Up here in Scotland looks to be an interesting mass in Glasgow. Last month two cops passed by and decided this kind of cycling and having fun on the streets really wasn't on and decided to start charging people with hazardous cycling, while ignoring two separate incidents where taxi's deliberately rammed cyclists.

I see the Gumball rally, with hundreds of cars taking to the street for fun in a similar way that the critical mas does just with carbon emissions and a greater chance of death, was given police security while in London...obviously them being rich has nothing to do with it....

.....is something that will probably be used by the bullies in blue as I have expirenced in recent masses. It would be intresting if the LDMG or suchlike happened to be cycling around on friday.As with any other day of the week,cyclists should show solidarity with each other,this includes any acts of intimidation and or violence by the states para militaries the blue bloc.Otherwise known as the metropolitan police.
It beggars the question though. If police cyclists join the mass and if they are stating it`s illegal,are they part of an illegal gathering? I`m meeting a load of mates on friday for a bike ride,hope more people join us for a peaceable ride.

Monty Pythons Flying Circus.

bring on the bicycle repair man!

what are the legal options left/available? if one judge can overturn another judge's ruling, can not a third judge be called in? does this ruling come into the effect the moment it is proclaimed? what is the procedure for an appeal?

i'm a bit worried that this bit of news seemed to have conveniently slipped into the background & am of course thinking, come july, will they be rounding up smokers huddling by backdoors, smoking cabins etc, or shoppers who are casually standing around large supermarkets, or...

[1950] 2 K.B. 498
1950 WL 10274 (DC), 114 J.P. 304, [1950] 2 K.B. 498, 66 T.L.R. (PT. 2) 89,
[1950] 1 All E.R. 1091
(Cite as: [1950] 2 K.B. 498)

Flockhart v. Robinson.

Divisional Court

DC

Lord Goddard C.J., Morris and Finnemore JJ.

1950 Apl. 26.

Public order--Public procession of political character--"Organize"--Meaning--
Public Order Act, 1936 (1 Edw. 8, & 1 Geo. 6, c. 6), s. 3, sub-ss. 2, 3, 4.

The defendant, an official of a political party, organized a public procession
of a political character in the City of London, and it dispersed at Temple Bar.
At that time an order was in force made by the Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis under s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Public Order Act, 1936, prohibiting the
holding of public processions of a political character in the Metropolitan police
district. Later the same day the defendant assembled members of the party at
Knightsbridge in connexion with a sales campaign for the party's newspaper, and
then went to Hyde Park Corner where he met other officials of the party and some
150 members, most of whom had taken part in the lawful procession in the City.
The defendant, as the senior official present, then walked eastwards along
Piccadilly followed by all the others in loose formation. After a traffic check
at Down Street, the defendant's followers were in a compact body marching in
ranks in close formation behind him and thus became a public procession of a
political character, though that occurred spontaneously and without any previous
arrangement. At each traffic crossing the defendant made the appropriate warning
signals to his followers. As the procession approached Piccadilly some of the
participants shouted political slogans. When a police inspector stood in front of
the defendant and shouted to the procession to break up, the defendant walked
past him followed by the rest. He signalled to them to follow him out of
Piccadilly Circus into Coventry Street, and they were then broken up by the
police. The defendant having been charged with having "organized" a public
procession of a political character, contrary to s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Act of
1936,

Held (by Lord Goddard C.J. and Morris J., Finnemore J. dissenting), that, as
the essence of a procession was that it proceeded along a route, the person who
directed its route was the person who organized it; that the events, subsequent
to the traffic check at Down Street, in which the procession maintained its
formation through the defendant's leadership constituted evidence on which the
magistrate could find that the defendant had organized the procession; and that
he was accordingly properly convicted.

Per Finnemore J. The fact that the defendant was the leader of the procession
was not enough to constitute him its organizer. The evidence being that, before
the traffic check at Down Street, he had not organized the procession in any way
and that it then formed spontaneously, no such change took place in it thereafter
as made it possible to say that the defendant had organized it. The fact that he
then led it on and round Piccadilly Circus still did not make him its
organizer, because to organize meant something in the nature of planning or
arranging.

CASE STATED by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate sitting at Bow Street
Magistrates' Court.

