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Pining for Freedom: Syrian occupation suffocates Lebanon

Graig vickers | 08.11.2003 18:55 | Cambridge

Syria's government, with its jackboot system, foul prisons, ruthless repression of dissent and support (in joint venture with Iran) of Hezbollah terrorists based in Lebanon, is utterly unfit to run Syria itself, let alone Lebanon. "All our intelligence agencies are under Syrian control," former Lebanese president Amin Gemayel tells me. Lebanon's Maronite Christian patriarch says that the entire Lebanese government has become "a creature of Syria." Lebanon is being transformed into a police

Pining for Freedom
Syrian occupation suffocates Lebanon, and the world shrugs.

BY CLAUDIA ROSETT

BEIRUT, Lebanon--Jewelry glitters in the shop windows, street cafes do a brisk business in fancy coffees and cakes, and just down the road from a lineup of fine new restaurants, an acquaintance shows off her exquisitely refurbished apartment, complete with hand-decorated tiles on the floor. Since the civil war ended in 1991, the Lebanese have largely restored the trappings of their shattered capital.

What they have not rebuilt is the once-modernizing civil society that in the 1950s and '60s earned Lebanon its old credentials as the freest nation in the Arab world and made Beirut the Paris of the Middle East. Since their 16-year civil war ended, the Lebanese have had no chance to reclaim the large measure of liberty and law they once knew. Behind the new glitz and bustle born of a cosmopolitan and enterprising culture looms the ugly truth that Lebanon, with the quiet assent of the free world, has become the ward of one of the most brutal states on earth--terrorist-sponsoring Syria.

Under any circumstances, this fate would be a horror. Given the urgency with which the U.S. is now seeking to promote democracy as the route to peace in the Arab world, it is also a crazy waste of Lebanon's rich potential. As one leading academic here notes, if the aim is to create free societies, "this is the only country in the Arab world where you don't have to start from scratch." He ticks off some of the basic institutions that once gave Lebanon such promise: a free press, a free economy, competitive politics. Following Lebanon's independence from France, in 1943, the country enjoyed for a time a civic framework that gave its many factions--Muslims, Christians and subdivisions thereof--ways other than war, or deference to tyrannical rule, to settle their differences.



What upset this balance was the arrival of Yasser Arafat and his Palestine Liberation Organization command, after Jordan kicked them out in 1971. Mr. Arafat set up shop in Lebanon, seeking to create, as many Lebanese describe it, "a state within a state," and bringing with him the havoc that has been the hallmark in many places of his long career. By 1975, Lebanon had descended into war. In 1976, with the blessing of the U.S., Syrian troops first arrived in the name of "stability." There followed many more years of violence, punctuated by a failed U.S. peacekeeping attempt. In 1989, under a deal struck by Arab nations in Taif, Saudi Arabia, Syria became the de facto guardian--and occupying force--in Lebanon.
What followed has been a deeply sinister sort of peace, which has already cost both Lebanon and neighboring Israel dearly, and for which America itself may yet pay a nasty price.

In the dream world of Realpolitik, Syrian forces have simply stayed on in Lebanon with the mission of keeping the country conveniently "stable." In practice, as in so much of the Middle East, this kind of stability is breeding new demons. Syria's government, with its jackboot system, foul prisons, ruthless repression of dissent and support (in joint venture with Iran) of Hezbollah terrorists based in Lebanon, is utterly unfit to run Syria itself, let alone Lebanon.

As one Lebanese political analyst explained it to me, Syria's dictators, first the late President Hafez Assad, now his son Bashar Assad, have simply played their hands more cleverly than Saddam Hussein has. Saddam invaded Kuwait by way of a frontal assault. He provoked the Gulf War, and was driven back. By contrast, Syria got hold of Lebanon in the name of "peacekeeping" and has since been consolidating its grip, largely unchallenged by the world community.

On the matter of this outrageous occupation, there is from many quarters a disturbing indifference. From the Arab world, so full of dictators professing deep concern over democratic Israel's dealings with the Palestinians, there comes not a croak of indignation that despotic Syria continues to occupy Lebanon. From the democratic club of nations comes the occasional groan, including noises recently from both Congress and the European Union. But there has been no serious effort to lever Syria out of Lebanon, or to end Syria's support for Hezbollah--whose terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks here in the 1980s, and today carry out assaults on Israel and threaten the U.S. itself.



By U.S. government estimates, some 25,000 Syrian troops are still based in Lebanon, though in recent years they have stayed out of sight, or at least out of uniform, in the capital itself. But Syria's army is just one part of the extensive machinery Damascus wields to keep control. "All our intelligence agencies are under Syrian control," former Lebanese president Amin Gemayel tells me. Lebanon's Maronite Christian patriarch says that the entire Lebanese government has become "a creature of Syria."
Among Lebanon's pro-Syrian politicians, the relationship is described as one of close "cooperation." Among members of the opposition, the Beirut-Damascus axis gets much less flattering labels. Describe it as you like, the link was amply evident during last week's visit to the Vatican by Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who told the pope that with turmoil ahead in the region, not only does he want Syrian troops to stay in Lebanon, but "I think we need them now more than ever."

