SECTION ONE
The case for White Rhodesians based on their record of administration and the consequential benefits to Africans.
THE AFRICANS AND THE COLONISTS
There have been many attempts to distort the early history of Rhodesia. But the outline is simple enough. Several hundred years ago the country now called Rhodesia was inhabited by Bushmen whose paintings are still found in various caves, dotted about the countryside.

Then came the Negro-Hamitic Bantu (the Mashona possibly in the 1500s, the Amandabele as recently as 1836). Movement was the essence of their life - settle, build rough huts, cultivate some millet. They lived on this, plus meat from the chase, some honey, fruit and nuts. In times of drought, many died. But, constantly, the tribes moved on.

Somewhere along the line, Rhodesia knew men from Madagascar, and even Indonesia. Arab slave traders came and men from Abyssinia and in the 1500's there lived in a corner of Rhodesia some Portuguese.

Yet when the first white hunters and missionaries entered in the 1800's they found a wilderness, where the Ndebele (an offshoot of the warrior Zulus), were ravaging the pastoral Shonas. Peace did not come to Rhodesia until the white men decided to settle, trekking up from South Africa. It is accepted that "many treks made Rhodesia", but the greatest "trek" was that of the Pioneers of 1890. They came, they founded Salisbury, and planted the British flag. By 1891 they numbered about 1500. These Pioneers soon made a country out of that primitive and inhospitable wilderness.

But, before we outline their story, let us deal with one point of controversy. Much of the argument about Zimbabwe, the well-preserved stone citadel in the southern part of Rhodesia (and several smaller examples, elsewhere, of the same pattern) stems from desperate attempts to "prove" that the Bantu had a culture "hundreds of years ago". Nothing can be certain about Zimbabwe - but even if it was built by Bantu, one swallow - even half a dozen - would not make a summer. It seems incredible that any culture could make such an isolated appearance, then disappear so completely. With not an iota of hard fact to support the Bantu theory of Zimbabwe, it is logical to see it as built by peoples who have left other traces of a culture, elsewhere, in Europe of Asia.1

The world admittedly has seen various cultures, in East as well as West, but any attempt to create, out of virtually nothing, some legend of the Bantu comparable with the story of the British Isles is, to most people's minds, ludicrous. Through the centuries, starting, if no earlier, at the period of the Anglo-Saxon literature, of Bede and Alfred, through Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, Wordsworth, to the majestic words of Churchill, some magic stream has flowed in the islands of the United Kingdom. A similar stream - painting, music, sculpture were prominent -flowed in what is now France, Germany, and Italy; and no one would deny the cultures of the East. But it is arguable, considering thousand years of history, over the fields of not only literature and art but also agriculture, mining, inventions, social systems, transport, finance, government, communications, etc, that no one nation has contributed as much as the British. And most people will be willing to accept that, in Rhodesia, when the Pioneers arrived - those heirs to all these centuries of advancement -they were confronted by a striking absence of any such stream, by a people in fact who had not discovered the principle of the wheel for themselves, nor evolved a written language, in all the centuries of their opportunity.

Barlow, in "Goodbye England" makes the point that even Asians, let alone Africans, have not invented steam turbines, or radial ply tyres, or jet engines, or radios, or TV systems, or typewriters or telephones.

Barlow is right - white men can be blazingly proud of the colonial record -they gave incredibly backward people the benefit of their own brilliant past. When they went, in Asia as well as Africa, barbarism re-appeared. There is something inherent in these people that takes them towards destruction rather than construction.

Liberal journalists such as Patrick Keatley and Richard West have tended to suggest that (because in Victorian times intelligent people didn't emigrate) so many white Rhodesians have a poor educational background -therefore, they cannot understand the changes in Africa, etc. etc.

There are two answers to this rubbish. One lies in the record of horrific events in Black Africa, considered alongside scientific analysis of inherited deficiencies and characteristics of black-skinned peoples.

The second answer, which is conclusive, comes from Intelligence, the journal of MENSA, of March 1, 1967, in a report on - "The Intelligence of White Rhodesians". The IQ's of white Rhodesian children are staggeringly high by even UK standards. And one of many reasons put forward is that intelligent and resourceful people don't want to be tied down in the stifling socialistic climate of modern England. . . and so emigrate to, e.g. Rhodesia!

In the great argument, Heredity versus Environment, as to which is the vital influence on a people, Rhodesians are heredity-cultists almost to a man. Some oblique reference to this will be made when dealing with education: but, here, let the facts of what the white man has brought to the African be enough. They form an essential part of the case for the white Rhodesian, and are presented here for the examination of any fair-minded person.

Before this examination starts, it can be suggested that some of today's ecstatic praise lavished on, say, the large face-masks or grotesque carvings of the modern African owes too much to the shifting winds of fashion to be considered lasting.2

There is nothing of permanence equivalent to the work of even second-rate European artists in the achievements of the Bantu - their field of music, for example, seems incredibly thin. And turning away from art to practical matters, we find that, even in agriculture, no evidence of original and valuable contributions evolved by "Black Rhodesians" has yet come to light.

Against this, no one would wish to deny the modern achievements of men born in mud huts, brought up in subsistence living, surrounded by that very absence, in their formative years, of culture such as we have noted -men who yet do enough to satisfy the examiners for university degrees. Wholehearted tribute is needed. But it is tribute to the distance covered, not the point reached. Because even today, when the number of African graduates is substantial, something important seems to be lacking. Why is this? An important part of the argument put forward by the whites of Rhodesia is the suggestion that the great majority of African passes at university are explicable by the nature of present-day examinations.

More will be said of this under the heading of "education". Here, we need only note that the schooling of Africans does not seem to be generating either economic productivity or cultural enrichment in any significant depth.

What of creation, of inventiveness, of ingenuity? What of the application of the parrot-like learning, to situations never envisaged in the text-books?

For that matter, what of even the elements of good organisation? Study the existent records of village communities in the 1500's in England, or even much earlier - note the sound and soundly-recorded monetary transactions, and the judicial systems, and the emergent pyramid of government. This of course is only in England - what if we study the record of the white men in that cradle of Western civilization, the Mediterranean, in even earlier eras, when so little had been handed on, so much had to be originated?

What can the Africans put against all this? Up to, say, fifteen years ago the perennial excuse was that they had never had a chance. This hardly seemed convincing - why after all no black Chaucer or Caxton or Newton? (or Leonardo or Grotius or Bach?) Now, anyway, the Africans are into their second, or third, decade of having many chances. And still we ask, where is the creativity that indicates intellect and intelligence, not just shrewdness?

Is temperament the missing factor in all the erudite studies of the black-skinned people? If it is, there is a load of guilt to be put on the heads of all those "do-gooders" who expected everything, from the form of church services to the style of dress, from the ethics of justice to the Westminster style of parliament, to evolve as in Europe. The temperament of the African involves emotion - and this alone guarantees a great difference.

Perhaps the very degree of British development, to a position of world leadership, was a handicap. Will the Chinese now entering Zambia (and Tanzania), bringing not only the wiliness of the Orient, but a more down-to-earth approach to agriculture, strike a chord with the Africans in a way that the British never have done? There are some signs that this will be so, perhaps due to the more intimate experience of the Chinese in mass-improvement, starting at low levels. If the Chinese do "convert" the Africans, it will be ominous for those who wish to prevent the expansion of communism, because a great bond will have been forged.

Yet nothing should detract from the proud and proven record of the Europeans in Rhodesia. Undeniably, they have protected their own interests, as all men do. There have been blunders and injustices - because men are not perfect. But they have triumphed in many ways.

Elsewhere in this book, evidence is given to show that the French colonial legacy is in some ways better than that of the British. But for this let us put much of the blame where it belongs - on to certain UK-based administrators and ministers, and commission-men, whose ignorance of African matters has bordered on the absurd. Faced with realities, and sadder but wiser, the modern Rhodesian has done much that is pure altruism, giving much that is, at worst, "a fair crack". Let us examine the record fairly, in order to decide about the future.

No one can in truth say that the African is really appreciative of the efforts of the white man. Rather than in gratitude, one must ascertain the scale of values of the African through his vociferous demands, expressed nowadays through his representatives in Rhodesia's parliament. By such standards, the economic things he wants most emerge as (apart from leisure) education, medicine, and (in the urban areas) a job and housing. To this list can be added (at least for the silent majority) peace and an absence of intimidation. These last will be covered in the second section of this book; in this first section, we shall examine the other mentioned demands, and see what the British, since they took over in 1890, have done to meet such needs, and what they will do in the future. There is no better subject to start with than education, with which can be coupled employment.

In 1908 there were 50 schools for Africans catering for an average of some 90 pupils each. Missionaries will tell you that in those days, and indeed for decades afterwards, they had to go round the African villages imploring parents to allow their children to attend school. By 1928, there were 1 487 schools with 93 000 pupils. Even at that time, Africans seemed to desire little more than literacy. How different it all is now! Today, the African demands that the relative handful of whites organize and provide a most comprehensive educational system.

Let us look at the latest statistical picture, compared with ten years earlier:

African School Enrolments




1963
1972


Sub‑standard A
123 719
144 562


Sub‑standard B
113 518
124 174


Standard 1
102 051
115 162


Standard 2
85 434
100 198


Standard 3
81 065
92 012


Standard 4
35 827
66 525


Standard 5
27 219
53 046


Standard 6
21 962
‑


Junior (tech.)
NIL
5 410


Sec. Schools




Sec. Form 1
3 407
8 162


Sec. Form 2
2 447
7 881


Sec. Form 3
724
4 098


See. Form 4
386
3 090


See. Form 5
45
306


Sec. Form 6
36
223


Miscellaneous
15 725
3 689







TOTAL
613 565
725 538




Note: In 1971, there were 987 full-time students at the multi-racial university in Salisbury, of whom 395 were Africans.

No one denies that the figures for the youngest classes contrast very sharply with those showing the comparatively few Africans receiving higher education - in other words, the pyramid of African education is broad-based. But no country on the African continent has fully solved the education problem, and Rhodesia's facts and figures compare favourably with those of countries where an African government is in power.3

For example on July 30, 1971, Rhodesia's Minister of Education announced:

"In 1969 we entered 2 048 candidates for the Cambridge School Certificate examination and 93,5 per cent passed. This was the highest percentage of passes obtained by any of the many countries taking the examination. Whilst a pass rate of 93,5 is something of which we can be proud, the most significant part of our success was the high proportion of passes in division one and two; there were 31,7 % division one and 38 % division two passes. Compare these passes with our neighbours to the north, and I think one can see the significance.

Zambia only obtained 5,4 % in division one, and 13 % in division two. To the south, Lesotho only obtained 8,5 % in division one and 19 % in division two, Botswana only 10,7 % in division one and 22,8 % in division two."

