News from NTK 2003/01/10/
 http://www.ntk.net

Lord Falconer continues to tell everyone who'll listen that over 1500 people have responded, and the majority of them were extremely positive on the idea.

Now, given that they're proposing a massive IT project to introduce a universal identifier for all citizens, with a centralised database of personal details, kept accurate by making a new crime of withholding your current address from the government - well, we can't help but think that more people would a bit squeamish on the principle.

And maybe they were. DAN BLANCHARD described what happened when he mailed the HO saying that he didn't think ID cards were necessary. Back came the reply from the Home Office: "Thank you for your e-mail of 13th December in support of the introduction of an entitlement/identity card scheme."

Now, we're not saying that something fishy is going on here. Although, obviously, yes we are *implying* it.

So to double-check the government, and test the accuracy of the Lord Falconometer, the STAND folk have set up an easy-to-use web form for those wanting to express their discontent (mild or otherwise) with the Entitlement Card scheme. STAND'll keep count of the number of contributions (in a giant, centralised database of biometric - nah, just kidding), and then compare that to the results that come from Lord Falconer next time.

We're hoping to get close to the 1500 entries already noted, perhaps even top it (that's only about 0.1 of a slashdotting after all). Because if the government can't even keep their database of an simple e-mail consultation straight, maybe they shouldn't be trusted with a universal database after all.

 http://www.stand.org.uk

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A Cynic's Guide To Entitlement (*cough* ID *cough*) Cards

You Say It's Worth The Money — But It will cost over 1.5 billion

The government's consultation paper tells us "Over a three year period of developing the systems and a ten year period during which the cards would be valid, the total cost of a scheme would be around £1.5 billion."
The history of ID card cost estimates in other countries (notably Australia and the Philippines) has risen sharply toward the implementation stage. The government has failed to successfully implement almost every large IT system it has ever undertaken. David Blunkett told Parliament: "I agree that it is important to recognise the past failures of Government technology systems".

It's a rather large amount of money to waste on something that won't serve the purpose, don't you think?

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You Say It's Not Compulsory — But Everyone Will Have To Have One?

Paragraph 2.12 makes the assurance that the card scheme could not dictate that service providers require the card. Despite this, we believe that central government would find it very difficult not to lay pressure onto public services it controls, such as the NHS and the Inland Revenue, to make use of the card. It stretches belief that, after the investment of large sums of money, the government would not find itself under political pressure to show that the scheme was worthwhile and presenting efficiency savings, no matter how contrived. And chances are, you'll be legally obliged to apply for the card

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You Say It Won't Leak My Information — But How Can You Stop It?

Well, the record sure ain't good thus far. There is no shortage of stories about police officers abusing criminal records databases.
But for our money, the Home Office's very own report (PDF) on Police Integrity makes for the most interesting reading.

THE INTEGRITY OF INFORMATION
6.6 Most police intelligence is now stored on computers and, with many members of staff being able to access it through their own terminal, it is a daunting task to try and protect it. To illustrate the potential problem, the Inspection Team is aware a spot audit in one force revealed that within 24 hours of the arrest of a high profile criminal for alleged murder, 67 officers accessed his intelligence record. When interviewed, most acknowledged they did it purely out of curiosity but it would have been equally possible for an unscrupulous member of staff to leak the information unlawfully to other criminals or the press.
If that's the culture right now inside the police regarding *criminal* data, it doesn't bode well for a database of tens of millions of law-abiding citizens.

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You Say It'll Stop Identity Fraud — But It Won't

If the cards have any value whatsoever, then people *will* find a way to forge them or to acquire them dishonestly; this point is quite certain. The technology gap between governments and organised crime worldwide has now narrowed to such an extent that even the most highly secure cards are available as blanks within weeks of their introduction. One should bear in mind, also, that criminal use of fake identity documents does not necessarily involve the use of counterfeiting techniques. In 1999, a former accountant was charged in London with obtaining up to 500 passports under false identities; the scam was merely a manipulation of the primary documentation procedure.

It is worth considering some inevitable formulæ that apply across the board to the black-market economy. Wherever governments, worldwide, have attempted to introduce ID cards, they have always been based, at least in part, on the aim of eliminating false identity. The higher the integrity or infallibility of a card, the greater is its value to criminals and illegal immigrants. A high value card naturally attracts substantially larger investment in corruption and counterfeit activity. The equation is simple — a higher value ID document equates to greater criminal activity. Criminals and terrorists can, in reality, move much more freely, safely and confidently with several fake "official" identities than they ever could in a country using multiple forms of "low value" ID such as birth certificates, as the UK does currently.

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You Say It'll Stop Illegal Immigrant Workers — But It Won't

One of the government's suggestions, rather predictably, is that the card might help combat illegal immigration. Of course, as plenty of people will be able to enter the country without a card — not least as casual tourists — this is largely fallacious.
The perception that people would be able to enter the UK illegally and to gain employment here, having done so, is unlikely to be suppressed by the introduction of a card proving lawful residence. Especially, given that many of the kinds of people who employ illegal immigrants — individuals seeking cleaners, parts of the construction industry seeking casual labourers and so on — are not in the least bit concerned by the legality of such practices and are unlikely to request their employees' ID cards before offering employment.

The mental image of transit vans pulling up to groups of young men waiting patiently on the kerb-side at dawn and asking for their ID cards before whisking them off to a construction site as casual labour is a bit of a giggle, though, you have to admit.

Black markets, by definition, operate illegally and have operated since society first tried to regulate markets; they have little reason to be worried that another hurdle has been placed in their path. In the same fashion, unscrupulous employers just wouldn't care whether they have checked their employees' ID.

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You Say You Want Biometrics — But Biometrics Don't Work

The government sets itself, in paragraph 5.21, three standards that much be met before it would be comfortable with implementing a biometric scheme with the ID card. These three standards are that the biometric technology or technologies in question:
would be sufficiently mature and reliable
could be implemented at a cost which justified the benefits
were acceptable to members of the public
We feel that none of these conditions could be met, now or in the foreseeable future.
For more information, take a look at Bruce Schneier's coverage of gummi fingerprints or the ACLU's report (PDF) on a facial recognition study in Florida.

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You Say You Care — But You Won't Punish Abuses

We are very disappointed that the government doesn't seem to consider it necessary to include criminal sanctions for unauthorised access to or misuse of individuals' data, something that is worryingly typical of the way in which the Civil Service seems to address issues of individuals' rights to privacy in the UK.
We consider that, in order to provide any level of public confidence in any scheme, there should be far greater punishments of such abuses of the scheme than there should be for the relatively trivial 'offences' of forgetting to tell the central government that one has moved house. As the Home Office was reminded in Summer 2002 with the badly thought-out Standing Order to extend RIP Act section 22 powers, there are many cases where state officials with access to sensitive data about citizens have abused that power.


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You Say You've Got A Mandate — But Not From Me You Ain't

ID Cards are one of those ideas that the public never votes on, but governments always propose. There is no mention of them in the Labour Party's manifesto.
But it's OK.

You will not be required to use a card unless you wish to work, use the banking or health system, vote, buy a house, drive, travel or receive benefits.

As Mr Blunkett advised Parliament: "The issuing of a card does not force anyone to use it, although in terms of drivers or passport users, or if services — whether public or private — required some proof of identity before expenditure was laid out, without proof of identity and therefore entitlement to do it I doubt whether non-use of it would last very long."

Of course, if enough people refused to use the cards they would lose their raison d'être.

Just not using the card is an option.