Peace in Palestine? Something to Debate.

# Avnery on martyrdom and the limited horizon of generals

Uri Avnery
27.3.04

òáøéú áàúø / Hebrew on the website
 http://www.avnery-news.co.il/hebrew/index.html

Three Generals, One Martyr

Five hundred black- and white-bearded Hamas members were sitting
opposite me. Venerable sheikhs and young people. On the side, some
rows
were occupied by women. I was standing on the stage, talking in
Hebrew,
with the crossed flags of Israel and Palestine on my lapel.
As I have recounted already several times, it happened like
this:
at
the end of 1992, the new Prime Minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, expelled 415
Islamic activists - mostly Hamas members - to the Lebanese border
area.
In protest, we put up tents opposite the Prime Minister's office in
Jerusalem. There we spent 45 days and nights - Israeli peace
activists
(who were later to found Gush Shalom) and Arab citizens of Israel,
mostly
members of the Islamic movement. Most of the time it was very cold,
and
some days our tents were covered with snow. There was a lot of debate
in
the tents, the Jews learning something about Islam and the Muslims
something about Judaism.
The expelled militants themselves vegetated for a year in the
hilly
landscape, between the Israeli and Lebanese armies. The whole world
followed their suffering. After a year they were allowed back, and
the
Hamas leaders in Gaza organized a homecoming reception for them in
the
biggest hall in town. They invited those Israelis who had protested
against the expulsion. I was asked to make a speech. I spoke about
peace,
and in the intermission we were invited to have lunch with the hosts.
I
was impressed by the friendly attitude of the hundreds of people who
were
there.
Undoubtedly, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and the spokesman of the
expellees,
Dr. Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantissi (who became Sheikh Yassin's successor
last
week) would have been present, too, if they had not been kept in
prison.
I recount this experience in order to point out that the picture
of
Hamas as an inveterate enemy of all peace and compromise is not
accurate.
Of course, 10 years of bloodshed, suicide bombings and targeted
assassinations have passed since then. But even now, the picture is
much
more complex than meets the eye.
There are different tendencies in Hamas. The ideological hard
core
does indeed refuse any peace or compromise with Israel. They consider
it
a foreign implantation in Palestine, which in Islamic doctrine is a
Muslim "wakf" (religious grant). But many Hamas sympathizers do not
treat
the organization as an ideological center but rather as an instrument
for
fighting Israel in pursuit of realistic objectives.
Sheikh Yassin himself announced some months ago in a German
paper
that the fight would be discontinued after the establishment of a
Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. Recently, he offered a
"hudna"
(truce) for 30 years. (Which strongly reminds one of Ariel Sharon's
suggestion that Israel would give up the Gaza Strip and retain large
parts of the West Bank for an interim phase to last for 20 years.)
Therefore, the murder of the Sheikh did not serve any positive
aim.
It was an act of folly.
The three generals who actually direct the affairs of Israel -
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Minister of Defense Sha'ul Mofaz and
Chief-
of-Staff Mosh Ya'alon - maintain that "in the short run" the
assassination would indeed increase the attacks on Israeli citizens,
but
"in the long run" it would help to "rout terrorism". They are very
careful not to spell out when the "short run" ends and the "long run"
begins. Our generals do not believe in timetables.
I take the liberty to tell these three illustrious strategists:
Nonsense in tomato juice! (as you say in Hebrew slang). Or rather,
nonsense in blood.
In the short run, this action endangers our personal security;
in
the long run it represents an even greater danger to our national
security.
In the short run, it has increased the motivation for Hamas to
carry out deadly attacks. Every Israeli understands this and is
taking
extra precautions these days. But the less obvious results are much
more
threatening.
In the hearts of hundreds of thousands of children in the
Palestinian territories and the Arab countries, this murder has
raised
a
storm of rage and thirst for revenge, together with feelings of
frustration and humiliation in view of the impotence of the Arab
world.
This will produce not only thousands of new potential suicide bombers
inside the country, but also tens of thousands of volunteers for the
radical Islamic organizations throughout the Arab world. (I know,
because
at the age of 15 I joined the armed underground in similar
circumstances.)
There is no stronger weapon for a fighting organization than a
martyr. Suffice it to mention Avraham Stern, alias Ya'ir, who was
killed
by the British police in Tel-Aviv in 1942. His blood gave an impulse
to
the emergence of the Lehi underground (nicknamed "the Stern gang")
which
only four years later was playing a major role in the expulsion of
the
British from Palestine.
