ZIMBABWE'S Black majority gained independence from British colonial rule over 20 years ago, after a long war of African resistance. It culminated in the Lancaster House agreement, following protracted negotiations in London between the liberation armies and the newly elected Tory government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1979.


The outcome ensured Black majority rule, based on the Lancaster House Constitution, which sealed the fate of the racist Rhodesia regime led by Ian Smith. An independent Zimbabwe ('Large House of Stone') was born, and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) formed the government under President Robert Mugabe.


The roots of the current conflict over land reform and the Zimbabwe Government-backed campaign by the War Veterans Association to expropriate white settler land, lead back to that agreement.


In all the demands made the most significant political and diplomatic struggle over the course of those talks - headed by the then Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington - that often threatened to collapse, was centred on land reform.


Rhodesia's white minority rulers were implacably opposed to the liberation struggle and would concede nothing. The solution was sought in what became the Lancaster House negotiations.


Liberation leaders were determined to ensure that Britain, which backed the Rhodesia Government, would not prevent Zimbabwe from beginning the battle to address the huge vested interests of white farmers in any agreement. The roots of that crisis, of course, go back to colonial days.


Colonial land theft


There was a time when fertile land was said to be plentiful and freely available in Zimbabwe, as in many African states - a time when, by comparison, 'life was easy' and tribal lands were worked relatively free of interference. British empire builders, invading troops and colonial rule put paid to that.


Over a hundred years ago, in 1890, British forces occupied a part of Africa that would long be associated with its 'founder': The cunning and ruthless imperial merchant Cecil John Rhodes, after whom Rhodesia was named. This was part of Britain's unholy mission to bring the 'uncivilised worlds under British rule'.


Rhodes' view was that the English had an inherent right to imperial rule because they were the "first race in the world and therefore the more of the world [they] inhabited, the better it would be for the human race." Such racist justification for empire-building echoes on white-owned farms in Zimbabwe today.


In 1889, a year before troops arrived, white settlers were given rights to the land of indigenous people. The British South Africa Company (BSAC) was formed to buy concessions from the British crown and this formed the basis of the subsequent wholesale land theft. Profit went into British coffers; Africa's people saw none of it.


Over the next ten years or so, as the take over of land unfolded, white settlers hemmed in the majority Black population on what they called Native Reserves (known today as communal areas). This began the division of African peoples' land. They got small, largely infertile tracts while expropriated land in the hands of white farmers was the biggest and best.


Conquest through land grab and livestock seizure brought stiff resistance. The first major national Chimurenga (uprising) soon exploded in 1893. It was bloodily suppressed, but the tide that would turn decisively against settlers today was rising.


In the years to the start of the First World War the white settlers and their administration created and entrenched a system of racial segregation to reinforce the unequal farmland distribution.


In a relatively short period of time to 1914, the division of land became vastly disproportionate: Just three per cent of the population controlled 75 per cent of the land, while most of the rest were harshly restricted to a mere 23 per cent of the worst land in designated Reserves. There were only 28,000 white settlers to nearly one million Africans in Zimbabwe at this time.


To this day, 70 per cent of the best land is still held by white farmers, despite the fact that many thousands of Africans have been allocated land.


After the war, in 1925, the Morris Carter Commission set out to prepare a comprehensive picture of ownership. It led to the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which defined and set in stone for decades the grossly unequal 'apportionment' of private, state and communal property.


In the main, it aimed to protect and strengthen the huge privately-owned settler farms that were largely situated in high rainfall areas.


In the 1950s the Rhodesia Government imposed conservation standards on communal Black smallholdings, causing an eruption of resistance that drew them closer to the growing guerrilla movement.


The rising Black population, with many moving into the communal areas having been dispossessed by white farmers elsewhere, could barely eke out an existence on poor soil that became little more than 'homelands'.


Discontent over such treatment gradually took shape within the guerrilla movement which emerged as a major challenge to the Rhodesian state and its army in the early 1960s. Fighters of the liberation forces roused the country to defy the colonial order.


The armed struggle moved from the towns into the villages and communal areas, involving Black trade unionists as well as peasant communities in the national uprising.


They advocated an end to colonialism and called on communal farmers to refuse to implement conservation measures in the government's battle to prevent communal farmers from cultivating any neighbouring wetlands. The crops on dry lands with poor soils invariably failed.


And carrying out the conservation measure was seen as slave labour. Nevertheless, the problem of the liberation was that it was not a revolution, even though it was a major advance for Black national development. In the Cold War era Western interests were forever fixed on Soviet and Chinese influence and assistance which was reflected in the political struggle for liberation.


The West did not want a major upheaval in Rhodesia, in the context of southern Africa, with Zimbabwe socialising the land and economy and developing anti-Western international political allegiances.


A negotiated settlement was preferred and the Lancaster House conference, while laying the foundations for creating a more balanced country -- which did occur to some degree -- was nevertheless conceived as a basis for change that did not uproot the entire system of exploitation.


Important sectors of the land are controlled by big industrial interests that have yet to be broken. And the crucial issue here is the parallel impact of international capital following the conference. That made all the difference to how Zimbabwe then developed.


Zimbabwe 'structurally adjusted'


In 1980 the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervened in Zimbabwe's economy to disastrous effect and since then it has undermined the country - bringing it almost to the brink of social and economic collapse in the 1990s.


The impact of its pressure, by the late 1990s, caused the Zimbabwean Government to begin opposing IMF 'reforms'. These demanded savage public spending cuts to meet loan obligations - which could never be met and were intended to shackle the country to Western interests - especially to enable easier foreign direct investment.


As part of the trap, the IMF ordered that the state push its privatisation programme to the limit supposedly to offset those unattainable obligations. Zimbabwe's chief industry is mining, contributing about 20 per cent of GDP, while agriculture dominates at 60 per cent.


