Brazil and Iran: Our motives and the bullying trio
Tomás Rosa Bueno | 17.06.2010 21:56 | Anti-militarism | Anti-racism | Social Struggles | World
If it was possible to blatantly lie about Saddam Hussein’s "weapons of mass destruction" and then devastate Iraq, if they can lie shamelessly about the Iranian nuclear program and threaten Iran with a military strike, what is to ensure that the same thing will not happen to Brazil tomorrow? Brazil has a duty to defend the rights of Iranians today, lest we endanger our own rights in the future.
Despite what the experts of barefoot diplomacy never stop repeating, there is nothing even remotely anti-American in the Brazilian position on Iran: our motives, unlike those of the bullying trio (USA, France, United Kingdom), are clear, transparent and openly stated several times.
We support the peaceful development of nuclear energy. We do not believe there is any evidence that Iran has a secret nuclear-weapons program. Defending Iran, we are defending our own right to master the full nuclear-fuel cycle, we are defending our right to develop our own enrichment technology, we are defending our right to build our own reactors that will move the nuclear submarines that will defend our sovereignty. No more, no less. We want for Iran just what we want for ourselves.
There is no proof that Iran is trying to make nuclear weapons according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the only international body that has the authority to speak on this subject and, being managed by a 32-country, hard-to-manipulate board, is relatively independent. If you don't believe everybody could be lying so brazenly, read all the actual reports, here on IAEA’s page on Iran, and especially the latest one, here.
What the IAEA does state to keep the bullying trio and their lesser Chinese and Russian partners happy, after saying in unequivocal terms that the Iranian nuclear program is fully tracked and monitored and that there is no evidence of "diversion of purpose", is that it cannot guarantee that a secret program is not active somewhere. Yet the very same thing can be said about Brazil, or South Korea, or Taiwan or even about Argentina. Iran is a signatory to the NPT and, according to what the IAEA has said repeatedly, it complies with all the safeguards established by the UN body.
The IAEA, however, complains that Iran refuses to comply with illegal Security Council resolutions demanding that it ceases enriching uranium, a right Iran has under the NPT terms. Nobody, not even the Security Council, has the legal power to prevent Iran from developing nuclear technology within the limits established by the NPT without overwhelming evidence that these limits are being exceeded. The IAEA complains that Iran does not adhere to the Additional Protocol, which is only voluntary - Brazil, for example, has not adhered to it and denounces the AP as detrimental to national sovereignty. And it requires Iran to grant UN inspectors access to the sites where the centrifuges are designed and manufactured, which not only is not an obligation for Iran or for any other party to the NPT but is also absurd: a country under threat of a military attack by two nuclear powers (one of which has just reformed its nuclear posture to include the possibility of a nuclear attack against a non-nuclear country - an obvious violation of the NPT basic tenets) cannot be asked to reveal where it manufactures the equipment that would allow it to rebuild what may be bombed, for these sites would then become the first targets.
Iran grants UN inspectors more access than for example Brazil, who, citing industrial secrecy, will not allow them to see what happens within our centrifuges: they can see what goes in at one end and what comes out from the other, but not what happens between them. Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan also do not disclose the sites where their centrifuges are designed and manufactured, and at least Brazil, in full compliance with the safeguards negotiated with the IAEA by the Brazilian government at the time we joined the NPT in 1997, allows no access to the development program for nuclear-submarine reactors, claiming military secrecy - Brazil does have a military nuclear program, Iran does not.
The Iranian government even volunteered to abide by the intrusive NPT Additional Protocol terms in 2003, giving UN inspectors unrestricted and unannounced access to any facility in Iran in which in their opinion there could be anything related to a nuclear-weapons development program, but withdrew from them almost two years later after realising that throwing everything wide open and having inspectors poking around did nothing to diminish the “West’s” suspicions - because, of course, these "suspicions" are and have always been unfounded, and thus resistant to any contrary evidence.