But Ya'ir's standing was nothing compared to the standing of
Sheikh
Yassin. The man was practically born to fulfil the role of a sainted
martyr: a religious personality, a paraplegic in a wheelchair, broken
in
body but not in spirit, a militant who spent years in prison, a
leader
who continued his fight after miraculously surviving an earlier
assassination attempt, a hero cowardly murdered from the air while
leaving the mosque after prayer. Even a writer of genius could not
have
invented a figure more suited to the adoration of a billion Muslims,
in
this and coming generations.
The murder of Yassin will encourage cooperation among the
Palestinian fighting organizations. Here, too, a parallel with the
Hebrew
underground presents itself. In a certain phase of the fight against
the
British, there was much unrest among the members of the Hagana, the
semi-
official underground army of the Zionist leadership (comparable to
Fatah
today). The Hagana (which included the elite Palmakh formation) was
seen
to be inactive, while the Irgun and Lehi appeared as heroes who
carried
out incredibly audacious actions. The ferment inside the Hagana
caused
the emergence of a group called "Fighting Nation" which advocated
close
cooperation between the various organizations. A number of Hagana
members
simply went over to Lehi.
Now it is happening among the Palestinians. The lines between
the
various groups are becoming more and more blurred. Al-Aqsa Martyrs'
Brigade members cooperate with Hamas and Jihad, contrary to the
orders
of
their political leadership, saying that "since we are killed
together,
let us fight together". This phenomenon is bound to grow and make the
attacks more effective.
Hamas' popularity among the population is rising sky-high,
together
with its capability to carry out attacks. This does not mean that the
Palestinian public accepts the aim of an Islamic state or that it has
given up the idea of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Even among
Hamas members, many embrace this idea. But the admiration of the
masses
for the attackers and their actions reflects the conviction that the
Israelis understand only the language of force, and that experience
proves that without extreme violence the Palestinians will not
achieve
anything at all.
Unfortunately, there is no real evidence for the opposite. The
truth
is that the Palestinians have never achieved anything without
resorting
to violence. Therefore the petitions being signed these days by well-
meaning Palestinian personalities, calling for an end to the armed
struggle, will have no effect. They cannot point to any other method
that
will sound convincing to their public. And our government always,
without
exception, presents such moves as a sign of weakness.
In the even longer run, the assassination of Yassin poses an
existential danger. For five generations, the Israel-Palestinian
conflict
was essentially a national conflict - a clash between two great
national
movements, each of which claimed the country for itself. A national
conflict is basically rational, it can be solved by compromise. This
may
be difficult, but it is possible. Our nightmare has always been that
the
national struggle would turn into a religious one. Since every
religion
claims to represent absolute truth, religious struggles do not allow
for
compromise.
The martyrdom of Sheikh Yassin pushes even further away the
chance
of Israel ever attaining peace and tranquility, normal relations with
its
neighbors, with a flourishing economy. It increases the danger that
future generations of Arabs and Muslims will view it as a foreign
implantation, installed in this region by force, with every decent
Muslim, from Morocco to Indonesia, duty-bound to strive for its
uprooting.
Such insights are far from the capability of our three generals
to
absorb. Sharon, Mofaz, Ya'alon and their ilk understand only brute
force
in the service of a narrow nationalism. Peace does not inspire them,
for
them compromise is a dirty word. It is quite clear that they will
feel
much more comfortable if the Palestinian people is led by fanatical
religious fighters than by a man prepared to compromise like Yasser
Arafat.
~~~

# Back to an existential fight - Ghassan Khatib
A PALESTINIAN VIEW

Israel's policy of assassinating Palestinian activists and leaders
has
now escalated to touch the very highest tiers of Palestinian
leadership,
supposedly in response to the provocation of Palestinian suicide
bombings. This change marks a new wider shift in the tenor and very
nature of the longstanding Palestinian-Israeli conflict and
confrontations.
While it is easy to view the killing of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin as part
of
the ongoing escalation of violence between the two sides, that view
is
also simplistic. One must explore the strategic roots of this ever-
growing phenomenon, and that question must turn the focus on the
Israeli
government as the only variable that has changed since the breakdown
in
talks.