The Zimbabwean Government, increasingly squeezed in this vice, began to shift from the IMF plan. But the British Government today, in fact, while attacking Zimbabwe for consequent economic mayhem, makes no allowance for the fact that since 1991 the country has been 'structurally adjusted'. Britain advocates it.


This underlying factor of social and economic destabilisation is crucial to the progress of the land reform programme and, ultimately, for the farm invasions. The IMF has reacted to Zimbabwe's defensive approach by terminating all loans in 1999 for supposedly defaulting on its obligations. No debt 'forgiveness' here it seems.


And now pressure is being exerted by Britain, the US and Europe to impose economic sanctions. In July the US Senate Sub-Committee on African Affairs approved the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Act proposing partial sanctions and passed it to the House of Representatives. The US Senate, meanwhile, has approved sanctions action against Zimbabwe.


The Brussels-based think tank, the International Crisis Group, at the same time called for a Yugoslav-style solution to be brought against Zimbabwe if next year's presidential elections prove 'undemocratic'. Europe is expected to take similar sanctions action in October if "dialogue" fails.


Mugabe, ZANU-PF demonised


The media focus in Britain on the way the Zimbabwean Government has handled the land reform, has been to suggest that President Robert Mugabe is an unhinged, corrupt and cynical tyrant who is out for white settler blood.


In conducting the campaign he is said to be trampling over opposition 'democratic' rights to secure his re-election early in 2002. The ZANU-PF War Veterans' actions, the British Government decided, should be stopped. Not surprising then that the Zimbabwean Government's own analysis and efforts at land reform is ignored and its formal decisions are given no credence. The extent of internal legal opposition through the

courts has also been a factor in hampering the conduct of real change and the resolution of the farm seizures.


The attack on Zimbabwe's leader and its Government is a familiar approach that we continue to see in the denigration of political leaders in all countries targeted by US and British imperialism. Whether they be consistent outright opponents of imperialism, or 'pragmatic' leaders who turn and bite the Western hand that initially fed them, the treatment meted out to such weaker countries that dare defy Western diktat continues to be swift and murderous.


It is all done under the guise of promoting 'democracy', the 'democratic opposition' and safeguarding 'human rights'. But it is no accident that African human rights should suddenly be discovered after so many years.


Or, for that matter, that farm invasions - which have resulted in some farmers' deaths - should appear like a bolt of lightening with chaotic brutality. The forcible expropriation began four years ago in 1997. At any given moment in Africa, one country's human rights record is elevated above others in order to exercise pressure, in this case against Zimbabwe, as part of the strategy to keep Western interests safe and prevent any African state from falling out of line or standing in the way.


President Robert Mugabe, it is now said, was looked upon as someone with whom the Western powers could do business; an instrument of African stability for Western capitalist interests while allowing certain limited reforms.


But over the latter part of the last 20 or so years, he and the Zimbabwean Government have begun to assert an independent role that does not reflect the blueprint Big Business and the British Government have decided for Zimbabwe.


The whole point of building this increasingly demonic picture of President Mugabe and ZANU-PF that is now emerging, is to prepare for and to encourage the undermining and wrecking of the Zimbabwean Government. This is the barely concealed British concern, not the militant treatment white farmers are receiving from the War Veterans. Even the Sunday Telegraph (August 26) had to admit that while there

were "decent, likeable" farmers (as if the issue were about manners!), there were those who were not "innocent victims of the Mugabe regime." It pointed out: "Some are openly racist; some even undisguised

fascists, with paintings of Mussolini over the fireplace and dogs named after Hitler's generals."


In general the degree of racism still runs very deep among the 50,000 or so white people and farmers (about 4,500 of them). Many fail to recognise the negative impact of years of Rhodesian segregation and because they have persisted in maintaining their exclusive control of prime land, they have remained separate themselves from African people. On those big farms, the Black farm workers invariably live in run-down, inadequate conditions.


But meanwhile, the British Government is handling white farmers' compensation - as required in the Lancaster House agreement - and the dispute over it with the Zimbabwe Government with care.


This is partly because of the effect the War Veterans are having beyond Zimbabwe's borders, especially in South Africa and Namibia. But also there could well be repercussions from the move by white farmers to other African countries, such as Mozambique.


Zimbabwean Government forces are currently a central part of the defence arrangement bolstering the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) led by President Kabila. The US, Belgium, France and Britain have spent most of the last century tearing that country up.


The US backed the Ugandan and Rwandan invasion of DRC and to protect the DRC, an alliance of forces including Zimbabwe, Angola and others, went in. Zimbabwean forces have been there for almost three years at the invitation of Kabila.


This presence and the fact that it is a significant power in the southern region of Africa, is a thorn in the side of Britain's interference in the DRC. The IMF also objects and has argued that its forces should withdraw.


So the combination of the Zimbabwe Government's refusal to accept World Bank/IMF constraints and demands, the role of the country's forces in the DRC and the militant uprooting of rich farmers, adds up to an unpalatable and volatile cocktail in Whitehall.


It has upset the transnationals' vision, yet again, of a pliable collection of divided states played against each other according to the requirements of Wall Street and the Stock Exchange. This put the ZANU-PF Government on the hit list for removal.


'Democratic' subversion


The threatening Zimbabwean opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which is a 'free market', pro-IMF Trojan Horse, has in recent years been trying to unseat ZANU-PF.


According to The Guardian (March 31), MDC is being used and supplied by US and British sources - euphemistically called "well-wishers" - to undermine ZANU-PF in the countryside. It reported that millions of

pounds worth of equipment have been allocated for its campaign.


But the key institution behind this in an 'advisory' role, The Guardian said, is the London-based Zimbabwe Democracy Trust (ZDT) whose patrons include former Tory foreign secretaries Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind and Geoffrey Howe, together with major business interests linked to Zimbabwe.


