Saddam's Friends
Marko | 25.02.2003 23:32
Primary documents show collusion between Saddam and Washington, despite known WMD programmes from the national security archives george washington university
National Security Archive Update, February 25, 2003
*Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984*
U.S. Documents Show Embrace of Saddam Hussein in Early 1980s Despite Chemical
Weapons, External Aggression, Human Rights Abuses
Fear of Iraq Collapse in Iran-Iraq War Motivated Reagan Administration
Support; U.S. Goals Were Access to Oil, Projection of Power, and Protection of
Allies; Rumsfeld Failed to Raise Chemical Weapons Issue in Personal Meeting
with
Saddam
http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82
For more information contact:
Joyce Battle - (202) 994-7145
Washington, D.C., 25 February 2003 - The National Security Archive at George
Washington University today published on the Web a series of declassified U.S.
documents detailing the U.S. embrace of Saddam Hussein in the early 1980's,
including the renewal of diplomatic relations that had been suspended since
1967. The documents show that during this period of renewed U.S. support for
Saddam, he had invaded his neighbor (Iran), had long-range nuclear aspirations
that would "probably" include "an eventual nuclear weapon capability,
harbored known terrorists in Baghdad, abused the human rights of his citizens,
and possessed and used chemical weapons on Iranians and his own people. The
U.S. response was to renew ties, to provide intelligence and aid to ensure
Iraq would not be defeated by Iran, and to send a high-level presidential
envoy named Donald Rumsfeld to shake hands with Saddam (20 December 1983).
The declassified documents posted today include the briefing materials and
diplomatic reporting on two Rumsfeld trips to Baghdad, reports on Iraqi
chemical weapons use concurrent with the Reagan administration's decision to
support Iraq, and decision directives signed by President Reagan that reveal
the specific U.S. priorities for the region: preserving access to oil,
expanding U.S. ability to project military power in the region, and protecting
local allies from internal and external threats. The documents include:
* A U.S. cable recording the December 20, 1983 conversation between Donald
Rumsfeld and Saddam Hussein. Although Rumsfeld said during a September 21,
2002 CNN interview, "In that visit, I cautioned him about the use of chemical
weapons, as a matter of fact, and discussed a host of other things," the
document indicates there was no mention of chemical weapons. Rumsfeld did
raise the issue in his subsequent meeting with Iraqi official Tariq Aziz.
* National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114 of November 26, 1983, "U.S.
Policy toward the Iran-Iraq War," delineating U.S. priorities: the ability to
project military force in the Persian Gulf and to protect oil supplies,
without reference to chemical weapons or human rights concerns.
* National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 139 of April 5, 1984, "Measures
to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the
Iran-Iraq War," focusing again on increased access for U.S. military forces in
the Persian Gulf and enhanced intelligence-gathering capabilities. The
directive calls for "unambiguous" condemnation of chemical weapons use,
without naming Iraq, but places "equal stress" on protecting Iraq from Iran's
"ruthless and inhumane tactics." The directive orders preparation of "a plan
of action designed to avert an Iraqi collapse.
* U.S. and Iraqi consultations about Iran's 1984 draft resolution seeking
United Nations Security Council condemnation of Iraq's chemical weapons use.
Iraq conveyed several requests to the U.S. about the resolution, including its
preference for a lower-level response and one that did not name any country in
connection with chemical warfare; the final result complied with Iraq's
requests.
* The 1984 public U.S. condemnation of chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq
war, which said, referring to the Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to agree to end
hostilities until Saddam Hussein was ejected from power, "The United States
finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its
avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq
to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the
moral and religious basis which it claims."
Follow the link below to view the documents:
http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82
*Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984*
U.S. Documents Show Embrace of Saddam Hussein in Early 1980s Despite Chemical
Weapons, External Aggression, Human Rights Abuses
Fear of Iraq Collapse in Iran-Iraq War Motivated Reagan Administration
Support; U.S. Goals Were Access to Oil, Projection of Power, and Protection of
Allies; Rumsfeld Failed to Raise Chemical Weapons Issue in Personal Meeting
with
Saddam
![](/img/extlink.gif)
For more information contact:
Joyce Battle - (202) 994-7145
Washington, D.C., 25 February 2003 - The National Security Archive at George
Washington University today published on the Web a series of declassified U.S.
documents detailing the U.S. embrace of Saddam Hussein in the early 1980's,
including the renewal of diplomatic relations that had been suspended since
1967. The documents show that during this period of renewed U.S. support for
Saddam, he had invaded his neighbor (Iran), had long-range nuclear aspirations
that would "probably" include "an eventual nuclear weapon capability,
harbored known terrorists in Baghdad, abused the human rights of his citizens,
and possessed and used chemical weapons on Iranians and his own people. The
U.S. response was to renew ties, to provide intelligence and aid to ensure
Iraq would not be defeated by Iran, and to send a high-level presidential
envoy named Donald Rumsfeld to shake hands with Saddam (20 December 1983).
The declassified documents posted today include the briefing materials and
diplomatic reporting on two Rumsfeld trips to Baghdad, reports on Iraqi
chemical weapons use concurrent with the Reagan administration's decision to
support Iraq, and decision directives signed by President Reagan that reveal
the specific U.S. priorities for the region: preserving access to oil,
expanding U.S. ability to project military power in the region, and protecting
local allies from internal and external threats. The documents include:
* A U.S. cable recording the December 20, 1983 conversation between Donald
Rumsfeld and Saddam Hussein. Although Rumsfeld said during a September 21,
2002 CNN interview, "In that visit, I cautioned him about the use of chemical
weapons, as a matter of fact, and discussed a host of other things," the
document indicates there was no mention of chemical weapons. Rumsfeld did
raise the issue in his subsequent meeting with Iraqi official Tariq Aziz.
* National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114 of November 26, 1983, "U.S.
Policy toward the Iran-Iraq War," delineating U.S. priorities: the ability to
project military force in the Persian Gulf and to protect oil supplies,
without reference to chemical weapons or human rights concerns.
* National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 139 of April 5, 1984, "Measures
to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the
Iran-Iraq War," focusing again on increased access for U.S. military forces in
the Persian Gulf and enhanced intelligence-gathering capabilities. The
directive calls for "unambiguous" condemnation of chemical weapons use,
without naming Iraq, but places "equal stress" on protecting Iraq from Iran's
"ruthless and inhumane tactics." The directive orders preparation of "a plan
of action designed to avert an Iraqi collapse.
* U.S. and Iraqi consultations about Iran's 1984 draft resolution seeking
United Nations Security Council condemnation of Iraq's chemical weapons use.
Iraq conveyed several requests to the U.S. about the resolution, including its
preference for a lower-level response and one that did not name any country in
connection with chemical warfare; the final result complied with Iraq's
requests.
* The 1984 public U.S. condemnation of chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq
war, which said, referring to the Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to agree to end
hostilities until Saddam Hussein was ejected from power, "The United States
finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its
avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq
to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the
moral and religious basis which it claims."
Follow the link below to view the documents:
![](/img/extlink.gif)
Marko
Comments
Hide the following comment
Saddam Hussein and Donald Rumsfeld c. 1983
26.02.2003 09:20
Saddam Hussein and Donald Rumsfeld c. 1983
Warrior