Nixon Papers Recall Concerns on Israel’s Nukes
NY Times | 29.11.2007 13:56 | Anti-militarism | World
“This is one program on which the Israelis have persistently deceived us,” Mr. Kissinger said, “and may even have stolen from us.”
November 28, 2007
Nixon Papers Recall Concerns on Israel’s Weapons
By DAVID STOUT
WASHINGTON, Nov. 28 — In July 1969, while the world was spellbound by the Apollo 11 mission to the moon, President Richard M. Nixon and his close advisers were quietly fretting about a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Their main worry was not a potential enemy of the United States, but one of America’s closest friends.
“The Israelis, who are one of the few peoples whose survival is genuinely threatened, are probably more likely than almost any other country to actually use their nuclear weapons,” Henry A. Kissinger, the national security adviser, warned President Nixon in a memorandum dated July 19, 1969.
Israel’s nuclear arms program was believed to have begun at least several years before, but it was causing special fallout for the young Nixon administration. For one thing, President Nixon was getting ready for a visit by Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel, who was also in her first year in office and whose toughness was already legendary.
Should Washington insist that Israel rein in its development of nuclear weapons? What would the United States do if Israel refused? Perhaps the solution lay in deliberate ambiguity, or simply pretending that America did not know what Israel was up to. These were some of the options that Mr. Kissinger laid out for President Nixon on that day before men first walked on the moon.
The Nixon White House’s concerns over Israel’s weapons were recalled in documents held by the Nixon Presidential Library that were released today by the National Archives. They provide insights into America’s close, but by no means problem-free, relationship with Israel. They also serve as a reminder that concerns over nuclear arms proliferation in the Middle East, currently focused on Iran, are decades-old.
The papers also allude to a campaign by friends of W. Mark Felt, who was then the second-ranking F.B.I. official, to have him succeed J. Edgar Hoover as director of the bureau in 1972. President Nixon, of course, did not take the advice, choosing L. Patrick Gray instead, and Mr. Felt later became the famous anonymous source “Deep Throat,” whose Watergate-scandal revelations helped to topple the president.
There are also snippets about Washington’s desire to manipulate relations with Saudi Arabia, so that the Saudis might help to broker a peace in the Mideast; discussion of possibly supporting a Kurdish uprising in Iraq; and a 1970 incident in which four Israeli fighters shot down four Russian Mig-21’s over eastern Egypt, even though the Israelis were outnumbered two-to-one in the battle.
But perhaps the most interesting material released today, and the most pertinent given the just-completed Mideast peace conference in Annapolis, concerns Israel and its relations with its neighbors, as well as with the United States.
“There is circumstantial evidence that some fissionable material available for Israel’s weapons development was illegally obtained from the United States about 1965,” Mr. Kissinger noted in his long memorandum.
One problem with trying to persuade Israel to freeze its nuclear program is that inspections would be useless, Mr. Kissinger said, conceding that “we could never cover all conceivable Israeli hiding places.”
“This is one program on which the Israelis have persistently deceived us,” Mr. Kissinger said, “and may even have stolen from us.”
Israel has never officially acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons, but scientists and arms experts have almost no doubt that it does. The United States’s reluctance to press Israel to disarm has made America vulnerable to accusations that it is a preacher with a double standard when it comes to stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
Mr. Kissinger’s memo, written barely two years after the Six-Day War and while memories of the Holocaust were still vivid among the first Israelis, implicitly acknowledged Israel’s right to defend itself, as subsequent American administrations have done.
After President Nixon met Prime Minister Meir at the White House in late September 1969, he said: “The problems in the Mideast go back centuries. They are not susceptible to easy solution. We do not expect them to be susceptible to instant diplomacy.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/washington/29nixon.html?_r=4&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print&adxnnlx=1196313108-Ymr7%20yXkeaPf0JT66mfr/g&oref=slogin
Nixon Papers Recall Concerns on Israel’s Weapons
By DAVID STOUT
WASHINGTON, Nov. 28 — In July 1969, while the world was spellbound by the Apollo 11 mission to the moon, President Richard M. Nixon and his close advisers were quietly fretting about a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Their main worry was not a potential enemy of the United States, but one of America’s closest friends.
“The Israelis, who are one of the few peoples whose survival is genuinely threatened, are probably more likely than almost any other country to actually use their nuclear weapons,” Henry A. Kissinger, the national security adviser, warned President Nixon in a memorandum dated July 19, 1969.