The Guardian said: "The British High Commission in Harare denies that the UK is officially involved in the operation, Mr Whitehead [a Zimbabwe retired mining engineer running the show] has been in regular

contact with one of its members, a man regarded by the diplomatic community as an intelligence officer."


The Commonwealth, meanwhile, has been pushed by Britain to interfere; and increasingly there are calls for direct US-led intervention. Financial services groups like Abbey National have launched international anti-Mugabe campaigns aimed at lobbying US President George Bush and calling for his direct intervention.


Britain retains a strong influence in Zimbabwe through its business connections with industrial conglomerates, the proliferation of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and via the so-called independent press that regularly has run-ins with the Zimbabwean Government. The MDC has found a ready outlet in sections of that press, which ZANU-PF accuses Britain of fostering.


Zimbabwean Government media have suggested that British intelligence has, among other activities, focused on a Kenyan-registered NGO called Global Witness, Environment and Law. In May, officials from Britain said to have intelligence connections, arrived in Harare representing this body. They were apparently there to carry out an assessment of the country's forestry commission timber logging activities in the Congo (DRC).


The Forestry Commission has had DRC-Zimbabwe agreed concessions in the Congo since March this year. But at a time when there was said to be no official British involvement with the Commission, the two arrivals

were said to have shown "unprecedented interest" in Zimbabwe's operations. Their alleged purpose was to develop a strategy to control both sides of timber company activity in the two countries.


In the event of the election of the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai against President Mugabe, this would bolster British control - in an attempt to exclude competing interests - and provide one of many routes into tapping African resources for the West's profit amid the turmoil. There is, in fact, nothing unusual in this as we can see with the corporate vultures' agenda unfolding in former Yugoslavia.


According to the South African Mail & Guardian (May 13) the Zimbabwe Government has passed legislation outlawing the raising of funds from foreign sources by its political parties. It was enacted in the teeth of opposition from MDC - the intended target - as fears grow that a concerted international effort is being mounted to bring down ZANU-PF. That will have been reinforced last weekend with the hundreds of MDC

supporters who demonstrated outside the Zimbabwe Embassy in London, demanding that the British Government support sanctions against President Mugabe. Ahead of the demonstration MDC supporters had

appealed for US and British funding for their campaign.


They also handed in a petition to Prime Minister Tony Blair. MDC's deputy chairman Jennings Rukani called upon him to "move into top gear and mobilise the international community and take a leaf from the American Government which has imposed selective sanctions."


MDC is no doubt getting bolder here given the comments of the Labour Government's present Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. He told BBC radio last week that at next month's meeting in Nigeria with Zimbabwean

ministers and six other Commonwealth countries, he hoped "a process to try to put further pressure [on Mugabe] and to resolve the issue of land reform..." would be discussed.


He said there are "wider issues of the economic state and need for economic reform in Zimbabwe and the issue of the rule of law, because they are linked." The imperial tone resonates. It will no doubt harden at the preliminary September 3-4 meeting of the London meeting of foreign ministers from the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group.


Conclusion


It is, therefore, not too difficult to see why the Zimbabwean Government think Britain is hatching a conspiracy to destroy their country, despite earlier strenuous denials in Parliament from former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook.


There can be no surprise at British foreign policy toward Zimbabwe when both Britain and the US continue to undertake bombing raids on Iraq with impunity; or when the British Government has contributed to the smashing of Yugoslavia, threatening to extend it to Macedonia and perhaps even to Greece.


The sanctions road is part of a pincer movement with the IMF/World Bank and so-called 'democratic' opposition undermining Zimbabwe from within. Any effort by Britain to promote this would fly in the face of developing African unity and would undermine its struggle to reach out of its crisis existence that often borders on extinction.


Rhodes and his imperial bandits may have lost no sleep over the bloodshed the British empire indulged, but real civilising missions today should allow genuine development, economic democracy and fair trade to solve problems. The British Government must not compound its callousness in Iraq and Yugoslavia with yet more destruction in Zimbabwe. #

 http://216.239.33.100/search?q=cache:A0IYA1sCytwC:home.clear.net.nz/pages/cpa/news/Zimbabwe.htm+zimbabwe+land+theft+white+farmers&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

Profile of internal displacement - Zimbabwe


Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP
Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council
(as of 17 October, 2002)

Summary Profile
Since the release in July 2002 of the first version of this profile on internal displacement
in Zimbabwe, the general food situation has become even more disastrous and there are
clear indicators that an increasing number of people have been internally displaced by
continuous political violence and the ongoing eviction of the commercial farmers. The
IDPs are left in an extremely vulnerable situation both with regard to physical security
and basic needs like food, health services and shelter.
While the food shortage in Zimbabwe attracts major international attention and has been
fairly throughout assessed, the internal displacement situation unfortunately remains
poorly documented. Lack of information makes it still not possible to prepare a profile on
internal displacement with comprehensive information about needs, figures and the
whereabouts of the IDPs. The added value of the present summary of the situation is
access to additional information produced by various organisations between July and
mid-October 2002.
____________________________________________________________________
Zimbabwe until the mid-1990s grouped among the more prosperous and politically stable
countries in Africa - has since then seen both her economy and political stability
deteriorate. Population movements, both voluntary and forced, have become an
increasingly visible aspect of the new situation. Economic hardship has led to new
movement patterns between rural and urban areas, but people have increasingly been
forced on the move because of political violence, both separate from and closely linked to
the accelerated land acquisition programme implemented by the Government.
Available information reveal that several hundred thousands workers and family
members on commercial farms have been forced to leave their homes, but it remains to
be assessed how many of these have had an opportunity to remain on the farms or
adjacent areas or to return to their original homes and how many remain in a situation of
internal displacement. With regard to victims of political violence not related to the land
reform, there are indications that more than 20,000 people have been forced to seek
protection away from their homes because of their affiliation with the opposition
movement during elections in 2000 and 2002. Again, there is as yet no clear pic ture of
numbers, humanitarian needs and the duration of displacement, but it is evident that
physical protection is a major concern in the context of the on-going state sponsored
violence.

