Comrades, beware of irresponsible web sites
TPTG | 17.11.2011 01:32 | Policing
An aspect of the whole “Aufhebengate” issue ( http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2011/10/486344.html, http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2011/10/486740.html) which is really important and extremely dangerous for all came to the fore recently. During a controversy on a thread on Libcom, admin Ed wrote: “avantiultras shares an IP address with dr.faustus whose sole activity is TPTG-related”. This brought to our attention the fact that Libcom “tracks all visits with log files”. For those who are not knowledgeable on the technical details, this means that the IP address of every person who visits Libcom is logged for an indefinite period of time in the logs (and surely for more than one month since our last visit occurred on 13/10/2011). According to Wikipedia, “an Internet Protocol address (IP address) is a numerical label assigned to each device (e.g., computer, printer) participating in a computer network that uses the Internet Protocol for communication. An IP address serves two principal functions: host or network interface identification and location addressing. Its role has been characterized as follows: ‘A name indicates what we seek. An address indicates where it is. A route indicates how to get there.’” In other words, the emergency services for which their cop collaborator friend works can utilize this address to determine the exact physical location of the residence, the workplace or the social space where the computer which was used by any member of Libcom in order to post an article, to post a comment or just to visit the site resides! This is obviously an extremely dangerous practice. For example, Athens Indymedia stores such logs only for 2 hours in order to protect the people who contribute to or just visit their site. The only reason why they keep such logs for 2 hours is to block spammers, malicious posters and trolls. In the case of UK Indymedia, things get even clearer: “Indymedia has in the past attracted the attention of authorities, that have occasionally tried to request logs of whom is accessing the web site and have in one occasion seized without any explanation our server. We believe in the right to anonymous political speech and therefore we do not keep logs that could provide any such information. Still, we advise indymedia readers that are concerned about the privacy of their reading and posting habits to hide them by using anonymizing services, like Tor or using SSL encrypted connections.” ( http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/static/security.html, the emphasis is ours)
The justification given by Libcom about the practice they follow ( http://libcom.org/notes/legal-notes) looks odd and suspicious: “Libcom.org respects our users privacy and will not release any information on users under regular circumstances. We track visits with log files. Libcom.org uses this information only to determine which pages are the most popular and least popular, and to detect any problems with the site. Libcom.org will not pass on any information collected from our users to a third party”. First of all, we really wonder what is meant with the term “regular circumstances”. Is “Aufhebengate” an “irregular circumstance” that would permit the release of information collected from us to their cop consultant friend, John Drury, a member of Aufheben? What are the measures taken by the Libcom group in order to prevent police authorities (and people so closely connected to these authorities like JD) to acquire these really sensitive data? How can they assure that “Libcom.org will not pass any information collected from [their] users to a third party”, when they have been proven to be fervent admirers of cop consultants and they have a “don’t worry, be happy” attitude towards the graded policing guidelines of Drury & Co. (which include use of intelligence, the kettling of ‘trouble-makers’ in demos etc. etc.) ? What will they do if they receive a search warrant?
What looks even more suspicious is the explanation given for the retention of these data: “Libcom.org uses this information only to determine which pages are the most popular and least popular, and to detect any problems with the site”. Anyone who has the slightest technical expertise knows very well that the logging of IP addresses is completely useless for keeping statistics on the popularity of the pages and for the “detection of problems with the site”. Statistics could be easily kept after discarding all relevant identifying information such as the IP address. Further, it’s totally clear for any IT professional that the detection of technical problems with the site has no relation whatsoever with the logging of the IP addresses. The error/debugging messages generated by the software platform (Drupal, SQL, etc.) would completely suffice after the discarding of all identifying (and incriminating) information.
Therefore, we would advise all future users of Libcom to be extra cautious when using this totally irresponsible, to say the least, web site and forum.
