jewish nation'. According to Sharon, then, the massacre in Jenin was done not only in the name of the Israelis but in the name of all Jewish people. If this was not enough, Sharon declared that very much like G. Bush he was conducting a holy war against terror. We must remember that this kind of approach is aimed at the American population, Sharon becomes American messenger or at least American platoon commander. As we can see, both world Jewry and the American administration have avoided public criticism of Sharon, hence, we can conclude that Sharon has committed his war crimes in the name of the Jewish people and the American nation. Unless major Rabbis stand up and firmly denounce Sharon's atrocities, unless the American administration decides to stop supporting the Jewish state, we will be able to force that Sharon has indeed been acting in the name of the Jews and the American nation.

Clearly, from an Israeli perspective, Sharon is the right man for the job. He is the embodiment of everything Israel is about. He is offensive, murderous and righteous. Sharon has proved again that he himself acts as a self-sufficient 'Iron Wall'. The real and only question that is left for us is whether we want to live in a world in which Israel, a criminal and offensive state, is accepted among the nations.