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Stalling of ID Card bill - but still no room for comfort

little brother | 31.01.2006 14:15 | Repression | Social Struggles

The House of Lords has dealt a blow to Labour's ID Card Bill, criticising the enormous cost, the obvious insecurity of personal information in a centralised database, the way the government wants cards to be used for accessing public services, and attacking compulsion partly as a result of it not being in the Labour manifesto.



But before we get too excited, government ministers say they are going ahead anyway, and that certainly looks likely at some point, with or without this bill. Cost hasn't stopped other government database projects that have lined the pockets of IT companies at public expense, nor has cost prevented the multi-billion pound war in Iraq. And an updated London School of Economics ‘Identity Report’ complains more than anything that the Home Office hasn’t budged an inch in response to ‘expert’ criticisms.

In February we are expected to see the start of biometric passports - starting with a chip that stores your digital photo and, we assume, with future capacity for finger-prints or eye-scans - and driving licences are also due to be enhanced with biometrics. These are seen as a back-door to a wider spread of compulsory ID, and could still be, even though the Lords appear to have voted down this kind of coupling last week.

The government is also creating a separate database for all children in the UK, to be up and running by 2008. It will contain name, address, gender, date of birth and ID number, information about the child’s parent or carer, and contact details for their school, doctor and other services. It will also allow 'practitioners' (social workers etc.) to "indicate to others that they have information to share, are taking action, or have undertaken an assessment in relation to a child". This is being promoted for child protection, but in reality means another vast identity database that could easily feed into the adult National Identity Register (NIR), which is the major component of Labour's ID Card Bill.

Privacy of medical records is also in question as these become computerised and available to just about anyone working anywhere across the entire NHS (not just your local GP or hospital) and used for all sorts of other purposes like setting prescription prices. At the moment the only way to stop this happening, it seems, is to write an individual opt-out letter to the NHS, otherwise you are considered to have consented! The government would like to link NHS records into the national ID scheme so they can control entitlement to healthcare. A similar trick is going on with the Electoral Register which is currently a local list, but the government intends this to become a national resource to help them set up the NIR.

Finally, we have just found out that the US-led professional body Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) have picked the UK's ID scheme as one of its 5 technology "Losers of 2006". Whilst Labour's biggest IT scheme might just help itself into a coffin on technical grounds it will surely take a concerted effort by activists to drive in the nails. New Defy-ID groups are forming, including one in Nottingham and another one in London, to do just that.

More info:

Corporate Identity: a new 16 page report which digs up more dirt on the companies who are developing and cashing in on ID card and database technology for the UK scheme. Available from Corporate Watch,
16B Cherwell St. Oxford, Oxfordshire OX4 1BG or visit  http://www.corporatewatch.org
Document link:  http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=2298

Defending Anonymity: thoughts for struggle against identity cards. Get this free pamphlet from the Anarchist Federation - send an SAE for a printed copy to BM ANARFED, London WC1N 3XX, or visit  http://www.afed.org.uk
Document link:  http://www.libcom.org/hosted/ace/af/anon.html

Defy-ID: Find out about groups in your area (or set one up!). Visit  http://www.defy-id.org.uk

Foundation for Information Policy Research: FIPR are an Internet policy think-tank who advise the government. They have produced a standard opt-out letter to demand privacy of medical records. Individual rather than collective action is limited, but still worth a look. Visit  http://www.fipr.org
Document link:  http://www.fipr.org/nhs-optout.pdf or  http://www.fipr.org/nhs-optout.doc

London School of Economics, Identity Report, Jan 2006 update. See LSE moan about the Home Office ignoring them:  http://is.lse.ac.uk/idcard/
Document link:  http://is.lse.ac.uk/idcard/statusreport.pdf

Children Act (2004). Check out Section 12 on 'Information databases' to read about the powers given to the state by this new legislation, so it can set up ID databases for children :  http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/20040031.htm

No2ID newsblog:  http://www.no2id.net/news/newsblog/index.php

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Previous Indymedia Analysis | Repression :  http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/regions/nottinghamshire/2005/11/328589.html
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little brother

Comments

Hide the following 4 comments

Spoofing

31.01.2006 18:02

For a biometric to be reliable it must be exceptionally difficult to spoof and impossible to repudiate. For example, "Obviously Spoofing" does not allow you to identify me in the street - so it's not a good biometric. Anybody could post using "Obviously Spoofing" as a name - good manners and consistency demand otherwise. But it's not impossible. So anybody could spoof "Obviously Spoofing". Because anybody can use the same name, "Obviously Spoofing" - Like Spartacus at the end of the film - is easy to repudiate.

