.Part 1.Short selling US empire stocks. The 1st obvious market for the $ great society is intelligence as described,another is assasinations that will be the subject of a seperate article.With the wisdom of insecurity you will preserve the best of your failed empire. Benedict arnolds pay attention!
Bin laden demolitions has authorised me to offer you a once in a lifetime deal. > > 1million dollars untracable digital cash will be paid to an account/s of > > your choice > > for enough intelligence to proceed with further superpower implosions. > > Insider info preffered but not essential,leave packet online in freenet > > transient node... > > Is there any way to solve this transaction problem without a > mutually-trusted third party?
It would be necessary to reduce the criteria used by the purchaser into algorithmic form. Write a program which would take the data and produce a yes/no answer. The program has to be such that even if the seller knows the program, he can't produce fake data which would fool the program.
Then the seller can commit to his data and produce a zero-knowledge proof that the committed data satisfies the criteria in the program. This can be done reasonably efficiently for moderate sized programs. It will leak no information But BLD would still be able to cheat the seller, wouldn't they? The > account number might be valid but unfunded, or any variation on that. > I'm looking for a way for each party to be sure he gets what he wants, > with no trusted third party and no recourse to government.
Providing guaranteed payment can be done but will ultimately require trusting the bank, as any payment system does.
The buyer and seller could jointly create a sequestered account, funded by the buyer, such that each party privately gives the bank a password for access and both passwords must be supplied for withdrawal. Then the buyer can give the password to the seller as his payment. The account can be such that if it is not accessed within a specified time, the contents revert to the buyer's account.
The buyer can't cheat and access the account without the password belonging to the seller. The buyer can reveal a hash of his password in advance and the seller can get the bank to verify that it is correct. As the buyer's password is revealed a bit at a time during the exchange of secrets, he uses a ZK proof to show that it corresponds to the committed hash, as is standard in exchange of secrets protocols.
They are trusting the bank, but it is not involved in verifying the conditions for successful completion of the transaction. Its sole responsibility is managing transfers of money in a reliable and trustworthy way, and that degree of mutual trust will always be necessary for any electronic payment system. I don't think this is possible --the inputs (e.g., scan > newsfeeds for "bin Laden" and "funeral"; or require > a weekly warm-biometric check from the dude) could always be spoofed.
Assuming that a human trusted third party could check the data if he had access to it, a program could do so as well.
Perhaps the assumption is that the TTP has some secret information that will allow him to check the seller's data for validity. For example, if the seller is providing floor plans of a building, the TTP may have some partial information about the floor plans which he can compare for consistency. If the seller doesn't know what information the TTP has, it is hard for him to spoof.
This can be simulated by using a secure multi-party computation in place of the TTP. The seller inputs his data, the buyer inputs his secret partial information, and they jointly run a calculation to see if the seller's data is internally consistent and matches the partial information of the buyer. The only output is a single boolean yes/no.
AC DC double your fun.Who wants to be a millionaire? We could be in the cayman isles or over there in lichtenstein.Jersey?Nauru? (article 1) secret money (english) by alternet 2:42pm Fri Oct 5 '01 (Modified on 4:06pm Fri Oct 5 '01)
Now we know why the more things change the more they stay the same. Certainly true for dirty money or dirty deeds done with hidden money. Check it out at: http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=11650 A controversial European book that might help authorities track terrorist funding sources remains unpublished and relatively unknown in the United States.
Entitled "Revelation$," it exposes a secret banking system that might be used by terrorists. At the center is a clearinghouse in Luxembourg called Clearstream, which transfers money for international banks and major companies.
Written by a former high-ranking Clearstream official and a French journalist, its publication last February by Les Arenes in Paris triggered the firing of Clearstream's top officials, a judicial inquiry in Luxembourg, and invitations to the authors to address members of the European Parliament and the French parliamentary commission on financial crime and money-laundering.
Authors Ernest Backes -- a former banker who helped design and install the clearinghouse's computerized accounting system in the 1970s -- and investigative reporter Denis Robert described a potential money laundering and tax evasion system that uses unpublished accounts to provide investors with a veil of secrecy.
This reporter was shown copies of what Backes says are records of the secret accounts. He keeps the originals in caches outside Luxembourg. The documents are a mine of information for any financial inquiry, with detailed information on every cross-border transfer in cash or securities. Some U.S. officials -- including New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani -- may well be aware of the system detailed in the documents.
Clients of Clearstream can be bankers, investment managers, offshore companies, tax evaders, officials of secret services, the CEOs of multinationals -- or terrorists.
For example, the records list a Clearstream account belonging to Bahrain International Bank, which is suspected of moving Osama bin Laden's money.
