Untying the Saudi-U.S. knot marks end of historic ties
Amir Taheri, Gulf News, 07-05-2003

London - In Saudi Arabia, it is the end of the lunar month of Safar and the beginning of summer, which will last until October. Traditionally, Saudis spend at least part of that period abroad, or trek to the cool oases of the Ta'ef region on the Yemeni border. This year, however, most Saudis will stay at home. The reason? They feel they are no longer welcome at their favourite destination, the United States of America. Or they've decided to wait and see "what happens next".

As one travels around this vast kingdom, almost as big as Europe, the mood is one of quiet concern about a troubling present and an uncertain future. The feeling of uncertainty has just been deepened with the announcement by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld that soon almost all the American troops will be withdrawn from the kingdom. "This is what Osama bin Laden wanted," says a Saudi university teacher. "People wonder when he will get the other things he wanted."

Many Saudis see Rumsfeld's visit as a historic parting of the ways for two traditional allies. "The Americans now have Iraq and no longer need us," says Abdul-Muhsin Al Mualaa, a businessman. "It is as if the ground has fallen [from] under our feet."

In one of those paradoxes of politics, this birthplace of Islam had developed into one of the most pro-American of all Muslim countries. Since 1980, an estimated 200,000 Saudis have studied in the U.S., and at least a quarter of a million Saudis have visited the country every year. Saudi investment in the U.S. is estimated at $300 billion. Prince Walid bin Talal, a nephew of the King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, Custodian of the two Holy Shrines, boasts that he is the single biggest foreign investor in New York City. Many top American firms, from Disney to Citicorp, have major Saudi shareholders.

At the other end of the spectrum, Saudi Arabia is the biggest source of American energy imports. It sits upon almost a quarter of the world's known oil reserves, and experts regard the recently developed fields of Shiba as "an almost endless source" of cheap oil. The country's importance as a strategic prize is certain to increase in the coming years as it develops new-found reserves of natural gas.

For over a decade the kingdom played host to the largest American military presence between Europe and the Far East. And it has played another crucial role in American global strategy: that of go-between with the Muslim world. As the site of the holy cities of Makkah and Medina, destination of Islam's two most imposrtant pilgrimages, and host to almost six million pilgrims each year, Saudi Arabia enjoys immense prestige in the Muslim world – a prestige enhanced by the billions it spends on Islamic charities, Quranic schools, aid projects, and patronage throughout the Muslim world.

The "strategic partnership" between Washington and Riyadh began in the 1940s, when the U.S. first established a military presence in the kingdom. In the 1960s and 1970s the two worked closely to deal with the threat of Arab nationalism, backed by the Soviet Union, and to contain the Palest-inian issue. In the 1980s they were partners in stopping the spread of the Khomeini-ist revolution from Iran to other Muslim countries.

Then came their joint venture in support of the mujahedeen fighting the Soviet army in Afgha-nistan. Thousands of Saudis went to fight the Communists in Afghanistan or to raise funds and procure arms for the Afghan mujahedeen. Among those who went was Osama bin Laden, a member of a Saudi family of Yemeni origin.

So close did the two countries become that Washington consulted with Riyadh even on issues such as defeating communism in Nicara-gua and El Salvador. Then in 1990-91, the two worked together to force Iraq out of Kuwait. In an important symbolic gesture, the United States made Prince Khaled bin Sultan, a nephew of King Fahd, deputy commander in chief of the allied forces.

The "special relationship" came to an abrupt end when it turned out that 15 of the 19 terrorists who took part in the September 11 attacks were Saudi citizens, some from prominent families. As the FBI proceeded to arrest suspects, hundreds of Saudis in the U.S. were rounded up and thrown into prison. Many managed to escape the dragnet aboard specially chartered flights. Among those who escaped were 18 members of the bin Laden family who had been working or studying in the U.S.

Washington retaliated by imposing stiff visa rules for Saudis, reversing a policy under which the kingdom had been among a handful of favoured nations. "For many of us the U.S. has been a second home," says Yahya Al Muqren, a businessman. "My daughter's godfather is an American. Now she comes to ask me why Americans are killing Muslims."

But the foreign minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, a nephew of the king, dismisses the current tension as "a rough patch". He insists that the USA and the KSA have too many shared interests to drift apart. "Over 60 years of special relationship is not damaged by occasional problems," he says.

That sentiment is not shared in the mosques and the shopping malls. One common feeling is that the leadership has not yet recovered from the shock of September 11 and its aftermath, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. "It is a pity that the king is unwell," says a senior Saudi on condition of anonymity. "We are used to our leader coming on TV to tell us what to think and how to act. Since September 11, however, we have been receiving conflicting signals from different officials."

That view is disputed by others, who insist that Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, who is effectively in charge of day-to-day policy, has been right to steer the kingdom away from an open alliance with Washington. "Abdullah wants the Ameri-cans to understand that they cannot have something for nothing," says another senior Saudi figure. "He wants Washington to deliver a solution to the Palestinian conflict before demanding the kingdom's help in other fields."

