Okay, there are lot's of flaws in your design - not in your facts and motivation though. But say you did design an effective Faraday cage to stop people listening in on your mobile - it wouldn't receive or transmit calls while in the cage. Or if it did, your design would be crap and they could still use it as a listening device.

Maybe I've missed your point. If you have to have a mobile phone on you then for health reasons or privacy reasons it would be good to stick it in a metal box. But you wouldn't get any incoming calls when it was in there. Which negates part of the reason of having a mobile phone. Not that I do anymore.

I would urge activists just to leave their mobile phones turned on at home when they go out on actions. Taking them with you and taking the batteries out while discussing actions is just a sign to the cops you are up to something.

If you put the mobile in such a Faraday Cage and left it switched on you would drain the battery faster than with normal use. A weak signal requires corresponding levels of amplification which requires more power.

Is there any credible evidence that a mobile can be tracked with the battery out? It seems to me that if the handset has no power it'd be invisible?

Aside: A friend who worked on 999 told me that mobiles are tracked/located using a triangulation of the node (unique network ID) between phone masts (the more remote the area and the fewer the masts the harder it gets to be precise. I.e. the Emergency Services wouldn't be able to tell if you were on Skye or Applecross if you were in line of sight of just a single mast within any point within hundreds of square miles. In a place like London, you could probably get it down to meters.

The US/UK governments, the FBI, CIA, MI6, Mossad, and others are tracking individual citizens' movements and personal associations with variations on ECHELON and Total Information Awareness, primarily using the triangulation method between phone masts described in the second comment (when cell phones lack built-in GPS devices). There are countless reasons and scenarios individuals concerned about government invasion of privacy might want to make use of such a simple plan to "foil" the powers-that-spy.

One example in Islamophobic Western societies might be using a cell phone while Arab, or any color skin darker than bleached pastry flour. A second would be defense attorneys meeting with clients afraid that government spy agencies are listening in on their private conversations: it has happened countless times before. Think Jose Padilla and Guantanamo, for example. Yet another would be the phenomenon of "flash mobs," which gained popularity a few years back, and are now under scrutiny as potential "tewwowists," as Elmer Fudd would say.

Take one claw hammer and batter phone to bits.

Well, they don't need access to your phone itself to "intercept" its data. The easiest and normal way to bug a phone is by obtaining a warrant over the phone and monitoring the phone's activity from the service provider's equipment.

Wrapping the phone in foil will achieve nothing to prevent this. Like mentioned, the best method of not being tracked is to take the battery out your phone... or better still just don't have a mobile phone. Which won't stop them them bugging everyone else's phone who they show to be of interest to an investigation.

See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_Investigatory_Powers_Act_2000

I remember seeing a nice flow chart of what the police/security services do to obtain a warrant and how wide the scope was for monitoring telephone numbers "close" to the person being monitored.

I'd be wary of believing the US about anything regarding how powerful their national security projects are. They are famous for telling massive fibs. Here's a prime example of them duping the public into letting rich people ride off the taxes of poor people:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Defense_Initiative

The following is a CNET article from December 2006, confirming the government's invasive monitoring of cell phone users, and its ability to turn on microphones remotely and listen in on private conversations. Note that while removing the battery should defeat government spying on cell phone conversations, it will not work for cell phones with removable batteries. Newer "trac phones" and many other new cell phones have the batteries built-in and cannot be removed. They can only be recharged using car cigarette lighters, or special plug-in adapters. Now if the FBI has access to these spying techniques, it's a safe bet that the NSA, CIA, and DOD have been doing the same for years now. Yes, technically governments that follow the law and due process would simply need to obtain a search warrant, but the US and UK governments have consistently broken both international law and violated human and privacy rights, ever since the blanket excuse of 9-11 and terrorism scared the sheeple witless. At any rate, if I had a cell phone at a wedding party in Iraq, Yemen, or Afghanistan, a sheet of foil would come in very handy for the safety of the wedding party...
==================================

FBI taps cell phone mic as eavesdropping tool

By Declan McCullagh
 http://news.com.com/FBI+taps+cell+phone+mic+as+eavesdropping+tool/2100-1029_3-6140191.html

Story last modified Mon Dec 04 06:56:51 PST 2006

The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a mobile phone's microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby conversations.

