This is the basis of an oil deal agreed in mid-2001 which is currently undergoing renegotiation before it is renewed for a further year. The way in which President Robert Mugabe has sought to rid Zimbabwe of the last vestiges of British colonialism, namely white land-owners, has made him an international pariah, creating a new alliance with Libya's Muammer Al-Qadafi. Libya's policy towards Zimbabwe reveals something of Al-Qadafi's concept of African unity, placing himself at the apex of the continent's politics and economy.

Chimurenga

The violent land grab that began in the run-up to the June 2000 parliamentary elections was originally engineered by Mugabe to bolster support for the ruling Zanu-PF. The government's support had been flagging due to widespread fuel shortages caused by a lack of foreign currency. Mugabe called on the mythology of the chimurenga, the war of liberation which he had helped lead in the 1970s, to rally support behind him. Yet, the land reform has been a messy affair, with agricultural productivity and rural jobs hit hard by the capital flight generated by forced nationalisation and attacks on commercial farmers. The result has been a deepening of the country's economic crisis, political instability, food shortages and international isolation.

In 2001, Al-Qadafi stepped in to support Mugabe as the international community turned its back on the regime in Zimbabwe. Al-Qadafi referred to Mugabe as a 'brother' in the struggle for Africa's liberation. The Libyan leader backed his words with actions. Hundreds of elite Libyan forces were sent out to Zimbabwe to help Mugabe clamp down on his opponents ahead of the March 2002 elections. Al-Qadafi also donated US$1 million to the election funds of Mugabe's Zanu-PF party. In a visit to Zimbabwe in August 2001, Al-Qadafi urged Zimbabwe's tiny Muslim minority to fight a jihad against whites. This further radicalised Mugabe, who seemed invincible with Libyan backing.

Libya's support for the Mugabe regime is not about brotherhood, but business interests. Al-Qadafi has sought to capitalise on Zimbabwe's economic problems, offering Mugabe generous oil deals to offset the effects of the fuel crisis. In July 2001, Libya agreed to supply US$360 million worth of oil in exchange for Zimbabwean goods to ease the fuel crisis. Al-Qadafi also aquired a number of Zimbabwean properties, including mansions in Harare's northern suburbs and large farms around Chinhoyi. The agreement appeared to be financially risky from Libya's point of view, while doing nothing to put Zimbabwe on the right economic footing in the long-term.

However, Libya is not just interested in the acquisition of commercial farming land, which is traditionally Zimbabwe's most productive and lucrative asset. With Al-Qadafi leaning on the Zimbabwean authorities, Libyan businessmen have snapped up stakes in a range of privatised companies, including shareholdings in the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ), oil firms and hotels. This has led the leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Morgan Tsvengirai, to claim that Mugabe had 'sold' the country to Libya.

The agreement's renewal was under discussion in August 2002 as the two governments were in deadlock over the terms of repayment. However, as the supplier of 70 per cent of Zimbabwe's fuel, Libya has the upper hand and is placing more and more demands on the Mugabe regime. Libya has demanded that it takes over Zimbabwe's entire 9,100 tonne beef quota to the EU and gets compensated with goods such as unprocessed tea, citrus fruit and bananas. Many Zimbabweans are scratching their heads, wondering why food and key agro-exports are being given away while millions are faced with starvation.

Paternalism

The exploitative nature of Libya's demands on crisis-hit Zimbabwe displays the real depth of Al-Qadafi's commitment to pan-African solidarity. International pressure on African governments to commit themselves to institutional and democratic reform has panicked many regimes such as Mugabe's who fear reform could jeopardise their own business interests. Consequently, they are running to Al-Qadafi for help.

The Libyan leader's grand tour of Africa that began in June was not simply a roadshow for Al-Qadafi's ego, but a business trip. As he made his way northwards across Africa, leaders tried to drum up Libyan support as the continent struggled in the face of the international downturn. Namibia's President Sam Nujoma, whose rhetoric is indistinguishable from Mugabe, was embraced by Al-Qadafi who endorsed the expulsion of 'white colonisers', presumably to make way for Libyan entrepreneurs. In a visit to Swaziland, Al-Qadafi referred to the country's absolute monarch, King Mswati III, as his son. This paternalism has encouraged Mswati to ignore calls for democratisation as Swazis await the publication of a new constitution.

Despite its considerable oil wealth, Libya cannot afford to buy off every African government in the way it has in Zimbabwe. Yet, this has not stopped African leaders from competing for Al-Qadafi's largesse. Ultimately, the growing influence of Libya risks undermining the African Union's high-minded commitment to political and economic liberalisation.