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Can we pursue conflict resolution without fully engaging the cultural aspect of

Pissenlit55 | 05.01.2008 23:22 | Culture | Social Struggles

In the field of conflict resolution, the legitimacy of this statement is one of the major conflictual arguments of the current academic debate. Can we acheive a meaningful peace without engaging the grassroots level and if we can't, does engaging in conflict represent any major step forward?


In the last twenty years, the serious study of finding a solution to resolving conflict has come much to the fore. There has been an implicit understanding that periphery conflicts, just as much as great power altercations need to be observed, minimized and resolved. There is a genuine fear that such conflicts can result in wider consequences. The interventionist framing of such incidences especially after the Cold War has created a genuine need for ending these conflicts based on the inalienable principles of human rights and self determination. Hoffman captures this succinctly by stating that such normative concerns have come to occupy a ‘central place in questions of state morality, obligation and responsibilities.’ [Hoffman, 1994: 41] This was partly a reaction to the rise of the ‘third wave of democratisation’ [Huntington: 1991] as much as the euphoria of the ‘new world order’ and the triumph of the Western system. The future of resolution was set with authors like Katz espousing the promotion of new conflict resolution approaches in Western universities [Katz 1989; 16] This progression inevitably spilled over into the sphere of conflict resolution and the planned re-structuring of ‘failed’ states into an image conducive to that of the liberal system in the hope that it will create a peaceful society, i.e. on the premise that democracies never fight.

Theoretically ennobling, yet at the same time jacketed by perceived motives of value exportation, neo-colonialism, structural deficiency and a lack of sensitivity to the states cultural and social values, a concerted academic response, borne out of the failure of such approaches in practice soon emerged. The call for a re-assessment of the post cold-war attitude to conflict practices was in reflection of perceived policy failures in Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia, unprecedented responsibilities in Kosovo and East Timor as well as the tenuous state of ‘ceasefire’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). What became apparent during these confrontations was that disputes had refused to remain neatly classified as an ideological battle that was subsumed within the ancient bi-polar world order and what tended to unfold instead was a type of conflict that became synonymous with a new type of language, labels such as ‘ethnicity’, ‘resource access’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’ suddenly became bandied about across the media. In this context, the focus of mediation became less fixed on the traditional and turned into what Jones calls a multi track ‘globalisation/ fragmentation’ framework that considerably expanded the scope for mediation planning. [Jones: 1999: 23] Also, in the international policy framework of the UN, the need for a ‘multi-track’ approach was framed in the ‘Agenda for Peace’ (1992), its supplement in 1995 and also in the Promulgation of the Brahimi report (2000). These publications posited a partial attempt and recognition to engage and connect on multiple levels in a failed state (from bottom up as well as top down) yet it did not seem to go far enough and there still remains the desire to do it within the UN construct – through the structure of the liberal economic system and within the confines of the sovereign state system. Indicative of this viewpoint, John Mccain recently based his 2008 presidential campaign on the need for the US to ‘ promote to the globe the conditions that we take for granted at home’ Brahimi, in conjunction, stressed the importance of the centralization of peace-building, the increase of local engagements, “re-integration” and the establishment of liberal peace norms. Together, these promulgations of the dominant (Western) peace-keeping agenda are serving to solidify the inherent stability and status quo of the current system, a dominant discourse that is seen to intensify the majority / minority imbalance in the world order. Thus, such a cleavage has led to the rise of a ‘culture clash’ that I aim to expand upon in the following arguments.

Therefore, in the course of this paper there is an underlying understanding that this multi-level approach has necessitated and strengthened the relationship between the cultural and mediatorial in resolving conflict, especially in relation to what went before. Firstly, there are a few points of note that needs to be addressed. In describing ‘conflict’ in relation to this essay, I will deal exclusively with the definition given by Azar of ‘protracted social conflict’ [Azar: 1986: 28] – a state of aggression that cannot be resolved without outside impetus. Discursively, it refers to the events where third party involvement is deemed essential, irregardless of whether it is right or wrong and it is here where the complications arise for analysis. Secondly, In practical terms, conflict resolution refers to the process of resolving a dispute or conflict, mediation in this sub-text means playing the role of ‘devils advocate’ and assessing the needs and desires of each actor and trying to find the most appropriate outcome or ‘cutting the cake correctly’ precipitating a win-win situation. It is also important to understand the conflict resolution is only applicable once a conflict has actually started.