So, despite all attempts at negotiation and the guarantees the Iranians have made for the past 20 years, despite lacking the technological capacity to enrich uranium to the levels needed to make atomic weapons or to reprocess spent fuel and for producing plutonium, despite the Iranian nuclear program being subject to strict surveillance by the IAEA with on-site inspections and 24/7 cameras installed at all sites linked to the production of LEU at 3.5% and 20%, despite postponing the start of uranium enrichment programme to 20% so that the IAEA staff could inspect the centrifuges and install surveillance cameras, despite all fissile material in Iran being fully accounted for and tracked, despite Iran’s repeated agreements in the past to suspend enrichment activities, to which they are entitled, so as to boost confidence and facilitate negotiations, despite Iran’s agreement with Brazil and Turkey to export most of their LEU according to the exact terms proposed by the Vienna Group and despite fulfilling its obligations under the IAEA Safeguards even though the country has been put under unjustified sanctions, Iran is still officially accused of "non- transparency" and of having a secret military program, and unofficially of being on the brink of making an atomic bomb (read here how to lie about Iran with UN support). And gradually, what was just rabid media scaremongering becomes the basis for the next round of official lies.
In short, it is clear that the charge that Iran is trying to make nuclear weapons is just another excuse, sustained by lies, for ulterior motives.
If it was possible to blatantly lie about Saddam Hussein’s "weapons of mass destruction" and then devastate Iraq, if they can lie shamelessly about the Iranian nuclear program and threaten Iran with a military strike, what is to ensure that the same thing will not happen to Brazil tomorrow? Today, we are friends and allies of the United States, and even signed a military cooperation agreement with them, but who can tell what our relations would be like in two, ten, twenty years? If the U.S., France and the UK have reasons to want to attack Iran for who knows exactly what reason, how can we be sure that they will not find a bunch of similar reasons to attack Brazil, or prevent it from developing this or that technology if it is convenient to them?
If we allow Iran to be illegally prevented from developing a peaceful nuclear program they are entitled to, the NPT would become a dead letter, and we may be subject to the same treatment in the future. The illegal attack against Iran's rights and the preparation of another illegal military intervention against a sovereign country under false pretenses obviously needs to be stopped now, while it is still possible. Brazil has a duty to defend the rights of Iranians today, lest we endanger our own rights in the future. Our status as an emergent global power and the very continuity of our development depend on our unconditional support for the right of the Iranian people to develop a peaceful nuclear program without interference, threats and attacks.
Russia and China have their own motives (some perhaps recognisable but almost all venal and none related to Iran’s nuclear program) to support the attempt to push Iran into a corner. The U.S., Britain and France have a very long track record of meddling in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries, and it is no surprise that they now may want to attack yet another country in the list of those they have invaded in the region since the eighteenth century - all except Iran and modern, post-Ottoman Turkey. The other seven countries (including two - Bosnia-Herzegovina and Uganda, whose GDPs are equivalent to the budget of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia income-transfer program, and another - Togo - with a GDP lower than the budget for education in the state of Bahia) yielded to the formidable pressure and blackmail of the United States and the two former colonial powers that have caused much misery in the Middle East over the past two centuries. This bullying trio has even tested us and almost succeeded against Turkey on the eve of the Brazil-Iran-Turkey agreement - which was forged only at the insistence of the Brazilian president.
Countries that were not subjected to these pressures, such as Indonesia, India, Central Asia nations, Pakistan, South Africa and most African countries who voiced their views on Iran’s nuclear programme, Portugal, Norway (both part of the EU, officially pro-sanctions), all of South America except Colombia and Chile, all of Central America except for Panama, the 57-nation Organisation of Islamic Conference and the 118 countries of the Non-Aligned Movement declared themselves against the imposition of new sanctions. And, with the exception of the US, Canada, Australia, and the UK and the few others who were quiet about it, every country in the world, including France, hailed the Tehran Declaration.
Brazil has now the obligation to live up to the trust and solidarity it got from the real international community and be faithful to the principles that guided the negotiations leading to the May 17 agreement, defending by all means the path of negotiation and dialogue to solve the Iranian impasse.
