ICG says army trying to control Balochistan through force

* Report says army useing JUI-F to counter secular Baloch, Pashtun forces
* Stresses ‘army losing campaign to win hearts and minds’

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: An International Crisis Group (ICG) report has said that the military is determined to impose state control in Balochistan through force instead of redressing Baloch political and economic grievances.

The report notes that the killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in August 2006 was followed by the imprisonment of Akhtar Mengal, who has been held on terrorism-related charges without due process of law since December 2006, according to the report.

Law enforcement agencies are also said to have detained thousands of Baloch nationalists or those believed to be sympathetic to the cause. Many have simply disappeared. With the nationalist parties under siege, many young activists are losing faith in the political process and now see armed resistance as the only viable way to secure their rights, it says.

Army uses JUI-F: Relying also on divide-and-rule policies, the military still supports Pashtun Islamist parties such as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) in a bid to counter secular Baloch and moderate Pashtun forces. Using Balochistan as a base of operation and sanctuary and recruiting from the JUI’s extensive madrassa network, the Taliban and their Pakistani allies are undermining the state-building effort in Afghanistan. At the same time, US and other Western support for Musharraf is alienating the Baloch, who otherwise could be natural partners in countering extremism in Pakistan, according to the ICG.

Hearts and minds
campaign: The group notes that although the military has retained control through force, it is fast losing the campaign to win hearts and minds. The insurgency now crosses regional, ethnic, tribal and class lines. President Musharraf appears oblivious to the need to change course if the insurgency is to be contained and political stability restored. Islamabad has yet to implement any of the recommendations on Balochistan’s political and economic autonomy made by a Senate committee in November 2005, it says.

The federal government has also disregarded the Balochistan provincial assembly’s unanimous resolutions against unpopular federal development plans. The government’s inadequate response to the cyclone and floods that devastated the area in June and July 2007 has increased local alienation. Although the crisis in Balochistan is assuming threatening dimensions, it is not irremediable provided the national and provincial elections are free and fair. The restoration of democracy would reduce tensions between the centre and the province, empower moderate forces and marginalise extremists. In the absence of a transition to meaningful democracy, however, the military’s “strong-arm tactics” are bound to further fuel the insurgency at great cost to the Baloch people and Pakistan’s enfeebled federal framework, the report warns

Asia Briefing N°69
22 October 2007

OVERVIEW

Violence continues unabated in Pakistan’s strategically important and resource-rich province of Balochistan, where the military government is
fighting Baloch militants demanding political and economic autonomy. President Pervez Musharraf’s government insists the insurgency is an
attempt to seize power by a handful of tribal chiefs bent on resisting economic development. Baloch nationalists maintain it is fuelled by the military’
s attempts to subdue dissent by force and the alienation caused by the absence of real democracy. Whether or not free and fair national and
provincial elections are held later this year or in early 2008 will determine whether the conflict worsens.

Instead of redressing Baloch political and economic grievances, the military is determined to impose state control through force. The killing of the
Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti by the army in August 2006 was followed by the incarceration of another, Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal, who has
been held on terrorism-related charges without due process since December. Law enforcement agencies have detained thousands of Baloch
nationalists or those believed to be sympathetic to the cause; many have simply disappeared. With the nationalist parties under siege, many young
activists are losing faith in the political process and now see armed resistance as the only viable way to secure their rights.

Relying also on divide-and-rule policies, the military still supports Pashtun Islamist parties such as Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Deobandi Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) in a bid to counter secular Baloch and moderate Pashtun forces. The JUI-F is the dominant member of the six-party Islamist
alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), Musharraf’s coalition partner in the provincial government since October 2002. It is also a key patron of
the Afghan Taliban. Using Balochistan as a base of operation and sanctuary and recruiting from JUI-F’s extensive madrasa network, the Taliban and
its Pakistani allies are undermining the state-building effort in Afghanistan. At the same time, U.S. and other Western support for Musharraf is
alienating the Baloch, who otherwise could be natural partners in countering extremism in Pakistan.

Although the military has retained control through force, it is fast losing the campaign to win hearts and minds. The insurgency now crosses
regional, ethnic, tribal and class lines. Musharraf appears oblivious to the need to change course if the insurgency is to be contained and political
stability restored. Islamabad has yet to implement any of the recommendations on Balochistan’s political and economic autonomy made by a
Senate (upper house) committee in November 2005. The federal government has also disregarded the Balochistan provincial assembly’s
unanimous resolutions against unpopular federal development plans. The government’s inadequate response to the cyclone and floods that
devastated the area in June and July 2007 has further worsened alienation.