In the academic literature there have been numerous approaches and experiments to ending conflict, some have been successful in a purely ad-hoc manner and others often fail to realise their objectives. ‘First Generation’ approaches [Richmond: 2002: 11] i.e attempts to mediate within the cold-war Westphalian state structure, aimed to impose and artificial state centric mould on dealing with disputes and thus promoted systems of negative peace - that is the absence of war which lacks any outside attempts at pursuing a peace-building structure. The first generation, despite limited successes, should now be seen as inherently unstable as it assumed that diplomatic success at the top level would trickle down to the grassroots level, however this can rarely be achieved when the very groups that are fighting do not claim legitimacy from the leaders or the issue that has been resolved at the state level is different to that of those on the ground. Such a situation arose when the ‘leaderless’ tribes of the Igbo in Eastern Nigeria, or the Soloman Islanders of the Pacific, without a clear hierarchical society effectively hindered British de-colonisation attempts at creating a consensus among its old subjects because the third party had no understanding of who they had to deal with and thus rendered their negotiation tools useless [Ware: 2006: 55]. The tendency of first generation approaches was to fit the process onto the problem as opposed to an organic approach to peace-building thus blocking off the opportunity for meaningful self-sustaining peace.
Burton first propagated a practical and usable alternative method to the classical diplomatic procedure of mediation terms the by arguing for a ‘controlled communication’ approach [Burton: 1970: 11] where third parties act as facilitators and encourage discussion in a non formal, explorative manner. In policy practice, this approach yielded positive results in the Malaysian, Singapore dispute in the late 1960’s. This view is in fact an echo of Quincy Wrights ‘billiard ball [Wright: 1951: 193]’ example where the social tension of society often dictates when and how a conflict occurs and the dynamics between them is akin to the movement of balls on the billiard table. Furthermore it removed the state bargaining process as the only form of resolving conflict, it gave the individual parties the ability to voice the concerns of their groups and their interests, it was a positive step, yet the result remained on an ephemeral footing where all issues still had to be formally negotiated at the state level. Azar, for his part, expanded on this by identifying the root problems of conflict as the lack of group identity, socio-economic under-development [Azar: ] and any attempt to pursue successful conflict resolution would need to address these points comprehensively, this also facilitated the growth of the ‘problem solving’, ‘workshop’ style of resolving conflict. In this vein, Kelmans championing of ‘Cooperational institutions’ and ‘interactive problem-solving’ in Post conflict settings [Kelman: 1990: 179] further addressed the need for involved public input into how their state should be run. In addition, Lederach’s critique of the lack of any cultural concept by the UN in the case of Somalia [Lederach 1993: 39] furthered the case for a more inclusive approach and to work within the frameworks of the existing group / clan structures of the state. Thus, interactive problem solving can therefore be considered as the first serious attempt to engage the cultural perspective through its reliance on unofficial means of communication. This was in effect a tacit understanding of the limitations of the mono-dimensional approach of the second generation and its emphasis upon conflict transformation as opposed to conflict elimination [Miall & Ramsbottom: 2005: 37 ]. What has recently come to dominate the discussion is the rise of humanitarian intervention based on ‘universalist’ principles of human rights (borne from the Geneva Convention and the UNCHR in 1998) and the imposition of democratic structures through a multilevel approach supplemented by the growth of an international civil society. Therefore, this brings us to the position of the most recent debates. The current climate for academic debate centres on the interactions between these issues and the applicability of the dominant Westphalian system.

