Timor-Leste’s President Jose Ramos-Horta was shot on 11 February by rebel soldiers in his house, a few miles outside the capital Dili. He is in a “critical but stable” condition, and he has been airlifted to Australia for further treatment. The failed coup was apparently led by Alfredo Reinado, a rebel soldier ho was himself killed in the attack. This incident is shocking, but shows how unstable the situation in Timor Leste still is. The “crisis” that started in 2006 is far from over, and Timor Leste’s security forces are unable to provide security. Not even for the acting President himself.
The ongoing crisis
In May 2005, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, in a speech marking the end of the UN peace-keeping operation in Timor-Leste, declared that the peacekeepers’ departure showed the world’s recognition of Timor as a safe and peaceful country, whose security agencies were able to take responsibility for its internal and external security. The outbreak of violence that started a year later sharply illustrates that this assessment was decidedly over-optimistic. In April 2006, the capital, Dili, went up in flames after the dismissal of 600 soldiers – nearly one third of the military – who protested against discrimination within the ranks of the newly formed Timorese army. The initially peaceful protest culminated in the death of at least 37 people and the displacement of two thirds of the capital’s residents. General frustration with the government’s failure to alleviate high unemployment and corruption, combined with objections to their response to turmoil in the defense force, encouraged numerous East Timorese to take up arms and join armed groups. Violent gangs of mostly unemployed youths joined the disaffected soldiers, roaming the streets of Dili, burning down houses and torching cars. Some members of the police force defected to join the dismissed soldiers, known as ‘the petitioners’, and openly confronted the military. Lethal clashes between elements of the national police force (PNTL) and the military (F-FDTL) were followed by widespread rioting and looting in the capital. Law and order broke down and within days the leadership of PNTL disintegrated.
Lack of trust
Both the PNTL and the F-FDLT are not perceived to have the trust of the population or the capacity to provide adequate security and order. Past behavior of some PNTL members while on duty reduced public confidence in the institution: some police members have been involved in sexual harassment, human rights violations, illegal weapons distribution and black market activities. The PNTL has been accused by a Human Rights Watch report of gross human rights violations and “police abuse has become one of East Timor’s most worrying human rights problems.” Moreover, neither organisation is regarded as politically neutral. Until the election in the summer of 2007, the F-FDLT fell under the control of President Gusmão – a former guerilla leader – while the PNTL reported to Fretilin’s hardliner Rogerio Lobato – a long term rival of Gusmão. The internal divisions within the leadership date back to the civil war and the Indonesian occupation.
Both institutions are internally fragmented due to their mixture of members from different regions and political backgrounds. Though ethnic and regional divisions had not previously been prominent in Timor-Leste, the April 2006 dispute had a significant regional component. Most of ‘the petitioners’ came from the West of the country and complained that they suffered discrimination in a force dominated by officers from the East (reflecting the force’s origins in the eastern-based, pre-independence, anti-Indonesian, armed resistance movement). A similar scenario can be observed in the police force, where some members have served under the former Indonesian local police – mainly from the West – while others were former members of the armed resistance – mainly from the East. Almost 70% of disciplinary cases within the military resulted from confrontations with police personnel, many of whom were recruits from the former local Indonesian police force. In late May 2006 for example, F-FDTL soldiers killed 10 unarmed police officers under UN protection. Regional tension not only affects the security forces, but increasingly Timorese civilians identify themselves with either the East or West. Gangs from different parts of the country have taken advantage of the situation and are fighting in the streets of Dili. A catholic priest has described the situation as "East against West, soldiers against soldiers, police against soldiers, everyone against everyone … It's total madness."
The collapse of law and order is the climax of many problems plaguing the PNTL and F-FDTL, at both individual and institutional levels. The crisis of April 2006 is still ongoing, and the country is regularly shaken by outbreaks of hostilities – as the post election violence clearly showed during the summer of 2007 and most recently the shooting of President Ramos Horta. A contributing factor to these problems was the formation and development of the security forces. Both were created under United Nations Transitional Adminstration (UNTAET) as part of preparations for Timorese self-government. It seems that despite years of UN administration and billions spent on rebuilding East Timor, there is a growing evidence of a disintegrating state.
Inadequate planning of the set up of the security forces and negligible East Timorese participation, consultation and ownership have led to the present explosive situation. The history of police service and defense force development in East Timor under the United Nations is largely a story of slipshod planning and unimaginative leadership. The security forces do not have the trust of the local population and are not capable of controlling outbreaks of violence and unrest. The problems Timor-Leste faces however are numerous and multidimensional. The final report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste warned that “the deep divisions in our society from 25 years of conflict, and the violence which entered East Timorese political life in 1975, remain a potential stumbling block to the development of a sustainable culture of democracy and peace in Timor-Leste.” These factors, combined with very high unemployment, widespread poverty, and pervasive trauma provided a fertile ground that allowed what could have been a manageable protest to explode into protracted violence that has been going on until the present day.