Various statistics have been put forward by the Rhodesian authorities to prove that, age for age, their ratio of children at school is the best, barring possibly that of South Africa, on the whole continent. Definitions are difficult, and it may be safer to say that no country has a better record, few as good, and many appallingly worse. The worst category includes some of Rhodesia's severest critics: Central African Republic, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sudan, Togo and above all, one of Rhodesia's arch-enemies, Ethiopia, where few children seem to go to school at all.

Another statistic which shows Rhodesia in a favourable light, in relation to other African states, is the proportion of her budget spent on African education. The most recent figures show this to be about R$ 21 million, the largest item (apart from debt servicing) in the Revenue Budget, and 9%. of the total. But Rhodesia leaves the total flexible, and has defined the expenditure by relating it to the National Product; in terms of a revised (1966) education plan, it is to be 2% of the G.N.P.4

The need for the present plan was obvious. With the African population increasing at 3 1/2% per annum, some definite blue-print was inevitable. So it was decided to aim fundamentally at giving every child a primary course of education and to make secondary schooling available to about 50% of those who completed the primary course. The 50 % would be divided up -12 1/2 % would be given a full 4-year academic course of education, to enable the best of them to enter university. The other 37,1 % would be given technical education, of one kind or another. Special arrangements would be made in regard to correspondence courses and any talented African who is unlucky could catch up through this latter method.

Clearly, the whole plan is a goal to be reached only gradually. Some features of it progress well, others not so - see the table of present enrolments.

A correspondent to the Sunday Mail (5.9.71) complained that whereas, in 1962, 86 % of all African children aged 7 enrolled in the first school class, by 1971 this had dropped to about 60%. This correspondent said that if the trend of the 1950's had been continued through the 1960's and 1970's, the percentage of functional illiterates would be by now below 50 % - as it was, it was rising towards 60 %. If he is correct, why blame (as he clearly did), government policy? In 1965, sanctions started.5

Every resource is used in this vital matter of African education. For the record, the contribution to education made by local government bodies, churches, mission societies, industrial organisations, employers and African parents is extremely substantial. The addition of this non-governmental contribution to the tax-payers' contribution surely shows the African education picture in Rhodesia in a very favourable light indeed.

Apart from the many pupils taught by the religious missions, there were, for example, as long ago as 1962, over 11000 African children enrolled in mine schools (a figure which has steadily grown). One of' the bigger mines, situated in Rhodesia's midlands, spent over R140000 in ten years on educational buildings, and has recently been contributing, either directly or through its beer-hall, some R.40 000 per annum. towards the recurring costs of its African schools.

Perhaps some of Rhodesia's critics might study a pamphlet put out a few years ago, by the Ministry of Overseas Development in London, called "Rural Development". In this pamphlet there is a willingness to admit that earlier British ideas about undeveloped countries were wrong. It seems that British planners now realise that the basic fact which has to be faced in this problem is the attitude of the Africans themselves. There is in the pamphlet a statement that it is essential for the community concerned to have the incentive and urge to improve itself. Aid, the pamphlet states, should be most effective where it reinforces local effort. In emphasizing that the need is for a return to the land, the pamphlet rightly says that agricultural development depends on local attitudes to land tenure, to agricultural extension services, and to the availability of fertilizer and other important items. It recommends that current attitudes to education should shift towards education for improved but realistic agricultural techniques.

But, most important of all, this pamphlet - as well as others in the same vein which have been put out by the British Government or other British bodies - deals realistically with the question of the population explosion in relation to education. It is noted that the developing countries of Latin-America, Africa, and Asia have approximately twice as many of their young people under sixteen years of age as have the countries of Western Europe and North America.

The number of young people entering the labour market is at present about twice the number of withdrawals, and this ratio, it seems, will increase to about 3 to 1 by, roughly, 1980. Stating bluntly that the almost certain prospect for nine Out Of ten is unemployment and perhaps near- star vat ion, the pamphlet contends that this fact must lead to a renewed consideration of the problems of the rural areas of the world, where 70% to 90% of the world's population must continue to live and work.6

This seems a suitable point to interpose some figures given by a Rhodesian MP in September 1971. He said that in Lesotho the field of employment in agriculture was over-occupied, with "no more room---. The industrial sector could absorb only 2 000 and yet 8 000 left school each year. Zambia had only 39 000 in industry in 1969, only 9 000 jobs available, and 58 000 leaving school. Botswana had 80 000 in primary school, only 4 000 in secondary school and "only 2 or 3 out of every 10 primary school-leavers could hope to find salaried jobs or get further training".

To return to the British pamphlet, it said that education is no insulation against unemployment - indeed education produces its own problems. The generally rising standard of qualifications tends to exclude those with only primary education from such opportunities as exist. Moreover, it added that primary schools continue to produce an increasing army of young people, youths with no chance of secondary education, who would rather seek unskilled work in town than revert to the subsistence agriculture of their parents.

Although all this applies to many countries, no Rhodesian could have stated the local problem with greater clarity. It is perhaps time that the whole idea of education being a panacaea should be restudied. Far too many good-minded but ignorant people in the western countries, including Britain, believe that it is "all a matter of education". It is not.

The harsh fact is that no economic system could be devised to absorb all the Africans pouring out of schools at various levels of education. No analysis of the problem could avoid the conclusion that, short of some form of agriculture, there will be no employment, in the foreseeable future, for a great many Africans with just primary education.

This is not an admission of failure. On the contrary, the European is proud of the size of the economy which he has developed, which means that so many Africans can have jobs. Although the exact figure is in dispute every white man entering the economy creates jobs for many non-whites. It is easy to see why this is so.

Every budding economist learns that the factors of production, the things needed to develop an economy, are Land, Labour and Capital, plus a fourth factor commonly called "Enterprise". All the factors can be given wide interpretation, but it is clear that, with a negligible proportion of exceptions, the Africans have, traditionally, contributed only "labour". Moreover, the vision of toiling Africans contributing almost 100% of this factor is plainly illusory. Labour is comprised of many degrees of skill, and traditionally the Africans have contributed only the lowest forms. (Incidentally, and in passing, an invaluable economic role was played in Rhodesia's history by its "strip" roads, which are thin tar tracks, separated at wheel width, and, to a large degree, these were made by whites sweating hard, during the depression of the 1930's.)

Suppose no white had ever been allowed into Rhodesia - what would we see today? Some mediocre stores, a few farms with fairly modern equipment, and some African-organised bus lines? Imagination can add a few more items but undoubtedly the country would still be primitive. The Shonas do not appear to have the trading abilities of certain West Africans, for example, and it is hardly logical to imagine their having evolved many businesses at all. (The Amandebele might have been rather more enterprising.)

Without the white man, there would be grass where there are today flourishing cities - shops. offices, factories, homes. True, there would not be thousands of Africans working at low wages on European farms and as servants in European homes - they would not be working for wages at all!

But let us look at the employment position in Rhodesia statistically and see what jobs have been created by the much-abused whites.

Latest figures show that there were about 789 000 Africans receiving salaries or wages in Rhodesia, at the end of 1971. This figure compares with 654 000 in 1965 and 602 000 in 1956. About 300 000 of the Africans are today employed in agriculture. Average earnings, per annum range from R$124 in Agriculture to R$744 in Finance. It is hardly necessary to state that, if African wages were increased without a proportionate increase in production, Rhodesia would soon know really galloping inflation.7

If sanctions were not being applied against Rhodesia and if the economy had developed in a different fashion, and faster, it might well have been the case that African employment figures would have

risen much more than they have, in fact, done. As it is, there are about 45 000 to 55 000 Africans coming on to the labour market each year at various levels of education, and clearly jobs cannot be created for more than a minority of them.

Let us be clear about this. Recently, Mr Sithole, President of Rhodesia's African T.U.C., complained that "275 000 white people have failed to create adequate employment opportunities for 5 000 000 black people". The truth is that Rhodesia's economy, despite sanctions, has recently been growing very fast, at 71 % p.a. in "real" terms. Yet simple economics will show that even such a rate cannot with maximum efficiency, generate more than some tens of thousands of new jobs each year.

However, there is considerable dispute over the definition of the words "unemployed" and "unemployment". Unfortunately, some Africans are so accustomed to a rural, near-subsistence level of living that they are willing to live little better than this when in the towns, perhaps living off their friends, while refusing to take jobs which they consider unsuitable.8 Such people can hardly be described as "unemployed".

There can be sympathy for the African brought up in primitive conditions, who regards any sort of education at all as entitling him to a wonderful job. If only it were true! As it is, his whole refusal to come to terms with modern realities only makes things worse for himself and the State. Clearly the most useful training that can be given to the majority of Africans is in improved farming. But once they have broken away from the subsistence areas, most of them do not want to farm, even at a skilled level. And, of course, there is a crying need for artisans - but it seems the majority of Africans with any education at all want white-collar jobs, and there simply are not enough of these to satisfy their aspirations.

Because of such factors and trying to be realistic, one can guess that, at a reasonable estimate, there are probably about 200 000 Africans in Rhodesia today who could be described as "unemployed" in the United Kingdom sense of the word; at best, such people work, for pay, only a negligible number of hours per month.

Realistically, Rhodesia has linked the educational problems to its community development concept. Details of this concept are given elsewhere, but it affects education in that newly-formed African local councils are gradually taking over responsibility for primary education in their areas, normally from the mission schools. It should be a very gradual process, and for some years to come it will still be possible for missions to play a part in primary, as well as secondary education.

In 1970 there was considerable controversy when the government announced a cut of 5 % in its financial grants towards the salaries of primary school teachers in aided schools. The missions resisted, but the government pointed out that, out of 43 African local councils administering schools, the majority had immediately elected to retain their schools and to meet the 5 % reduction9; indeed, councils had expressed a desire to administer 25 more schools in 1970 than they wire administering in 1969. The missions said that, in many areas, local councils had not the experience to run the schools: and the missions closed many schools, causing a new crisis. In areas where there was no African council, the government was forced temporarily to become responsible for the administration of any schools no longer run by missions; in such cases, parents would probably be asked to meet the 5 % increase.

No one pretends that this scale of increase is negligible to Africans in the rural areas; yet, on the other hand, any increase in the size of their families comes as a result of a "voluntary decision" and the government's attitude is one of realism, faced with the population explosion.

Comparisons are often made between the amount spent per head on a European child's education and that on the average African10. (As stated above, there are many Africans who start out on the school road and comparatively few who finish at the higher levels). Yet to make such comparisons is to see the matter out of all proportion.11 The plain fact is that any Europeans coining from England, or any other country where an educational system is well developed, would not feel that they were doing their duty to their children if they accepted education of an inferior quality. And indeed it has been the general experience in countries which have been taken over by Africans that the education thereafter available to Europeans does not meet the high standard to which they are accustomed, and they leave. This undoubtedly would happen in Rhodesia.