At a court of summary jurisdiction sitting at Bow Street, London, an
information was preferred by Chief Superintendent of Police Alexander Robertson
against Lawrence Alfred Flockart, alleging that on October 15, 1949, at
Piccadilly and elsewhere within the Metropolitan police district he organized a
public procession of a political character contrary to an order prohibiting such
processions made by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis under s. 3, sub-
s. 3 of the Public Order Act, 1936. [FN1].

FN1 Public Order Act, 1936, s. 3, sub-s. 3: "If at any time the. ... Commissioner
of Police of the Metropolis is of opinion that, by reason of particular
circumstances existing in his police area .... the powers conferred on him by
subsection 1 of this section will not be sufficient to enable him to prevent
serious public disorder being occasioned by the holding of public processions in
that area .... he may with the consent of the Secretary of State, make an order
prohibiting for such period not exceeding three months as may be specified in the
order the holding of all public processions or of any class of public processions
so specified .... in the police area. ..." Sub-section 4: "Any person who ....
organizes or assists in organizing any public procession held or intended to be
held in contravention of an order made under this section or incites any person
to take part in such a procession, shall be guilty of an offence."

On the hearing of the information the following facts were proved or admitted:-
There was in force at all material times an order dated October 3, 1949, made by
the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis with the consent of the Home
Secretary prohibiting the holding of all public processions of a political
character within the Metropolitan police district. The defendant was assistant
secretary of the Union Movement, an organization having political objects, and
was the senior officer of the Union Movement present on the occasion referred to
below.

On October 15, 1949, the defendant and others assembled at about 5 p.m. within
the boundaries of the City of London, and there the defendant organized a lawful
public procession of members of the Union Movement, which procession duly
dispersed at Temple Bar at about 6.45 p.m. The defendant issued musical
instruments to the band leading the procession marched at the head of it, and
gave verbal commands to those taking part.

Having dismissed that procession, the defendant on the same day assembled a
number of members of the Union Movement at Knightsbridge Station, issued copies
of the "Union" newspaper to them, and placed the members at the edge of the
pavement at regular intervals between Knightsbridge Station and Hyde Park Corner
for the purpose of their taking part in a sales campaign for "Union, " that being
a political newspaper setting out the aims and objects of the Union Movement.

At about 9.45 p.m. the defendant went to Hyde Park Corner and there met
officials of the movement accompanied by about 150 members. Most of them had
taken part in the procession in the City of London. The defendant then walked
eastwards on the north pavement along Piccadilly in company with one Hamer, a
member of the organization, and followed by the officials and members to the
number of about 150.

The persons following the defendant were at first in loose formation and not in
ranks, and did not give the appearance of a compact body of persons. On reaching
the junction of Down Street with Piccadilly, the defendant, being delayed by
traffic, stepped into the road and made a hand signal to stop those behind him.
Those immediately behind him halted and those further back closed up on those in
front. When the road was clear the defendant crossed to the south footway of
Piccadilly followed by the members of the organization, and continued walking in
an easterly direction. After passing Down Street those following the defendant
were in a compact body marching in ranks in close formation immediately behind
him. At the junction of Arlington Street with Piccadilly the defendant was again
delayed by traffic and again held up his left hand as a signal to those behind
him, who halted. When the traffic cleared the defendant crossed Arlington Street
followed by the body of persons. At the junction of St. James's Street with
Piccadilly he again signalled to those behind him, who halted. He crossed the
street when there was a lull in the traffic, still followed by the body of
persons.

Outside Simpsons, about 25 yards before entering Piccadilly Circus, the body of
persons behind the defendant, but not the defendant himself, began singing a song
to the tune of the Horst Wessel or European Marching Song and shouting political
slogans. When the singing started Hamer warned the defendant to "hold on"
as, once someone started, all would be singing. The defendant took no notice, but
continued towards Piccadilly Circus followed by the body of persons.

When the defendant and the body of persons had nearly reached Piccadilly
Circus, a police inspector stepped in front of him and them, held out his arms,
and said in a loud voice "Stop this. Break this up." The defendant held up his
hand, the body of persons checked, and the defendant then walked past the
inspector and moved into the roadway followed by the body of persons in close
formation. The defendant turned north and marched round Piccadilly Circus
followed by the body of persons in close formation still singing and shouting
political slogans.

After parading once round the Circus the defendant gave a direction signal on
reaching Coventry Street, which he entered followed by the body of persons. Here
they were broken up by police.