The most "obvious" biometric for ID cards is the fingerprint. The nice machine recognises it and we are all identified. But the fingerprint is also one of the more easily spoofed biometrics. Using scene of crime lifting tape, a scanner (say 800dpi or so) and some jelly babies (or gummie bears) it's possible to spoof existing fingerprint readers.
Type >>> +spoofing +biometrics <<< as a search term into Google.
What you'll turn up is a lot of companies claiming they cannot be spoofed. But also a lot of people telling you how to do it. For eyes, fingerprints or (insert other appendage here).

With spoofing being so easy, the obvious solution is to ensure that it is difficult - in order to remove the consequence of spoofing, repudiation. Obviously, the only safe approach would be for a trained person to watch you provide your fingerprint to the fingerprint recogniser. This ensures that you cannot later repudiate the fingerprint as a token of identity. This is the tricky part. Of course, it would be possible for the fingerprint reader to have a higher dpi than the scanner or the printer. But that would cost. And there are physical limits to how may dots per inch you can have.

The obvious question is, "Well this well trained person - surely they should do the same". The answer is yes. To prevent you repudiating your identity, this is required.

For thorough, effective biometrics, every biometric card read should be only readable at the same time as a second card. To prevent repudiation and spoofing. This means that all card readers need to be double card readers. This has the added advantage that racist policemen will disappear - because they don't want to be seen to be picking on any one group. It also doubles the price of the system (although, this is probably an underestimate since doubling the size of a system usually results in dieconomy of scale).

But it also means that ID cards cease to have any utility for preventing subversion. Of any kind. Because any genuine subversive would build an identity that positively oozes the need to be identified. At banks, building societies, the corner shop, that ATM, the local police station.... The overall effect being that the most upright citizens are the ones to watch.

 http://www.biometrics.org/bc2005/Presentations/Conference/Wednesday%20September%2021/Wed_Ballroom%20B/White_updated.pdf
 http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,1002,sid%253D74251%2526cid%253D79553,00.html
 http://www.it-analysis.com/technology/security/content.php?cid=7735
 http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/095.pdf

Obviously Spoofing


Passport biometrics - update

03.02.2006 10:39

An article in yesterdays Guardian suggests that the details and timeframe for addition of embedded-chip biometrics in passports have been revised by the Home Offfice, and that the system is far from robust...

Should I Photoshop my passport picture?
 http://technology.guardian.co.uk/weekly/story/0,,1699507,00.html
"From August, all new British passports will be "e-passports" with embedded biometric data, based on facial characteristics such as the distances between the eyes, nose, mouth and ears."

Plus, more info about creation of a national Electoral Register list:

Government moots ID card links for new UK voter database
 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/12/16/core_voting_system/
"The Government is moving ahead with plans to establish a centralised national register of voters, together with central checking and verification of the data held on electoral registers. The system, to be implemented in the form of CORE (Co-ordinated Online Record of Elector) schemes, is intended to be brought in via the Electoral Administration Bill currently before Parliament, and is subject to a consultation process ending on 7th March."

little brother


Correction

22.02.2006 15:22

Defending Anonymity: thoughts for struggle against identity cards...
Document link:  http://www.libcom.org/hosted/af/ace/anon.html

lil bro


Defending Anonymity anti-ID pamphlet - March 2008 update

19.03.2008 21:15

Find this here - contains latest info:
 http://www.afed.org.uk/ace/anon.html

Anarchist Federation
- Homepage: http://www.afed.org.uk