If it did, the whole basis of economic life would be disrupted no one denies that the overwhelming proportion of the skills are at present contributed by non-Africans. And indeed if the present Europeans left it would undoubtedly be necessary to import foreign specialists - if they could be obtained in sufficient numbers - on an even higher rate of pay, on contract terms (Consider the Zambian experience in e.g. the medical and transport fields, years after independence). If these people brought their children with them they would almost certainly demand special schools - this has happened elsewhere. It is only when one analyses the problem in such terms that one begins to see that there are indeed two sides to this question of pro-rata expenditure on schooling.

The condition attached to the political terms for a settlement by the United Kingdom negotiators on H.M.S. Fearless, that expenditure on African education should be increased by an amount of £10 million sterling per annum was seen, in the light of all the facts, as of less value than the British thought. The amount mentioned was roughly what Rhodesia was spending at that time anyway; and to double it would be demanding education for Rhodesian Africans at a higher level than in any African-ruled state. And it would vastly increase the employment problem.

What is needed is to develop the economy first, in order that jobs should be created, jobs in which the Africans can use their education. This involves a relationship between a forecast of needed skills and the type of training to be offered.

A great deal of discussion has revolved round this point in Rhodesia in recent years. The creation of the junior (technical) secondary schools was a major move, although they are not yet offering long enough courses, - some l ads trained there cannot get jobs. But apprentices reach a higher standard; in 1971 there were 255 Africans undergoing training in various trades - 58 were indentured, 197 were not.

At a higher level, there has been mounting criticism of the number of Africans being given courses in the arts and the social sciences at the University -- too many graduates have found their qualifications useless. (A typical example quoted in the press was of a B.A. majoring in history and sociology, the only other subject being Shona.) African graduates wanting to teach may fail to find posts if they offer only, say, theology and Shona. Clearly the African languages offer a "soft option" for a degree of little value.12

There is, admittedly, another side to the story. For example, although it is a fact that 158 out of 339 Africans graduating 1959-1971 took B.A. General, it is said the same preference exists with white students. (The answer here is that the taxpayer no more wants to pay for a useless white than a useless black.)13

But, beyond that, facts are now being published to show prejudice against Africans who do major in the "useful" faculties. There is criticism of the civil service: outside African Education (which relies heavily on Arts graduates) there were said to be only 15 African graduates in public service in 1971. Internal Affairs, which has so much to do with Africans, employed none. Apart from "practical discrimination" (e.g. over the eternal question of separate toilets), there may be other factors behind this situation.

In 1972, there was argument over the fact that there were no African attorneys in Rhodesia. The Secretary of the Law Society quoted figures. Since 1963, 9 Africans had served articles - one qualified (but left Rhodesia), one remained, the other 7 gave up. And firms considered this revealed a position too risky for them to spend money on. In reply, African advocates (there were 7 by 1972) alleged, once again, discrimination - not just that white clients wanted white practitioners, but the old "toilets" issue cropped up, again, as a reason for non-employment of black attorneys.

The present author believes that there is some needless discrimination over recruitment and that the public service, in particular, should re-examine its whole policy. Nevertheless, there is another consideration which must be mentioned. Rhodesians are becoming acutely conscious, perhaps more so than people in certain other countries, of the inadequate nature of present University training, in many faculties. Too many pupils are seeing the getting of a degree as an end in itself. There is too much of the frantic effort to cram a certain number of facts into a brain, to regurgitate these facts in sufficient quantities to gain the lowest acceptable mark, for a minimal degree.

There are demands for the whole approach to be altered. Present syllabi are often so long as to make the covering of all the required reading an impossibility. Genuine study is replaced by shrewd analysis of past papers, the "spotting" of questions, the memorising of a few "shop-window" facts - all related to the rigid formula of 4 or 5 questions in the three-hour paper. Mass education means mass marking - the weary tutor, looking through his thirtieth paper of the evening, can hardly be blamed if he notes only that the candidate has trotted out the essential points, and passes him. Such factors more than explain the unsatisfactory later performances of many graduates, white as well as black.

What is so obviously needed is a form of test which, before a degree is granted, ensures that the pupil concerned is capable of original thought, has an analytical mind, and is able to comprehend subjects not specifically introduced into his curriculum; has enterprise and is willing to ally his skill to risk taking; and has patience and other character qualities which will enable him to adapt the information which he has gained. Many white Rhodesians believe that the overwhelming mass of Africans lack these qualities, even after they have been, usually at considerable cost to the State, to University; it may be contended that such feeling is due to prejudice - if so, the best way to eliminate this prejudice is for Africans to refute white beliefs by their activities in such fields as are at present open to them. There are already many organisations in Rhodesia in which an African could demonstrate the abilities detailed above. And as the white man pays so much the greater part of Rhodesia's taxes, his views should not be disregarded on grounds of pure theory.

And this, quite logically, brings us back to the question of finance. Even before the declaration of independence, Rhodesia seemed to be getting a raw deal, in comparison with other African countries, in the matter of aid from developed countries. Kenya, for example, by the time of Rhodesia's UDI, had received perhaps £100,000,000, much of it for education. In contrast, Rhodesia had received no outside help for education, apart from a Colonial Development and Welfare Loan of £355,000 in 1962 and some help, some years ago, from the American A.I.D. organisation towards the establishment of a Teachers College.

There is one final thing to be mentioned and that is the position of women in the world of education. The failure to educate more African women is often held against the white Rhodesians. But it must be remembered that, before the white men came, Mashona society was a patriarchal organisation, which recognised polygamy but abhorred polyandry. Women had little status. A daughter was controlled as a child by her father and when she married her husband assumed authority over her. Long before UDI, the Government encouraged the education of African women by the ruling that at least one-third of the enrolment at every secondary school be kept aside for girls; and it can be said that in the matter of bettering the status of women the white authorities are ahead of the Africans even today. The average African male shows every sign of wishing to keep his woman in subjection. It is indeed necessary for the white men to go slowly in this matter, for fear of alienating otherwise friendly Africans.
HEALTH
From education, we turn to health matters. Tied up with the religious beliefs of the African is his whole traditional approach to medicine. This is perhaps typified by the well-known story concerning a tribal battle - of a native hero who died in foolhardy fashion because he thought he had taken an "invulnerable" medicine. Precisely the same thing happened only a few years ago in the Zambian Lenshina uprisings, when other men met inevitable death through thinking themselves immortal.

African "witchcraft" medicine has two real bases of effectiveness herbalism and faith-healing. Africans are not, however, in their own "medicine", cured of malaria, bilharzia, etc, hookworm or any of the other common parasitic diseases. Nor have they a cure for the multitude of ordinary diseases e.g. T.B., leprosy, epilepsy, rheumatism, diabetes, congestive heart failure, nor for typhoid, pneumonia, meningitis.

The first man to bring "our" medicine to Rhodesia was Livingstone. Other medical missionaries followed. They did much basic work on maternity and child welfare, on leprosy and against fevers. Too often forgotten is the research carried out in the course of such treatment - research of world importance. As for the role of Europeans women, although nurses tended, in the early days, to be religious Sisters, government nurses were in both Rhodesias before the turn of the century.

In Southern Rhodesia, the first medical centres were set up as "clinics'' (i.e. small hospitals) - in Northern Rhodesia they were dispensaries only. Those early efforts have now grown into a vast network of treatment centres. And, naturally, a prime concern has been the training of African auxiliaries. There are thousands of male auxiliaries today, and even the traditional reluctance to allow unmarried girls to train as nurses has been overcome. In 1956 a milestone was passed when a Rhodesian African, named Parirenyatwa, obtained the degree of MB, ChB, at South Africa's Witwatersrand University.

Rhodesia's African population has doubled three times in less than 70 years, exploding from half a million at the turn of the century to nearly five million today. Infant mortality is dropping spectacularly and now half the population is under 16 years of age. At Salisbury's Harari Hospital about 10,000 African babies are born each year and this is only one hospital among many. All this organisation has been done against the influence of the belief in witchcraft. In health, as in other matters, Africans have been their own worst enemies.

Rhodesia's figures of just over four beds per thousand of the population compares more than favourably with that of most African countries. Direct Government expenditure on health is equivalent to 4.5 US dollars per head per annum, as against less than 2 dollars in most developing countries. Alongside the R$21.4 million for African Education in the 197112 Budget went R$18.4 million for Health, and the sheer weight of numbers ensures that the bulk of this goes to the African.

It must be noted that missionary societies provide nearly half the beds available for African patients, mostly in the rural areas, while mining and other large industrial concerns offer excellent health and hospital services for their employees of all races.14

Rhodesia is now training its own doctors. The medical faculty of the Salisbury University has now over 200 students, one third of whom are Africans. (There are already a number of qualified African doctors in government practice.) The first African from Rhodesia to qualify as a surgeon was appointed to the Salisbury African Hospital in 1972. A year earlier there was the graduation of the University's first African woman doctor.

By 1968, 600 student nurses were in training in Rhodesia. 371 were Africans. African Health Assistants are trained at a special centre. Europeans also make great contributions to African health in the fields of health education surveillance and outpatient treatment of leprosy, in extensive campaigns against tuberculosis, and many other diseases, and in an expanding mental health programme. Endemic diseases have now been brought under control in Rhodesia. Leprosy for example, exists now only in a few low-lying river valleys. It is part of the Community Development Programme (which is dealt with elsewhere) that rural authorities are encouraged to establish preventive health services. The Rhodesian Ministry of Health provides assistance by subsidizing staff up to 50 % of their salaries, providing all materials for preventive measures free, and giving grants-in-aid to the cost of drugs required for the treatment of minor ailments.

Not unnaturally, Rhodesia's Ministry of Health wishes Africans would learn to be more careful and so allow more to be spent on preventive medicine and less on curative medicine. For example, the bilharzia problem is actually growing bigger, mainly as a result of the extensive irrigation systems now being developed; yet the position could be far better if only Africans would heed warnings against wading in rivers and streams which carry the bilharzia.

The fight is uphill, the costs mount, the population still explodes. The Minister of Health intimated in mid-1972 that the burden was getting too great to be borne by the national taxpayer. As in education, there must be a taking-over of rural health services by the local councils; missions and the private sectors must also help.15

At the end of it all one has the uneasy feeling that if all white men (and other non-Africans) were excluded indefinitely from Rhodesia, and African graduate doctors were left in competition with witchdoctors, the latter would soon regain much influence. A Zambian MP in 1965, pleading for witchdoctors to be allowed into hospitals, spoke of their ability to find the cause of a disease "whether it comes from an old ancestor or a ghost". And in an early debate of the new 1970 parliament in Salisbury, an African MP suggesting the use of medicinal plants which were being used by the African "before the European came", said "People who investigated would be in a position to find out that the roots would cure without reporting to the ancestral spirits". If MP's believe these things, it is hardly surprising that cases are constantly coming before Rhodesia's lower courts, in which "bone-throwers" and others are accused of taking advantage of the credibility of peasants.