Israel’s nuclear arms program was believed to have begun at least several years before, but it was causing special fallout for the young Nixon administration. For one thing, President Nixon was getting ready for a visit by Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel, who was also in her first year in office and whose toughness was already legendary.
Should Washington insist that Israel rein in its development of nuclear weapons? What would the United States do if Israel refused? Perhaps the solution lay in deliberate ambiguity, or simply pretending that America did not know what Israel was up to. These were some of the options that Mr. Kissinger laid out for President Nixon on that day before men first walked on the moon.
The Nixon White House’s concerns over Israel’s weapons were recalled in documents held by the Nixon Presidential Library that were released today by the National Archives. They provide insights into America’s close, but by no means problem-free, relationship with Israel. They also serve as a reminder that concerns over nuclear arms proliferation in the Middle East, currently focused on Iran, are decades-old.
The papers also allude to a campaign by friends of W. Mark Felt, who was then the second-ranking F.B.I. official, to have him succeed J. Edgar Hoover as director of the bureau in 1972. President Nixon, of course, did not take the advice, choosing L. Patrick Gray instead, and Mr. Felt later became the famous anonymous source “Deep Throat,” whose Watergate-scandal revelations helped to topple the president.
There are also snippets about Washington’s desire to manipulate relations with Saudi Arabia, so that the Saudis might help to broker a peace in the Mideast; discussion of possibly supporting a Kurdish uprising in Iraq; and a 1970 incident in which four Israeli fighters shot down four Russian Mig-21’s over eastern Egypt, even though the Israelis were outnumbered two-to-one in the battle.
But perhaps the most interesting material released today, and the most pertinent given the just-completed Mideast peace conference in Annapolis, concerns Israel and its relations with its neighbors, as well as with the United States.
“There is circumstantial evidence that some fissionable material available for Israel’s weapons development was illegally obtained from the United States about 1965,” Mr. Kissinger noted in his long memorandum.
One problem with trying to persuade Israel to freeze its nuclear program is that inspections would be useless, Mr. Kissinger said, conceding that “we could never cover all conceivable Israeli hiding places.”
“This is one program on which the Israelis have persistently deceived us,” Mr. Kissinger said, “and may even have stolen from us.”
Israel has never officially acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons, but scientists and arms experts have almost no doubt that it does. The United States’s reluctance to press Israel to disarm has made America vulnerable to accusations that it is a preacher with a double standard when it comes to stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
Mr. Kissinger’s memo, written barely two years after the Six-Day War and while memories of the Holocaust were still vivid among the first Israelis, implicitly acknowledged Israel’s right to defend itself, as subsequent American administrations have done.
After President Nixon met Prime Minister Meir at the White House in late September 1969, he said: “The problems in the Mideast go back centuries. They are not susceptible to easy solution. We do not expect them to be susceptible to instant diplomacy.”
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The Middle East has had a secretive nuclear power in its midst for years
29.11.2007 15:13
Actually, it has. Olmert admitted as much last year, and when he did, there were outraged calls within Israel for his resignation.
After all, this renders all US taxpayer-'aid' illegal, according to US law ...
The Middle East has had a secretive nuclear power in its midst for years
When will the US and the UK tell the truth about Israeli weapons? Iran isn't starting an atomic arms race, it's joining one
George Monbiot
Tuesday November 20, 2007
The Guardian
George Bush and Gordon Brown are right: there should be no nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The risk of a nuclear conflagration could be greater there than anywhere else. Any nation developing them should expect a firm diplomatic response. So when will they impose sanctions on Israel?
Like them, I believe that Iran is trying to acquire the bomb. I also believe it should be discouraged, by a combination of economic pressure and bribery, from doing so (a military response would, of course, be disastrous). I believe that Bush and Brown - who maintain their nuclear arsenals in defiance of the non-proliferation treaty - are in no position to lecture anyone else. But if, as Bush claims, the proliferation of such weapons "would be a dangerous threat to world peace", why does neither man mention the fact that Israel, according to a secret briefing by the US Defence Intelligence Agency, possesses between 60 and 80 of them?
Officially, the Israeli government maintains a position of "nuclear ambiguity": neither confirming nor denying its possession of nuclear weapons. But everyone who has studied the issue knows that this is a formula with a simple purpose: to give the United States an excuse to keep breaking its own laws, which forbid it to grant aid to a country with unauthorised weapons of mass destruction. The fiction of ambiguity is fiercely guarded. In 1986, when the nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu handed photographs of Israel's bomb factory to the Sunday Times, he was lured from Britain to Rome, drugged and kidnapped by Mossad agents, tried in secret, and sentenced to 18 years in prison. He served 12 of them in solitary confinement and was banged up again - for six months - soon after he was released.