Although the crisis in Balochistan is assuming threatening dimensions, it is not irremediable provided the national and provincial elections are free
and fair. The restoration of participatory representative institutions would reduce tensions between the centre and the province, empower moderate
forces and marginalise extremists. In the absence of a transition to meaningful democracy, however, the military’s strong-arm tactics are bound to
further fuel the insurgency, at great cost to the Baloch people and Pakistan’s enfeebled federal framework.

Islamabad/Brussels, 22 October 2007

Related Links:


Click here to view the full report as a PDF file in A4 format.

Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan: ICG

Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan , INTELLIBRIEFS

Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan: Reuters

Free vote would calm Pakistan's Baluchistan-report

Pak govt supporting Islamist groups to suppress Balochs: ICG

Report raises concerns about Balochistan

ICG says army trying to control Balochistan through force

US hands over 25 military helicopters to Pakistan







Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan
Asia Report N°119
14 September 2006

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

President Pervez Musharraf and the military are responsible for the worsening of the conflict in Balochistan. Tensions between the government and
its Baloch opposition have grown because of Islamabad’s heavy-handed armed response to Baloch militancy and its refusal to negotiate demands
for political and economic autonomy. The killing of Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in August 2006 sparked riots and will likely lead to more
confrontation. The conflict could escalate if the government insists on seeking a military solution to what is a political problem and the international
community, especially the U.S., fails to recognise the price that is involved for security in neighbouring Afghanistan.

Tensions with the central government are not new to Balochistan, given the uneven distribution of power, which favors the federation at the cost of
the federal units. The Baloch have long demanded a restructured relationship that would transfer powers from what is seen as an exploitative
central government to the provinces. But Musharraf’s authoritarian rule has deprived them of participatory, representative avenues to articulate
demands and to voice grievances. Politically and economically marginalised, many Baloch see the insurgency as a defensive response to the
perceived colonisation of their province by the Punjabi-dominated military.

Although regional parties still seek provincial autonomy within a federal parliamentary democratic framework, and there is, as yet, little support for
secession, militant sentiments could grow if Islamabad does not reverse ill-advised policies that include:

exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources without giving the province its due share;
construction of further military garrisons to strengthen an already extensive network of military bases; and
centrally driven and controlled economic projects, such as the Gwadar deep sea port, that do not benefit locals but raise fears that the resulting influx
of economic migrants could make the Baloch a minority in their homeland.
While Baloch alienation is widespread, crossing tribal, regional and class lines, the military government insists that a few sardars (tribal leaders)
are challenging the centre’s writ, concerned that their power base would be eroded by Islamabad’s plans to develop Balochistan; the state therefore
has little option but to meet the challenge head on. This failure to accept the legitimacy of grievances lies at the heart of an increasingly intractable
conflict, as does Islamabad’s reliance on coercion and indiscriminate force to silence dissent.

The military government should recognise that it faces conflict not with a handful of sardars but with a broad-based movement for political, economic
and social empowerment. The only one way out is to end all military action, release political prisoners and respect constitutionally guaranteed
political freedoms.

As a preliminary confidence-building measure, Islamabad should implement recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan,
which have local support. But a sustainable solution requires implementation, in spirit and substance, of constitutional provisions for political,
administrative and economic autonomy. The federation would also be strengthened if the national parliament were to amend the constitution, to shift
powers from an overbearing centre to the provinces. However, centralised rule is the hallmark of authoritarianism. Like its predecessors, this
military government is averse to democratic engagement and powersharing, preferring to retain and consolidate power through patron-client
relations and divide-and-rule strategies.

Reliance on the Pashtun religious parties to counter its Baloch opposition has strengthened Pashtun Islamist forces at the cost of the moderate
Baloch. With their chief Pakistani patron, Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam running the Balochistan government in alliance with Musharraf’s
Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam), a reinvigorated Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are attacking international forces and the Kabul government across
Balochistan’s border with Afghanistan. But the international community, particularly the U.S. and its Western allies, seem to ignore the domestic and
regional implications of the Balochistan conflict, instead placing their faith in a military government that is targeting the anti-Taliban Baloch and
Pashtuns and rewarding pro-Taliban Pashtun parties.

With the federal government refusing to compromise with its Baloch opponents, intent on a military solution to a political problem and ignoring local
stakeholders in framing political and economic policies, the directions of the conflict are clear. The military can retain control over Balochistan’s
territory through sheer force, but it cannot defeat an insurgency that has local support.

