US aim at Russian Nukes
>Vremya Novostei | 12.01.2005 17:04
>UNITED STATES SEEKS TO TAKE CONTROL OVER RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILES
>Nikolai POROSKOV [from RIA Novosti's digest of the Russian press]
>Nikolai POROSKOV [from RIA Novosti's digest of the Russian press]
18
>January 12, 2005
>
>Yesterday Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov arrived in the U.S. on
>a
>working visit. The visit will last until January 15. The "issues of
>military-technical cooperation and regional problems both countries are
>interested in" are announced to top the agenda of the Russian-American
>talks. While it would be premature to talk about any results so far, the
>main point appeared to be clear as the Russian minister was still heading
>for the meetings.
>
>On his way to the United States, Mr. Ivanov unexpectedly decided to
>enlarge
>on the aims of his trip. "I can see no connection between these meetings
>and the summit due in February," he said, meaning a meeting between Russian
>President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush, scheduled for
>February 24 in Bratislava.
>The most obvious reason for such a statement was probably a bunch of recent
>reports in Western media, all suggesting that at the next summit the U.S.
>President will try to persuade "his friend Vladimir" to agree to establish
>international control over "potentially dangerous sites on the Russian
>territory"-- nuclear power plants, stockpiles of combat chemicals awaiting
>disposal, and also stocks of nuclear materials. The latter, according to
>American estimates, contain up to 600 tons of such substances. Although
>taking control over missile launchers making up the backbone of Russia's
>nuclear deterrence capability is not on the table so far, an agreement
>might pave the way to this in the long run.
>
>Vremya Novostei has interviewed a key Russian military diplomat who
>believes the U.S. proposal might possibly be disguised as an offer of
>setting up a joint security task force to guard potentially dangerous sites
>in both Russia and the U.S. However, he said, Russians will be admitted in
>the U.S. only at the early stages of the project as part of a
>trust-building effort, but subsequently the Americans will be trying to
>find a pretext to go further unilaterally.
>
>It is hard to predict what might happen if Russia agrees to the U.S.
>proposal. This is a reason to suspect that Mr. Ivanov's visit "without
>protocol, ceremonies, and all that," as he put it, is in effect an effort
>to ensure that the discussion in Bratislava goes on smoothly. Sergei Ivanov
>could provide evidence to show Russia's nuclear sites are safe, citing the
>latest annual report of the Russian Atomic Energy Agency. The report
>concludes, "Relevant checks and laboratory tests have confirmed the
>credibility and safety of Russia's nuclear stockpiles." The question is,
>will the Americans trust the Russian inspectors?
>
>********
>January 12, 2005
>
>Yesterday Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov arrived in the U.S. on
>a
>working visit. The visit will last until January 15. The "issues of
>military-technical cooperation and regional problems both countries are
>interested in" are announced to top the agenda of the Russian-American
>talks. While it would be premature to talk about any results so far, the
>main point appeared to be clear as the Russian minister was still heading
>for the meetings.
>
>On his way to the United States, Mr. Ivanov unexpectedly decided to
>enlarge
>on the aims of his trip. "I can see no connection between these meetings
>and the summit due in February," he said, meaning a meeting between Russian
>President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush, scheduled for
>February 24 in Bratislava.
>The most obvious reason for such a statement was probably a bunch of recent
>reports in Western media, all suggesting that at the next summit the U.S.
>President will try to persuade "his friend Vladimir" to agree to establish
>international control over "potentially dangerous sites on the Russian
>territory"-- nuclear power plants, stockpiles of combat chemicals awaiting
>disposal, and also stocks of nuclear materials. The latter, according to
>American estimates, contain up to 600 tons of such substances. Although
>taking control over missile launchers making up the backbone of Russia's
>nuclear deterrence capability is not on the table so far, an agreement
>might pave the way to this in the long run.
>
>Vremya Novostei has interviewed a key Russian military diplomat who
>believes the U.S. proposal might possibly be disguised as an offer of
>setting up a joint security task force to guard potentially dangerous sites
>in both Russia and the U.S. However, he said, Russians will be admitted in
>the U.S. only at the early stages of the project as part of a
>trust-building effort, but subsequently the Americans will be trying to
>find a pretext to go further unilaterally.
>
>It is hard to predict what might happen if Russia agrees to the U.S.
>proposal. This is a reason to suspect that Mr. Ivanov's visit "without
>protocol, ceremonies, and all that," as he put it, is in effect an effort
>to ensure that the discussion in Bratislava goes on smoothly. Sergei Ivanov
>could provide evidence to show Russia's nuclear sites are safe, citing the
>latest annual report of the Russian Atomic Energy Agency. The report
>concludes, "Relevant checks and laboratory tests have confirmed the
>credibility and safety of Russia's nuclear stockpiles." The question is,
>will the Americans trust the Russian inspectors?
>
>********
>Vremya Novostei