However, in December last year, the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, accidentally let slip that Israel, like "America, France and Russia", had nuclear weapons. Opposition politicians were furious. They attacked Olmert for "a lack of caution bordering on irresponsibility". But US aid continues to flow without impediment.
As the fascinating papers released last year by the National Security Archive show, the US government was aware in 1968 that Israel was developing a nuclear device (what it didn't know is that the first one had already been built by then). The contrast to the efforts now being made to prevent Iran from acquiring the bomb could scarcely be starker.
At first, US diplomats urged Washington to make its sale of 50 F4 Phantom jets conditional on Israel's abandonment of its nuclear programme. As a note sent from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to the secretary of state in October 1968 reveals, the order would make the US "the principal supplier of Israel's military needs" for the first time. In return, it should require "commitments that would make it more difficult for Israel to take the critical decision to go nuclear". Such pressure, the memo suggested, was urgently required: France had just delivered the first of a consignment of medium range missiles, and Israel intended to equip them with nuclear warheads.
Twenty days later, on November 4 1968, when the assistant defence secretary met Yitzhak Rabin (then the Israeli ambassador to Washington), Rabin "did not dispute in any way our information on Israel's nuclear or missile capability". He simply refused to discuss it. Four days after that, Rabin announced that the proposal was "completely unacceptable to us". On November 27, Lyndon Johnson's administration accepted Israel's assurance that "it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons".
As the memos show, US officials knew that this assurance had been broken even before it was made. A record of a phone conversation between Henry Kissinger and another official in July 1969 reveals that Richard Nixon was "very leery of cutting off the Phantoms", despite Israel's blatant disregard of the agreement. The deal went ahead, and from then on the US administration sought to bamboozle its own officials in order to defend Israel's lie. In August 1969, US officials were sent to "inspect" Israel's Dimona nuclear plant. But a memo from the state department reveals that "the US government is not prepared to support a 'real' inspection effort in which the team members can feel authorised to ask directly pertinent questions and/or insist on being allowed to look at records, logs, materials and the like. The team has in many subtle ways been cautioned to avoid controversy, 'be gentlemen' and not take issue with the obvious will of the hosts".
Nixon refused to pass the minutes of the conversation he'd had with the Israeli prime minister, Golda Meir, to the US ambassador to Israel, Wally Barbour. Meir and Nixon appear to have agreed that the Israeli programme could go ahead, as long as it was kept secret.
The US government has continued to protect it. Every six months, the intelligence agencies provide Congress with a report on technology acquired by foreign states that's "useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction". These reports discuss the programmes in India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and other nations, but not in Israel. Whenever other states have tried to press Israel to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the US and European governments have blocked them. Israel has also exempted itself from the biological and chemical weapons conventions.
By refusing to sign these treaties, Israel ensures it needs never be inspected. While the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspectors crawl round Iran's factories, put seals on its uranium tanks and blow the whistle when it fails to cooperate, they have no legal authority to inspect facilities in Israel. So when the Israeli government complains, as it did last week, that the head of the IAEA is "sticking his head in the sand over Iran's nuclear programme", you can only gape at its chutzpah. Israel is constantly racking up the pressure for action against Iran, aware that no powerful state will press for action against Israel.
Yes, Iran under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a dangerous and unpredictable state involved in acts of terror abroad. The president is a Holocaust denier opposed to the existence of Israel. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran responded to Saddam Hussein's toxic bombardments with chemical weapons of its own. But Israel under Olmert is also a dangerous and unpredictable state involved in acts of terror abroad. Two months ago it bombed a site in Syria (whose function is fiercely disputed). Last year, it launched a war of aggression against Lebanon. It remains in occupation of Palestinian lands. In February 2001, according to the BBC, it used chemical weapons in Gaza: 180 people were admitted to hospital with severe convulsions. Nuclear weapons in Israel's hands are surely just as dangerous as nuclear weapons in Iran's.
So when will our governments speak up? When will they acknowledge that there is already a nuclear power in the Middle East, and that it presents an existential threat to its neighbours? When will they admit that Iran is not starting a nuclear arms race, but joining one? When will they demand that the rules they impose on Iran should also apply to Israel?
George Monbiot