The technique is called a "roving bug," and was approved by top U.S. Department of Justice officials for use against members of a New York organized crime family who were wary of conventional surveillance techniques such as tailing a suspect or wiretapping him.

Nextel cell phones owned by two alleged mobsters, John Ardito and his attorney Peter Peluso, were used by the FBI to listen in on nearby conversations. The FBI views Ardito as one of the most powerful men in the Genovese family, a major part of the national Mafia.

The surveillance technique came to light in an opinion published this week by U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan. He ruled that the "roving bug" was legal because federal wiretapping law is broad enough to permit eavesdropping even of conversations that take place near a suspect's cell phone.

Kaplan's opinion said that the eavesdropping technique "functioned whether the phone was powered on or off." Some handsets can't be fully powered down without removing the battery; for instance, some Nokia models will wake up when turned off if an alarm is set.

While the Genovese crime family prosecution appears to be the first time a remote-eavesdropping mechanism has been used in a criminal case, the technique has been discussed in security circles for years.

The U.S. Commerce Department's security office warns that "a cellular telephone can be turned into a microphone and transmitter for the purpose of listening to conversations in the vicinity of the phone." An article in the Financial Times last year said mobile providers can "remotely install a piece of software on to any handset, without the owner's knowledge, which will activate the microphone even when its owner is not making a call."

Nextel and Samsung handsets and the Motorola Razr are especially vulnerable to software downloads that activate their microphones, said James Atkinson, a counter-surveillance consultant who has worked closely with government agencies. "They can be remotely accessed and made to transmit room audio all the time," he said. "You can do that without having physical access to the phone."

Because modern handsets are miniature computers, downloaded software could modify the usual interface that always displays when a call is in progress. The spyware could then place a call to the FBI and activate the microphone--all without the owner knowing it happened. (The FBI declined to comment on Friday.)

"If a phone has in fact been modified to act as a bug, the only way to counteract that is to either have a bugsweeper follow you around 24-7, which is not practical, or to peel the battery off the phone," Atkinson said. Security-conscious corporate executives routinely remove the batteries from their cell phones, he added.

FBI's physical bugs discovered
The FBI's Joint Organized Crime Task Force, which includes members of the New York police department, had little luck with conventional surveillance of the Genovese family. They did have a confidential source who reported the suspects met at restaurants including Brunello Trattoria in New Rochelle, N.Y., which the FBI then bugged.

But in July 2003, Ardito and his crew discovered bugs in three restaurants, and the FBI quietly removed the rest. Conversations recounted in FBI affidavits show the men were also highly suspicious of being tailed by police and avoided conversations on cell phones whenever possible.

That led the FBI to resort to "roving bugs," first of Ardito's Nextel handset and then of Peluso's. U.S. District Judge Barbara Jones approved them in a series of orders in 2003 and 2004, and said she expected to "be advised of the locations" of the suspects when their conversations were recorded.

Details of how the Nextel bugs worked are sketchy. Court documents, including an affidavit (p1) and (p2) prepared by Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathan Kolodner in September 2003, refer to them as a "listening device placed in the cellular telephone." That phrase could refer to software or hardware.

One private investigator interviewed by CNET News.com, Skipp Porteous of Sherlock Investigations in New York, said he believed the FBI planted a physical bug somewhere in the Nextel handset and did not remotely activate the microphone.

"They had to have physical possession of the phone to do it," Porteous said. "There are several ways that they could have gotten physical possession. Then they monitored the bug from fairly near by."

But other experts thought microphone activation is the more likely scenario, mostly because the battery in a tiny bug would not have lasted a year and because court documents say the bug works anywhere "within the United States"--in other words, outside the range of a nearby FBI agent armed with a radio receiver.