MDC supporters displaced because of political violence
Credible human rights observers have documented how a 'climate of fear' has emerged
over Zimbabwe since the beginning of 2000 when political opposition to the ruling party
ZANU-PF became more articulate during a constitutional referendum and subsequent
parliamentary elections. The outcome of the latter was that the new opposition party
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) gained nearly half of the seats. Both MDC
politicians and supporters have since then been exposed to systematic threats,
intimidation and direct violence. A major perpetrator has been the youth militias affiliated
with the ruling ZANU-PF party, often directed by militant veterans of the independence
war of the 1970s. Much of the militia violence has taken place in rural areas. However,
there have been regular reports of intimidation of opposition supporters in urban
constituencies especially in the two main cities, Harare and Bulawayo - by police and
military personnel (HRF August 2001). This state-sponsored violence continued both
prior to, during, and after the presidential election in March 2002 (PHR 21 May 2002),
and local human rights observers have reported that the severity of the violence,
including rape and systematic torture, has worsened during 2002 (Amani Trust 25 June
2002). During the first five months of 2002 alone, the NGO umbrella Human Rights
Forum documented nearly one thousand cases of torture (HRF June 2002). The violence
further escalated when local elections were held by the end of September 2002 (AI 1
October 2002). It has been claimed that one of the motives behind forced displacement
prior to these elections was to keep opposition supporters away from their home districts
and thus hinder their possibility to vote (Zimrights 6 September 2002), and it has been
reported that about half of the opposition MDC candidates for the local elections
withdrew because of violence and intimidations (AI 11 September 2002).
The displacement caused by political violence is often on an individual basis. A typical
pattern appears to be that victims are exposed to intimidation because of their MDC
affiliation. This often includes beating, temporary detainment, and in many cases looting
of property and burning of houses before or after the victims have fled their homes. The
practical organisation of both the March 2002 and September 2002 elections exposed
active MDC candidates and supporters. The militias have among others used public lists
of polling agents when seeking out targets for their violent campaign. Teachers in rural
areas have been particularly targeted: Between January 2001 and June 2002 as many as
238 cases of human rights abuses against teachers were systematically documented, with
nearly half having been victims of torture or armed assault (AI June 2002, p29; HRF 20
September 2002).
Sexual violence rape in particular has been reported to be increasingly associated with thepolitical violence (Amani Trust 28 August 2002).



Displacement related to the land reform
Most observers agree that there is a genuine need for land reform in Zimbabwe because
of the skewed distribution of the best farmland that has remained since the colonial days.
However, previous attempts to undertake land distribution in an orderly manner were by
the end-1990s overtaken by political events and put on a "fast track" by the government
without regard for the negative consequences for national food security and the farm
worker population.
Land redistribution has been high on the agenda since independence in 1980 when a total of 15.5 million hectares land was in the hands of farmers of European descent, who have dominated the large-scale commercial farming sector. Only about 3.5 million hectares of this land were redistributed between 1980 and 1997. In June 1998 the government set a target for Phase II of its land-reform programme to redistribute an additional 5 million hectares of land within six years. However, two years later only about 3 percent of this target had been reached. In mid-2000 the Government embarked on a "Fast Track" implementation of the programme aiming at distributing 9 million hectares before end- 2001 by radically expanding the list of land to be acquired from white farmers. By November 2001 a total of 4,874 farms totalling 9,233,859 Ha were listed for acquisition (UNDP January 2002, pp5-13). It should be noted that there are different categories of acquisition and that this does not necessarily imply that all of the farmers affected would necessarily have to transfer all their land. However, a dramatic measure was taken in May 2002 to accelerate the land reform process when the Government pushed through the legislature a 'Land Acquisition Act' which directs that about 2,900 farms falling under its 'Section 8' should cease all farming activities by 25 June 2002 and leave their farm 45 days later (IRIN 24 June 2002).
It is a positive achievement that more than one million poor Zimbabweans have benefited
from the re-distribution of land since 1980 (UNDP January 2002, p20). However, the
recent approach to land acquisition has dire consequences for the workers on the
commercial farms. Violent farm occupations have become a hallmark of the "fast track"
approach, and the process has become deeply politicised as the farmers and the farm
workers have been considered supporters of the MDC opposition. In many cases, ZANUPF militias often led by war veterans have forcefully occupied the farms. This has not
only affected farms officially listed for acquisition, but also several hundred non- listed
farms (UNDP January 2002, p17). Several credible human rights observers have
documented serious acts of violence against farm owners and the farm workers (e.g.
Amani Trust 31 May 2002; AI June 2002, HRF August 2002, HRW March 2002).
Already by June 2000 it was reported that as many as 26 farm workers had been killed
and 1,600 assaulted when farms were forcefully occupied. As of October 2001 a total of
1,948 farms had been temporary or permanently occupied (HRW March 2002, pp 11, 19-
21). Many of the workers on the farms affected by these occupations have decided to flee
the farms as the violence, intimidation and the undermining of their livelihoods have
become unbearable. During the first half of 2002, farm workers increasingly became
victims of the organised political violence (Amani Trust 31 May 2002), and by mid-2002
media regularly brought stories of farm workers brutally forced to leave the farms and
seeking shelter in makeshift camps, in the bush or drifting to urban areas (e.g. BBC 10
July 2002).
Although the pattern outlined above illustrates the situation in large parts of Zimbabwe,
there are regional differences with regard to the level of violence associated with the farm
occupations. For example, it was reported in May 2002 that the situation was "calm with
the new settlers co-existing with the farmer and the fa rm workers" in Manicaland and
Mashonaland West provinces, while the situation remained tense and confrontational in
neighbouring provinces (FCTZ May 2002, p8). However, local human rights observers
reported in September 2002 that displacement caused by political violence was especially
serious in the Manicaland province, where MDC supporters had been forced to seek
refuge in major cities after being "chased away from their homes" by the police and
ZANU PF supporters (Zimrights 6 September 2002).