Tomás Rosa Bueno
Homepage:
http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/10378
Comments
Hide the following 4 comments
collaberators
18.06.2010 10:36
Why Iran isn't a pariah for the way it treats its citizens is a mystery to me
anon
please remove
18.06.2010 18:33
Most people are against Nuclear energy here..... please remove
edward
Brazil slams UN Security Council Sanctions Resolution against Iran
18.06.2010 22:11
Brazil's ambassador votes against the UN Security Council sanctions on Iran
The following is the statement by Brazil, a UN Security Council member, read to the council yesterday, strongly opposing the new sanctions resolution against Iran. The resolution was adopted today under the pressure of the US, UK and France. Turkey and Brazil voted against and Lebanon abstained.
__________________
"Mr. President,
Brazil has voted against the draft resolution.
In doing so, we are honouring the purposes that inspired us in the efforts that resulted in the Tehran Declaration of 17 May.
We do not see sanctions as an effective instrument in this case. Sanctions will most probably lead to the suffering of the people of Iran and will play in the hands of those, on all sides, that do not want dialogue to prevail.
Past experiences in the UN, notably the case of Iraq, show that the spiral of sanctions, threats and isolation can result in tragic consequences.
We voted against also because the adoption of sanctions, at this juncture, runs contrary to the successful efforts of Brazil and Turkey to engage Iran in a negotiated solution for its nuclear programme.
As Brazil repeatedly stated, the Tehran Declaration adopted 17 May is a unique opportunity that should not be missed. It was approved by the highest levels of the Iranian leadership and endorsed by its Parliament.
The Tehran Declaration promoted a solution that would ensure the full exercise of Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while providing full verifiable assurances that Iran’s nuclear program has exclusively peaceful purposes.
We are firmly convinced that the only possible way to achieve this collective goal is to secure Iran’s cooperation through effective and action-oriented dialogue and negotiations.
The Tehran Declaration showed that dialogue and persuasion can do more than punitive actions.
Its purpose and result were to build the confidence needed to address a whole set of aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme.
As we explained yesterday, the Joint Declaration removed political obstacles to the materialization of a proposal by the IAEA in October 2009. Many governments and highly respected institutions and individuals have come to acknowledge its value as an important step to a broader discussion on the Iranian nuclear program.
The Brazilian government deeply regrets, therefore, that the Joint Declaration has neither received the political recognition it deserves, nor been given the time it needs to bear fruit.
Brazil considers it unnatural to rush to sanctions before the parties concerned can sit and talk about the implementation of the Declaration. The Vienna Group’s replies to the Iranian letter of 24 May, which confirmed Iran’s commitment to the contents of the Declaration, were received just hours ago. No time has been given for Iran to react to the opinions of the Vienna Group, including to the proposal of a technical meeting to address details.
The adoption of sanctions in such circumstances sends the wrong signal to what could be the beginning of a constructive engagement in Vienna.
It was also a matter of grave concern the way in which the permanent members, together with a country that is not a member of the Security Council, negotiated among themselves for months at closed doors.
Mr. President,
Brazil attaches the utmost importance to disarmament and non-proliferation and our record in this domain is impeccable.
We have also affirmed - and reaffirm now - the imperative for all nuclear activity to be conducted under the applicable safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran’s nuclear activities are no exception.
We continue to believe the Tehran Declaration is sound policy and should be pursued. We hope all parties involved will see the long-term wisdom of doing so.
In our view, the adoption of new sanctions by the Security Council will delay, rather than accelerate or ensure progress in addressing the question.
We should not miss the opportunity of starting a process that can lead to a peaceful, negotiated solution to this question.
The concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme raised today will not be resolved until dialogue begins.
By adopting sanctions, this Council is actually opting for one of the two tracks that were supposed to run in parallel – in our opinion, the wrong one.
Thank you".
* * * * *
Em debate sobre o mesmo tema, realizado ontem, 8 de junho, no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, em Nova York, a Representante Permanente do Brasil, Embaixadora Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, fez a seguinte intervenção:
"Mr. President,
Brazil and Turkey requested a meeting of the Council open to all members of the United Nations because we firmly believe that the relevance of the issue at hand requires that those on behalf of whom the Council acts have the chance to fully understand the positions and perspectives of each one of us.