But let us conclude this section with some statistics. In Rhodesia in 1971 there were 508 200 admissions to hospitals - of these 468 800 were of Africans. (Of the latter total, 330 000 went into government hospitals, 138 700 into mission hospitals.) The African total represents nearly a 60 % increase since 1954.
HOUSING
The third in the great triumvirate of services demanded by the Africans from the Europeans is "housing". It is a good idea to emphasize that the problem is common throughout Africa.

Two quick examples: from Kinshasha (ex-Leopoldville), it is reported that in the twelve years since the Congo became independent a million people have flocked into the capital city - now at least 200 000 homeless and unemployed are to be forced back to their rural "homes". And in Lusaka, capital of Zambia, half the population were, in 1972, living in shanties (cardboard, plastic bags, bits of tin) on the outskirts.

When shanties became a problem in Salisbury, they were soon bulldozed down, to prevent a health hazard. They are not the answer. What is?

Fundamentally, birth-control - everything comes back to that But that being an impractical solution, in the short term, one turns to other ideas, taking Salisbury as the worst case, and therefore best example. There are demands for control of the influx from the tribal areas, which means permits, pass-laws. Salisbury has preferred lodger-control16 which means raids by police or authorities to ensure that there is no illegal over-crowding in any of the African dwellings. If an African has no legal residential basis, he must quit city limits; but he will probably sneak back.

Why can't he get a job, pay an economic rental? This question is often put by foreigners. For the employment situation, see elsewhere in this book. Rentals -well, every relevant piece of economic arithmetic has been done. The thousands of little boxes, neatly laid out in their rows, are as small as practicable. Mass building at minimal cost is constantly reviewed. For new "married houses in Salisbury, the average cost, including essential services, is about R$760 per unit. This means a rental on an economic basis of about R$10 per month. At present, in the Salisbury suburbs of Harari, Mabvuku and Mufakose, about 80% of tenants each pay only R$3 a month, the others paying R$5 to R$10 per month. There is heavy subsidisation through a levy on industrial and commercial firms, which in recent years paid over R$500,000. But the present levy level can only reduce the average rent to about R$8, or, say, R$100 a year. Average African income (including benefits) on a national basis excluding agriculture was, in 1971, about R$430 probably higher in Salisbury.17

There are (1972) about 35 000 married and 21000 single accommodation units for Africans in Salisbury. The backlog is estimated as 17 000 to 18 000 married units needed and the ratio should be, on demand-factor, 2 1/2 married units to every single unit. (But in financial terms single units "subsidize" married units.) It has been estimated that to catch up, Salisbury needs to build 11 300 married units and 3 100 single units each year for 5 years, at an estimated annual cost of R$ 10 million.

There is a shortage of capital finance. One approach which Government is trying is to persuade employers to take over. (One estimate: They would charge R$2 a week rent for a small, but three-bedroomed, house which the employer would buy on a 40 year lease - money back in 18 years.) But employers see practical difficulties - eg. over evictions, and are reluctant.

Meanwhile, the government has shifted responsibility to the City Council. The City Council wants future suburbs built where the tribal areas come nearest to Salisbury. (Who would cover the heavy transport costs?) The Government seems to oppose this: The argument continues.

Undoubtedly, the European suburbanites of Salisbury will soon be paying much more to subsidize African housing. The immediate backlog could be covered by about R$20 million; could this be an item for which the City of London might provide loan finance? Rhodesia is now bottom of the list in getting international aid would it be forthcoming in the event of a political settlement?

Certainly, houses for the mass of unborn Africans will continue to be denigrated by tourists as "little rabbit hutches". But they must be compared with the huts, which is all that the Africans tends to provide for himself. Once again, it must be noted that no one stops an enterprising African getting rich in Rhodesia. A few - a very few - Africans, rich even by European standards, live in beautiful houses on the outskirts of Salisbury.
DEVELOPMENT OF "THE AFRICAN AREA"
Everyone agrees that it is necessary to do something about the tribal trust lands, the more primitive parts of Rhodesia where subsistence living has been the rule. These TTL's, to use the common abbreviation, take up about 40 million acres out of Rhodesia's 96 million acres. Sometimes they are combined with the "purchase areas", (4 million acres) and called "The African Area". Not long ago the population of the TTL's was estimated at about 1 1/2 million adults and almost twice that number of children - a large percentage of Rhodesia's 5 000 000 Africans. Yet it was also estimated that they account for less than 7 % of the national product.

It is clear that the average family living in the Tribal Trust Lands is very poor. This, however, is a very different thing from being discontented. Indeed there is a theory among Europeans that they should create a "Divine Discontent" among these peasant people, in order to stimulate them; the aim would be to make them more aggressive in their attitude to economic life. (It is perhaps ironical that, when white Rhodesians are so often criticised for doing little about the condition of tribal people, a substantial minority of critics are opposed to the "divine discontent" theory and say that these simple, but on the whole happy, people should be allowed to continue as they are!)

It can fairly be said that, overall, the handicaps of the TTL's are only in a minor degree due to soil and climate. It is estimated that Africans occupy about 37 % of those areas of Rhodesia most suited to intensive and semi-intensive farming and about 65 % of the areas most suited to grazing. It is true that most of the Tribal Trust Lands are in low rainfall areas where the only practical farming is cattle raising; nevertheless, this need not be the handicap to economic progress that it appears to be at the present time.

One must realise that to these Africans the plough was unknown only a short time ago. The tribe scratched the soil and gathered what they could before moving on to new land. And, today, one of Rhodesia's greatest agriculture problems is that a large proportion of the country's rural Africans, most of them living in the Tribal Trust Lands, are still content to farm at the subsistence level in primitive ways.

The basic handicaps are almost entirely due to tradition and to the lack of sophistication on the part of the inhabitants. These are areas ruled by tribal chiefs; basically every chieftain has several "wards" under headmen, and in turn these headmen govern kraals. The kraals may have, say, twenty homesteads covering 200 or more persons. It is important to realise that the chief usually governs "in council", and "The Chief in Council" is a trustee for the economic welfare of the community.

This is important because, although tenure can be individual, and often is for arable land, grazing is normally communal. The essence of communal tenure is that everyone has a right to a share. This principle applied to land inevitably means that there needs to be more and more land available as the population increases; and of course it is increasing rapidly, nowadays, by about 33 % per annum – in other words, doubling every 20 years or less. The tribes oppose the idea that the right to allocate land should be saleable - in their views it goes with the right to graze stock.

Westerners tend to see communal tenure as leading to a loss of initiative and "drive". And it certainly seems to accord with the high leisure preference of many tribesmen. More importantly, lack of ownership and of mortgage facilities go together; thus, there is no access to normal credit institutions.

But, in any case, the tribesmen are unsophisticated. It is not merely a question of not understanding interest rates - for that matter they often do not appreciate the need for grading of maize etc. And they do not have the same views as Westerners on the subject of fat as against lean pigs, and on other elementary questions.

In the 1950's the then government, under the premiership of Mr. Garfield Todd, an extreme liberal, tried to improve the lot of the Africans through the Land Husbandry Act. But (as has been found elsewhere) one cannot change traditions by decree. The Act was a good one, but it failed, at a cost of possibly £17 million. Tribal resistance was too strong.

More recently, different approaches have been tried. For example, there is increased use of the African Loan Fund, a government fund fed by certain contributions from the Africans themselves; this makes loans, normally to co-operatives. Another scheme, now ended, started by a group of white individuals, called African Farming Development, gave practical assistance especially in the growing of maize.18 There is another organization called the African Loan and Development Company. This did have hopes, at one time, of making loans to African businessmen with the idea of creating that very desirable thing, an African middleclass. But apparently the ratio of bad debts was too high; so the ALDC concentrated on loans to groups of farmers, mainly in the better rainfall areas, and has been successful on this basis.

There has never been any let-up in the determined attempts by both individuals and government to save the Africans from themselves. The backbone of the effort has traditionally been Conex, the "conservation and extension" arm of the government, whose patient officers have tried to instil in the peasants better ideas of husbandry, decade after decade. But, so often, Conex officers find only vast area devastated through wasteful practices and neglect.

They fight, perpetually, against sheet and gully erosion, against lack of interest in rotational grazing and dip tanks, against excessive stock concentrations and against the handicaps imposed by traditions and the lack of sophistication mentioned previously.

One always comes back to the reluctance of Africans to change their traditional attitudes. For example, the insistence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in its capacity as Administrator of the African Loan Fund), that cattle offered by African farmers as security for loans should be branded with the Ministry's mark before any loans are granted, led in 1970 to widespread resistance by farmers in the purchase areas. (The purchase areas are those districts where provedly competent Africans can buy land to become independent.)19 Before the branding requirement was introduced, most purchase area farmers financed their fertilizer needs from the Fund - afterwards many clearly preferred to grow their crops without fertilizer rather than brand their cattle. As a result, acre yields dropped substantially, in some cases by more than 70%.

According to press reports, purchase area farmers contended that the Ministry's mark on their beasts would be a social embarrassment to them. They felt it signified to all and sundry that the cattle did not belong to their rightful owners.

They also believed that branding was part of a secret numbering system to prevent farmers from keeping more than a given number of cattle, or to force them to destock. It is by no means certain that this latter feeling had any validity at all, but if it had it was directed towards better husbandry.20 Over-stocking is a curse of the African tribal areas, but the African peasants and European administrators will never, it seems, see eye to eye on this question.21

It is not always easy to establish ownership of cattle in African areas because traditionally there are three classes of ownership. There are those beasts belonging to the family as a whole and in which distant cousins may also have a claim; there are those dedicated to the "spirits"; and there are those owned exclusively by the farmer himself. About 60%, of the cattle on a typical farm are believed to be family-owned.

Fighting against such entirely different attitudes to life, the successive white governments have tried every approach possible to raise productivity. A whole chapter could usefully be devoted to irrigation. There are several larger schemes which involve over one thousand acres each. These schemes will cost in total at least two million dollars. Four schemes which are going concerns at present are in places called Makwe, Silalabuhwa, Ingwesi and Chisumbanji (of which more later).22

In addition to the major irrigation schemes, the government plans to develop smaller ones ranging from 50 acres to 200 acres, to assist drought-liable areas. There is plenty of scope. Not long ago, government figures indicated 50 000 acres of irrigable land available in the Binga district; 20 000 acres in the Dande valley; and 5 000 acres of rice soil which could be irrigated in the Nuanetsi district.

Continually, critics complain that the government is not doing enough in the Tribal Trust Lands. Some of this unfounded criticism may be due to ignorance of what large expenditures are undertaken on infrastructure: there are at present over 30 000 miles of roads in the tribal areas, together with many bridges and much other essential infrastructure.

But in recent years a whole new positive approach has been tried. Two aspects of this deserve special treatment.