We now have a government in Israel that is responsible for
transforming
the nature of our struggle. Previously, Palestinians and Israelis
were
more or less in agreement over the guidelines to the
solution--basically
the two state solution as stipulated in the terms of reference of the
peace process and international legality. The differences between the
two
sides were not minor, but they all were located in determining the
details of this solution. For example, at the 2000 Camp David talks,
agreement broke down over various details of how to implement two
states:
the percentage of Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza,
the
borders that would be drawn between the two states, which settlements
would be dismantled, how to solve the refugee issue, how to divide
Jerusalem, and so on.
Since then, a revolution has taken place. The peace camp in Israel is
entirely marginalized and those groups that opposed the peace process
are
now in power. That opposition has capitalized on this new reality and
succeeded in transferring the conflict and confrontations from a
discussion over the details of creating two neighboring states to an
existential conflict. This Israeli government has spent most of its
energies trying to negate
the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state by reoccupying
the
territories of the Palestini
an Authority and gradually emasculating the Palestinian Authority
itself.
This new character of the conflict naturally brings new levels of
confrontation. It is useful to re
member that Israel tried the assassination policy on the Palestinian
leadership in previous phases
of the struggle, namely
before the initiation of the peace process and at a time when the
two
sides had not yet decided to
compromise, but were still trying to wipe each other out. The 1960s
and 70s witnessed a great numb
er of Israeli assassina
tions of leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
But Israel did not learn its lesson. Those assassinations only
succeeded
in intensifying the confrontations and increasing determination among
Palestinians to continue the fight. The same can be said for the
current
round of political eliminations. Assassinations strengthen
Palestinian
hostility, and consequently provide a backbone for the ongoing
violence.
But let us make no mistakes. Those Israelis who understand
Palestinian
political structures and aspirations also knew in advance the likely
outcome of this assassination for the Palestinian balance of power.
Therefore, if they were trying to systematically tilt this balance
further against the Palestinian Authority, the peace camp, and the
secular camp, then they have made no mistakes. -Published
29/3/2004©bitterlemons.org
Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of bitterlemons.org and bitterlemons-
international.org. He is minister of labor in the Palestinian
government
and for many years prior was featured in the press as a political
analyst.
~~~~

# Bankruptcy - Yossi Alpher
AN ISRAELI VIEW

A week after the assassination by Israel of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, it
is
easy to draw up a list of justifications for the act. It is equally
easy
to demonstrate that on balance the killing was a serious mistake,
reflecting a dangerous absence of strategic wisdom on the part of its
perpetrators. But this entire discussion of the assassination of a
terrorist must not be allowed to obfuscate the more important basic
fact
that the assassinations reflect: none of the relevant leaders has a
realistic strategy for peace, or even for ending the violence.
This targeted killing was justified because Sheikh Yassin was a major
terrorist leader, and in the post 9/11 era there are no longer
inhibitions about eliminating terrorist leaders. It was popular with
the
Israeli public because the public, legitimately, wants its terrorist
tormentors to be punished. With Israel having announced its plan to
leave
the Gaza Strip, it was legitimate to expect that terrorism from and
within Gaza would cease; when it did not, and when Hamas leaders,
with
Hezbollah's backing, escalated the terrorism (the Ashdod port
attack),
it
made sense to launch a campaign to send a message of strength, and to
diminish Hamas in favor of more
moderate Palestinians, as part and parcel of the withdrawal plan.
And
while the murder of a quadri
plegic political-religious figure in a wheelchair as he was leaving a
mosque undoubtedly seems grot
esque and cynical, it d
oes send a deterrent message to Yassin's fellow religious terrorist
leaders: witness the effect of
the hu! miliating capture of Saddam Hussein on the likes of Libyan
leader Moammar Qaddafi. A previo
us round of assassinati
ons led Hamas to agree to a hudna or ceasefire.
There is also an obvious political angle--cynical, but real--to the
Yassin killing. By this act, Pr
ime Minister Ariel Sharon silenced the militant critics of his
disengagement plan within the Likud,
and seemingly enhanced
his "irreplaceable" status in anticipation of a possible criminal
indictment. Some would add that
there is an international angle, too--one that refers to the global
war
on terrorism: the election
of the Zapatero governm
ent in Spain, with its platform of withdrawing from Iraq on the heels
of the Qaeda attacks in Madri
d, ostensibly sealed Yassin's fate, in the sense that a strong and
aggressive anti-terrorist messag
e was called for to cou
nter the impression of appeasement emanating from Spain.