For the prosecutor it was contended that on the night in question there was a
public procession of a political character along Piccadilly and in Piccadilly
Circus; that the procession was illegal by virtue of the Public Order Act, 1936,
and the Order made under it, and that the defendant organized the procession
contrary to s. 3, sub-s. 4 of the Act.

For the defendant it was contended that no procession was proved to have
existed; and that, if there was a procession as contended by the prosecutor,
there was no evidence that the defendant had organized it.

The magistrate, being of the opinion that a public procession of a political
character was proved to have come into being spontaneously and without any prior
arrangement after the persons in question had passed Down Street; that the
procession, being within the Metropolitan police district, was by reason of the
Order referred to, illegal; that the defendant, as an officer of the Union
Movement and the senior officer present, had marched in front of the procession;
and that, by giving the signals described to the procession from time to time and
by leading the column along Piccadilly and round Piccadilly Circus, he had to
that extent organized the procession, held that he was guilty of organizing the
procession contrary to s. 3, sub-s. 4 of the Act of 1936, and convicted him,
fining him 10l.

The defendant appealed.

Scarman for the defendant. There was no evidence that the defendant
organized the procession. It came into being spontaneously, without any prior
arrangement. "Organizing" pre-supposes a plan or prior arrangement: it is not
synonymous with being at the head of or taking part in a procession. "Organize "
means to arrange or "get up," and here there was no evidence to this effect. The
defendant might have been charged with inciting persons to take part in the
procession, but the prosecution preferred the mole deliberate charge of
"organizing." When a limitation has been placed by the legislature on the
subject's freedom of action, the limiting words must not be construed narrowly,
and the prosecution must state accurately the offence charged.

The defendant took no part in the political side of the procession, which the
magistrate found came into being spontaneously. He merely led it and acted as a
traffic guide. He cannot be said to have organized a procession of a political
character.

Maxwell Turner for the prosecutor. A procession may be organized without prior
arrangement. The organizing may take place while the procession is in progress,
by giving to it a definite orderly structure. In this case the body of persons
began marching in loose formation, but subsequently became a compact body, and
then the procession came into being. The defendant, the senior official present,
gave directions to those marching behind him, and the magistrate was entitled to
find that a procession of a political character was organized by him.

LORD GODDARD C.J.

[after stating the facts]. The question here is whether there was evidence that
the defendant organized this procession. "Organized" is not a term of art. When a
person organizes a procession, what does he do? A procession is not a mere body
of persons: it is a body, of persons moving along a route. Therefore the person
who organizes the route is the person who organizes the procession. That is how I
approach this case.

It seems to mt clear that, at any late from the time when these people reached
Piccadilly Circus, the defendant was organizing the route for the procession to
follow, and that they followed it. Therefore I think that there was evidence on
which the magistrate could find that he organized a procession, at any rate after
these people reached Piccadilly Circus, for he proceeded to take them round the
Circus and then into Coventry Street. He was organizing the procession
because, although he did not organize the body of people, he organized the route.
There is no other way of organizing, a procession, because a procession is
something which proceeds. By indicating or planning the route a person is in my
opinion organizing a procession.

For these reasons this appeal in my opinion fails.

MORRIS J.

I have come to the same conclusion. The defendant does not contest that there
was a public procession of a political character, but it was argued for him that
it was not shown that he organized that public procession. The chief magistrate
has found that a public procession of a political character was proved to have
come into being spontaneously and without any prior arrangement after the persons
concerned had passed Down Street. It seems to me, on the facts as found by the
chief magistrate, that, when that political procession came into being, the
defendant, being the senior officer of the organization present, placed himself
at the head of that public procession of a political character and, having done
so, organized it: he directed them and they obeyed him. The findings of the chief
magistrate show that on many occasions he gave them directions and that on each
occasion his direction was followed.

What had happened earlier in the day is also not without significance: the
defendant had earlier organized a public procession which was lawful because it
was in the City of London. It is the defendant who is found to have organized
that procession; and it is found that what he did was to issue the instruments to
the band, to march at the head of the procession, and to give verbal commands to
those taking part. Therefore, when the defendant, being an officer of the Union
Movement, placed himself at the head of the procession which came into being in
Piccadilly, he was placing himself at the head of people who had been organized
by him earlier in the day, for the chief magistrate finds that most of those
present in Piccadilly had taken part in the earlier procession in the City. There
was no band in Piccadilly, but otherwise the defendant there did much the same as
he had done earlier in the day when in command of the lawful public procession
which he did organize: in each case he marched at the head of the procession and
gave words or signs of command which were obeyed.

