The Northern Alliance now controls most of northern and western Afghanistan, including the cities of Mazar-i-Sharif, Taloqan and Herat. From Washington's standpoint, the sudden collapse of the Taliban war effort in northern Afghanistan demonstrated the success of an operational model - close US air support for Northern Alliance ground troops - that Pentagon planners will now look to replicate elsewhere in the country. According to the Pentagon sources, this model will be expanded as soon as more US and British special forces deploy in sufficient numbers to direct the bombing sorties.

The sudden turn of military events will help the anti-terrorism coalition press its offensive against what is considered the Taliban's heartland in southern Afghanistan. Northern Alliance control of the north greatly enhances its ability to resupply its troops, as weapons, ammunition and other essential supplies can now be brought in overland from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

The victory will also facilitate a massive humanitarian assistance effort. With winter looming, millions of Afghan civilians face the threat of hunger. UN agencies hope to begin aid shipments from a depot in Uzbekistan on November 13.

The ultimate success of the anti-terrorism effort will rest on the ability of the coalition to promote stability in post-Taliban Afghanistan. At present, a clear political blueprint for Afghanistan's reconstruction is lacking. The United States has backed an initiative to forge a broad coalition under Afghanistan's former monarch, Mohammed Zahir Shah. But details on the composition of the Zahir Shah coalition remain sketchy. It is possible that the Zahir Shah coalition will not take definitive shape until the Taliban is crushed.

Serious differences exist among key coalition partners over the state-building process. Russia and Central Asian states have spoken out against any Taliban role in a future Afghan government, and would likely support a rapid Northern Alliance offensive on Kabul. Pakistan, meanwhile, is anxious for Pashtuns to be well represented in a post-Taliban government, and has announced its categorical opposition to a Northern Alliance takeover of Kabul before a political coalition is ready to govern. US diplomats face the immense task of trying to harmonize the divergent views within the coalition.

Conquering the Taliban will not be easy in southern Afghanistan, where the radical Islamic movement has its power base. Intelligence gathering difficulties could hamper anti-Taliban operations in the south. The US-led coalition knows little about the morale and the war plans of the Taliban leadership, or about the sources of their continued outside support from radical Islamists in Pakistan and in the Arab world.

Pressure will increase on the Central Intelligence Agency to develop sources inside the Taliban and al Qaeda, as well as inside the Pakistani military, intelligence service, and particularly the secretive nuclear weapons establishment. Already, the CIA recently has taken action to expand its networks in the Arab Gulf states, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and elsewhere.

Current intelligence-gathering capabilities appears adequate to direct air strikes, but the US government still does not know where bin Laden is, or what kind of weapons of mass destruction he may have.

Beyond the shortage of reliable intelligence, the Northern Alliance is grappling with a manpower shortage. Yet, even if it can find reinforcements, inter-ethnic suspicions will likely limit the ability of the Northern Alliance, which comprises mostly ethnic Uzeks and Tajiks, to operate in Pashtun-dominated southern regions.

Thus, before the anti-terrorism coalition attempts to drive the Taliban out of Kabul and Kandahar, a change of tactics may be in order. The coalition may once again try to foster a Pushtun anti-Taliban militia force that would stand a better chance of gaining the support of local residents. Earlier efforts to create a Pashtun force were a miserable failure, underscored by the summary execution of Pashtun commander Abdul Haq on October 26.

Finally, the logistical challenge remains immense. Russia and Uzbekistan did a good job supplying the alliance during its northern offensive. However, if the Northern Alliance is to stand any chance of conducting effective operations elsewhere in Afghanistan, more supplies from the United States, Britain, and possibly Russia, will be in order. These supplies need to be airlifted or shipped by rail across Russia and Central Asia to the Uzbek-Afghan border, then trucked into the war-torn Afghanistan, which is plagued by corruption and has a crumbling infrastructure.

Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow at the [right-wing] Heritage Foundation.