all this does is slow your connection down to a standstill.

you don't have to use Tor all the time, and if you need to, it is better to have slow browsing than to spend time in jail...

Tor was hacked in to by fort meade, when i spotted this i alerted indymedia who took my post of?
i noticed when you logged on it went to fort meade, against my wish.
despite my warnings it was about 3weeks befor the new tor was introduced and the old one shut down.
the addy was tracked down to washington dc,despite trying to hide it in another country ,still the yanks are every where.
theres a much better system out there than tor.
despite what tor say this was the security services, ive nothing to hide ,have you?
 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/01/22/tor_security_update/

"Neither was the attack severe enough for the unidentified attackers to match up users to their destinations. Nor did it affect the Tor source code."

If you read the article that you yourself posted, you'll see that the 'cracking of TOR' is really rather a minor affair. Hardly a reason to avoid it. Just remember - nothing you do online from an IP address that you pay for or have been recorded using is 100% safe to use in terms of privacy....but you can minimise the risks and TOR seems to be fairly easy to use and effective.

A few folk looked in to the breach, if it was not SO BAD, why shut the tor down and rebuilt,
i can trully say ip was routed through nsa fortmeade via other countrys, of course tor are not going to admit to being so breached, nothing is possible on the web, we checked the ip address etc , not really arsed ,just pointing a FACT out, ive nothing to hide,

If you have some research that is useful to people, then you should post it. Otherwise what you say means nothing, particularly since your source materials actually contradict you.

100% compromised

It is just a network of 5 proxies, all proxies make a cache of their data flows and it totally ruins https encription. And who owns these proxies?

Also the exit IP numbers are all barred from posting on wikipedia.

see article in 1600 entited "Torminator"

also Tor button-
 https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/2275?collection_uuid=6fa2752d-f181-3d1d-bccf-508f5ff7c939

OK, so I've done a bit of googling ( https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=TOR+compromised&hl=en&num=10&lr=&ft=i&cr=&safe=images&tbs=qdr:m - use this link for month-old aticles) to see what you're talking about. Apart from one or two people saying the entire system is compromised, the vast majority are responding that it has not been ( http://bulletins.iwantabro.com/topic/50112). There seems to be a very complicated debate about encryption and some people claiming to have 'inside knowledge', but little concensus.

So, even if - and this is a big supposition - Tor is 100% compromised, the CIA and FBI and whoever else are going to keep this very secret. They'll save the information for big cases - - big-time child abusers and terrorists - not social activists. Otherwise the terrorists will come up with a much better response to the destuction of Tor, and the CIA and FBI will be years behind again.

Personally, I'd feel perfectly happy using Tor. I use a VPN instead though, and I do know that this isn't perfect. My aim isn't to have 100% security - that's impossible. But VPN or Tor or whatever else one wishes to use, it can all help. If you're really bothered, stop using the net altogether.

2600 magazine isnt online. It was in Borders bookshop.

Where do you think Tor staff member Daniel "eisberg" got over a million docs to help start wikileaks?

"The torminator" also investigated the IP of the other proxies, including private sector NSA partners!

Two months ago, the Iranian government dealt a strong blow to Tor. A breakdown follows.

Tor claims that their software protects users in two ways: i) Tor protects your communications from ``traffic analysis;'' and ii) Tor provides ``anonymity.'' Neither of these is true, but the latter is where the Iranian government chose to strike, and is the subject of this memo.

Tor uses a public key exchange protocol called Diffie-Hellman [1] to establish an initial encrypted connection between the user and an ``entry node.'' However, the parameters to this exchange -- which are sent unencrypted on the wire -- were chosen to be those defined as the ``Second Oakley Group'' (RFC 2409). No other web software uses these parameters. Thus, if traffic on the wire is observed to be communicating these parameters, it is almost certainly traffic generated by Tor. In other words, the use of these specific parameters is a unique signature which identifies Tor traffic from all other encrypted traffic. And this, in a nutshell, is how the Iranian government caused Tor usage in Iran to plummet from 10,000 users per day, to zero -- overnight. [2] Note that the Diffie-Hellman parameters in Tor were since updated to match those used by the most popular web server on the Internet (Apache), between versions 0.2.1.29 and 0.2.1.30 of the stable branch. [3]

What does this mean for Tor users in Iran? It means the Iranian government knows exactly who was using Tor in Iran -- and at exactly which times. The contents of the communications remain purportedly secure, but the fact that the communication took place is established, which in itself could be a death sentence in Iran. The Iranian government chose to use the information about Tor's traffic signature to block it -- a more patient government would have not have blocked Tor, but simply logged the identities and times of Tor users' access to the network.

A hacker employed by the Tor Project, ``phobos,'' has since admitted in no uncertain terms that this particular vulnerability in Tor has been known ``for years,'' but that a decision had been made that it would remain unpatched [4] -- until now. Now that the Iranian government had begun exploiting it publicly. It is interesting to note that the developer assigned to tune Tor's Diffie-Hellman parameters in order to un-block Tor in Iran is Jacob Appelbaum -- a hacker who recently garnered criticism for urging fellow hackers to insert ``bug-doors'' in their software. This logically leads to the question of whether this serious vulnerability was one such ``bug-door,'' patched only when another government begins exploiting it...

[1] <  https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Diffie%E2%80%93Hellman_key_exchange

[2] <  https://blog.torproject.org/blog/update-internet-censorship-iran

[3] <  https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/release-0.2.1:/ChangeLog#l26

[4] <  https://blog.torproject.org/blog/update-internet-censorship-iran#comment-8848



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