It seems to me that, on the findings of the chief magistrate, there were seven
separate occasions when the defendant gave a direction which those behind
him followed. [His Lordship referred to the case stated, and continued:] Then the
inspector held up the defendant and he walked past the inspector and into the
roadway followed by the body of persons, he was again giving the lead to those
behind him, intending them to follow, which they did.

The act of organizing might in some circumstances take a lot of time and
require premeditation. In other circumstances organizing might be speedily done.
The organizing by the defendant of this procession which had come into being
required very little time because of the circumstances of the day, because of his
relationship to those behind him, and because of their common understanding of
his leadership. In my opinion, the facts as found by the chief magistrate show
that what he was doing did amount to organizing the procession which had come
into being. It would by no means follow that, even though the procession had come
into being spontaneously and without any prior arrangement, it would continue to
be in orderly formation: it might have become disintegrated; but, under the
direction and leadership of the defendant, it continued as a procession along the
south side of Piccadilly, and those who formed part of it obeyed the defendant
over and over again. On those facts there was ample evidence on which to hold
that the defendant had organized a public procession, and I am of the opinion
that this appeal fails.

FINNEMORE J.

With very great diffidence I feel bound to come to a contrary opinion. The
defendant was convicted of organizing a public procession of a political
character. What "organize" may mean must depend on the facts of each case. The
mere fact that a person takes part in a procession would not of itself be enough.
I do not think that the fact that the defendant was the leading person in the
procession would by itself be enough, although it might be some evidence to be
considered.

The difficulty in which I find myself is this: some 150 people belonging to a
political body, after certain political activities at Hyde Park Corner, moved
towards Piccadilly Circus. The defendant was in front. The magistrate has found
that a number of people in loose formation were walking behind him. When they
reached Down Street there was traffic in the way. The defendant, being the
leading person, held up his hand, on which those following him stopped. When they
resumed their walk along Piccadilly they had closed up together, and the
magistrate finds that thereafter they were in an orderly formation. At that time,
he finds, they became a public procession of a political character; but he finds
as a fact that that procession came into being spontaneously and without any
prior arrangement. Certainly up to that point, on the evidence, the defendant had
not organized this procession in any way at all; and thereafter, it seems to me,
that procession never altered. It is true that, on reaching Arlington Street,
where there was another traffic block, the defendant held up his hand and the
procession stopped, and that when they reached St. James's Street exactly the
same thing happened again. But the procession never broke formation; it was never
reorganized, or, as it seems to me, organized at all apart from the self-
organization at Down Street which the magistrate has found was spontaneous. When
they reached Piccadilly Circus the police inspector stepped out and called on
them to break formation. The defendant walked past him, and the others, still in
the same formation, followed him. They marched round Piccadilly Circus once, and
then, on the defendant's signal, followed him into Coventry Street, still in the
same formation, still as it seems to me the same procession, and were there
finally dispersed by the police.

I think that the finding of the magistrate that this procession formed
spontaneously without any prior arrangement after the persons concerned had
passed Down Street makes it impossible to say that the defendant had organized
the procession, and I cannot see that anything which happened thereafter
justifies our saying that at some stage after Down Street he had organized it.

The chief magistrate says that, by giving what were traffic signals, and by
leading the column round Piccadilly Circus, the defendant to that extent
organized the procession; but I do not think that that is organizing a procession
I think that organizing a procession means something in the nature of arranging
or getting up or planning a procession. It is not necessary, of course, for the
plans to be made long in advance, or, perhaps, in advance at all. There is
certainly no need for persons to meet in a back room and make secret plans. The
procession could be organized on the spot in the street; but, on the findings of
the chief magistrate, that did not happen: the procession formed itself
spontaneously; and I do not think that anything that the defendant did thereafter
amounted to organizing that procession. True he walked in front of it and
took part in it; and it may well be that he disobeyed an order given to him by
the police inspector; but I do not think that any of these matters constitutes
the offence or the act of organizing a procession.

I am therefore driven to take a different view from the rest of the court.

Representation

Solicitors: Grinling, Harris & Hale, for Marsh and Ferriman, Worthing; The
Solicitor, Metropolitan Police.

(L. F. J. MCD. )

END OF DOCUMENT