There is now a driving force called the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR). This is government-backed. For several years after it was set up, the organisation, probably for reasons beyond its control, failed to live up to its rather grandiose title. It made mistakes.23 But at last it seems to be succeeding. It has set up an industrial complex in Seki, the tribal area nearest to Salisbury, has a leather project and a tea-estate and has taken over Chisumbanje (see below). But perhaps more interesting are some novel ventures showing at least a spirit of "try anything" e.g. termite-prospecting for minerals and tribal homecraft industries. TILCOR is also backing crop-processing and marketing, Turkish tobacco production, and the commercial provision of various services (eg. training machine-operators). Recently, it gave encouragement to an independent non-profit-making society, formed to organize shows of industrial products in tribal areas. A dozen firms are cooperating in these mini-trade-fairs, which will be held in conjunction with normal agriculture and homecraft shows. Even more importantly, TILCOR has joined forces with four large Rhodesian companies, to build a chain of supermarkets in tribal areas. One such supermarket has already been completed at Chisumbanje. The new organisation, Tiltrade, says "By taking the city lights to the rural African, we believe a general reaction can be set off".

One model for the future is clearly Chisumbanje - a large area, in the south-east of Rhodesia, between the Sabi River and the Mozambique border. This scheme for Africans was once the pride of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority, the body charged with developing Rhodesia's Lowveld. Now it is the best asset of TILCOR. Look at the figures: 1 700 hectares under irrigation, with 50 000 hectares waiting - a training centre turning out 100 qualified irrigation farmers a year - 500 permanent workers employed -these are able to become tenant farmers on 11 to 21 hectares - crops grown include sugar, citrus, wheat, vegetables, Sunflowers, soyabeans and, above all, cotton. Thousands of seasonal cotton pickers are offered employment - and now there is the new supermarket. There are visionary plans - R$35 000 worth of shares in the trading union are held by TILCOR for disposal to African shareholders - shops of every kind, in the management of which Africans will be trained - a whole vast complex of recreation centres, sports fields, churches, schools, cinemas. And anyone can see all this for themselves -just cross over from South Africa at Beitbridge, take the Fort Victoria road, and turn right at Rutenga. It's a pity that some of Rhodesia's critics cannot spare enough time from writing polemics to do just that.

The second big aspect of the new positive approach, alongside TILCOR, and probably the most basic attack of all on rural poverty, comes from the government's Community Development programme. This seems to go to the core of the whole matter, involving as it does a defined philosophy. The government now works through the tribal authorities and is seen to be making a genuine attempt at introducing local government through African Councils, of which about a hundred and thirty have been set up at present.24 Well over two hundred may be needed before Rhodesia is completely blanketed with these Councils. Governing relatively small areas in some cases, the Councils are urged to establish a permanent headquarters and for this purpose the government gives financial assistance.25 Moreover, it trains secretaries and treasurers to assist these Councils.

Some dramatic developments, as a result of this "C.D." approach, have been reported from time to time in the press. For example, the Mrewa-Mtoko area, which, incidentally, had a bad record in the days of political intimidation in the 1960's, had, by 1968, dispensaries, sizeable dams, weirs, bridges, halls, demonstration plots, classrooms, teacher's homes etc. All this had been achieved through self-help plus some governmental assistance. Another area near Plumtree reported clinics, transport for the nurse, and an ambulance.

Roads were maintained, the community had a grader, and a lorry for borehole maintenance. A place called Nkai established a dam, a piped water scheme, a mortuary, clinic accomodation, and a veld management scheme.

These are a few examples - let us take one or two more seen by businessmen on a tour in mid-1972. There is the Mvinsi river community project, where a bridge was built across the Umwindsi River, after the people of the district raised R$2,100 by collecting R$1 from each cultivator. The Chikwaka Council gave a cash grant and the D.C. paid wages and bought materials from allocations for assistance to Community Boards.

The businessmen, among many other projects, saw the Chikowore grazing development unit, one of five similar schemes, covering 10 000 areas of TTL. Started only in 1969, there is vastly better grazing and a calving rate up from 15 % to 85 %.

The villagers' contributions come mainly from taxes on adults, on dogs, from dip fees and from sale of alcohol. Among the government's forms of assistance to councils are block grants amounting to perhaps 80 % of rates collected; salary grants (of up to 60 % of the secretary's wages); specific grants especially related to agricultural improvements; and roads, education and health grants.

In contrast to the above and many similar encouraging stories, there are areas where the villagers simply do not wish to exert themselves, where a high leisure preference is clearly demonstrated. In these areas the government applies negligible, if any, pressure the approach is nothing if not realistic.

Perhaps the most important feature of the Community Development concept is the gradual take-over by the African Councils of primary education from the religious missions. There is some validity in the criticisms that in the initial stages this often means a lowering of standards. But no strong pressure is being put on the missions to hand over, and the process is a slow one. Council control at least means that the Africans will face up to the realities, especially to the cost of education. By August 1971, there were 825 primary schools being run by African councils, which also ran two junior (technical) secondary schools. About 600 primary schools were still run by missions, all other schools being "sponsored".

And, as we have already seen, inevitably the African communities will have to administer, and raise money for, much more of the health bill.

But - and this is the important point - there is no reason why Africans should not better themselves by their own efforts. It is a safe bet that the white administrators, grown weary, would be delighted to see an end to teaching, advising, cajoling, ordering, demonstrating, organizing, administering, preventing, rescuing and above all financially assisting. That there is nothing to stop the Africans building up a middleclass, through entrepreneurial initiative, has already been demonstrated by the handful of bus-owners, shopkeepers and master-farmers. In April of 1972 a news item announced that a well-known African bus operator had completed a new hotel in the Chinamora tribal area near Salisbury. The Provincial Commissioner officially opened the hotel saying "I exhort other businessmen to follow the lead". And indeed, as this book is being written, work has started on a R$500,000 hotel in one of Salisbury's African townships. The enterprising African behind this venture is working at a big Bulawayo Hotel to gain practical experience.

But these rare exceptions merely emphasize the sheer lack of initiative of the other 99 %. Any idea that the white man deliberately keeps the African in poverty and ignorance can be refuted by glancing at any week's issue of Rhodesian newspapers. At random I note an item: the Minister of Information visited Chief Gwenzi's area and pointed out that his district, Chipinga, was ideal for the growing of coffee, which combined with the raising of good beef, could materially improve the standard of living of people in that area.

And then there is Dombashawa, a residential training institute, on 2 000 hectares. Fair-minded journalists have commented that there is nothing better in any black-ruled state. It is here that the secretaries and treasurers of African area councils are trained. But this is only one aspect of Dombashawa's work. It continues with its traditional teaching of conservation and good husbandry; but it also embraces health and hygiene training, secretarial work, maintenance of farm machinery and much more.

It is difficult for white Rhodesians who, decade after decade, have worked in all the aforementioned practical ways to improve the lot of the backward African, to see the nationalists as "saviours of their people" -the role in which they are overwhelmingly presented in Britain and many other countries. Their frenzied rabble-rousing calls for black power could, perhaps, be charitably ascribed to an excess of zeal, were it not for certain concrete evidence, not least related to the agricultural matters referred to above.

It may seem incredible that, today, nationalists denounce contour-ridging -indeed, make contour-ridging one of their focal points of appeal. Other nationalists denounce dipping - in an earlier era, dip-tanks were stealthily destroyed.

But, of course, advocating negative measures is a sure way of winning popular support from lazy masses - cheap and nasty but effective. It even has a traditional appeal.

When such obvious aids to progress are denounced, it can surely be accepted by fair-minded people that agitation against wholesale removal of tribes is politically motivated. Take for example the Stapleford area -about 5 000 of the Mtasa tribe were to be moved by the government from here to a resettlement area. The government took the precaution of flying the Editor of the Rhodesian Herald (often a stern critic) over the area, and he agreed that "were the cultivation of these steep slopes to persist and spread, there is little doubt that the hillsides could become seriously eroded". But nationalists headed press articles "The Stapleford agony" saying that “ millions" would resent the action. And nationalists added, what about the hundreds who had moved voluntarily (because in humanity the government gave two years notice) "Families trek endlessly trying to settle - schools are closed etc". Every family can be resettled - can one doubt that propaganda exploits foolishness?

In Rhodesia there are several recent examples of entirely voluntary tribal migration from one part of the country to another. The government's role is little more than to point out the economic advantages of the better areas. In a place called Gokwe, a location where there has been outstanding success in the growing of cotton, whole tribes have found a home after migrating.

As an example, one chief established himself in Gokwe, with 800 followers. The settlers grow maize, sorghum, millet and rapoko, cotton, groundnuts and beans. Not so long ago there were about 1 900 men, women and children in the Nembuzia area of Gokwe 380 taxpayers - today there are ten times as many. Provided they accept the authority of the chief, every family can settle where it wishes - can build its huts where and how it pleases, and use as much land as it can clear and care for, up to eight acres, with common grazing in addition. The area around Gokwe town is moving onto a cash economy. Mobile banks come out twice a week - one cashed cheques worth £9,000 in a single day and one bank alone has opened over 200 savings accounts in the Gokwe area.

Yet, over all these efforts lies a great shadow - the relentless increase in the size of the black hordes. There is a strong case for saying that the greatest good that could be done by those persons overseas, who wish to see the Africans in Rhodesia and other countries develop as fast as possible, would come from a definite stand on the matter of birth control. Every economic argument seems to come back to this fundamental point. It is the sheer weight of numbers in relation to economic organisation and skills that is causing so much of today's trouble. The Africans are not given much encouragement, towards reducing their families, by their leaders; when the first Africans were appointed to the newly-created Rhodesian Senate in 1970, it was found that at least six out of the ten had more than ten children - one had fifteen. And in debates in Parliament, over the years, African representatives have tended to take the view that a man gains in stature by having as many children as possible. All attempts by European MP's to show the relationship between the size of African families and the demands for health, housing and educational facilities have been unsuccessful. The Africans have insisted on their right to have large families, yet have also insisted that the minority of Europeans- a minority growing smaller as a insisted percentage of the total population every year -should go on providing what is wanted at ever rising levels. White Rhodesians understand the African attitude on these matters, even though they get exasperated by it. But it is very difficult to believe that the majority of overseas critics have ever grappled with the realities of the population explosion.

The foregoing represents no more than an outline of how "The Whites" have brought, and are bringing, "The Blacks" along through assistance, through tuition, and through examples in practice.

Most important of all perhaps, they are giving them every encouragement, without dictation, to learn sound government at the grass roots level. (How much of the ghastly chaos in so many African countries might have been avoided if the same approach had been tried?)

But there is one new chapter to add now in Rhodesia - local African authorities are to be established within the townships. They will have the task of dealing with social problems in the highly populated urban areas and will deal with minor and local services. (They will not however supplement the parent European authority in engineering services.)

Ten such township boards before the end of 1973 was the aim only one existed at the time of writing this book. This new aspect of Community Development will inevitably be a slow process - the government is determined that the boards themselves should decide what functions they can assume. It was expected that Africans would come forward only slowly.