The core critique centres on the universality of the dominant western approaches to conflict resolution. It is very hard to successfully argue and analyze positively that a liberal, economic state can be replicated to an agreeable extent on every group and state in global society. In addressing this issue, it is possible to give three identifiable reasons why such a view is problematic; namely the issue of legitimacy, alternatives to the UN approach and the role of civil society.

To begin with, any party that wishes to change the infrastructure of another group/ state requires legitimacy and consent – this is consent in the Azar and Burton sense of ticking the boxes of compatible identity, culture and experience. The Western resolution models, the current open, economic and democratic ontology is often very different to the area in which a dispute is taking place. In Bosnia for example, where it has never enjoyed the democratic norms and pluralistic experience of the Western system, the introduction of elections has only served to bring back the hard-line politicians of the 1990’s into what is quickly turning into a vicious circle, and may even convalesce into conflict following the secessionist riots of October 2006 . In Afghanistan and Iraq also, we can observe the difficulties of applying the Western, UN approach to peace-building. It can be forcefully argued that the mechanisms of such processes and ‘transitional state-building’ actually perpetuate the conflict by creating a political vacuum that allows the more extreme elements of society to gain a platform. This is not helped by the apparent paradox of the UN military occupation of both countries without the necessary legitimation to actually enforce their doctrine of legal norms and custom, without impinging on their judicial customs. [Roberts: 2006: 580] In response to this however, there should be a tacit understanding that both long term and short term considerations do play an important part in the peace process, what the Afghans and Iraqis may currently see as an anarchical state system must also be tempered with that fact that they are getting their voices heard and such processes necessarily take at least a generation to accommodate a common experience of elections. Therefore, an argument can be constructed to say that it is in fact progressive to put in place a western democratic system in the hope that it may foster the growth of pluralism and begin a debate on issues of controversy and what most mediators agree on is the vitality of bringing all parties to a dispute round the table.

The second problem with the Universalist principle (and which indirectly relates to the above point) is that there are more worldviews and perspectives than that of the West. Islamist practices, the Chinese approach to conflict resolution and the practices of the N.A.M all have the capacity to provide alternatives to the orthodoxy. In some cases this can be of great benefit as they would share common cultures or at least have frames of references that are closer to the seeds of the dispute. This would especially be true in cases of civil war. The Chinese approach, for example, offers a highly collectivised process which at its heart seeks to pursue a ‘non-confrontational and indirect’ approach to conflict resolution [Chen: 1997: 1] Thus in their own sphere of influence, the Chinese approach should yield a higher probability of penetrating Diamond & Mcdonald model of levels of state analysis [Mcdonald: 1991: 32] This is due to the confluence of socio-political and linguistic factors, yet unfortunately, the level of research given to this field concentrates primarily on disputes of a domestic, economic or familial nature [i.e Xie: 1998] and its applicability has had mixed results in the case of Taiwan and the in the case of Hong Kong. [Chen: 1997: 11].

In the other examples, the African experience of conflict resolution through the efforts of the AU has been historically fractitious and has long lacked coherence and accountability [Mazrui: 1994: 39]. This was despite the disastrous UN/US intervention into Somalia There is also an apparent lack of authority as was shown in the recent ambush of the African Union peacekeeping forces in Darfur, which served to highlight the minimal operational capacity of the OAU. This is nothing new, as it has been chronically under-utilised since its inception [Woodhouse: 1996: 131]. This makes it all too apparent that you cannot resolve a conflict when you do not have the ability to manage it. Furthermore there is also the issue of religion and ethnicity that any African mediator would need to resolve as there is often a deep rooted division of Islamic and Christian groups in many states which are easily exploited by belligerent actors or spoilers,. However, in terms of culture, the “value tapping” [Ibid: 41] possibility for an African centric approach would be more sensitive to the African frame of references in areas such as respect for elderly wisdom, the traditional role of women in conflict disputes and linguistic complications.