In addition, a paranoid Mafioso likely would be suspicious of any ploy to get him to hand over a cell phone so a bug could be planted. And Kolodner's affidavit seeking a court order lists Ardito's phone number, his 15-digit International Mobile Subscriber Identifier, and lists Nextel Communications as the service provider, all of which would be unnecessary if a physical bug were being planted.

A BBC article from 2004 reported that intelligence agencies routinely employ the remote-activiation method. "A mobile sitting on the desk of a politician or businessman can act as a powerful, undetectable bug," the article said, "enabling them to be activated at a later date to pick up sounds even when the receiver is down."

For its part, Nextel said through spokesman Travis Sowders: "We're not aware of this investigation, and we weren't asked to participate."

Other mobile providers were reluctant to talk about this kind of surveillance. Verizon Wireless said only that it "works closely with law enforcement and public safety officials. When presented with legally authorized orders, we assist law enforcement in every way possible."

A Motorola representative said that "your best source in this case would be the FBI itself." Cingular, T-Mobile, and the CTIA trade association did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Mobsters: The surveillance vanguard
This isn't the first time the federal government has pushed at the limits of electronic surveillance when investigating reputed mobsters.

In one case involving Nicodemo S. Scarfo, the alleged mastermind of a loan shark operation in New Jersey, the FBI found itself thwarted when Scarfo used Pretty Good Privacy software (PGP) to encode confidential business data.

So with a judge's approval, FBI agents repeatedly snuck into Scarfo's business to plant a keystroke logger and monitor its output.

Like Ardito's lawyers, Scarfo's defense attorneys argued that the then-novel technique was not legal and that the information gleaned through it could not be used. Also like Ardito, Scarfo's lawyers lost when a judge ruled in January 2002 that the evidence was admissible.

This week, Judge Kaplan in the southern district of New York concluded that the "roving bugs" were legally permitted to capture hundreds of hours of conversations because the FBI had obtained a court order and alternatives probably wouldn't work.

The FBI's "applications made a sufficient case for electronic surveillance," Kaplan wrote. "They indicated that alternative methods of investigation either had failed or were unlikely to produce results, in part because the subjects deliberately avoided government surveillance."
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Bill Stollhans, president of the Private Investigators Association of Virginia, said such a technique would be legally reserved for police armed with court orders, not private investigators.

There is "no law that would allow me as a private investigator to use that type of technique," he said. "That is exclusively for law enforcement. It is not allowable or not legal in the private sector. No client of mine can ask me to overhear telephone or strictly oral conversations."

Surreptitious activation of built-in microphones by the FBI has been done before. A 2003 lawsuit revealed that the FBI was able to surreptitiously turn on the built-in microphones in automotive systems like General Motors' OnStar to snoop on passengers' conversations.

When FBI agents remotely activated the system and were listening in, passengers in the vehicle could not tell that their conversations were being monitored.

Malicious hackers have followed suit. A report last year said Spanish authorities had detained a man who write a Trojan horse that secretly activated a computer's video camera and forwarded him the recordings.

"A weak signal requires corresponding levels of amplification which requires more power. "
Which is why you should never use a mobile with a poor signal, in a shopping centre for instance. Not for security, just because you will fry your brain.

"It seems to me that if the handset has no power it'd be invisible? "
Yep, if it really has no power and hasn't been tampered with.


This is that BBC article from when MI6 was exposed by Claire Short of spying on the UN and Kofi Annan just before Blair invaded Iraq ( I posted it here at the time).