It is necessary to avoid cynicism over this important step. It would be easy to contrast the eagerness of the African to assume top posts in the national government, with all the glamorous trappings, with the hesitance about doing unglamorous administrative jobs in their urban communities. But they must be given every chance.26

There is plenty of material available to give anyone interested the real story of African advancement - the foregoing is no more than an outline. It can be expected, however, that not even an outline will be read by those journalists and others who make their living out of perpetual denigration of the white residents.

Let us take a typical example, one of hundreds. This article comes from what is possibly the most prestigious of all British journals, The Economist, in March, 1972 - the "Pearce" period of course.

It starts off with a reference to Mr. Smith refusing to let Labourites and Liberals into Rhodesia (to stoke the fires burning at that time?)

Further paragraphs in the familiar vein can be exemplified by quotes: "The truth is that there is no one so ignorant about Black Rhodesians as White Rhodesians". Really? Is one to suppose that all the DC's Conex officers, Dombashawa teachers, Tilcor officials, irrigation specialists, Loan Fund administrators, Sabi-Limpopo staff, are ghosts? Does The Economist think that the overcoming of all the difficulties described, the achievements mentioned, was achieved by people in offices in Salisbury? And on the other hand, would any average Foreign Office official - let alone man-in-theBritish-street - like to take an exam on the subjects covered in this section of the book? "Rhodesia is a police state". It is suggested that the two sections of this book dealing with Africa and Russia be read, in order to understand what a real police state is. Now that the trouble-makers who accompanied Pearce have gone, one can once again walk anywhere in Rhodesia in safety - and are those few thousand white policemen really able to control every thought and action of those five million blacks in Rhodesia's 150 000 square miles?27

"The bulk of these (Africans) are subsistence farmers . . . any money they have probably comes from the sale of surplus crops in years of good harvest or from remittances from wage-earning relations." If this is true -and this chapter indicates that to a significant degree it is not - whose fault is it?

"Rhodesia is a vast underpopulated country . . . some 68 % of the tribal trust land is unsuitable for cash cropping". So - what about voluntary migration? This chapter has indicated many areas where things can be done, and, to the extent that black listens to white, is being done. And what of forced transfer, those diabolical moves by wicked whites, who actually suggest better places to go to? "The African annual cash income (per head) has dropped". Is it just barely possible that the population increase - 1740 000 more in 1970 than in 1958, the years used by The Economist - has something to do with this statistic?

"In 1965 ... 13 % of tribal trust land was denuded and 36 % heavily overgrazed and the situation is probably worse today." The tone of this (and succeeding sentences in the article) suggest that the whites are being accused. In the politest way, may we ask, "Why"?

“,The Whites' half' of the country," says the Economist sternly, "happens to embrace almost all the towns, railways, and main roads." What a strange coincidence! Could this - one hates to ask this of course - be due to the fact that the whites built the towns, railways and main roads? And in fact organized just about everything else of note in Rhodesia today?

"Africans might be less resentful of this if the division of the country did not mean the forced uprooting of families from their traditional homes to new land." Leaving aside the rationale of transference (see above) one is baffled as to how this can be ascribed to the division of land. And if the Africans are "resentful", may we ask who has stopped them creating a town (or a railway, or a road) for themselves? In fact (with white encouragement, but keep this dark) they are, at last, creating towns and roads.

"Tilcor has been a failure." A fair review of Tilcor has been given above -let the reader judge for himself.

"African school enrolments have dropped from 713 000 in 1968 to 670 000" (in 1971). If one takes, however, say, 1963 as a base (613 000) there is quite an increase. And unfortunately for The Economist's disciple of Selective Statistics, enrolments rose in 1972 to a highest-ever figure.

" Whites live in neat bungalows . . . blacks live in dormitory townships ... of identical huts." The handful of Africans who have shown white-type enterprise live in houses quite as good as the average white.

"Rhodesia has the scourge of shanty towns every bit as bad as those to be seen in Zambia, Nigeria or Ivory Coast." There is a photo taken during the "Pearce period". During this period, one can assume that the authorities were reluctant to move against the shantytowns which suddenly mushroomed up; they have since been cleared, and Rhodesia has returned to a state where shanty-towns are almost unknown. But, even at their Pearce worst, they sheltered only a few thousand - Zambia's capital, Lusaka, has about 100 000 permanently. Since one must not accuse The Economist of telling lies, could we say "terminological inexactitude"?

Then comes the great admission. "Black Rhodesians are not visibly under-nourished or ill-treated." Well, then, is it not a little unkind of The Economist to suggest that the country be handed over to black rulers who would soon reduce it to the level of the other countries on the continent?

Then The Economist indulges in a curious criticism, saying that all this is made worse by the fact that Rhodesia "was not colonised until 1890." This being so, and in view of the incredibly healthy economic state of the country despite 7 years of sanctions, may we suggest that those whites are pretty able men? Or did ghostly black figures build those towns and railways and eradicate diseases and evolve SR 52 maize and not need to devalue (twice)?

Back to selective statistics. Black Rhodesian miners get £215 a year -Zambians (only Black?) get £780. Zambia is a mono-economy, based on a mineral, copper. It is to be expected that wages in the country's one great industry will be high - could we have some figures for other African countries, not selective, please?

"Roads through tribal trust lands will be constructed by white companies . . . schools (African) will be built by white firms." Let's get this argument right - blacks could build but don't, whites do the job for them, help develop their areas, so they are accused of…

But, at this point, one can be excused for giving The Economist up. It wasn't a particularly bad article anyway - thousands have been worse. But, as the editor considers himself a man of integrity, could he not spare a week here, to discover the truth?

As for others, all those countless readers of the articles on Rhodesia in Britain and elsewhere, does it never occur to them to check the facts even once? It would not matter, of course, but for the fact that, by their silence, the British voters sanction what is being done in their name at Westminster.

So, if there exists even one person with some of the old British spirit of fair play left, perhaps, after reading any particularly nasty reportage on Rhodesia, he might care to write a letter. It could be sent to the Department of Information, Salisbury, Rhodesia.

The reply, which I am sure will be courteous, will give the other side. Because Rhodesia has been forced into fighting for her life, I do not say it will, necessarily, be the whole truth and nothing but the truth. But I guarantee that it will be a lot nearer the truth than the distorted masterpiece which prompted the enquirer to ask. And the latter can then weigh up the facts in their probabilities.

Rhodesia would ask no more.
THE "WHITE" ECONOMY
In this section there will be an attempt to review, briefly, the whole range of European-style economic benefits, basically created by the whites for themselves, but which also benefit the Africans to a greater or lesser extent.

Firstly, Finance28. Rhodesia has a miniature replica of the London money market - a central bank, commercial banks, merchant banks, acceptance houses, building societies, hire-purchase houses, and a stock-exchange. The Treasury, and the national accounting system, are modelled on British lines. The annual budget is by "Votes", with a Revenue Account and a Loan Account division. The Rhodesian statistical office is the envy of every country of a comparable size. There is an excellent state-auditing system.

Commerce has been organised on traditional "developing-country" lines. (Until UDI, the manufacturer's agent was very important indeed.)

Industry has, of course, a truly remarkable record, especially since 1966 -despite handicaps such as the small market, the need for quick improvisation, and limited foreign exchange. The difficulties over getting raw materials need no elaboration, and there was hasty importation of machines and machine-tools in the early years after UDI. It is scarcely surprising that some low-quality goods were produced; but over a thousand new industries have blossomed since UDI, and the bigger stuff is now being tackled.

In mining, where a present output of about R$100 million per annum is expected to double in relatively few years, the exploration and prospecting had been a classic combination of large-scale enterprise and the romantic "loner" of tradition. European agriculture has some impressive technological successes to its credit in Rhodesia - the scientific backgrounds to the growing of cotton, wheat, maize and even ground-nuts have often been in the news.29 And the importance of "tobacco" as a source of employment, and in the economy generally, has been emphasized by what has happened since UDI. Cotton production is up about 1000 % (M) since 1965.30

Water resources have been soundly organized and administered, and the spectacular development of the Lowveld - millions of acres is worth a study on its own. On power, such accelerated use has been made of Kariba in the last ten years that a new power station or source of supply, has become vital. (Kariba Stage Two has recently been started, on the Zambian side, and has run into difficulties.)

The road system is excellent for a country at this stage of development, and the railways have survived a number of problems very well. The internal air-line system is efficient, and the posts, telegraphic and telephone services have been developed on British lines.

But the whites have "made" Rhodesia in other matters too. For example, in those sports which have depended on its whites - still under a quarter of a million people in total - cricket, soccer, rugger, tennis, hockey, athletics, -the Rhodesian international record is outstanding for a country of its size. Soccer and athletics are now fully multi-racial, and Asian teams play in the cricket and hockey leagues. Theatre in Salisbury is, for a city of 100 000 whites, brilliant, and some of Rhodesia's broadcasters have won international competitions.

The Rhodesian record in military matters is outstanding for a country of its size. The European cities are incredibly clean and attractive - a common talking point for visitors - and hotels in Salisbury and the holiday centres are very sound, with the offerings amazingly good after five years of sanctions. The suburban villas and their gardens are understandably envy-producing.

This is the heritage which the whites are now asked to hand over. On what grounds? To a majority made up of, say, Swedes, Brazilians, Dutch and Irish - a mass of people with a different attitude and approach, different values, a different culture, but able to show a good record of administration and inventiveness, of sound finance and social skills? No - the handover would be to a mass of people who have no weighty argument in their favour except their mass. Always, always the arguments in favour of the Africans involve numbers - simple arithmetic, over land distribution, over per capita income, and per capita educational spending, over the number of houses, the number of university places, the number of employment opportunities. Understandably, one often refers to such criticisms as "the numbers game".

It is as if one half of the whole basis of evaluation had been buried for all time - the "quality" half as opposed to the "quantity" half. Why do people who, in their daily lives, when assessing whether to "go" for something, put at least as much value in its quality as in its mass, reject this approach when it comes to the Africans of Rhodesia?

The poor quality of African leadership - up and down the continent - will become clear in the next section of the book. The excellent quality of the white leadership of Rhodesia is shown in the country's resistance to world sanctions. Giving full weight to the helpful attitude of South Africa, and other factors, is it not still remarkable to see, for example, the following Rhodesian figures:

Visible Trade



In R$(millions)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

Imports
216 240 169 187 207 199 235 282

Exports
260 309 187 182 176 219 254 277



(UDI was declared in November 11, 1965)



Gross Domestic and National Products



In R$(millions)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

G. D. P. (factor cost)
641 687 676 722 781 893 958 1088

GNP (market prices)
660 717 709 764 826 941 1019 1163



Let us put it in simple terms. The economy has, since 1966, been growing at between 10 % and 11 % per annum, or, if you correct it for inflation, at about 7 to 8% per annum. (This takes into account 1972, figures for which were not official when this book was drafted.)

A rate in real terms of 7 1/2 % for the best part of a decade is excellent by any standards, in the circumstances of sanctions, superb. And, indeed, even political opponents have paid tributes to the brilliant economic management of Rhodesia's "Treasury Team" since 1966.