The current situation in Darfur serves to illustrate the experience of the Islamist approach. In what can be perceived as a process of genocide between a devolved power base of warlords and groups divided on ethnic and tribal lines, there has been an influx of foreign actors into the region under the pretext of supplying aid. The growth of civil society in the Darfur region has extended to Chinese construction workers and Islamist NGO’s working in concurrence with the western NGO’s and IO’s on the ground. The rise of the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the success of their peacekeeping work [Salih: 2005: 25] also serves to highlight the importance of religion in bridging gaps between the community, a tool distinctly lacking in the secular remit of the UN peacekeeping forces. Ultimately however, such a mix of opinions and backgrounds should therefore be acknowledged in the post positivist sense of providing a rich tapestry of knowledge and expertise but at the same time can also complicate and convolute the peace process.

Thirdly, the role of civil society in conflict resolution is an interesting one. Specific groups unaffiliated on a policy level with any high level-efforts are afforded the opportunity to attack the structural problems of as poverty, mis-representation, violence, illiteracy, famine and ill-health by calling upon a resource bank of highly trained professionals and specialist who can permeate deep into the core fissures of the conflict. It addresses one of the cornerstones of the Galtung triangle of conflict and can perhaps be seen as one of the most important tools for understanding specific issues on the ground. If more knowledge of the problems are unearthed then the greater the likelihood of finding a breakthrough. To highlight its impact, one can trace the work of Oxfam in poverty alleviation, the coalition for woman’s human rights in conflict situations and environmental groups such as Greenpeace to name but a few of a plethora. All of these groups have the will and expertise to make a difference and most of these organisations are free from policy pressures. However, global civil society can often serve to promote globalisation, undermine cultural processes and workers can often be accused of tunnel vision [Goodhart: 2004: 16]. There can also be different spheres of civil society operating within one state through different policy groups.

What can be taken from this strand of thought is that pursuing a more regional approach towards disputed territories would undoubtedly be closer to the needs of the fractitious parties and would penetrate the levels of society in a much more comprehensive way than the dominant UN approaches; it does have its drawbacks. Firstly, there is the problem of finding a mediator that can be trusted by both parties and comes from a background that is untarnished by partiality. It also requires that unofficial approaches be sensitive to the environment and this is not easy in volatile regions that sees any outside offerings of aid as an exogenous political tool that can be used against the aid workers as confirmed in Zimbabwe where the US aid programme was accused of ‘robbing the people’ [Breslin: 1994: 109]. On another level, the above spheres do not have the will, academic literature, historical experience or resources of the Western liberal internationalist approach, therefore the other approaches can often be muzzled or constrained by economic factors or, as in the case of China and many other states, to be subsumed within the UN framework. To provide an example of the economic reach of the UN it was disclosed that over $700 million was spent in supporting UNAMSIL . As of March 2007, the UN could also call on a pool of 83,700 troops from a total of 115 member countries . As members of the UN any action that is given the green light automatically casts legitimacy for the action and as a result, derives legitimacy from states that would be best suited to adopt the ‘other approaches’ outlined above.


Yet ultimately, in all of these approaches, the universal consensus, (if there is one) is that it is at the state level which still holds the ultimate arbitrary power, it is the ‘walk in the woods’ the CNN worthy declarations of peace and stability that still remain the primary factors in conflict resolution. This impacts on world opinion and can sometimes turn from a tragic series of events into a platform for making (or breaking) the peaceful reputations of the leaders of the great powers. There is also a tendency for some conflicts to be given credence over others (i.e compare the US attitude to Liberia, as opposed to Sierra Leone) and this suggests that some actors in conflict have to act as violently and bellicosely as possible within their limits to attract attention.