In May 2005, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, in a speech marking the end of the UN peace-keeping operation in Timor-Leste, declared that the peacekeepers’ departure showed the world’s recognition of Timor as a safe and peaceful country, whose security agencies were able to take responsibility for its internal and external security. The outbreak of violence that started a year later sharply illustrates that this assessment was decidedly over-optimistic. In April 2006, the capital, Dili, went up in flames after the dismissal of 600 soldiers – nearly one third of the military – who protested against discrimination within the ranks of the newly formed Timorese army. The initially peaceful protest culminated in the death of at least 37 people and the displacement of two thirds of the capital’s residents. General frustration with the government’s failure to alleviate high unemployment and corruption, combined with objections to their response to turmoil in the defense force, encouraged numerous East Timorese to take up arms and join armed groups. Violent gangs of mostly unemployed youths joined the disaffected soldiers, roaming the streets of Dili, burning down houses and torching cars. Some members of the police force defected to join the dismissed soldiers, known as ‘the petitioners’, and openly confronted the military. Lethal clashes between elements of the national police force (PNTL) and the military (F-FDTL) were followed by widespread rioting and looting in the capital. Law and order broke down and within days the leadership of PNTL disintegrated.
Lack of trust
Both the PNTL and the F-FDLT are not perceived to have the trust of the population or the capacity to provide adequate security and order. Past behavior of some PNTL members while on duty reduced public confidence in the institution: some police members have been involved in sexual harassment, human rights violations, illegal weapons distribution and black market activities. The PNTL has been accused by a Human Rights Watch report of gross human rights violations and “police abuse has become one of East Timor’s most worrying human rights problems.” Moreover, neither organisation is regarded as politically neutral. Until the election in the summer of 2007, the F-FDLT fell under the control of President Gusmão – a former guerilla leader – while the PNTL reported to Fretilin’s hardliner Rogerio Lobato – a long term rival of Gusmão. The internal divisions within the leadership date back to the civil war and the Indonesian occupation.
Both institutions are internally fragmented due to their mixture of members from different regions and political backgrounds. Though ethnic and regional divisions had not previously been prominent in Timor-Leste, the April 2006 dispute had a significant regional component. Most of ‘the petitioners’ came from the West of the country and complained that they suffered discrimination in a force dominated by officers from the East (reflecting the force’s origins in the eastern-based, pre-independence, anti-Indonesian, armed resistance movement). A similar scenario can be observed in the police force, where some members have served under the former Indonesian local police – mainly from the West – while others were former members of the armed resistance – mainly from the East. Almost 70% of disciplinary cases within the military resulted from confrontations with police personnel, many of whom were recruits from the former local Indonesian police force. In late May 2006 for example, F-FDTL soldiers killed 10 unarmed police officers under UN protection. Regional tension not only affects the security forces, but increasingly Timorese civilians identify themselves with either the East or West. Gangs from different parts of the country have taken advantage of the situation and are fighting in the streets of Dili. A catholic priest has described the situation as "East against West, soldiers against soldiers, police against soldiers, everyone against everyone … It's total madness."
The collapse of law and order is the climax of many problems plaguing the PNTL and F-FDTL, at both individual and institutional levels. The crisis of April 2006 is still ongoing, and the country is regularly shaken by outbreaks of hostilities – as the post election violence clearly showed during the summer of 2007 and most recently the shooting of President Ramos Horta. A contributing factor to these problems was the formation and development of the security forces. Both were created under United Nations Transitional Adminstration (UNTAET) as part of preparations for Timorese self-government. It seems that despite years of UN administration and billions spent on rebuilding East Timor, there is a growing evidence of a disintegrating state.
Inadequate planning of the set up of the security forces and negligible East Timorese participation, consultation and ownership have led to the present explosive situation. The history of police service and defense force development in East Timor under the United Nations is largely a story of slipshod planning and unimaginative leadership. The security forces do not have the trust of the local population and are not capable of controlling outbreaks of violence and unrest. The problems Timor-Leste faces however are numerous and multidimensional. The final report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste warned that “the deep divisions in our society from 25 years of conflict, and the violence which entered East Timorese political life in 1975, remain a potential stumbling block to the development of a sustainable culture of democracy and peace in Timor-Leste.” These factors, combined with very high unemployment, widespread poverty, and pervasive trauma provided a fertile ground that allowed what could have been a manageable protest to explode into protracted violence that has been going on until the present day.
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