Still, the conflict could be resolved easily. Free and fair elections in 2007 would restore participatory representative institutions, reducing tensions
between the centre and the province, empowering moderate forces and marginalising extremists in Balochistan. In the absence of a democratic
transition, however, the militancy is unlikely to subside. The longer the conflict continues, the higher the costs – political, social and economic for a
fragile polity.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

To the Government of Pakistan:

1. End reliance on a military solution in Balochistan and quickly take the following steps to deescalate:

(a) cease military action, send the armed forces back to the barracks and restrict their role to guarding the province’s land and nautical borders;

(b) withdraw the Frontier Corps, replacing it with provincial security forces that are firmly under provincial control;

(c) dismantle all check posts manned by paramilitary and other federal security agencies; and

(d) halt construction of military bases (cantonments) and end plans to construct additional military or paramilitary facilities.

2. Respect democratic freedoms by:

(a) producing immediately all detainees before the courts and releasing political prisoners;

(b) ending the political role of intelligence agencies, military and civil, and barring them from detaining prisoners;

(c) withdrawing travel restrictions, internal and external, on Baloch opposition leaders and activists;

(d) ending intimidation, torture, arbitrary arrests, disappearances and extra-judicial killings;

(e) allowing all political parties to function freely, respecting the constitutionally guaranteed rights of speech and expression, assembly, association
and movement; and

(f) respecting the constitutional obligation to preserve and promote distinct language and culture.

3. Entrust the Baloch with more responsibility for their own security by:

(a) accepting provincial jurisdiction over law and order and policing;

(b) retaining Balochistan Levies, re-establishing those that have been disbanded, reforming them into a professional force accountable to provincial
authority and replacing them by the police only once police reform has been enacted countrywide;

(c) ensuring that locals are recruited to the police force and Levies in Balochistan; and

(d) meeting the quota for Baloch recruitment in the armed forces and federal security agencies.

4. Allow local and international media unhindered access to all districts in Balochistan, including the conflict zones.

5. Begin immediately a dialogue with all regional and national-level political parties on ways of solving the crisis and create a favorable environment
for such a dialogue by:

(a) implementing at once recommendations of the Mushahid Hussain parliamentary subcommittee, particularly those that pertain to revised gas
royalties, social sector expenditure by the federation as well as oil and gas companies, and jobs for Baloch in the federal government and its
institutions;

(b) establishing and empowering the special task force proposed by the Mushahid Hussain subcommittee to monitor and implement these
recommendations;

(c) revising the distribution criteria for National Finance Commission awards to account for backwardness, level of development, geographic size,
and revenue levels of the provinces; and

(d) reviving the moribund Council of Common Interests, accepting parliamentary authority over the body, and accepting and implementing its
decisions.

6. Ensure sustainable development with local ownership by:

(a) meeting Baloch concerns about Gwadar Port by placing the project under provincial government control; ending the practice of allocating coastal
lands to security agencies; giving local fishermen unimpeded access to their fishing grounds; revising the “master plan” so locals are not
dislocated; addressing pressing health and education needs, with an emphasis on new technical institutes and colleges; and implementing job
quotas for locals at the port and related projects;

(b) ensuring in Sui and other oil and gas extraction projects that the well head value and natural gas rates are on par with other provinces;
renegotiating natural gas rates and the royalty formula; encouraging oil and gas companies to hire and train Baloch workers and allocate funds for
social development; and consulting with the province on privatisation of the oil and gas industry and other state-owned enterprises; and

(c) making the provincial government a party to all investment and development projects.

7. Refocus policies towards human development by:

(a) allocating an annual financial package for social sector development pursuant to district level recommendations;

(b) granting specific funds for hospitals, technical institutions, medical colleges and universities, as well as high schools in all districts; and

(c) developing irrigation schemes, including small dams, for rural Balochistan, on the recommendation of the provincial government.

To the National Assembly:

8. Enhance provincial autonomy and strengthen the federation by:

(a) eliminating the Concurrent Legislative List and devolving all its subjects to the provinces;

(b) constituting a bipartisan parliamentary committee to recommend, within a fixed timeframe, the transfer of subjects from the Federal Legislative
List to the provinces, beginning with subjects in Part II of the list;

(c) enacting legislation to regulate and monitor land allotment, sales and transfers in Gwadar; and

(d) constituting a parliamentary committee, with an equal number of members from the ruling and opposition benches, to examine cases of abuse
of power by security agencies.

To the Supreme Court:

9. Form a high-level judicial commission to enquire into the 26 August 2006 killing of Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti.

To the International Community:

10. Urge the Pakistan government to immediately end military action in Balochistan.

11. Press the Pakistan government to end all practices that violate international human rights standards, including torture, arbitrary arrests,
detentions, and extra-judicial killings.

Islamabad/Brussels, 14 September 2006