All these arguments and more can be mustered to justify the Yassin
assassination. Yet it remains an
act of futility, if not stupidity. While it may reduce Hamas'
capabilities by striking at one lead
er and forcing others t
o go deep underground, it does not deter; on the contrary, it only
increases the motivation of both
the lower ranks and the leadership to kill Israelis, now including
Israeli political leaders. Whil
e some moderate Arab le
aders who fear militant Islam may secretly rejoice over Yassin's
killing, they remain angry at Isra
el and embarrassed by its actions. Jordan's King Abdullah, in
particular, was compromised and weake
ned in Arab eyes becaus
e he had met with Sharon scarcely two days before the assassination.
Plans for the end-March Tunis
Arab summit to reinforce the commendable Saudi peace initiative of
two
years ago were scrapped (alo
ng with the entire summ
it) by compromised Arab moderates. Perhaps of most concern, Yassin's
martyrdom is liable to incite
the Ar! ab street to greater religious extremism and anti-
Americanism,
far from the borders of Isra
el.
After balancing out the pros and cons of this assassination, and in
general of the policy of assass
inating the political leadership of anti-Israeli terrorist
organizations, the bottom line points to
the strategic bankrupt
cy not just of Israel, but of all the relevant parties. Israel and
the
Palestinians appear to be ca
pable of responding only to violence. It is difficult in logical
terms
to support the convoluted cl
aim that we are softeni
ng up Gaza in March 2004 in anticipation of a justified withdrawal
that
is sponsored by a lame duck
prime minister for all the wrong reasons (e.g., holding onto the
West
Bank) and which, if it happe
ns, is scheduled for th
e summer of 2005. The seemingly endless succession of empty slogans
emanating from the Israel Defen
se Forces (IDF) leadership since this intifada began--"let the IDF
win," "burn defeat into their co
nsciousness," "Hamas is
a strategic enemy" (what was it before, a tactical enemy?)--all
reflect
the lack of a strategy for endin! g the violence and winning the
peace.
Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian leadership, including that of
Hamas,
have even less of a claim to a realistic strategy: they started the
current conflict, have suffered far more, and appear to have learned
nothing, whereas Sharon is at least planning to disengage. And US
President George W. Bush seems oblivious to the damage caused by our
conflict to his program of "freedom and democracy" in the Middle
East.
If only Sharon at least had a realistic strategy for peace,
assassinations might not be necessary. Certainly they would be far
more
justified. -Published 29/3/2004©bitterlemons.org
Yossi Alpher is coeditor of bitterlemons.org and bitterlemons-
international.org. He is former director of the Jaffee Center for
Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, and a former senior adviser
to
PM Ehud Barak.
~~~

# Yassin and the camp of death - Eyad el Sarraj
A PALESTINIAN VIEW

I was apprehensive all night as the TV satellite reception was
dysfunctional, a usual sign of Israeli spy drones invading our skies
when
they are on their way to prepare a kill.
At 5:20 am, I was awakened by the thundering noise of the low flying
F16,
another sign of the Israelis closing in on a target. Five minutes
later
I
heard a distant explosion and the local Palestinian TV station, the
only
available source of news, announced the assassination of Sheikh Ahmad
Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas.
Immediately, Gaza was sealed off by the Israel Defense Forces, as was
the
West Bank--a prison locked. The skies filled with dark clouds of
smoke
as
burning tires suddenly appeared in every corner. Tens of thousands
gathered in the streets demanding revenge as the funeral procession
of
Yassin made its way to the cemetery. Gaza had never been this way
before.
Every man and woman was shaken with apprehension of what will come
next.
The killing of Yassin was not surprising. Israeli officials recently
declared that everyone, including the leaders of militant groups, is
a
legitimate target. It was obvious that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon was incensed by the suicide bombing in Ashdod, not only
because
a
number of Israelis were killed, but because it proved that
infiltration
inside Israel remains possible in defiance of the notorious wall
Israel
has constructed and all of its other security measures.
Indeed, this whole story can be viewed as another form of the tribal
revenge and retaliation that h
as continued for more than three years. Politicians and commentators
are declaring that Sharon is m
ad and that by killing
Yassin, he is throwing the whole area, if not the world, into chaos.
But I don't think Sharon is ma
d or acting in retaliation. He has a plan, and it is working.