How many displaced because of political violence?
Political violence in Zimbabwe is widespread and the perpetrators, especially the youth
militias, has established bases throughout the country (PHR 21 May 2002, p8). There are
no opposition held areas in Zimbabwe out of reach of the militias, so the only option for
the victims of the violence is to keep a low profile and seek shelter in secret locations
alone or together with their families. This displacement patterns makes it difficult to
quantify the number of people displaced.
However, available information gives some indication of the gravity of the situation. By
end-2001 USCR estimated that 50,000 people were internally displaced due to political
violence and the land reform (USCR 2002, "Zimbabwe"). With regard to new
displacement during 2002, it was reported in May that 1,000 displaced were given shelter
in 'safe-houses' run by the NGO Amani Trust. About 20 new victims were assisted per
day before these shelter facilities were closed down. Local media reported that by end-
March 2002 about 2,500 families had been displaced because of the political violence
(Zimbabwe Independent, 28 March 2002). As many of the displaced are provided shelter
by relatives and church groups, the real number is likely to be substantially higher. As of
May 2002 an estimate of between 20,000 and 50,000 people displaced by the violence
was talked about within the NGO and human rights community (OCHA 26 May 2002, p6).



How many displaced because of the accelerated farm reform?
With regard to the number of people forced to leave the commercial farms it appears
possible to estimate the number of farm workers forced to leave, but it remains difficult
to assess to what extent these people subsequently end up in a situation of internal
displacement. The UN distinguishes between these two categories as a difference
between people being "economically displaced" or "physically displaced" (UN July 2002,
p11).
The precise number of large-scale commercial farms in Zimbabwe is not available but
appears to amount to around 7,000. At the outset of the present crisis in 1999 these farms
reportedly employed about 322,000 farm workers – which translates into an average of
about 50 workers per farm (MPSLSW September 2001, table2). Taking into account
family members this may equal a total farm worker population of up to 2 million people
(FCTZ May 2002, p5). The UN indicates an even larger number of commercial farm
workers, reporting in July 2002 that "270,000 commercial farm workers have lost their
job…[and that] a substantial number of the remaining 200,000 commercial farm workers
may join this pool of economically displaced people (UN July 2002, p11)."
One reality is that the new farm owners are only to a limited extent offering the existing
farm workers employment. Neither are the workers offered farm land when larger farm
units are divided into small plot farms. Government figures reveal that as of October
2001 former farm workers represented only 1,7 percent of the beneficiaries of redistributed land (UNDP January 2002, p.36). It has been reported that ZANU-PF supporters are being given preference in the land allocation (HRW March 2002, pp3, 27).
Taking into account regional differences, information about past farm closures and
surveys of farm workers' preferences, it appears that after farms are acquired between 10
to 45 percent of the farm workers have an option to return to their homes in communal
areas and between 10 to 50 percent may find ways of remaining on the farms or adjacent
areas (FCTZ May 2002). A preliminary interpretation of available information may as
such suggest that when farms become acquired under the fast-track programme, at least
50 percent of the present workers and their dependants are likely to end as internally
displaced without any viable alternative for long-term resettlement – what the UN
apparently calls "physically displaced".

The Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) has reported that the effect of 653 farm closures
between February 2000 and June 2002 was that 76,000 employees and family members
were evicted (CFU 24 June 2002). A conservative estimate based on the above
information would be that one should expect that more than 300,000 farm workers and
their dependants become homeless if the estimated 2,900 commercial farms falling under the "Section 8" regulation close down. Other sources indicate different and often far
higher numbers. As mentioned above, the UN operates with an estimate of 470,000 farm
workers potentially becoming forced off the farms; ICG reported in June 2002 that more
than 300,000 had been displaced since the year 2000 (ICG 14 June 2002, p2); USAID
reported in August 2002 that "more than 100,000 farm workers had been displaced
(USAID 20 August 2002); while Refugee International reported in September 2002 that
"a million or more" people had been displaced because of the land reform program (RI 16
September 2002). Although a government spokesman has considered claims that 300,000 workers may become unemployed as "a complete exaggeration" (IRIN 22 August 2002), the National Vulnerability Assessment Committee has included as many as 489,000 excommercial farm workers in their assessment of populations in need of food aid between September 2002 and March 2003 (ZNVAC 16 September 2002, p4).
By the beginning of August 2002 when the deadline for vacating their farms expired for
those falling under "Section 8", it was reported that 60 percent of the affected farmers had
decided to continue working as normal (IRIN 9 August 2002). One month later it
appeared that a process of forcefully evicting the farmers had gathered pace (CFU 18
September 2002). As of end-October 2002 accurate figures about the displacement
impact were still not available.
A major concern is the fact that one fifth of the farm workers have ancestral roots in
countries outside Zimbabwe and represent a particularly vulnerable group in the land
reform process. A government survey in 2001 showed that only between 4 and 10 percent
of this group wished to be repatriated to their home of origin (MPSLSW September 2001,
p9). One reason for this may be that many of these people are second and third generationfarm workers who have never lived in their ancestral country, and who therefore see limited opportunities for access to land and employment if they retur ned. The
Government has in fact previously recognized that farm workers who entered Zimbabwe
during the federation period (1953-1963) should together with their children be entitled to
citizenship (Amanor-Wilks 12 February 2000). A consequence of this would be that a
large share of the "foreign" farm workers should in reality be considered internally
displaced when expelled from the farms where they have been permanently employed.