"But today's spies are also able to convert conventional phones into bugs without the owners' knowledge. Experts believe this is the most likely method used to gather information in the UN building. Mobiles communicate with their base station on a frequency separate from the one used for talking. If you have details of the frequencies and encryption codes being used you can listen in to what is being said in the immediate vicinity of any phone in the network. According to some reports, intelligence services do not even need to obtain permission from the networks to get their hands on the codes. So provided it is switched on, a mobile sitting on the desk of a politician or businessman can act as a powerful, undetectable bug. The technology also exists to convert land line telephones into covert listening devices. According to one security expert, telephone systems are often fitted with "back doors" enabling them to be activated at a later date to pick up sounds even when the receiver is down....Another way of making sure you are not being bugged is to use a Faraday cage or shielded tent, which prevents radio waves entering or leaving. Mobile phone calls are impossible from inside the tent, but no-one will be able to listen to your conversations using bugs or radio wave listening devices. "

In 1990 when the telephones were going over to digital i contacted Lorraine electronics for info about digital infinites.They told me they had them in the pipeline and to contact them again in the not too far future.Today they deny they have them.

Laser-Mic Room Monitoring System
£10,575.00

For use in situations where secret surveillance is absolutely necessary and the operator is not able to enter the target room in order to place a transmitter.

 http://www.spyshop.ltd.uk/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=27


Ideally something that omitted noise at the key frequencies of male/female speech placed right against the window glass should mask people talking. Getting a couple of portable radios (about £5 each) and having them on two different talk channels, at a reasonable volume right against the window should fuck this up.

Given the price of equipment, I'd doubt that many agencies have it as standard equipment.

use the little disk from inside a musical card,join it to wires and put a jack on it to a voice operated recorder.Tape disk to window and leave.return later and play back tape.

I've been told closing the curtains is enough to mess up the laser thingy. I even have metalised liners for my curtains which can't hurt - they are for heat insulation not paranioa before anyone starts.

I couldn't vouch for that being effective. As I understand the technology, the laser "visually" monitors minute vibrations on the glass's surface. As I understand the physics of sound that curtains will at best filter a small amount off the higer (treble) frequencies and not much more. The frequency loss will probably be too little and of too high a frequency to affect the intelligibility of human speech.

Putting the curtains on the outside would probably be more effective... a little less than low profile as far as appearances go.

Perhaps adding a perspex sheet and sealing it with silicone would reduce the overall transmission. Certainly using thick felt curtains would make a difference but expensive, heavy and not very flexible.

Asking a supplier about what the weaknesses of the system is (triple glazing, ambient room noise, curtains etc.) would probably give you some insight.

I just found this, which confirms some of my ideas.

 http://www.security-int.com/categories/audio-surveillance-countermeasures/audio-surveillance-countermeasures-2.asp

This came up on the search too, but not being an electronics buff, I have no clue if it's valid.

 http://www.instructables.com/id/EF9RFCKV9JEPORT41Y/

 http://www.floridasoundmasking.com/americansoundmasking/sound_masker_desc.html#ds2410

Looks suspiciously like those cheapo speakers you get greetings cards.

I just don't talk about shit indoors, nothing I wouldn't post here anyway. I've been conned into having agents in my house. I haven't even looked for bugs recently, who'd believe me or care ? It is difficult getting folk into the same habit, writing things down, but once they get their collar pulled a few times then they soon learn. the laser thingy will be less of a problem in France I guess, where they all have shutters on their windows. I know how the fascists do it, they pump crap music up full volume and then talk under the music. Fewer of them can write or read though.

Thanks for the tip though. I guess the only way to test  http://www.electromax.com/laser.html would be to buy one. Or someone from here could offer to become the 'UK affiliate' and ask for sample products. The sad thing is although the home page is a tweenage James Bond fetish pastiche, all their other products are genuine. So it would be surprising if the laser thingy didn't work. I wouldn't mind living in a surveillance state but it is illegal to walk around naked and talk honestly. If there are future generations they will consider us bizarre.

People who have nothing to say like to listen in to those of us who do. Write things down and burn the paper. I don't have a techie tip of equal quality except to recommend once again the movie 'The Lives of Others' to anyone who has the brains to realise the Stasi wasn't so different from MI5 - except it was disbanded.