TPTG
The justification given by Libcom about the practice they follow ( http://libcom.org/notes/legal-notes) looks odd and suspicious: “Libcom.org respects our users privacy and will not release any information on users under regular circumstances. We track visits with log files. Libcom.org uses this information only to determine which pages are the most popular and least popular, and to detect any problems with the site. Libcom.org will not pass on any information collected from our users to a third party”. First of all, we really wonder what is meant with the term “regular circumstances”. Is “Aufhebengate” an “irregular circumstance” that would permit the release of information collected from us to their cop consultant friend, John Drury, a member of Aufheben? What are the measures taken by the Libcom group in order to prevent police authorities (and people so closely connected to these authorities like JD) to acquire these really sensitive data? How can they assure that “Libcom.org will not pass any information collected from [their] users to a third party”, when they have been proven to be fervent admirers of cop consultants and they have a “don’t worry, be happy” attitude towards the graded policing guidelines of Drury & Co. (which include use of intelligence, the kettling of ‘trouble-makers’ in demos etc. etc.) ? What will they do if they receive a search warrant?
What looks even more suspicious is the explanation given for the retention of these data: “Libcom.org uses this information only to determine which pages are the most popular and least popular, and to detect any problems with the site”. Anyone who has the slightest technical expertise knows very well that the logging of IP addresses is completely useless for keeping statistics on the popularity of the pages and for the “detection of problems with the site”. Statistics could be easily kept after discarding all relevant identifying information such as the IP address. Further, it’s totally clear for any IT professional that the detection of technical problems with the site has no relation whatsoever with the logging of the IP addresses. The error/debugging messages generated by the software platform (Drupal, SQL, etc.) would completely suffice after the discarding of all identifying (and incriminating) information.
Therefore, we would advise all future users of Libcom to be extra cautious when using this totally irresponsible, to say the least, web site and forum.
TPTG
TPTG
e-mail:
tptg@tptg.gr
Homepage:
www.tptg.gr
Comments
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Libcom
17.11.2011 07:14
Anarchist
Libcom - not an anarchist site
17.11.2011 09:39
Captain anarchy
well...
17.11.2011 10:32
Well, it's not that suspicious, really.
1. If a popular page is defined as one that is visited many times by MANY people, than it is rather necessary to track the IP addresses. For example, if a single person visits a page a million times, does this make the page popular??
2. To solve some technical problems, it is essential to have a log of visiting IP addresses. Example: Distributed Denial of Service is a certain attack on websites which has a bunch of "infected" computers send continuously a lot of requests to the web server hosting the site, thus bringing the server down (the server will spending most of its time serving those requests rather than serving benign requests from users). In order to handle such an attack, the admin should blacklist the problematic IP addresses, which is again done with the help of logs.
Of course, I fully agree with the dangers and the problems involved with a web site storing your personal data (such as your IP address) and in this case users can use ip tunneling techniques to avoid their address being logged on the server. For more, check www.torproject.org or www.i2p2.de
me
Me again
17.11.2011 10:36
SQL is not a software system, it's a computer language used for managing data in databases :)
And would like to take the opportunity to stress what I believe to be crucial: people should reaally learn about issues with anonymity when using the web and try as best to stay anonymous and hidden as possible. SImply switching to private browsing doesn't work.
me
Under regular circumstances - WTF!!?
17.11.2011 10:58
Well done to TPTG for highlighting these issues.
Hooked Bell
technical info
17.11.2011 11:01
2. About the DDOS attack, what you say is also wrong. In order to respond to a DDOS attack, logs of all the visits to a site from the day of its creation are totally useless. What you need is a DOS Defense System which blocks the attacking IPs without logging every activity in the site!
It's suspicious that you say it isn't suspicious!
it
re: tech info
17.11.2011 12:34
1. I agree on hashing the addresses, makes quite good sense.
2. What if: server's not completely down, but quite slow with responding to user requests. If you, the admin, detect that something's wrong with the server, you could use tools (like netstat, etc.) to determine current connections, rate of requests and other stuff, and manage to block the attacking IPs. What is you're away at the moment and need to investigate later, when the attack has terminated? How would you really see what connections there were, where the attack originated from?
