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Global Eavesdroppoers Tight Lipped about Voice Recognition.

Harry Humprey | 12.02.2005 00:42

There exists an integrated global network to extract information and intelligence illicitly from all electronically transmitted messages.It’s coverage can be assumed to be total. British intelligence benefits greatly from being is a minor partner to the United States in this system, by having limited access to the collected data - this is what puts the ‘special’ in Britain's relationship with the US. None of our European neighbours have access to this mighty all encompassing system: they have their own far more limited systems.

The novel question is: can this system now use voice recognition on speach from any phone call or radio communication in the world, in order to track known targets, and cross-match suspect messages. It has for many years been able to scan for key words and phrases,in verbal and writen communications.

This would be a huge leap forward because a person could be tracked and his spoken communications monitored, independent of what device was being used. It would be useless borrowing a friends phone, or using a call box because the known voice pattern of the target could be monitored.

If a terrorist suspect was brought to trial, and the intercept of a call s/he or she made in Kenya was used as evidence, and say s/he had used a borrowed phone without being observed in the proccess, surely that would imply voice recognition was being used. S/he would be on a suspect list such that his/er voice pattern was stored along with all others who were being monitored. Digital storage and capability of the computer systems makes all possible.

Data is stored for years including calls, emails, faxes, so once a suspect is identified related data can be accesssed going back years, including matching voice patterns. So, for example, the calls you made over the last several years, on any phone anywhere in the world could be retrieved. This is just a bit more powerful than getting your own personal telephone bills.

I do not know if this is now the case, and hope others will contribute to determine whether it is. If it is the case, it will eventually leak out, not matter what restrictions govbernments put in place.

But people should be aware that this capability most probably exists. There is some circumstantial evidence that it does. Besides, the behaviour of the British government in refusing to allow intercept evidence in court implies that there is a lot to hide, and not just the fact that British is reliant on the US for much of its globally intercepted data, and for processing much of that data, such as from GCHQ, including all the data picked up by the US spy base a Menwith Hill in Yorkshire, and other ground bassed intercept stations in the UK.

The global system is in reality controlled and most owned by the USA, and so Britain is wholly dependent on the US for its signals spying; unlike France, Germany and most other countries, apart from a very small number.

The United States National Security Agency (NSA) , assisted by security agencies in Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, began developing a global surveillance system after the Second World War. One part of it, known as Echelon, intercepts and processes international communications passing via communications satellites; other parts intercept messages from the Internet, from undersea cables, from radio transmissions, from secret equipment installed inside embassies, or use orbiting satellites to monitor signals anywhere on the earth's surface.

Colossal amounts of computer process power is used to filter and analyse the collected data which is sent to the NSA in the United States. The Junior partners, of which Britain is the most important , are rewarded with limited access to intercepted data. This is probably how Britain benefits from most from the ‘special relationship.’ Blair has taken the view that it is worth backing the US in an illegal war to retain this facility, and any other benefits from the special relationship, although I am at a loss to think of anymore. One of the other minor partners in the system: Australia was also one of the most supportive in invading Iraq.


The recent controversy over imprisoning terrorist suspects without trial indicates the sensitivity of using intercepted data in a prosecution. The Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, announced on 26 January 1996 that the government had decided not to go ahead with plans to lift the ban on intelligence gathered by phone tapping being presented in court.

Human rights lawyers believe that if intercept intelligence were allowed as evidence in court, those terrorist suspects detained without trail in Belmarsh and Woodhill prisons could be prosecuted, so that their guilt was tested in a court. This is normal practice in the United States, France, Israel, Canada and Australia, so what's the problem with British intercepts.

But Mr Clarke told MPs that: "All of us need to recognise that it isn't always possible to bring charges given the need to protect highly sensitive sources and techniques.".

The former Home Secretary, David Blunket, believed it was feasible to use intercept evidence in court as long as the protection of British and friendly nations' intelligence assets could be guaranteed, and some other unspecified difficulties could be overcome.

Charles Clarke repeated some of these concerns, saying that allowing intercepts in court would risk compromising national security, damaging relationships with foreign powers and endangering the lives of sources.

Of course none of this remotely proves that voice recognition techniques are now being employed on a global or local level, but that doesn’t mean they aren't. If they are not then the question must surely be why not? What technical problems are stopping them? My answer to that question is that surely there are none?

So, are there any boffins out there that can inform us?



Reference:  http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/6/6929/1.html

Harry Humprey

Comments

Display the following 3 comments

  1. Correction — Humphrey
  2. Yes and No — Epimenedes
  3. Yes and No — Epimenedes