Mr. President,
There are important commonalities among the governments represented at this table regarding the Iranian nuclear program:
a. We all share the goal of fully ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful.
b. We all want Tehran to clarify legitimate doubts the international community has regarding its past and current nuclear activities.
c. I believe that we also share the understanding that for these things to happen, we need Iran’s cooperation.
The disagreement among some of us is therefore not on the ends we pursue but on the means to achieve them.
Brazil fully supported the policy of engagement and dialogue with Iran pursued by the new US Administration. We also considered the IAEA proposal of last October a very promising avenue and actively encouraged Iran to firmly take it. It did not materialize then.
We continue to believe that this is the right policy to pursue and that additional efforts might yield results that could build confidence and allow for further progress.
We therefore, together with Turkey, continued to engage with Iran in order to help remove the political obstacles that prevented the IAEA proposal to be implemented. In doing so, we had the encouragement of key actors.
The result of such continued engagement was the Joint Declaration of 17 May.
The Declaration fully addresses all key elements that prevented the implementation of the IAEA proposal – i.e quantity, timing and place of exchange. It signaled Iran’s flexibility in a number of aspects.
a. Iran agreed to send 1,200 kg of its LEU. Although the quantity may now seem insufficient to some, we concur with experts who note that Iran’s agreement to export a large portion of its LEU outside its borders for up to a year is worthy of consideration as a confidence-building measure.
b. Iran agreed to deposit the LEU in Turkey, thus accepting not to retain the uranium in its territory. The LEU is to remain in Turkey under IAEA surveillance.
c. Iran also accepted sending the LEU to Turkey before receiving the fuel. This is a positive development in relation to the previous position that the swap should take place simultaneously (i.e. upon receipt of fuel for the TRR).
d. Iran also agreed to officially commit to the terms of the Declaration. Since then, it fulfilled its notification commitment through a letter to the DG of IAEA.
Mr. President,
The Joint Declaration was never meant to solve all problems related to the Iranian nuclear program, just as the IAEA proposal never did. Rather, it was conceived to be a confidence-building measure, a gateway for broader discussions about that matter.
Brazil recognizes that there are still very important pending issues to be addressed. These aspects can only be dealt in an atmosphere of less suspicion and more cooperation.
The Declaration calls for discussions among the concerned parties to reach an agreement. This will permit the necessary clarifications on a number of issues, including the enrichment of uranium to 20%.
Mr. President,
We are not alone in this overall assessment of the benefits of the Declaration.
Members of the Security Council have expressed support for the Declaration.
This is also the opinion of analysts in respected institutions and knowledgeable people who occupied important positions in international organizations and national governments, such as the former Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohammad ElBaradei, who was instrumental in the original proposal.
Dr. ElBaradei said in an interview to the Brazilian press (and we have his authorization to quote him) that the TRR deal "should be perceived as a first good confidence measure, a first effort by Iran to stretch its hand and say [they] are ready to negotiate". He also argued that "if you remove around half of the material that Iran has to Turkey, that is clearly a confidence-building measure regarding concerns about Iran’s future intentions. The material that will remain in Iran is under IAEA safeguards and seals. There is absolutely no imminent threat that Iran is going to develop the bomb tomorrow with the material that they have in Iran".
Of course, for the Joint Declaration to be implemented, it needs some but not indefinite time. Certainly a period shorter than any period in which other means can be realistically expected to work.
For all these reasons, Brazil does not believe that this is the moment to adopt further sanctions against Iran.
We believe, along with many, that the only viable solution to disagreements with Iran over its nuclear program is a negotiated diplomatic solution. This is why we are convinced that the fuel exchange arrangement of last May is an opportunity that should not be missed.
Thank you".
Maria Ribeiro Viotti
Homepage:
http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/10314
Oil or coal?
23.06.2010 18:58
Please spare us the silly quips about solar and wind - solar panels to generate energy for Germany would cover three times the German territory, and I don't think the Poles and the Czechs would be too happy about the Germans going solar. To start with.
And then this article is not about nuclear energy, it's about national sovereignity and the threat of war.
Tomás Rosa Bueno
e-mail:
basileos@gmx.net
Homepage:
http://papo.lionbueno.net