br />PM

Dear colleagues -- At the link below you will find a document that provides a good glimpse into current U.S. nuclear lab and Pentagon plans to undercut the test ban treaty -- and even to build new kinds of nuclear weapons in small lots.

 http://www.lasg.org/hmpgfrm_a.html

This important document has not yet to my knowledge been the subject of any U.S. press accounts, and therefore may be newsworthy in the United States and elsewhere in the world. Please feel free to disseminate it widely. It may provide another opportunity for disarmament-oriented groups to move key issues regarding the Bush nuclear agenda -- and, more broadly, the extreme militarism in U.S.
policy-making circles -- into the mainstream.

Now, before the invasion of Iraq, it may be especially important to trumpet U.S. nuclear perfidy widely, and to use any outrage in organizing.

The Study Group deserves no credit for unearthing this document, and I've been waiting to see it hit the U.S. press for almost two weeks. I couldn't sit on it any more.

The document is closely related to the new House Republican nuclear weapons policy statement, released just yesterday, and to an October memorandum from Pete Aldridge, Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council, which formally requested that U.S. nuclear labs look into the benefits of low-yield nuclear testing.

Both these documents are also available at the same location on our web site.

Somewhat more detail:

The purpose of the January meeting memorialized in these minutes was to plan a secret conference, to be held at U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska - during "the week of August 4, 2003" if possible - to discuss what new nuclear weapons to build, how they might be tested, how these weapons might be mated to new delivery systems, and even how the process for granting authority to build small quantities of new nuclear weapons might be changed.

The minutes say the genesis of this meeting was an October 2002 memorandum from the Pete Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (and Chairman of the three-person Nuclear Weapons Council). Aldridge's memo requested, inter alia, that the nuclear weapons laboratories examine the benefits of low-yield nuclear testing.

The upcoming conference would have four panels.

The first would deal with the stockpile stewardship program,
especially topics dealing with the (now annual) certification of weapons and the potential role of nuclear testing in the certification process.

For example: "What are the anticipated limits of the extent to which improved understanding of weapon physics is [a] basis for confidence?...

What is the role of nuclear testing in reducing risk in the
stockpile.what would recommend a test?"

The second panel would deal with the future U.S. nuclear arsenal - what kinds of new weapons should be in the arsenal, how these weapons should be matched to modernized delivery platforms, and the like.

Examples: "Strategy for selecting first 'small builds;' requirements for low-yield weapons, EPWs [earth-penetrating weapons], enhanced radiation weapons, agent defeat weapons.What forms of testing will these new designs require?.What is the testing strategy for weapons
more likely to be used in small strikes?...Do we put GPS [global positioning system guidance] on all systems, or just a few?" and so on.

The third panel would deal with the NNSA and DoD infrastructure,e.g. "Determine if the NNSA and DoD infrastructures are agile enough to support a 'small build' strategy."

The fourth panel would address nuclear strategy and policy, e.g. "Reexamine the policy issues of the various levels of testing," and "How do we frame the explanation of emerging [sic] policy to show the deterrent value of reduced-collateral damage, precision, agent defeat, and penetrating nuclear capabilities in meeting our national security objectives?" (emphasis added).

Topics left unassigned to any panel were: "What should the policy and process be for granting authority to adapt and build small quantities," and "Evaluate the DoD/NNSA requirements process. Do we adequately identify requirements, and their priority in existing systems?"

What this document says about the nature of the planning process is almost worse than the actual policy content.

While there are no real surprises for many of us, seldom do so many revealing facets appear in one damning place.

It is extremely important that a considerable ruckus be made of this, or it may well slip into the paralyzed, numb acceptance that grips much of of the U.S. in the face of the Bush onslaught.

The worst-case scenario would be if the U.S. media and public become "immunized" or habituated to nuclear weapons initiatives like this, and lose their sense of outrage.

Therefore I felt it was important to get this out as widely as possible, exactly in order to stimulate as much outrage, from as many places, as possible.

Please feel free to contact me about any of this.

greg mello

-- **************************
Greg Mello Los Alamos Study Group 212
East Marcy Street, #10 Santa Fe, NM 87501
505-982-7747 voice
505-982-8502 fax
 gmello@lasg.org