Abdullah was put in charge of running the country in 1995. Since then, the prospect of an early succession has receded. But Abdullah has won popularity by curbing the government's spending, maintaining the country's Islamic character, normalising ties with Iran, strengthening relations with Syria, and taking a tough anti-Israeli stance.

He has also announced some populist measures, designed to counter criticism. Thus, the crown prince has published an ambitious plan for reforming all Arab states, and he has offered to secure the recognition of Israel by all Muslim nations in exchange for the establishment of a Palest-inian state.

In addition, Abdullah has opened a dialogue with a group of intellectuals who last winter published an open letter calling for "serious reforms in the kingdom". In a clear signal that he was serious, the crown prince told a delegation of the reformers that he envisaged a major review of the role played by the Consultative Council, the kingdom's appointed 120-man parliament. The review could lead to the election of members and, more significant, the inclusion of women.

Some reformers dismiss the proposed measures as too little, too late. And Abdullah's policies enjoy little support among members of the royal family. Most want no change at all. A small minority wants to go "the whole way towards a constitutional monarchy". But one thing is certain: the family and its retainers have a keen instinct for survival and would unite at the first whiff of real danger. "Those who compare us to the Shah of Iran are dead wrong," says a prince.

"The shah was a loner with only about 50 close relatives. We are a large, very large, family linked to many clans and tribes. We are the backbone of society. Also, we know how to survive. We survived the challenge of Nasser and communism and the threats of Khomeini and Saddam Hussain. We will get through this one too." But what exactly is "this one"? It is the fact that an extremist and violent version of Islam, symbolised by bin Laden, seems to have seduced part of the kingdom's golden youth.

No one knows the extent of bin Laden's actual popularity in Saudi Arabia. What is clear, however, is that, with one or two exceptions, almost no one has dared condemn him in public. The exceptions are Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, the interior minister, who called bin Laden "a diseased organ that has to be removed" from Islam, and former secret service chief Prince Turki Al Faisal, a nephew of the king, who has branded the fugitive "an arrogant coward".

For Saudis, spurning bin Laden is not easy. The bin Laden family is one of the kingdom's wealthiest, with a multi-billion dollar empire that employs some 50,000 people. For many, even if they disapprove, they are not prepared to denounce Osama from the heart.

By contrast, many preachers at the estimated 25,000 mosques in the kingdom pounced on the September 11 events as an excuse for lashing out against the U.S. and its policy of "support for the Zionist entity", Israel. So violent were some of these attacks that Crown Prince Abdullah had to call in some of the religious leaders and publicly warn them against "exaggeration and excessive remarks" during the Holy Month of Ramadan and on other religious occasions. In the past six months, many state-employed preachers and muezzins (callers to prayer) were dismissed for their "immoderate language and behaviour".

Nevertheless, audiocassettes containing vitriolic speeches by many sheikhs, notably Safar Al Hawali and Salman Al Awdah, two dissident clerics recently released from prison, still sell briskly in many cities, including the capital, Riyadh. And a fatwa (religious opinion) by the sheikh Hamoud Al Shuaibi is distributed under the counter in many shopping malls and teahouses. In it the blind sheikh condemns American intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq as "a war by the Infidel against Muslims" and states: "Any Muslim who cooperates with the Infidel is an apostate."

More ominous, the Islamic charities, some of which have been accused of raising funds for terrorist operations, continue to function. The government's promised efforts to "dry up" terrorist funding are in their early stages, according to sources. Saudi Arabia's identity crisis comes at a time when trouble is brewing on other fronts. In the 1980s the Saudi per capita GDP was around $18,000 a year. This year it has fallen to just under $6,000. Falling oil prices and loss of market share are blamed, while the real explanation is the economy's failure to grow beyond a meagre 2.2 per cent per year since 1990. And that translates into rising unemployment, especially among young Saudis with college degrees.

As the hope of landing easy, plum jobs in the government fades, some Saudis are beginning to take up menial jobs previously reserved for foreign "guest workers". A hotel in Jeddah has just hired its first Saudi porter. More significant, a restaurant in Makkah has become the first in the kingdom to employ women to wait on tables.

Yet the fact that women are not allowed to drive cars means that the kingdom has to employ almost a million guest workers to drive family cars on simple errands like taking the children to and from school and shopping. Saudi Arabia spends almost a third of its oil income to employ the estimated 5.6 million foreigners who work there. Another third of its oil income goes to buy weapons and service the debts incurred in the 1990-91 war to liberate Kuwait.

Then there are the lavish subsidies that the government provides for public services, delivered free or below cost. Once the oil industry's need for continuous investment has been met, there's not much left to spend on new development. Crown Prince Abdullah has tried hard to attract foreign investment, especially in the energy sector, so far with limited success. Prolonged tension with Washington is sure to harm investment prospects further.

Some Saudis call for "urgent action" to repair relations with the West in general and the U.S. in particular. For the time being, many Saudis will have to sweat the summer out at home. They can look forward to a shortened workday of just four hours, followed by a 10-hour siesta. This is the season of juicy dates from Qassim, washed down with cups of Arabian coffee. There will be endless games of backgammon to play, with periodic interruptions to watch the latest news on satellite television.

The Iranian writer, author and journalist is based in Europe. E-mail:  amirtaheri@benadorassociates.com