Following on from this, conflict resolution approaches are often seen as ‘cradling’ the problem which in itself is seen to save lives. The value of stepping into an area of violence is that the third party, if backed up by enough force/prestige can effectively provide a new set of rules that the disputants will in time try to work inside which can effectively stabilise hostilities. However, resolution is much more difficult to arrive at than mere management (as shown in over 30 years of mediation in Cyprus). Northrup has pointed to the fact the sometimes it can seem like too high a price is placed on pursuing peace at the expense of creating a consensus [Northrup: 1989: 67]. The role of conflict resolution should be the fostering of trust and positive identity and allowing time and space for this to happen. If we were to continue to adopt a goal based approach that encapsulates success in a bold piece of rhetoric or a handshake by the elites we are guilty of putting a cracked lid on a volatile cauldron. Surely preventing the outbreak of violent conflict is preferable to a humanitarian disaster? Preventative diplomacy can work in situations such as this. Yet in short there seems to be a practice where the normative principles of the operations are made subservient to practicability in the short term [Richmond: 2001: 6]. History is replete with magnamonious declarations of peace; think of the numerous failed peace agreements in Northern Ireland and the 2005 declarations in Nairobi on Sudan for example. Such cases show that there is a ‘ripeness’ for ending resolution and it is fallacious and dangerous to declare a state of peace where none exists. The main reason for the collapse of these accords is often the flaring up of old disputes that are pushed by the delusion of the negative peace. When the needs of a group are not sufficiently met there is a tendency to resort to violence as the best alternative and again this brings out the lack of understanding at the individual level and not realising their notions of ‘peace’, for a peace agreement to work, it needs consent by both parties. Yet there is certainly a value for them, in the event of a hurting stalemate or other situations conducive to peace, peace accords afford legitimacy to the parties involved and often serves as a voucher for re-entry back into the international system, look at the Camp David (1973) and Dayton accords (1995) as examples of this. Statistically this has proved to be the case with over 50% of Civil Wars being terminated by peace agreements in the last fifteen years [Bell: 2000: 373]

In retrospect, what we can take from this is that there is no ‘One size fits all’ policy despite the increasingly complex framework that is being erected around the study of resolution. There are inescapable problems that occur if resolution techniques do not address every level. However, what has come to light in the progressing debate of conflict resolution approaches is the desire to engage with the ‘people on the ground’ in conflict, in short; we must address the cultural issues. A policy of ‘status-quo’ diplomatic gestures is therefore not perceived as being enough. This is a broadly ‘critical approach’ and one that has garnered considerable attention amongst policy-makers. Empirical evidence has shown on numerous occasions the pitfalls of avoiding the cultural dimension; i.e the failure of the UNMIH troops in Haiti to involve interpreters in their ‘hearts and minds’ excursions often invoked images of unfriendly aggressors to the local populace and also the negative view given to UNTAC following their desire for getting a sun-tan as oppose to extend an olive branch [Pouligny: 2006: 42]. Burtons theory of ‘human needs / world society’ certainly comes to play on this level, because in order to be accepted you must first feel included, you must feel a certain level of trust with who you are dealing with and above all you must be sensitive to the needs of the involved actors. Without this, there is no opportunity for discussion and neither is there any place for a facilitative workshop environment. Galtung thus proposed the existence of a form of ‘cultural violence’ that utilizes aspects such as religion, art and history to promote conflict within a given structure [Galtung: 1990; 291]. Examples such as the religious underpinning of the Israel / Palestine conflict and the divisibility of the Chechen state and ETA are all given vitality and have been maliciously guided (or identified against) by adherence to common ‘cultural goals. The practitioner should recognize the role that these variables can play and prevent them accordingly; this could take place in the form of allocating resources equally or making sure that there is little scope for mis-use of weapons. During the Somali peace talks for example, it was reported that it took over six months for the opposing parties to leave their machine guns outside the negotiation table [Ware: 2006: 58]. This scenario does show how bargaining and negotiation techniques can construct new discourses of mutual understanding and consideration and despite achieving little as an end result goes a long way in establishing trust. It also promotes the idea of preventative diplomacy as a tool for conflict resolution. An approach concerned primarily with conflict management and sometimes derided as acultural, it can operate on the principle that the absence of violence through the suppression of militaristic tendencies and reduced group interaction would create an atmosphere more responsive to gaining a positive peace.

