Tony Blair is Mussolini to our Hitler, America's first openly fascist president. We had no choice (Kerry): You at least have a choice. Below is a secret memo showing how subservient your government is to ours (America's). With the arrest of the Israeli syp Larry Franklin of the Pentagon, we now know to whom our govenment (US) is subservient.
Many in the UK will justify a Tony Blair vote on the the basis that he is the best alternative. But that is based on selfishness. He is the best for your pocketbook, perhaps. But he and George W. Bush are leading our countries to destruction. Nothing can justify the killing of 100,000 innocents. The following SECRET Downing Street memo shows how your government conspired with the US warmongers.
You probably will return Mr. Blair to office. In doing so, you are no friend of America's.
==========================================================
This was copied from:
http://cryptome.org/10-secret.htm
1 May 2005. Thanks to Intelligence Digest.
The secret Downing Street memo - Sunday Times May 1st 2005
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
To: DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
You probably will return Mr. Blair to office. In doing so, you are no friend of America's.
==========================================================
This was copied from:
http://cryptome.org/10-secret.htm 1 May 2005. Thanks to Intelligence Digest.
The secret Downing Street memo - Sunday Times May 1st 2005
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
To: DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
Comments
Hide the following 12 comments
Who me??
05.05.2005 22:20
puggled of Quaintville
fuck off
06.05.2005 01:17
Most of the UK did not even vote for Blair, troll cunt. Blair and his party are hated by the majority of the Uk People
So don`t ever call the Uk Blair-lovers again, or you`re dead
voice of reason
the united states of america
06.05.2005 05:41
President Bush is turning our country into a theocratic/authoritarian police state.
Remember, 49% of us voted against Bush. Not to mention, millions of others stayed home on election day and were disinfranchised due to voter fraud/manipulation.
We're not all Christian fundamentalist-redneck-gun toting-anti science idiots.
Impeach Bush!
-J
New York
jeremy
the united states of america
06.05.2005 05:41
President Bush is turning our country into a theocratic/authoritarian police state.
Remember, 49% of us voted against Bush. Not to mention, millions of others stayed home on election day and were disinfranchised due to voter fraud/manipulation.
We're not all Christian fundamentalist-redneck-gun toting-anti science idiots.
Impeach Bush!
-J
New York
jeremy
This was a Parliamentary election, not a Presidential election, idiot
06.05.2005 06:43
What our American poster here doesn't appreciate is that if the British people all voted against the Labour party in order to get rid of Blair, what we'd end up with is another Tory government. Anybody old enough to remember the Thatcher years and what that was like would be pretty stupid to vote Conservative just to get rid of Blair. you think the Tories would not have taken us to war? Don't make me laugh.
Also, don't talk to us about choice - just because in America you have the Republocrats and a propaganda system that would make Goebbels or Stalin proud doesn't mean that we in the UK live in some kind of democratic paradise. It may looks that way from there but I assure you it isn't true, we live in a corporate dictatorship too it's just that we're a bit more sophisticated about disguising the fact.
sincerity77
Not me!
06.05.2005 07:56
I doubt Tony "the Liar" Blair won't be in power this time next year. With a drastically reduced majority and those within the labour party openly criticising him, his undemocratic leadership will hopefully soon become a thing of the past. And if there is any justice he will be remembered in the same way as Nixon!
Harry The Hornet
Less than 25% of the population voted for Labour....
06.05.2005 10:40
Buzz
pauvre USUKISTs, may not understand they ave no PR
06.05.2005 10:55
tala
We must pray for them and hope they get well soon, before their tax Pounds more children to DUst with their 7UP and bombs.
PR means they could have a proper democracy like Germany. It will come to UK now, at the cost of armless Ali and his dead sisters.. Plus 100,000 murdered by Bliar and bliar his children va suicede maintenant. Priereez nous tous ensemble.
Au revoir mes enfants. Vive La Verite.
Alphonse Daudet
Don't exaggerate
06.05.2005 11:37
Next time think before you make such accusations.
Max
Don't Exaggerate, Max?
06.05.2005 21:41
imprisoned in amerika
Re: if Blair was like Mussolini there'd be no protest possible in the UK
07.05.2005 16:55
Totally excessive police restrictions on a small and peaceful march at Brize Norton air base last month:
A Brighton-based arms manufacturer is trying use anti-stalking laws to get an injunction banning any protests near their site:
There was much use made of anti-terrorism police powers to disrupt and harrass protests at the DSEI arms trade fair two years ago:
And then there's the Serious Organised Crime and Police Powers bill (a better name would be the Protection of the Interests of the Vivisection Industry Bill), forced through parliament in an awful hurry in the hope that no-one would notice:
People keep drawing an analogy between the current world situation and the second world war, equating Saddam to Hitler and Blair to Churchill. But I've always thought this analogy was false. Nazi Germany was a superpower on the world stage, able and determined to overrun the rest of Europe and more. Iraq 2003 may have been run by a despicable dictator, but was effectively crippled by sanctions and certainly not a threat to us.
The analogy drawn by the original poster is far more accurate, with Blair playing Mussolini to Bush's Hitler while the US military industrial complex pursues global full-spectrum domination.
Simon (don't blame me, I didn't vote Labour)
The English are losers
19.06.2005 18:11
I say English because I DO respect the Irish, the Welsh and the Scots.
The once oh-so powerful Sons Of The British Empire now have to lick the soiled ass of a mental retard like Dubya to retain some form of "prestige". Sad thing is that this also costs innocent Iraqi lives. But we all know that the English (and the US) don't care what they kill, as long as it serves the purposes of the plutocrats behind the scenes, the ones who REALLY call the shots.
It will last as long as it lasts. No-one ever believed the USSR would crumble, either.
We, continental Europeans, sit back for the time being and watch the UK and the US destroying themselves from the inside and crime taking over slowly, but surely.
Good thing we still have the Atlantic and the North Sea.
You fluttering idiots, please DO keep voting for Bush and Blair, it alienates you more and more from us.
And, you English Refuse, don't threaten to leave the EC, no need to, we may just KICK you out.
Heheh.
Rudolf.
Rudolf