Sharon has succeeded in turning the clock back, destroying the Oslo
agreement and the Palestinian A
uthority as a partner. Sharon has decided that peace is a mortal
danger
to Israel because it entail
s giving up the land in
the West Bank. More seriously, Sharon is determined to kill the
dream
of the "loony left" of a bin
ational state. He is ready to sacrifice even more Jews to stop it.
Violation of international law i
s unimportant and the n
umber of Palestinians murdered is of no consequence. Yassin is just
another number on Sharon's list
; there will be many to follow.
The killing of Yassin may well be one of the final nails in the
coffin
of the Palestinian Authority
, after Sharon has meticulously carved it piece by piece into
nothing.
Not only intent on destroyin
g the Authority, Sharon
is all the more determined to kill any future partner--including
Hamas.
Interestingly, Yassin once accepted an end to the conflict, one that
included a Palestinian state n
ext to Israel, and thus abandoned the dream of an Islamic state in
historic Palestine. His main tar
get was to end the Isra
eli occupation. It is important to remember that Hamas and all forms
of
resistance were born out of
the Israeli occupation.
Last summer Yassin was instrumental in bringing to bear a unilateral
ceasefire that held for nearly
two months. Yassin was much-respected. His killing has elevated him
to
the level of sainthood, to
a powerful model of mar
tyrdom.
In the aftermath of Yassin's murder, Hamas could credibly strengthen
its hold and assume the leader
ship in Palestine as President Yasser Arafat's Authority has
degenerated into a symbol of humiliati
on and impotence. This
was ingeniously executed by Sharon, helped--no doubt--by the
Palestinian lack of leadership and vis
ion, and at times assisted by blessings from the White House.
The killing of Sheikh Yassin in his wheelchair outside a mosque
following the dawn prayer will not
make Israel a safer place. It may temporarily offer Sharon safety in
his position as he embarks on
a new level of violence
that will in turn make Hamas more popular and more militant and
Israelis more frightened. Tragical
ly, the logic of terror has played out very well for Sharon, while
helping the Bush Corporation. Sh
aron desperately needs
a Palestinian retaliation that will strengthen his hand against his
domestic foes.
But it may all go wrong for Sharon and Bush alike as the truth
shockingly
becomes more apparent, and were the new leadership of Hamas to
consider
a
dramatic change of course. It is not an impossibility to imagine new
Gaza
Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi on the screen telling Israelis that
he
opposes more corpses and wants a just peace--telling them that,
indeed,
revenge is not his game.
In the killing of Yassin, only the death camp can rejoice. But this
will
be short-lived, as life always wins in the end. This is the lesson of
history. -Published 29/3/2004©bitterlemons.org
Dr. Eyad el Sarraj is the founder and director of the Gaza Community
Mental Health Programme (GCMHP).
~~~

# Targeted killings: a retro fashion - Yossi Melman
AN ISRAELI VIEW

Assassinations, or as they are termed in Israel, "targeted killings,"
are
nothing new to the Israeli intelligence community. But over the
years,
at
least until the 1970s, they were considered a last resort, a means to
be
employed rarely and wisely.
There were a few reasons for this caution. First, many in the
intelligence community thought over the years that espionage was not
mafia-style Murder, Inc. More important, the policy of targeted
killings
is a double-edged sword. What you do to your opponents, they can do
to
you.
The first time Israeli intelligence carried out an assassination was
on
July 11, 1956. Colonel Mustafa Hafez, Egyptian commander of military
intelligence in the Gaza Strip and the man responsible for sending
the
fedayeen infiltrators to Israel, was killed when a book he received
exploded.
The use of mail bombs became a central tool in the 1960s, especially
in
harrassing and assassinating German (former Nazi) scientists who were
involved in developing advanced weapons for Egypt.
After the Six-Day War, the fight against Palestinian terror, both in
the
territories and beyond the borders of Israel, moved assassinations up
the
ladder of Israeli intelligence priorities. But the watershed was the
murder of 11 Israeli athletes in Munich in 1972 by "Black September,"
a
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) front. Then Prime Minister
Golda
Meir ordered Mossad head Zvi Zamir to embark upon a campaign of
targeted
killings of anyone directly or indirectly connected with the
athletes'
murder.
It was the first time in the history of Israeli intelligence that it
had
been directed to initiate a "project"--not a one-time killing but a
systematic elimination of dozens of people.