3. What if somebody hacks the website, messes it up completely and takes your private data? How would you track the guy's actions, what hidden door he came from and so on? In case of somebody hacking, for example, riseup.net private mailing lists and stealing all e-mails, this will be bad.
4. I didn't mention anything about storing everything from day 0. While I fully support anonymous web surfing and data privacy, I do believe that some kind of logging is necessary for good functioning of a web site. I believe IPs and other user data should be logged on some regular basis for a short period of time, to check if everything is OK, and then delete all logs, thus keeping nothing most of the time. For example, riseup.net's policy is that they don't log any user IPs, except for troubleshooting purposes (or this is the way I interpret "For troubleshooting, we may enable increased logging for brief periods of time") and after the troubleshooting period is over, all logged data is deleted.
I believe the main problem is, as this article states, with the sentence "Libcom.org respects our users privacy and will not release any information on users under regular circumstances" and how the term "regular circumstances" is handled. As well as the fact they constantly store user data. The problem is, how many websites can you think of that do not log user data?
me
cryptographic hash - not a good idea
17.11.2011 14:38
Anyway, the people you want to be worried about will be tracking the IP addresses further upstream, so whether libcom themselves store any IP addresses isn't that relevant.
anon
Libcom 10 - who are they?
17.11.2011 14:46
From an outsiders perspective i alway thought they were just a bunch of frustrated kids angry at the anarchist movement, hence their pre-disposition to slag off any all and groups in a rather unsavoury manner.
There is obviously a lot more to the website than merely name calling. Can we have something concrete of the libcom 10?
xax
Honesty ?
17.11.2011 15:29
user
er what?!
17.11.2011 16:29
I imagine all these comments slagging off libcom are written by people who haven't looked into the evidence on this matter at all.
baffled
@ xax
17.11.2011 16:43
"we know aufheben's relationship to the state and libcom's close relationship to aufheben but can anybody give any insight into libcom's relationship to the state? We know there are ten admin's who control and run the site - what are their backgrounds, histories, current status?
From an outsiders perspective i alway thought they were just a bunch of frustrated kids angry at the anarchist movement, hence their pre-disposition to slag off any all and groups in a rather unsavoury manner.
There is obviously a lot more to the website than merely name calling. Can we have something concrete of the libcom 10?"
Only on indymedia...
I'm also coming from an outsiders perspective (although I've met one or two of them, neither of whom were 'kids'). They obviously don't slag off all groups, given some of them are in groups. The profiles of the admins clearly show this on their site, and they also show the occupations and political histories of the admins. Hope that clears things up :)
On a real, don't throw about accusations of people having relationships to the state. Libcom might have strong political criticisms of certain anarchist-y groups, but they don't go about saying they have a relationship to the state.
"There is obviously a lot more to the website than merely name calling." Yeah, there is. It has a fantastic library full of books, essays, reports, news, etc. from a libertarian communist perspective - unmatched in the English speaking world I reckon. If they are state assets, I think we should be very grateful for them ;)
P.S. My personal favourite bit in xax's post is calling the libcom admins the 'libcom 10'.
mint
Libcom owner
17.11.2011 17:02
He takes your security as seriously a7 he does his own.
John Blair
Who to trust?
17.11.2011 17:25
Anon
Mint royale
17.11.2011 18:02
Watch Me Burn, Mother
Libcom are not "comrades"
17.11.2011 18:20
Fucking mint!
John Bowden's Fridge
sore losers
17.11.2011 18:54
LOL
Honesty ?
17.11.2011 20:06
Pot: Kettle: Black
response
17.11.2011 20:40
As I told you before, you need an DOS Defense System / Intrusion Detection System which could log only the malicious / attacker IP addresses
@anon
1. In order to generate the hash you could use as an input a result of the XOR on a relatively big number of bytes from the article's data and the IP address (repeated as many times as it is necessary as a sequence of bits) in order to make the brute force attack infeasible. Therefore, the problem you mention can be easily resolved.
2. Tracking the IP addresses further upstream entails real-time eavesdropping which is a totally different issue. The issue here is about the practices of a so-called libertarian communist web site.
it
Question...?