Physical security undermined
A major concern in Zimbabwe is the fact that the perpetrators of the political violence can
operate with impunity vis-à-vis the state law and order enforcement institutions. The
militias, in particular, appear to operate above the law. According to Amnesty
International, "By ignoring the violation, the state compounds it. […] Moreover, this
failure by the state gives a green light to the perpetrators to continue (AI June 2002, p1)."
Even more disturbing are reports documenting how police and army staff have been
indirectly and directly involved in the violence, for example by assisting the militias with
transport and other resources during the farm occupations (AI June 2002, p19; HRW
March 2002, p23). In September 2002 it was reported that even regular army personnel
were involved in the evictions at the commercial farms (HR Forum 9 October 2002). This
situation raises serious concerns regarding the protection of displaced people.
International law and the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement clearly assigns
national authorities the "duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian
assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction (Guiding Principles,
principle3)."
NGOs and the opposition party MDC have tried to offer displaced victims of violence
shelter and protection in "safe houses". It is difficult to estimate how many of the
displaced people benefit from this, but it is clear that the present situation adds serious
constraints to the opportunity to maintain such shelters without the interference of the
militias. There have been reports of direct attacks on "safe houses" and abduction of those who had been in hiding (HRF August 2001, p8).

Subsistence Needs (Health Nutrition and Shelter)
Many of the displaced farm workers are expected to return or seek temporary shelter in
rural areas where the food security situation already has reached a critical stage. Serious
drought in combination with the accelerated land reform process resulted in a 75 percent
decreased crop production in nearly two-third of Zimbabwe's districts during the
2001/2002 agricultural season. While the national maize requirements are almost 2
million MT, only 0.5 MT was harvested at the end of the 2001/2002 season. With
reference to a 70 percent decrease in the commercial production of maize and other
cereals, the UN considers the fast track land reform programme "a leading cause of the
current crisis (UN July 2002, pp 4, 8)." Inflation, high unemployment and a major
HIV/AIDS problem have further compounded this situation. It was reported in June 2002
that people in 40 of Zimbabwe's 57 districts were facing a situation of "extreme food
insecurity", and further estimated that as many as 6.7 million Zimbabweans will require
food assistance during the most critical period between December 2002 and the next
harvest in March 2003. The worst affected districts are the same where most of the
communal areas of return for many of the displaced farm workers are located
(FEWSNET 3 July 2002, sects1.3 & 2.3; SC 31 May 2002, p1; WFP November 2001,
para8; ZNVAC 16 September 2002).

It has been estimated that workers on commercial farms cover 80 percent of their food
needs by the income from their farm employment (SC 31 May 2002, p6). Given the
overall poor food security situation in Zimbabwe, it is clear that displacement and loss of
income and other in-kind benefits from employment at the commercial farms put those
affected in a situation with only limited coping mechanisms available.
Many farm workers are in fact entitled to retrenchment packages – especially those with
union membership - but because of the expedite expulsion from their farms it is uncertain
to what extent the commercial farm owners are in a position to fully fulfill such
obligations (IRIN 22 August 2002).
Displaced farm workers with ancestral roots in countries outside Zimbabwe will be
particularly vulnerable as they already lack access to communal land within Zimbabwe
(SC 31 May 2002, p6). The latter group and others have no options but to join the urban
poor and seek shelter in peri-urban areas or informal settlements – environments where
the available coping mechanisms may be even more limited than in the communal areas
where at least some opportunities for subsistence farming may exist.
Major concern has been expressed over state control of the mechanisms for distribution
of food aid. The state Grain Marketing Board has a monopoly on grain imports and much
of the food aid provided by donors is distributed though government structures. The latter
has raised concern as the ruling ZANU-PF party has effective control over local
government structures as well as traditional institutions. It has been reported that people
associated with the opposition have been discriminated against in distribution of food
assistance and that in some cases ZANU-PF membership has been a requirement (RI
September 2002) . Even children have been denied food aid because of their parents'
affiliation with the opposition (PHR 21 May 2002). There are strong reasons to expect
that displaced farm workers, who are often seen as opposition supporters, may face
similar problems to access food aid unless humanitarian actors target these groups
especially.
Orphans have been identified as one particularly vulnerable group when people are
forced to leave the commercial farms. One report has estimated that there may be
between 75,000 and 100,000 orphans on the commercial farms, among others, caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As the situation deteriorates the existing support structures for
these children are often undermined. Reports indicate that the older orphans end up as
street children and may become exposed to prostitution or child labour (OCHA 27 May
2002, pp.6-7)
As most of the displaced workers are without the necessary means to rent accommodation and the capacity of relatives and friends to provide accommodation is limited, there has been an fast growth of squatter camps outside major urban centres and there is an urgent need for emergency shelters (IRIN 22 August 2002; Zimrights 6 September 2002).

Constrained humanitarian access
In addition to the discrimination in food aid distribution, humanitarian assistance to the
displaced is undermined by constrained access facing both national and international
humanitarian actors. There have been several reports of food distribution activities being
hindered by war-veterans and the militias (IRIN 12 June 2002; ICG 14 June 2002, p7;
ICG 29 August 2002). It has been reported that the Government actively undermines the
work of national NGOs, among others by imposing restrictions on foreign funding and
closing down "safe houses" established to shelter victims of the political violence (HRF
August 2001, pp. 8, 14; ICG 14 June 2002, fn8). The opportunities for raising awareness
about the rights of IDPs and the obligations of natio nal authorities are limited due to
restrictions on human rights education activities (HRW March 2002, p36). Some areas
controlled by the ZANU-PF militias have become "no-go" areas with blocked access for
both monitoring and delivery of humanitarian assistance (PHR 21 May 2002, p13).
Non-governmental organisations have further faced restrictions with regard to import of
food commodities. However, some humanitarian actors, among others Plan International,
Oxfam (GB) and the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe have obtained licenses to
import food (UN RRU 8 July 2002; 30 September 2002).

