The Mistaken Arab Experience
Giles Vickers | 10.12.2003 17:16 | Analysis
Even before the ink dried on the Geneva Accord, signed on Monday by self-appointed Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, enemies on both sides of the regional divide were united in their antipathy toward what is, after all, just a virtual agreement.
Among other things, the plan calls for the creation of a Palestinian state. That the initiative should have provoked such anger, but also interest, highlights a deeper problem in the Arab world: for all its centrality to the Arab experience during the past half-century, and for all the justifiable grievances it has aroused, the Palestinian fight for self-determination has, in many respects, rendered the Arab world impotent. Through overriding
attention to the fate of their Palestinian brethren, Arabs - whether consciously or not - have sacrificed much-needed political, social and economic advancement in other domains.
Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the reaction of many Arabs to President Bush's recent speech before the National Endowment for Democracy. The president declared that the United States had for too long backed autocratic regimes in the Middle East, and outlined a vision for the future where, presumably, this would be forsaken. Yet here in the region, the prevailing reaction to the speech, both from intellectuals and others who have spent decades blaming the United States for precisely the behavior Mr. Bush condemned, was resentment, as if it were preferable to
disown the president than to make him practice what he preached.
The main justification for the derision was the fate of the Palestinians. "How can President Bush be sincere on democracy," went the standard reaction, "when he allows Israel to abuse the Palestinians?" The question was fair, but those asking it missed a pivotal opportunity: it is far more profitable for Mr. Bush's Arab critics to demand that his administration fulfill its pledges, and use this as leverage to bring about Palestinian (and Iraqi) self-determination and democracy, than to fall back on perennial doubt. However, this would mean engaging the United States without malice, which many in the Arab world simply cannot bring themselves to do.
The Palestinian problem has also allowed countless Arab regimes, particularly those in states near Israel, to validate despotism in their overmilitarized societies. Some might argue this was and is needed to face down real or potential Israeli threats, but the explanation is unsatisfactory. For one thing, open societies usually equal or surpass dictatorships in defending themselves. For another, Arab societies have accepted autocratic regimes not because of imminent danger from Israel, but because the Palestinian problem remains unresolved.
In other words, the open wound of the Palestinian tragedy has allowed Arab regimes to transform outrage on the part of their people into tolerance for authoritarian, security-obsessed societies that are perceived as necessary to fight (even if they never do fight) a militarily superior Israel.
At the same time, a majority of Arab states has refused to normalize relations with Israel until the Palestinian issue is resolved. While Arab public opinion would accept nothing less, on ethical grounds, this means the Palestinian issue and public support for it have stifled contravening
policies that states might otherwise contemplate pursuing in their national interest. In effect, Palestine, far more than raison d'�tat, has come to define how Arab states approach Israel.
Yet, how could governments behave otherwise in a region where Palestine has become a benchmark for justice and the definition of injustice? That Egypt and Jordan managed to make peace with Israel says much more about the specific circumstances in which their respective agreements were
concluded than about any ambient Arab readiness to break ranks on a comprehensive settlement.
Specific Arab states have also paid a heavy price for the sanctity of the Palestinian struggle - none more so than my own country, Lebanon. It has been twice deprived: first, in the 1970's, when it was prevented by its Arab counterparts from defending against the encroachment of the Palestinian
national movement, which used the country as a base of operations against Israel; and second, at present, because the region's fixation on the Palestinians has taken the spotlight away from Syria's open-ended military presence in Lebanon, which began in 1976.
To invite the Arab world to look beyond the problem of the Palestinians is hardly incitement to abandon their cause, a move that in any case is neither sensible nor morally acceptable. However, the prism of 1948, when the Palestinians were dispossessed, has distorted so many things in the Middle East that it is with little imagination that Arab states and societies tend to address such fundamental issues as democracy, sovereignty, the
perils of overmilitarization, relations with the United States and, even, the optimal pursuit of national interests.
In reaffirming the value of such issues and playing down the importance of the Palestinian predicament with respect to how it affects them, Arabs would not only help themselves, but also the very people whose sad destiny they cannot seem to quite shake off.
09/12/03
Michael YOUNG - New York times
attention to the fate of their Palestinian brethren, Arabs - whether consciously or not - have sacrificed much-needed political, social and economic advancement in other domains.
Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the reaction of many Arabs to President Bush's recent speech before the National Endowment for Democracy. The president declared that the United States had for too long backed autocratic regimes in the Middle East, and outlined a vision for the future where, presumably, this would be forsaken. Yet here in the region, the prevailing reaction to the speech, both from intellectuals and others who have spent decades blaming the United States for precisely the behavior Mr. Bush condemned, was resentment, as if it were preferable to
disown the president than to make him practice what he preached.
The main justification for the derision was the fate of the Palestinians. "How can President Bush be sincere on democracy," went the standard reaction, "when he allows Israel to abuse the Palestinians?" The question was fair, but those asking it missed a pivotal opportunity: it is far more profitable for Mr. Bush's Arab critics to demand that his administration fulfill its pledges, and use this as leverage to bring about Palestinian (and Iraqi) self-determination and democracy, than to fall back on perennial doubt. However, this would mean engaging the United States without malice, which many in the Arab world simply cannot bring themselves to do.
The Palestinian problem has also allowed countless Arab regimes, particularly those in states near Israel, to validate despotism in their overmilitarized societies. Some might argue this was and is needed to face down real or potential Israeli threats, but the explanation is unsatisfactory. For one thing, open societies usually equal or surpass dictatorships in defending themselves. For another, Arab societies have accepted autocratic regimes not because of imminent danger from Israel, but because the Palestinian problem remains unresolved.
In other words, the open wound of the Palestinian tragedy has allowed Arab regimes to transform outrage on the part of their people into tolerance for authoritarian, security-obsessed societies that are perceived as necessary to fight (even if they never do fight) a militarily superior Israel.
At the same time, a majority of Arab states has refused to normalize relations with Israel until the Palestinian issue is resolved. While Arab public opinion would accept nothing less, on ethical grounds, this means the Palestinian issue and public support for it have stifled contravening
policies that states might otherwise contemplate pursuing in their national interest. In effect, Palestine, far more than raison d'�tat, has come to define how Arab states approach Israel.
Yet, how could governments behave otherwise in a region where Palestine has become a benchmark for justice and the definition of injustice? That Egypt and Jordan managed to make peace with Israel says much more about the specific circumstances in which their respective agreements were
concluded than about any ambient Arab readiness to break ranks on a comprehensive settlement.
Specific Arab states have also paid a heavy price for the sanctity of the Palestinian struggle - none more so than my own country, Lebanon. It has been twice deprived: first, in the 1970's, when it was prevented by its Arab counterparts from defending against the encroachment of the Palestinian
national movement, which used the country as a base of operations against Israel; and second, at present, because the region's fixation on the Palestinians has taken the spotlight away from Syria's open-ended military presence in Lebanon, which began in 1976.
To invite the Arab world to look beyond the problem of the Palestinians is hardly incitement to abandon their cause, a move that in any case is neither sensible nor morally acceptable. However, the prism of 1948, when the Palestinians were dispossessed, has distorted so many things in the Middle East that it is with little imagination that Arab states and societies tend to address such fundamental issues as democracy, sovereignty, the
perils of overmilitarization, relations with the United States and, even, the optimal pursuit of national interests.
In reaffirming the value of such issues and playing down the importance of the Palestinian predicament with respect to how it affects them, Arabs would not only help themselves, but also the very people whose sad destiny they cannot seem to quite shake off.
09/12/03
Michael YOUNG - New York times
Giles Vickers