And though the Lebanese still enjoy a much greater degree of freedom than do the Syrians themselves (who have none), opposition members here note that step by step, Lebanon is being transformed into a police state. Last year, Beirut authorities shut down an independent television station, MTV, owned by businessman Gabriel Murr, and, on a technicality, kicked Mr. Murr out of a seat he had won in parliament. Interviewed in his 11th-floor office, just upstairs from his boarded-up MTV headquarters, Mr. Murr sums up the situation: "Nothing happens in Lebanon if Syria does not want it to happen. There are some Lebanese who do not like this situation. MTV was for them."

He added that for those favored by Syria, there are no such problems. From his office window, he points across town to the broadcasting tower for the TV station run by Hezbollah. Along with its terrorist operations, Hezbollah fields a vigorous presence in Beirut politics, including a prominent presence at many high-level state functions, and seats in the parliament from which Mr. Murr was expelled.

In recent weeks, the Lebanese authorities have also cut the satellite service of another private TV station, NTV, to stop it from airing a program critical of totalitarian Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, America's request to air paid, Washington-sponsored TV spots were flatly refused by Beirut authorities.

At a respected Beirut-based family-run newspaper, An-Nahar, founded in 1933, publisher Gebran Tueni wonders why a country like America sits so calmly by while Lebanon falls under the sway of a "totalitarian regime." The outspoken Mr. Tueni points out that with a minimum of intelligent policy, Lebanon--freed of Syria--"could find its place and play a major role" in leading the Arab world toward more enlightened government. "We know what democracy means."



I met a group of Lebanese students from various universities, and they also seem to know what democracy means. They all despair of Lebanon's prospects under Syrian occupation. "I don't see that we have a future in Lebanon," said one young man, who plans to leave next year for France. Were there any prospect of Lebanese self-rule, he says he might stay; but "in a totalitarian country, we don't have our future in our hands."
None of this is to say that Lebanon in its heyday was a pristine democracy, or that forcing out Syria would lead immediately to the creation of a free and peaceful society. But the foundations exist, and so does a thoughtful and in some cases daringly outspoken opposition, full of people who wonder why they have been consigned by the free world to live under the shadow of Damascus. As the more enlightened nations of Europe, along with America, ponder ways of bringing true peace and stability to the Middle East, it would be wise to put the liberation of Lebanon high on the agenda. To ignore the democratic promise of this country's early past, while leaving Syria to manage its future "stability," would be to go on incubating monsters.


Graig vickers
- Homepage: http://2la.org/syrian/index.php

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SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM

08.11.2003 22:44

in the mid-1980s, much media attention was paid to Syria's alleged use of terrorism to achieve diplomatic, military, and strategic objectives in the Middle East and elsewhere. Although the exact Syrian role was murky, in the mid-1980s, Syria's intelligence and security networks were strongly implicated in the support of Middle Eastern and other international terrorist groups in Western Europe. In fact, Syria was one of the countries on the terrorism list issued by the United States government, first compiled in 1979

Within Syria's intelligence and security services, sponsorship of terrorism reportedly was conducted by Air Force Intelligence, of which Major General Muhammad al Khawli, an air force officer, has served as chief since 1970. Khawli, an Alawi, was considered Assad's most important adviser and his office was adjacent to Assad's in the presidential palace in Damascus, where he was presidential adviser on national security and head of security. Since 1976 Khawli has been the architect of Syria's policy in Lebanon. He also was credited with crushing the uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood in Hamah in 1982, and, according to the London Times, under his command Air Force Intelligence operatives had directed at least twenty-nine terrorist operations as of late 1986. These intelligence operatives reportedly worked in the offices of the Syrian Arab Airline abroad and also as military attachés in Syrian embassies. Thus, Syria had a formidable intelligence network with which to direct and fund terrorist groups and provide them such assistance as explosives and weapons, false passports and official Syrian service passports, diplomatic pouches, safe houses, and logistical support. Lieutenant Colonel Haitham Sayid, deputy chief of Air Force Intelligence and its operations director, was second in command to Khawli. In Lebanon, Khawli's power was exercised by Brigadier General Ghazi Kanaan, head of Syria's military intelligence in Lebanon.

Military Intelligence services (mukhabarat) were headed by General Ali Duba, an Alawi, who was, in effect, the country's chief of internal security. The mukhabarat was headquartered in the Defense Ministry complex in the center of Damascus and reputedly exercised immense authority because it operated from within the military establishment. Reportedly, Military Intelligence services handled radical Palestinian terrorist groups, such as Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command. General Khawli and Lieutenant Colonel Sayid were allegedly also the "paymasters" of the Abu Nidal terrorist organization, also called the Fatah-- Revolutionary Council. According to the United States Department of State, Syria provided the Abu Nidal organization with logistical support and permission to operate facilities in Damascus (the Syrian government asserts the facilities were limited to cultural and political affairs). It is also claimed that the Syrian government helped the Abu Nidal organization maintain training camps in Lebanon's Biqa Valley, an area controlled by Syrian armed forces, and supplied travel documents permitting Abu Nidal operatives to transit freely through Damascus when departing on missions.