Rhodesia has immense natural resources and is now self-sufficient in very many products, agricultural and industrial. The economy could weaken considerably, and still there would not be anything approaching disaster. But one point is worth making, because it has been missed by so many foreign commentators.

At least three main influences on the Rhodesian economy can be noted. One is weather, another is world prices for raw materials, and the third is sanctions. There seems little doubt that the weather is the most important influence of all, and it is at least arguable that, taking today's trading conditions, a typical swing in the raw material prices can effect as big a change in, say, one year as sanctions do.

Failure to understand the economic basis of the Rhodesian economy has caused many foreign analysts to indulge in foolish wishful thinking. It should be said, once and for all, that sanctions cannot have such an influence alone as to ever force a change of government.31

It is just conceivable that year after year of bad weather, with continuously depressed raw material prices, plus sanctions. could bring about this result. But commonsense suggests that this is so unlikely a combination as to make the retention of sanctions on this basis ridiculous.

There is one other feature of life, economic as well as political, which must be covered: multi-racialism in day to day life.

This has been deliberately left to the end, because it is not put forward as part of the author's case. The reason is basic: this book states the arguments in favour of the white people of Rhodesia on the basis that there is a very great disparity of standards, values, aims, manners, preferences, backgrounds, traditions, cultures, habits, etc. That being so, any failure to integrate entirely is not condemned, but considered as a reasonable and logical outcome of attitudes common to all human beings. "Attitudes" in this connection is not synonymous with "failings" - it may well be synonymous with pride, in e.g. one's history and heritage.

That said, nevertheless it is a fact that the picture of Rhodesia as an apartheid-model state is ludicrous. Let us note the existing multi-racial institutions: some of the best hotels in Salisbury, most shops, cinemas, Salisbury's main theatre, concerts, the university, some sports (see above), buses, post offices, trains, aircraft, some leading private schools, lifts, park-benches. Some cafes can be included and there are many minor manifestations of multi-racialism.

An interesting new development is that the African Chiefs in the Senate can use a vernacular language for their speeches - not multi-racialism, but what might be called equi-racialism.

But let us retain our honest approach. Be it due to pride or prejudice, there are gaps in the multi-racial picture.32 In certain cases, a personal opinion is that these gaps should be filled. One or two examples have been indicated already; another could well be the promotion to full officer rank of one or two African members of the forces. If a professional soldier who knew his job, firstly, and had shown gallantry in the Valley, secondly, was commissioned, I feel quite confident that white soldiers would take orders from him with respect.

Yet there are three areas to which I feel multi-racialism cannot extend: suburbs, schools and toilets.

As to the last-named, there is a story that a former Rhodesian Prime Minister complained in London that all the British diplomats wanted to talk about was "lamentable legalistic disabilities - we want to talk about lavatories". If this is authentic, he was wrong. Mixing metaphors like the British MP who smelt a rat and wanted to nip it in the bud, we may say that Rhodesians have tended to sweep lavatories under the carpet. But I will say no more than that any experienced traveller could state a case. On the other two items, there is undoubtedly hypocrisy among Britons and at least some Americans. The picture is often distorted - "Surely white Rhodesians should have no objection to the occasional black-occupied house, the occasional black pupil?" The exceptional minority is not the point - it is the take-over by a majority which causes the banner to be raised - as it would in any of those dignified English districts which have as yet not been affected by immigrants. A challenging question is put to all British readers: in these two aspects, would you accept being in a minority of 20 to 1, which is what the Rhodesian faces? Learn about, for example, Zambia, and reply carefully.

This, then, is the domestic part of the case for the Whites. If nothing else, it explains the bitterness which they have felt since UDI. If, through the success of sanctions, a handover were forced, it would be a tragedy. But it would be much more. Economic destruction of what has been built up would be inevitable. Even if a new African government brought in contract-whites, as would be probable, they would not have a fraction of the knowledge and experience of Rhodesia's present rulers - and would themselves demand different living standards.

As for what would happen in the areas of activity where the Africans "ran the show" on their own, we must proceed to the next section of this book. In summary of this first section let us consider a few basic questions:

Has not the paternalistic rule of the Rhodesian whites been a very good thing? Should not even those constitutionally opposed to it, at least see it as very much the lesser of two evils, and accordingly support its continuance?

What, after all, do Mr. Smith's critics want? We have shown that education of Africans already takes the biggest allocation in the Budget and that no economy could provide jobs for more than a percentage if this allocation was greatly increased.

On health, Africans are being given excellent services. On housing, perhaps more could and should be done - but, even here, remember that Rhodesia has had to do without the massive foreign aid given elsewhere.

Development of tribal areas, after some false starts (due not least to intellectual theorizing) is going ahead effectively.

Looked at in this way, there really does not seem much substance in all the criticism, does there?
REFUTATION OF CRITICISMS
The author, looking round for some publication which would sum up the case against the Rhodesian regime succinctly, found an admirable example.

In 1966 a book was published in London under the title Rhodesian Perspective. 33 It was banned in Rhodesia. It consisted in part of extracts from the former Salisbury magazine Central African Examiner, which perished under the first impact of press censorship in 1965. Curiously, perhaps, after the lifting of press censorship no attempt was made to restart this or indeed any other magazine devoted to intelligent criticism of the Smith government, from the Left. (One or two religious publications may be seen as a partial contradiction of this statement.)

It seems that there should be a place for a periodical which made factual criticisms of a sober kind. In 1972, at least two newspapers, giving an "African viewpoint", seem to be a permanent fixture. But their better critiques are inevitably obscured by the emotional journalism found in dailies and even weeklies of all kinds. It seems that a monthly is needed, and the only one opposing Mr Smith does so from the Right.

Censorship is necessary to fight communism and black nationalism. But it seems to the author that some unique system might be devised in order to allow books like Rhodesian Perspective to be sold. Perhaps it should be a condition of sale that a (free) pamphlet should be included, refuting factually the criticisms made. Rhodesian Perspective undoubtedly consists of anti-Smith propaganda, some of it rather wild. But we should be able to counter it with our own propaganda, and in fact we are able, easily, to dispose of the more lucid type of criticism.

In the chapter on education, for example, the author seems to keep threatening to shatter the whole edifice of Rhodesian governmental claims. Yet in the end we find several tributes to what has been done educationally, several acknowledgements of the difficulties, and, with one or two exceptions, no real criticisms apart from those based on the numbers game. And even in regard to the latter, the "Perspective" author has to admit that the cost of providing an adequate educational standard for Europeans and Africans alike would, in fact, cost about twice as much as Rhodesia's entire budget.

One would have rather more respect for those putting forward criticisms such as those in Rhodesian Perspective if they were at least consistent. For example, the book makes the point that a lot of jobs which Africans could well fill, are, in fact, taken by working white wives. Partly the author seems to be attacking the working wife per se - would he attack the working wife in other countries too? He must know surely that a study of total Rhodesian European employment figures suggests that, at most, about 5 000 wives are in posts which could even remotely be filled by Africans; it is worth noting that very few Africans, male or female, can type to acceptable European standards, far less take shorthand, for example. And, regrettable though it may be, 5 000 more jobs would hardly make a dent in the African employment problem. Against this, if we accept the book's implication - that if they were not able to include a wife's salary in their total earnings many European couples would leave - then the certain result of a take-over in these parts would be still fewer skills to keep the economy going.

In other places the book is frankly unfair - for example it criticises the standard of teachers in certain rural schools - and the author must surely know that it is impossible at present to provide the fullyqualified teacher on as wide a scale as everyone would like - no one is more well aware of this problem than the government.

Apart from education the book deals at some length with separate development and Black politics generally. At the end of the book, quite fairly, it sets out briefly what is considered to be the case for the whites and the case for the blacks. Since the whole of The Real Case for Rhodesia expresses the case for the whites at far greater length than this fair but brief summary, we can ignore that side of things for the time being, and concentrate on the case for the blacks, which is worded as follows:

"We are the people of this country.(1) The whites came in by trickery, and established themselves by conquest.(2) They destroyed our chiefs,(3) and set up their own administration by right of the gun, and by that right alone they have continued to rule.(4)They have held us down in ways that make a cynical farce of their claims to have brought "civilisation" to an uncivilised land. To quote but a few examples: secondary and higher education available to us has been deliberately restricted.(5) The white school leaver or graduate has every conceivable advantage over his African opposite number.(6) The Government has long ago declared most of the land to be "white",(7) and has made it over to white farmers whose productivity, taking all "white" land into account, is pitifully low, largely because they have far more land than they can possibly use.(8) Our massive rural population has been penned into areas that are quite inadequate to support their numbers.(9) Our title to land and property has been restricted so that we have hardly been able to raise loans.(10) It is we who have provided the labour for all the development, which the whites take credit for,(11) and at very low wages. And why have these wages not been forced up to a reasonable level? Because we have been prevented by the whites, who control the Government, from organising proper and effective trade unions.(12) And of course every time we have been able to better ourselves in terms of earnings and education, the Government has raised the voting qualifications.(13) To make absolutely sure of their position, they have armed themselves with a battery of security laws under which they can control any political activity that might possibly threaten them.(14) Europeans boast about their standard of living.(15) Of course it is high: indeed it is grossly inflated considering how little work the average white man does.(16) It is true that whites have been enterprising but their wealth is founded on their exploitation of the people whose very country they have stolen and who account for 95% of its population. Is that anything to be proud of?"(17)

An answer to this case is given by reference to the inserted numbers:

1. This is debatable. Centuries ago, "Rhodesia" was an uninhabited area. Then the Bushmen came and lived there, and then the Mashona, and much later the Amandebele, as set out in the first chapter of this book (and in much more detail in other publications). But which tribe is to be the dominant one? As has been made clear, Rhodesia would be an exceptional case, if after black rule came, one tribe did not dominate the others. The white man's boundaries (Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia etc.) bear no relation to tribal areas. Would the Barotse of Zambia say that they were the "people" of that country? And if so, what would the Bemba, Lozi, Tonga etc. reply?

2. There were one or two acts in which the sophisticated pioneers took advantage of e.g. Lobengula. But at least they tried to acquire the territory with some semblance of fairness. Plain conquest has, after all, been more normal throughout history.

3. On the contrary - the whole basis of the present approach by the Rhodesian Government is to restore and uphold the authority of the chiefs - it is the nationalist politicians who want to" destroy the chiefs".

4. By power after conquest, yes. Should America revert to the Red Indians, or any other country to its original tribes? These are not rhetorical questions - the true answer is surely that any area should be governed by those who can best advance the welfare of the people of the region. If the Czechs were a backward people, and the Russians brought them great benefit, then the "occupation" of that country could be justified. But they are not, and it can't.