17.11.2011 21:18
JC
cryptographic hash
18.11.2011 10:57
Well they could spend ages writing a convoluted way of using some half-arsed way of hashing their IP address, but it would be very non-standard and difficult to integrate with other things. And maybe they aren't programmers or cryptographic experts?
Also, since an attacker would know the page content, they could still brute force it just by doing the same process with each IP address and seeing what matches. If the police confiscated the server, for example, they would be able to see the exact method used to generate the hashes.
Anyway, to generate the statistics you need to know things like unique IP addresses across different pages. If you've hashed the IP address with the page content you've lost that. You wouldn't be able to see a DOS attack from one IP that is hitting multiple pages, for example.
And various firewalls along the way probably store IP addresses in their caches for at least some time...
And even if someone says they don't log IP addresses, or that they hash the IP addresses according to some easily-broken scheme like you suggest, you shouldn't trust them anyway if you really need privacy. Use something like Tor to hide your real IP address, as someone else suggested.
anon
bad bad
18.11.2011 20:32
piece of piss to reverse engineer.
Visit with a known IP address, spot the hash code. Repeat 10 times and then spot the pattern.
XOR is not a crypto method of any worth because it is reverse engineerable.
die hard III
re: bad bad
19.11.2011 12:00
Plus the added issue that anyone seizing the server would just have to perform the same XORing and hashing process on all 255^4 IP addresses (minus private networks) to identify the IP address, which wouldn't take very long at all.
enjoying this geeky pissing contest ;-)
anon
Honesty ?
19.11.2011 14:00
Well at least they admit they do it unlike here at Indy UK where they claim not to but in fact have been recording IP details for years
IP freely
Response to libcon lies about TPTG
07.12.2011 07:17
http://libcom.org/news/open-letter-tptg-06102011
and look at my November 20th comment underneath, you will see that when libcon said that dr.faustus and avantiultras were the same person, they were lying. Moreover, when I pointed this out, they locked the thread 15 minutes later, and seem to have deleted it as a link on their long endless list of "recent posts" (check out November 20th - the date I posted the comment - there's no mention of the TPTG's Open letter). But most important of all was the fact that they did not say I was lying in accusing them of lying, which would have drawn attention to the comment and, given that they've temporarily banned people for repeating "lies" would've meant I'd have been temporarily banned at that time (in fact, I was temporarily banned a few days later, but not apparently for "lying").
All this might seem fairly trivial and excessively detailed, but it's symptomatic of the deceitful manipulative power games libcon admin are increasingly developing. The whole of Aufhebengate indicates how unlibertarian significant sections of the "libertarian" Anglophone milieu is, and how many of these people could well be the politicians of the future, since they are playing politics in a crudely vicious way in the present, albeit on a very small scale.
Samotnaf
e-mail: dialecticaldelinquents@yahoo.co.uk
Technical discussion
09.01.2012 08:59
Well, friends there is a very easy and secure solution to this problem and due to the relatively short number of the IP addresses, it is not the cryptographic hash code but plain and simple Public-Key Cryptography. The use of a strong algorithm such as RSA encryption on the IP address and some metadata of each post would make the analysis of the data by the emergency services really difficult. The private key could just be destroyed...
Further, I do not understand a word of what is being said in relation to stats. If I understood well the issue here is to keep stats about the popularity of the pages. Well then you do not need track different users across different pages. A unique combination of the user with the page is more than adequate. Therefore, the method described above (RSA cryptography) is fully functional.
Finally, I am really puzzled with what is being said about the DDOS attacks. Be serious! This is totally irrelevant with tracking the IP addresses of all visits. You just need to block the IP addresses that follow specific traffic patterns. There are specific systems for that and their functionality has no relation whatsoever with IP logging!
In any case, DDOS attacks are usually handled by the ISP and not by the administrator of a web site.
I would agree with a previous commenter that It's really fishy that some people try to backup IP logging with such fervor using arguments related with statistics or DDOS attacks!
profi
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