National and International Responses
Assistance to IDPs in Zimbabwe has so far been provided mainly by national NGOs. No
particular UN programme or agency has been designated as "lead agency" responsible for humanitarian assistance to IDPs. However, the major UN agencies have established a
Relief and Recovery Unit (RRU) with responsibility to coordinate the humanitarian
assistance programme established as a response to the drought situation. RRU has also been asked to "increase its intervention and advocacy for IDP Issues" (OCHA 27 May
2002, p8). However, in the reports by RRU there is a striking absence of information on
internal displacement. In the UN humanitarian appeal for the period July 2002 – June
2003, the UNDP is seeking funding to establish a database on internal displacement.
However, the proposal appears to focus on what the UN considers the "economically
displaced", and it is uncertain to what extent it will be focused on people displaced
because of the political violence and the farm workers that have been most violently
affected by farm evictions (UN July 2002, p93). USD330,000 has been provided by
USAID/OFDA to fund an IDP advisor to work with this initiative (USAID 20 September
2002).
Some food aid has arrived in Zimbabwe in response to the generally poor food security
situation, but it appears that displaced people are not particularly targeted for such
assistance. Food security between December 2002 and the harvesting time in March 2003 is expected to be especially critical, and the World Food Programme has appealed for 452,955 tonnes of food aid.
Both the Government and the humanitarian community should be well aware of the
consequences of the political violenc e and the fast track land reform. In fact, the UN
Secretary-General himself raised the issue on 28 August 2002, when he especially
pointed to the need to provide "compensation to displaced farm workers (IRIN 28 August
2002)." Between March and July 2001 the Government undertook an IOM-sponsored
survey of options for farm workers (MPSLSW, September 2001). On the request of the
Commonwealth and the Government of Zimbabwe, the United Nations undertook an
assessment mission in November/December 2001 and produced a comprehensive report on the land reform programme and the need for durable resettlement of the farm workers (UNDP January 2002).
Zimbabwe is party to most major international human rights instruments (HRW March
2002, p36), including those that forms the basis for the UN Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, and has thus a clear obligation to protect its population from being
displaced and to provide protection and humanitarian assistance after displacement.
Official policy documents from the la te 1990s in fact recognise the needs of farm workers
and their rights to resettlement as part of the land reform programme (FCTZ May 2002, p7).
The political climate in Zimbabwe has made it difficult to raise the issue of political
violence and the effects of the accelerated land reform process with the government.
International organizations tend to avoid confrontations with the government and even
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have not responded to the situation (ICG
14 June 2002, p8). Other African countries have chosen to keep a low profile on the issue
of human rights in Zimbabwe. In fact, in April 2002 the African member countries of the
UN Human Rights Commission blocked a resolution on human rights in Zimbabwe that,
among others, would invite UN human rights experts to monitor the situation in the
country (BBC 19 April 2002).
(updated October 2002)

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CFU Commercial Farmer's Union
CIO Central Intelligence Organisation
COHRE Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
DN The Daily News
ESC Electoral Supervisory Commission
FCTZ Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe
FG The Financial Gazette
HCRA Harare Combined Residents’ Association
ICG International Crisis Group
IOM International Organisation for Migration
LOMA Law and Order (Maintenance) Act
MDC Movement for Democratic Change
MP Member of Parliament
MPSLSA Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare
NAGG National Alliance for Good Government
NCA National Constitutional Assembly
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NYTS National Youth Training Scheme
POSA Public Order and Security Act
SADC Southern African Development Community
SC Save the Children
UMP Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe (constituency in Zimbabwe)
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union (also known as ZANU-Ndonga)
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union
ZIMCET Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust
ZNA Zimbabwe National Army
ZNLWVA Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZRP Zimbabwe Republic Police

LIST OF SOURCES USED
Amnesty International (AI), 11 September 2002, Zimbabwe: Orchestrated campaign targetting
opposition intensifies in run up to local elections
Amnesty International (AI), October 2002, "Zimbabwe : local elections marred by statesponsored
violence"
Amnesty International (AI), 25 June 2002, Zimbabwe: Impunity enables ever more human rights violations
AMANI Trust, 31 May 2002, Preliminary Report of a Survey on Internally Displaced Persons from
Commercial Farms in Zimbabwe
AMANI Trust, 28 August 2002, Incidents of Rape associated with Political Violence
AMANI Trust, 25 June 2002, Beating your opposition: Torture during the 2002 Presidential
campaign in Zimbabwe, A report and a dossier of cases prepared by the Mashonaland
Programme of the AMANI Trust.
BBC News, 19 April 2002, "Zimbabwe escapes UN censure"
BBC News, 11 July 2002, "Eyewitness: Zimbabwe in turmoil"
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), September 2001, Land, Housing and
Property Rights in Zimbabwe
Commercial Farmers' Union of Zimbabwe , 18 September 2002, PRESS STATEMENT BY MR COLIN CLOETE, PRESIDENT COMMERCIAL FARMERS' UNION
Dede Amanor-Wilks , 12 February 2000, Zimbabwe's Farm Workers and the New Constitution

Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) , 3 July 2002, Food Security Monthly
Update ( May 19 - Jun 19, 2002)
Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe, May 2002, Report on Assessment of the Impact of Land
Reform Programme on Commercial Farm Worker Livelihoods
Human Rights Watch (HRW), March 2002, Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 28 August 2002, "Annan urges revised landreform programme"
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 22 August 2002, "Thousands of labourers face eviction"
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 9 August 2002, "Farmers defy order to leave land"
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 19 November 2001, "NGOs fear being
targeted as violence escalates"
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 3 July 2002, "Food crisis forcing people from homes"
Internal Displacement Unit, OCHA, 27 May 2002, The IDP situation in Zimbabwe: Current
trends and a strategy for the UN system
International Crisis Group (ICG), 29 August 2002, Zimbabwe's silent, selective starvation