Western government and intelligence sources admit that they cannot pinpoint Assad's complicity in planning terrorist operations but consider it unlikely that he was not informed in advance of major terrorist acts. If these reports are true, it was equally unlikely that Major General Khawli would act without clearing a potentially risky operation with Assad.

Various news organizations have claimed that, as part of its overall support network, in the 1980s Syria provided training camps for Middle Eastern and international terrorists. There were reportedly five training bases near Damascus and some twenty other training facilities elsewhere, including the Syriancontrolled Biqa Valley in eastern Lebanon. In late 1986 U.S. News & World Report stated that since October 1983, when Israel withdrew from Beirut, large numbers of international terrorists known to Western intelligence sources have turned up in Damascus. These include members of radical Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist groups, which depended on Syria for refuge, logistical, and financial support, as well as other freelance terrorists. Other sources report that a number of West European terrorists, including members of the Red Army Faction (also known as Baader Meinhof), and the Action Directe, as well as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Japanese Red Army, the Kurdish Labor Party, the Pakistani Az Zulfikar, the Tamil United Liberation Front of Sri Lanka, the Moro National Liberation Front for the Philippines, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia, and the Eritrean Liberation Front, have also received training in Syrian camps or in Syrian-controlled areas in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) was based in the Lebanese village of Qubayat, within the area of Syrian control. Syria also permitted Iran to operate training camps in eastern Lebanon for the Shia Hizballah (the Party of God) organization.

Syria's goal was to employ as surrogates terrorists whose operations left few traces to Syria. In June 1986 the Washington Post reported that Middle East analysts had noted three distinct types of relationships between Syria's intelligence and security services and terrorist groups. In the first type of relationship, however, there was direct Syrian involvement, because Syrian intelligence created new radical Palestinian factions, such as As Saiqa, which were, in effect, integrated components of the Syrian armed forces and hence direct Syrian agents. The radical Palestinian Abu Musa group, which was almost totally dependent on Syria, was another example of such a relationship. In the other two types of relationships, Syria used terrorists as surrogates to avoid direct blame. In the second relationship, Syria collaborated with and provided logistical and other support to terrorist groups that maintained independent organizational identities, but were directed by Syrian intelligence, which formulated general guidelines as to targets. Reportedly, Abu Nidal's Fatah--Revolutionary Council and the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) were examples of such collaboration. The third relationship involved selection of freelance or "sleeper" terrorists, mainly Palestinians and Jordanians, to carry out a specific operation. The convicted Lebanese assassin of Bashir Jumayyil and Nizar Hindawi and his half-brother Ahmad Hasi, convicted in 1986 of trying to blow up an Israeli commercial airliner in London and of bombing the German-Arab Friendship Society office in West Berlin, respectively, were listed as examples of this type of relationship.

The firmest proof of Syrian sponsorship of terrorism occurred at the trials of Nizar Hindawi in Britain and his half-brother, Ahmad Hasi, in West Berlin. Evidence introduced in Britain, and other information not made public, linked Hindawi with the Syrian intelligence services. Because of the evidence, the British government severed diplomatic relations with Syria. Hasi's case implicated Haitham Sayid, deputy chief of Syrian Air Force Intelligence, for whom an international arrest warrant was issued by West Berlin authorities. After Hasi's conviction, the West German government downgraded its relations with Syria.

A series of terrorist explosions in Paris in September 1986 were linked to a Marxist Maronite terrorist group, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF). LARF was implicated in the assassination of a number of American, West European, and Israeli diplomats in Europe, and its operations were reputedly known to Syrian intelligence. In a magazine interview in September 1986, Pierre Marion, former director of the French General Directorate of External Security, charged that in the early 1980s Syrian intelligence agents had helped terrorist groups to operate in France, as part of a Syrian effort to punish France for its involvement in Lebanon.

Although Syrian links to terrorists in Western Europe are relatively recent, observers believe that Assad has long used terrorism to further Syrian policy objectives in the Middle East. Over the years, Jordanian officials have accused Syria of assassinating Jordanian diplomats. PLO leaders have accused Syria of the assassination of Arafat's chief of staff and close aide, Saad Sayil (known as Abu Walid), killed near a Syrian checkpoint in the Biqa Valley in eastern Lebanon in 1982. According to the report by the United States Department of State on "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983," several attacks by members of the Abu Nidal organization reflected Syrian opposition toward the proArafat Fatah faction of the PLO. In 1983 these attacks included the assassination at the International Conference of Socialists in Portugal of PLO observer Issam Sartawi, who had advocated dialogue with Israel. The same report also charged Syria with encouraging the radical Shia Lebanese group, Islamic Jihad, to carry out the 1983 suicide bombing attacks against the United States Embassy in Beirut and the headquarters of the United States and French contingents of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut, which resulted in 557 casualties.

John
- Homepage: http://2la.org/syria/index.php