However, how do such approaches deal with the predominance of intra-state conflict in today’s society? Most conflicts are small but exceedingly brutal and often play out along ethnic fault lines. In 2006 alone there were over 60 latent conflicts taking place and twenty four of these were taking place at an intra-state level. To narrow it down even further, such tensions are seen as fundamentally ‘ethnic’. Therefore negotiating such racial and cultural rifts is akin to walking through a mediatory mine-field. Yet, to ignore these facts would constitute eventual failure. Factors such as recognising differences of language, class, dominant groups and custom all need to be addressed and this requires a high level of skill on behalf of the those involved. One of the most salient affidavits to this was the size of the task encountered to the mediators working on the secessionist revolt in Papua New Guinea, where there are over 800 local dialects shared amongst a population or five million people. Thus the margin for error and misunderstanding is greatly enhanced and gives some credence to the idea that we cannot realistically provide a perfect solution here. Yet with hindsight, the resolution of this conflict in 1997 does give a favourable impression of the process of applying electoral institutions and pursuing a structural policy of war prevention [Gewertz: 1997: 135]. This however, was achieved in parallel with the efficacy of what the USIP summary calls the ‘local processes’ for peace that ‘addressed the needs of the Bougainville population’ Another observation to take from this lengthy peace processes was its apparent disregard for time concerns, which in a way served to strengthen the socio-cultural aspect of the dispute . This ‘critical theorist’ assumption goes a long way in suggesting that by adopting a multilevel-approach to conflict resolution- and carried out within a reasonable framework can bring the work of the third parties and disputants together in a bond of trust – a stark contradiction of the impression given by the statist UN troops in Haiti or the Baghdad bombings of the UN headquarters in August 2003 which showed the vividness of local opposition to the blue helmets [Reisman: 2004: 522].

One of the blueprints for rectifying this problem has been approached by the interactive ‘ARIA’ model of conflict resolution which argues that conflict will remain intractable so long as we keep to a state-centric, power politics diadem [Rothman: 2001: 303]. A progression from Kelman, the main power base should be identified through identity and groups and should focus on attaining basic human needs as opposed to the traditional negotiation and bargaining techniques of the elites. In disputes that centre on the acquisition of resources, the different standpoints can be met if we reduce our scope to addressing the key problems.

Evidently then, the role of embracing indigenous culture is not the be all and end all in determining a policy of resolution yet, it should rightfully be considered an integral part of the process. Hoffman argues for example that ‘you need a clear view of the state in order to do anything about it’ [Hoffman: 1997: 167] and this requires an understanding of the views of the villager and the shopkeeper just as much as the diplomat and the politician, as for example, you cannot expect to eat a coconut without its innards just as much as you can’t create a shell of an imposed framework without it being enriched by those within the state. The mere fact that such a system is in place that has the capacity to work on a multi-level basis and affords the opportunity to create an alternative to violence is one that has little forebears in history. And then there are solid indications of success when we think of the work of the UN in Mozambique, Tajikistan, Macedonia and also in the positive peace situations prevalent in East Timor and Cambodia. There may still be enclaves in those societies that are still un-represented but it is indeed a major step forward from what otherwise would be a system of anarchy. Thus in terms of state level social harmony, the Benthamite principle of utilitarianism is conducive to the dominant conflict resolution approaches. The criticism however, if one can be made here, is that this principle is rarely omnipotent, there will always be problems of group identity and mistrust, a problem that is becomingly increasingly exacerbated by environmental concerns, the war on terror and access to resources. Global civil society, unofficial channels and regional approaches as we have seen can offset this to a certain extent but there still exists a fine loop-hole with the Western democratic construct that can allow for structural violence. Alternative approaches may be theoretically better but can they be practicably sustained and resourced in the way that the UN is? The answer currently is no and this is primarily because of the flexibility of the UN multi-level approach, it encourages input and devolved interactive problem solving and although this can justifiably over spice the meal, it does allow victims of conflict a wider range of support. We cannot possibly be sensitive to every viewpoint of every society, nor comprehend their experiences, but we can and do provide the space for getting their views heard.






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