International Crisis Group (ICG), 14 June 2002, Zimbabwe: What Next?
Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (MPSLSW), September 2001,
Zimbabwe Farm Workers Survey - Land Reform: a Labour Perspective
Physicians for Human Rights, Denmark, 21 May 2002, Post Presidential Election, March to
May 2002: "We'll make them run"
Refugees International (RI), 16 September 2002, Zimbabwe: From Breadbasket to Basketcase

The Commercial Farmers Union , 24 June 2002, Press Release: "Legislation shuts down farms"

U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), 2002, World Refugee Survey 2002: Zimbabwe

United Nations, July 2002, UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal in Response to the
Humanitarian Crisis in Southern Africa – Zimbabwe: July 2002 - June 2003
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2002, Zimbabwe, Land Reform and
Resettlement: Assessment and Suggested Framework for the Future (Interim Mission Report)

United Nations Relief & Recovery Unit (UN RRU), 8 July 2002, Zimbabwe: Humanitarian
Situation Report
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 1998, Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement
US Agency for International Development (USAID), 20 August 2002, Southern Africa -
Complex Food Security Crisis: Situation Report #10 (FY) 2002
US Agency for International Development (USAID), 20 September 2002, Southern Africa -
Complex Food Security Crisis Situation Report #12 (FY) 2002
World Food Programme (WFP), November 2001, EMOP 10140.0 - "Emergency Food
Assistance to Rural Victims of Drought, Floods, and Economic Crises and Identification of
Assistance to Vulnerable Urban Populations"
Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights), 6 September 2002, Political violence
report
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 9 October 2002, Political Violence Report: September
2002
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 20 September 2002, Teaching them a lesson: A report
on the attack on Zimbabwean teachers
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 6 September 2002, Political Violence Report: 1 –
August 2002
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, August 2001, Politically motivated violence in
Zimbabwe:2000–2001
Zimbabwe Independent, 28 March 2002, "Zanu PF reprisals displace 18 000 MDC supporter"
Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZNVAC), 16 September 2002,
Zimbabwe: Emergency Food Security Assessment Report

Nat Hentoff
Zimbabwe: Anyone in America Give a Damn?
October 11th, 2002, 4:00PM

This is the story of a woman in Zimbabwe. She is not one of the white farmers being extracted from their land and homes by President Robert Mugabe and the veterans of the 1980 war for independence, who are in the front lines of the takeovers. This woman is black and is being punished for her supportof the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) the leading opposition party.

Her tormentors are members of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU_PF) which has been in power since independence was won under Mugabe's leadership. I learned of her story from a June 20, 2002, report by the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition - a wide range of what we call civil rights groups fighting for a "civil society" Among them: trade unions, women's rights organizations, students, and the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. Leading the report is a letter of confirmation signed by Desmond Tutu, archbishop emeritus, Cape Towwn, SA - a world-renowned paladin of the anti-apartheid movement.

This thoroughly documented and voluminous "Zimbabwe Report" contains many horror stories. This one is "Case 2 and 3: Baby 4 months old, and mother of child: interview with mother . . . Date of Incident: from November 2001, and still continuing in April 2002."

"B is 4 months old. When he was only 8 days old. . . he was taken from his mother at midnight by 12 war veterans and held upside down by his ankles. The war veterans said he was a whip and they would use him to beat others. They slapped him on the face and body and said he should die because he was "an MDC property." The mother was gagged and beaten."

While she was 8 months pregnant with B, the mother was attacked by war veterans who kicked her in the groin and lower abdomen "until sh pled profusely from her vagina." She couldn't go for treatment at any clinic in her district because "she is among those blacklisted as an MDC supporter." (An interesting use of "Blacklisted" [is it? I don't get it?]

Refused health care throughout her pregnancy because of her pariah status, she delivered by herself at home. She has had no postnatal care. Her child "has also received no medical attention whatsoever - his birth is officially unrecorded and he has received no immunizxations."

In hiding andon the run, she is "in sever pain" and "needs urgent specialist attention for her back and needs to see a urologist" for problems that started "from her beating when 8 months pregnant."

The entry of this case in the Zimbabwe Report" closes with "The history is remarkable as to the violence against a newborn baby; but otherwise it is in agreement with other testimonies of reprisals against MDC supporters."

There is a foreword to the report by Pius A. Ncube, archbishop of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe: "in the past 2 months, I have known of a number of persons who have died of hunger right here in my city. We have seen police and militia threaten, intimidate, and sometimes attack unarmed civilian protesters. We have spoken out, only to be threatened and attacked ourselves. Writing a report such as this 1 by the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition carries great risks Those risks must be borne by us all if we are to find a more peaceful path into the future."

The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in NY and Washington has distributed this report to members of Congress and other groups. But while there has been considerable coverage in newspapers though not on TV, of what is happening to the families of the foreclosed whiter farmers, the desperate condition of huge numbers of black Zimbabweans is largely ignored.

In his letter that prefaces the report, Archbishop Tutu writes: "The hard facts on the ground in Zimbabwe, so well compiled in this report, suggest an alarming array of policies and practices that may be leading the country to a catastrophic future. . . The ongoing political violence. . . must be brought to an end. The threatening famine, cause in part by government lands policy, will make things even worse."

etcetc. - people killed, missing, tortured, rape as a political weapon.

". . . but I suspect, as with Bosnia, the real extent of what is happening is going to take a hell of along time to come out." Tony Reeler, clinical director of the Amani Trust in Sunday Teelegraph UK

Why, in this country, are there only whispers, if that, from most civil rights activists and organizations, the clergy of all colours that finally awoke to the slavery and mass rapes in Sudan, editorial writers, women's rights groups, and such trombones of the people as Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton?

For information: Lorna Davidson, Lawyers Committee for human Rights, 333 7th Avenue, 13th floor, NY, NY 10001; 212-845-5251;  nyc@lchr.org. We're supposed to be fighting a war on terrorism right? By the way, Zimbabwe is a proud member of the UN Human Rights Commission - along with Syria, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and Sudan.