Proof that Iraq did posses weapons of mass destruction
October 2002 CIA report on Iraq | 31.01.2004 14:19
In October 2002 the CIA published an extensive document detailing all of Iraqs' weapons of mass destruction programmes. The information for this report came from secret agents operating inside Iraq and from interviews with exiled Iraqi scientists.
Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.
Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled. Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production. Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material. If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year. Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade.
Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs. Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of weapons per year.
Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Its capability was reduced during the UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved. Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents. The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds. All key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war.
Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland.
Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war.
Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.
Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km. Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit. Baghdad's UAVs—especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents—could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland. Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities.
Full report:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm
Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled. Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production. Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material. If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year. Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade.
Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs. Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of weapons per year.
Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Its capability was reduced during the UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved. Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents. The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds. All key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war.
Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland.
Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war.
Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.
Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km. Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit. Baghdad's UAVs—especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents—could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland. Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities.
Full report:
![](/img/extlink.gif)
October 2002 CIA report on Iraq
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what is proof
31.01.2004 14:44
translator
You're a little late
31.01.2004 14:57
spanner
Semantics......
31.01.2004 15:17
.
Iraq ended its WMD programmes in 1991
31.01.2004 15:42
On 24 February 2001 Colin Powell said in Cairo: "... Saddam Hussein ..has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors." On May 15 2001, Powell went further and said that Saddam Hussein had not been able to "build his military back up or to develop weapons of mass destruction" for "the last 10 years".
(2) THERE WAS NO WMD IN IRAQ:
July 2001, Condoleezza Rice echoed Powell ... "We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt."
(3) THERE WAS NO WMD IN IRAQ:
Lt. General Hussein Kamel, who was the most important source of information of Iraq's WMD programme, told them during his interrogation in 1995: "All weapons-- biological, chemical, missile, nuclear, were destroyed" after the end of the First Gulf War.
Kamel was no obscure defector. A son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, his departure from Iraq carrying crates of secret documents on Iraq's past weapons programs was a major turning point in the inspections saga. In 1999, in a letter to the U.N. Security Council (1/25/99), UNSCOM reported that its entire eight years of disarmament work "must be divided into two parts, separated by the events following the departure from Iraq, in August 1995, of Lt. General Hussein Kamel." As Newsweek reported in February 2003, this testimony of Kamel was suppressed, and only the bits of his testimony which mentioned the pre 1991 Iraq WMD program (which the West had contributed to!) was published
(4) THERE WAS NO WMD IN IRAQ
In January 2004, David Kay, who stood down yesterday as head of the Bush administration's hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, said that he did not believe that any stockpiles of such weapons ever existed.
Mr Kay, a former UN inspector, said that most of what was going to be found in the hunt for Saddam Hussein's WMD had already been uncovered. The returning of sovereignty to the Iraqis would make the search more difficult, he added. "I don't think they existed," Mr Kay said, referring to Saddam's alleged stockpiles of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. "What everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end of the [1991] Gulf War and I don't think there was a large-scale production programme in the Nineties."
Resigning from his post after nine fruitless months in charge of the Iraq Survey Group he said he did not think there had been a large-scale weapons programme inside Iraq since 1991. ]ECHOING KAMEL'S 1995
TESTIMONY[/B].
Epimenedes
who were the defectors?
01.02.2004 18:36
For example take phoney Iraqi defector Hamza's claims..
Here some quotes from the testimony of 'Iraqi defector' KHIDIR HAMZA for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,July 31, 2002. How many of Hamza's claims have turned out to be the truth?
"purchases of Russian radioactive materials through an African country re-enforces Iraq’s intents in this direction."
"Saddam has managed from the experience of the last eleven years to create the perfect cover. In effect it turns the whole Iraqi science and engineering enterprise into a giant weapon making body."
"Iraq is well into CW production and may well be in the process of BW production."
"With the more than 10 tons of uranium and more than one ton of slightly enriched uranium in its possession Iraq has enough to generate the needed bomb grade uranium for three nuclear weapons by 2005. "
"Iraq is importing directional control instruments for its missiles of much higher precision than those needed for the allowed 150km missiles under UN sanctions. Thus Iraq is gearing to extend the range of its missiles to easily reach Israel. "
"Iraq is or will be able to produce its own growth media for the biological weapons program and many of precursors for its CW program. The same can be said for local uranium production from phosphates."
"Iraq configured its program to generate its own materials for the nuclear core. Thus the plan that was set in 1982 targeted a 100 kg (220 lb) of bomb grade uranium a year. This is equivalent to 6 implosion or two gun type bombs a year. With a worked out design for the implosion option Iraq planned on being a major power in the region through its nuclear arsenal."
"With the a workable design and most of the needed components for a nuclear weapon already tested and in working order, Iraq is in the final stages of putting together its enrichment program to enrich enough uranium for the final component needed in the nuclear core."
"If the inspectors go back now there is very little human intelligence that will help them locate the new weapons sites. Spread widely among the government infrastructure in smaller hard to detect units, the inspectors will have a hard time locating all the programs components. A recent defector with credible information asserted that all units are built with a backup. If one is detected or is in danger of discovery all activity is immediately transferred to the back-up facility."
"We know from credible sources that Osama Bin Laden was a frequent visitor to the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum when Bin Laden was a resident of the Sudanese capital until 1996."
"It has also been confirmed that the Iraqi ambassador in Turkey, Farouk Hijazi, traveled to Afghanistan and met Bin Laden in December 1998."
"Iraq’s WMD are under the control of the Special Security Organization (SSO). This is the same group that are charged with Saddam’s Security."
spikey