A pattern was set in motion at that time that became the basis for
similar operations to this day. Intelligence compiled a list of
targets;
today it is known as a "bank". A special, limited forum known as
the "X
Committee" had the authority to approve Mossad requests to eliminate
a
person on the list. The X Committee would consult the attorney
general,
who served as a one-man court, sentencing the suspect to death.
This was also the first time that the motive for the assassination
was
revenge. Although it was couched in lofty terms like "deterrence" and
"future prevention" of terror, it was clear that the urge to avenge
the
deaths of the Israeli athletes was the main reason for the decision.
The systematic assassination campaign suffered a near fatal blow in
July
1973 in Lillehammer, Norway, when Mossad gunmen, out to eliminate Ali
Hassan Salameh, who was believed to be the brains of Black September,
mistakenly shot and killed a Moroccan waiter, Ahmed Boushiki.
The failure in Norway brought several questions into sharp relief:
Are
targeted killings worthwhile? If so, who should the targets be?
Although
clear answers have never been formulated, a kind of tacit
understanding
was reached whereby targeted killings are permissible, in certain
circumstances, but the use of this weapon must be cautious, wise and
rare.
It was advisable that only senior operational commanders should be
targeted, those whose deaths would result in a serious impairment of
the
organizations' operational capabilities. Responsibility should not be
taken publicly so that Israel would not appear to be using terror
itself,
and so that its relations with other countries were not damaged, as
they
were with Norway and with Jordan after the attempt to assassinate
Hammas
leader Khaled Mashaal in 1997.
The intelligence community also assumes that it is possible, even
desirable, to hit leaders of small organizations, those that are no
more
than a "one-man show." Fathi Shikaki, leader of the Islamic Jihad,
was
killed in October 1995 on the assumption that killing him would put
an
end to the capabilities of his small organization. His presumed
successor, Abdullah Ramadan Shalah, was considered ineffectual and
lacking in leadership capabilities.
Those assumptions were proved wrong. Shalah proved to be a capable
leader, and Islamic Jihad in Gaza has produced some of the worst
suicide
bombings of recent years.
The most important element that is always taken into consideration in
discussions between the intelligence chiefs and the political echelon
is
the cost-benefit ratio. If the assassination leads to a severe
response
on the part of the terror organizations, then it was a losing
proposition.
This consideration was apparently either forgotten when it came to
the
targeted killing of the director-general of Hezbollah, Abbas
Moussawi,
in
southern Lebanon in 1992, or those who made the decision operated on
the
basis of mistaken assumptions. Hezbollah's response was stinging: two
car
bombs in Buenos Aires, against the buildings housing the Israel
Embassy
and the Jewish community organization, in which more than 100 people
were
killed and many were injured.
With hindsight, there is no doubt that many in the intelligence
community
believe that the 1988 decision to hit Khalil al-Wazir, Yasser
Arafat's
deputy, also known as Abu Jihad, was a mistake. Looking back, it is
clear
to many that his death left Arafat alone at the leadership level of
the
PLO, without the counsel of a talented and pragmatic strategist.
Always, even at the height of assassination wars, there was a kind of
silent agreement on both sides not to hit "national" leaders. Here
and
there, exceptions cropped up, like the failed attempt of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine to kill then former Prime
Minister
David Ben-Gurion during a visit to Scandinavia in the 1960s, or plans
devised already in the late 1960s and again in Lebanon in 1982 to
kill
Arafat.
Already in 1998, after the failed attempt against Meshal, the
subcommittee for intelligence and security services of the Knesset
which
investigated the case published an unprecedented critical statement
in
which it said,"for many years the governments of Israel have not
formulated policies in the war against terror organizations that are
based on fundamental thought processes and continuity...".
But over the last three years, and especially with the unwise
decision
to
kill Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, all the basic assumptions and past lessons
have
been forgotten or abandoned. From a weapon of last resort,
assassination
has become the most available of weapons; from wise and cautious use,
it
is now widespread and wholesale.
This change has damaged another, mainly psychological, assumption:
the
mystery that surrounded previous assassinations cast fear into the
hearts
of the enemy by their very rarity and sophistication. That mystery
dissipates the moment the act becomes routine. This, more than
anything
else, shows the long road the Israel Defense Forces and the
intelligence
and security forces have traveled, from daring and creativity to
paralyzed thinking.
-Published 29/3/2004©bitterlemons.org

Yossi Melman is a senior correspondent with the Israeli daily Haaretz
and
author of several books on intelligence, clandestine diplomacy and
foreign policy.