5. The author should know this to be absolutely untrue. See the section on education. Missionaries of integrity confirm that in their earlier days they had to go round beseeching parents to let their children go to school. Today it is different. But in relation to the rest of the Budget, and the usage of the national product, Rhodesia's educational expenditure is relatively outstanding and the fairly rapid expansion commendable.

6. In that the White has, bluntly, much more to offer, (in the great majority of fair comparisons), this is true.

7. Not "most" of the land. Under the 1969 Constitution it is divided about 50/50 between black and white.

8. See the section on agriculture. The whites made Rhodesia into a number one tobacco nation. Their progress in maize, wheat, citrus etc. is outstanding. Cotton is a miracle of rapid expansion. Domestic technological achievement on varieties is remarkable. etc. etc. But 1 do accept that at present some areas of European farms are unused. 1 would support the transfer of some of this land to any Africans who can show hard work leading to qualification as master farmers and who can be relied on not to sit back when they have amassed what, for them, will be great wealth. (See the evidence of African resistance to suggestions of better husbandry.)

9. Not yet inadequate, if Community Development is fully supported by the tribesmen everywhere. It may become inadequate if it does, the fault will lie with the sheer irresponsibility, and/or traditional attitudes, of the tribesmen towards procreation the 3 3/4 % per annum increase without regard for economics.

10. The author must know perfectly well that "title" is something on which the whites would like the Africans to adopt a western approach. It is the family tribe system which is the big stumblingblock - mortgage is often impossible. As for loans, there have been a few attempts, but the individual African's record at paying back is so patchy as to discourage even idealists. Progress however, probably will come in these matters given time.

11. This is the classic argument over which is the most important economic factor of production - Land, Labour or Capital or Enterprise. Left-wing economic text-books try to play down the role of the entrepreneur. People of lower intelligence or lesser character don't like to think "bosses" get on top because of more brains or greater initiative. The fact is that without "Enterprise", one finds labour used only for subsistence living.

12. The "Perspective" author clearly approves of the modern trade unions. Most reasonable people, who saw the need for them up to a few decades ago, now feel that they are causing the West to lose out to Communism -Russia is not so silly as to allow trade union activity, with its perpetual strikes, and the perpetual resultant inflation, on western lines. Roughly, wages in Rhodesia are determined by a supply and demand position, which is not immoral. 1 believe, however, that we are coming to a position where many Africans will seemingly be unfairly rejected when competing with a white man. This rejection may be called prejudice - it will usually reflect a conviction that the white man will show other, traditional, qualities in his job which, too often, have not been shown by those Africans who were given a chance. I would be at one with the author in supporting a true meritocracy; but "merit" must include desire for sound government.

13. The voting qualifications are only raised by a judicial commission, in accordance with statistically-proved inflation.

14. By and large, this is true. It is the argument of this book that this is justified, for all the reasons which the book puts forward, to avoid the barbaric chaos of the north.

15. Actually not so - like people everywhere, the European thinks he is hard done-by!

16. There might have been some truth in this in the days of the "stoep farmer" - not today, as e.g. the enterprise of the European industrialist under sanctions has proved. All "work" is not manual.

17. "Exploitation". This is the classic communist argument. See point 11 above. According to the communists, the "working class" is always "exploited". They are never, it seems, in their lowly position because they haven't got what it takes, or because they prefer to put less into life (or are stricken with disease which may or may not be their own fault). The Europeans have indeed shown enterprise, and they deserve their success. But incidentally, a few, a very few, Africans have also shown enterprise -in Rhodesia, the busline owner is the classic example. And they are today rich men, even by white standards. So it is entirely possible for an African to succeed, and there is little to stop him doing so.

The foregoing was a 1966 criticism. But the leftists are saying much the same sort of thing today. Nearly all the anti-white propaganda comes down to the fact that the blacks are not given political power.

Or, put another way, that this or that step is not taken which would bring them nearer, ever nearer, to running Rhodesia. What would happen if they did? Let us see.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

NOTES
_______________________________

1 Those interested can read, for example, The Arab Builders of Zimbabwe, J. E. Mullan, Rhodesian Mission Press, Umtali, and Origin of Zimbabwean Civilization, Galaxie Press, Salisbury.

2 And also, it seems to political prejudice. Shona sculptors had a considerable success in a Paris exhibition in 1971; but a review in Le Monde said that it was a "pity" that this renaissance of Rhodesian sculpture was "assisted" by a white man, presumably Mr McEwen, Director of Rhodesia's National Gallery.

3 These figures remind one of those for literacy - see Barlow p. 100 - the record in South Africa and Rhodesia is very much better than that for the countries of Black Africa.

4 Which, in recent years, has increased by about 5% to 10% per annum - and could presumably grow even faster if sanctions were removed. Incidentally, African communities can add to the total spent - taking it above the "2%" - by their local community efforts.

5 Here, as elsewhere in this book, it is necessary to draw the moral that even if sanctions were morally justified by the "crush-Rhodesia-in-three-months" attitude every bit of that moral justification fell away when it became clear that they would not force a change of government, but would (by limiting economic expansion), do direct harm to the very Africans they were supposed to assist.

6 If any country has a reasonably satisfactory growth rate of 5% p.a., and a population growth of 3 1/2% p.a., income rises 1 1/2 to 2% p.a. - and it takes 35 to 50 years to double living standards and this doubling might well (e.g. in India) give an average income per head of only £50.

7 However, the present author accepts arguments that, in 1973, significant increases in African wages could and should be given in rnany sectors, with benefit to productivity.

8 The classic case in Rhodesia concerns cotton-picking. Every season vast numbers of Africans are needed for cottonpicking; in 1972 it was about 200 000. They are paid about 60 cents a day which, though hardly more than a nominal return, would appear to be preferable to complete unemployment. But every year there are tens of thousands of vacancies.

9 As an interesting example, there is the 1972 case of Nyamande School in the Chinamora tribal area. At a meeting, 33 parents voted for the Salvation Army to continue running the school, 33 for the Chinamore local African council to take over.

10 It was said in Parliament 1-1-71 that, at government secondary schools, fees for Africans were about R$ 18 a year, and for Europeans R$48 a year. While the disparity in average incomes must be taken into account, so must the fact that Europeans pay 99% of income tax in Rhodesia.

11 A calculation in 1971 showed that, to duplicate the European, Asian, and Coloured systems for African children would, for that year, have cost R$380 million. Rhodesia's entire revenue budget for a year is only about R$200 million.

12 Of course, thousands of graduates of all colours in e.g. Britain and America are finding their degrees no passports to jobs. In one press argument, Rhodesia noted that a hotel in Bristol, England, had three graduates working as porters. Every university graduate in England is said to represent an investment of £4 000 - is it not time that all taxpayers, everywhere, were relieved of this nonsensical burden, where students choose useless courses?

13 Latest available figures showed 987 full time students at the Rhodesia University -526 Europeans, 395 Africans, and 66 others. Rather more than half receive government assistance.

14 It was not until 1971 that Africans had to pay for services at the Country's 62 African rural hospitals. Medical fees paid by Africans are totally sub-economic.

15 At end-1972, four doctors at Harari (African) Central Hospital, Salisbury were trying to cope with 1 000 to 2 000 outpatients per day.

16 In late 1972, it seemed that at last influx-control, based on the carrying of identity documents, and the expulsion of all without jobs from city limits, was at last being enacted. It is sad, in a way. But the measures need to be considered in relation to the Government's plans for developing the African areas (the "African half") of Rhodesia. Every available pair of hands can usefully be devoted to this task - as well as every cent spent by Africans, as far as is practicable.

17 If, as proposed (1973) the levy is abolished, a significant increase in African wages must be decreed. Figures suggest that (at least in industry) this can be done without significant inflationary effect.

18 For a good account of The Stanning Scheme, see Barlow, p. 107. Many African subsistence farmers grow only two bags of maize to the acre - on similar soil, under similar climatic conditions, the European farmer can get 20 - 30 bags. Advice is available to Africans - if they want it.

19 For example; a typical news item of February, 1971, noted that 3 African farmers had become the first in their area to take title. They took occupation on lease in 1964, on farms of 76 - 93 hectares. Another item, noting that new surveys had made it possible to increase the size of many APA farms, recorded government approval of applications to irrigate these farms.

20 At organized sales in 1970, Africans sold only 95 000 head of cattle out of a total holding of 2 840 000. Yet a moderately bad drought will cause about 60 000 beasts to die. A beast may be worth, say R$40 - so another R$2,400,000 could have been available to Africans - and the economy - if an equivalent extra number, 60 000 had been taken, in 1970, to an abattoir.

21 Not only are Africans always reluctant to sell cattle - with every economic reason to do so - but, furthermore, the authorities have continually to beg them to sell their goats, which are often an agricultural menace.

22 The taxpayer is already digging deep. Two 1972 reports of the Auditor General noted, on irrigation, "a direct operating loss of R$640,844 and an assessed loss of R$1,383,727". But the Ministry said that "economic aspects" were subordinate to settling Africans on the land.

23 The main one was the pouring of over R$2 million into a shaky textile concern in an attempt to find at least one industry to move to a tribal area. But how did this effort, born of desperation to set up a tribal industry, justify The Economist saying "It is this kind of experience that makes Africans sceptical of TILCOR's motives?"

24 More than half the adults in TTL's and Purchase Areas now elect their Councils.

25 Often contributing one dollar of national tax-money for every dollar raised locally. Local revenue is assisted at source e.g. from November 1970, vehicle licence fees were payable to African Councils.

26 There seems no reason to doubt that the government are pressing ahead with their plans to create three provinces - Mashona Africans, Matabele Africans, and European. Each province could, in effect, be a state, administering several departments, with, ultimately, only Defence, Foreign Relations, and one or two other departments left under the federal, i.e. national government.

27 These words were drafted in late 1972. 1 see no reason to alter them in mid-1973. They are indubitably true of 99% of Rhodesia. In the 1% with an odd terrorist, the danger is less than one would find by night in, say, Washington.

28 It is worth recording that Rhodesia did not devalue in 1967, with Britain, nor again in 1971, when South Africa and many other countries did.

29 For example the entirely Rhodesian development of a variety of maize called S R 52, which has won world-wide recognition - another gift from the white man to the black. And of his most basic foodstuff.

30 It has been the spectacular increase in cotton-growing which has enabled much of Rhodesia's agriculture to withstand the impact of sanctions on tobacco. And, similarly, from growing hardly any wheat in 1965, Rhodesia was, by 1972, 80-90% self-sufficient.

31 It must be reiterated that sanctions have not only had the beneficial effect of "forcing 20 years of industrial growth in 5", but taught vital lessons in the achievement of efficiency, the elimination of waste.

32 In late 1972 came six or seven Bills which were immediately labelled "racial istic". It is too early to assess these measures, which seem to be based on the -"provincialization" concept i.e. of "persuading" the Africans who cannot find work in white, urban, areas to return to their own areas and put all their effort (and spending power) into developing those areas.

33 Rhodesian Perspective, by Bull and others, published by Michael Joseph.