Clearstream and another clearinghouse, Euroclear -- based in Brussels -- transfer titles in 150 million transactions each year, involving more than US$7 billion in assets. At the discretion of Clearstream, clients can open non-published accounts that do not figure in any printed document or record of international financial transactions. When law enforcers ask to see records, they don't exist.
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07.10.2001 17:15
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information markets
07.10.2001 17:27
.Part 1.Short selling US empire stocks.
The 1st obvious market for the $ great society is intelligence as described,another is assasinations that will be the subject of a seperate article.With the wisdom of insecurity you will preserve the best of your failed empire.
Benedict arnolds pay attention!
Bin laden demolitions has authorised me to offer you a once in a lifetime deal.
> > 1million dollars untracable digital cash will be paid to an account/s of
> > your choice
> > for enough intelligence to proceed with further superpower implosions.
> > Insider info preffered but not essential,leave packet online in freenet
> > transient node...
>
> Is there any way to solve this transaction problem without a
> mutually-trusted third party?
It would be necessary to reduce the criteria used by the purchaser into
algorithmic form. Write a program which would take the data and produce
a yes/no answer. The program has to be such that even if the seller knows
the program, he can't produce fake data which would fool the program.
Then the seller can commit to his data and produce a zero-knowledge
proof that the committed data satisfies the criteria in the program.
This can be done reasonably efficiently for moderate sized programs.
It will leak no information
But BLD would still be able to cheat the seller, wouldn't they? The
> account number might be valid but unfunded, or any variation on that.
> I'm looking for a way for each party to be sure he gets what he wants,
> with no trusted third party and no recourse to government.
Providing guaranteed payment can be done but will ultimately require
trusting the bank, as any payment system does.
The buyer and seller could jointly create a sequestered account,
funded by the buyer, such that each party privately gives the bank a
password for access and both passwords must be supplied for withdrawal.
Then the buyer can give the password to the seller as his payment.
The account can be such that if it is not accessed within a specified
time, the contents revert to the buyer's account.
The buyer can't cheat and access the account without the password
belonging to the seller. The buyer can reveal a hash of his password
in advance and the seller can get the bank to verify that it is correct.
As the buyer's password is revealed a bit at a time during the exchange
of secrets, he uses a ZK proof to show that it corresponds to the
committed hash, as is standard in exchange of secrets protocols.
They are trusting the bank, but it is not involved in verifying the
conditions for successful completion of the transaction. Its sole
responsibility is managing transfers of money in a reliable and
trustworthy way, and that degree of mutual trust will always be necessary
for any electronic payment system.
I don't think this is possible --the inputs (e.g., scan
> newsfeeds for "bin Laden" and "funeral"; or require
> a weekly warm-biometric check from the dude) could always be spoofed.
Assuming that a human trusted third party could check the data if he
had access to it, a program could do so as well.
Perhaps the assumption is that the TTP has some secret information that
will allow him to check the seller's data for validity. For example,
if the seller is providing floor plans of a building, the TTP may have
some partial information about the floor plans which he can compare for
consistency. If the seller doesn't know what information the TTP has,
it is hard for him to spoof.
This can be simulated by using a secure multi-party computation in
place of the TTP. The seller inputs his data, the buyer inputs his
secret partial information, and they jointly run a calculation to see
if the seller's data is internally consistent and matches the partial
information of the buyer. The only output is a single boolean yes/no.
AC DC double your fun.Who wants to be a millionaire?
We could be in the cayman isles or over there in lichtenstein.Jersey?Nauru? (article 1)
secret money (english)
by alternet 2:42pm Fri Oct 5 '01 (Modified on 4:06pm Fri Oct 5 '01)
Now we know why the more things change the more they stay the same. Certainly true for dirty money or dirty deeds done with hidden money. Check it out at:
A controversial European book that might help authorities track terrorist funding sources remains unpublished and relatively unknown in the United States.
Entitled "Revelation$," it exposes a secret banking system that might be used by terrorists. At the center is a clearinghouse in Luxembourg called Clearstream, which transfers money for international banks and major companies.
Written by a former high-ranking Clearstream official and a French journalist, its publication last February by Les Arenes in Paris triggered the firing of Clearstream's top officials, a judicial inquiry in Luxembourg, and invitations to the authors to address members of the European Parliament and the French parliamentary commission on financial crime and money-laundering.
Authors Ernest Backes -- a former banker who helped design and install the clearinghouse's computerized accounting system in the 1970s -- and investigative reporter Denis Robert described a potential money laundering and tax evasion system that uses unpublished accounts to provide investors with a veil of secrecy.
This reporter was shown copies of what Backes says are records of the secret accounts. He keeps the originals in caches outside Luxembourg. The documents are a mine of information for any financial inquiry, with detailed information on every cross-border transfer in cash or securities. Some U.S. officials -- including New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani -- may well be aware of the system detailed in the documents.
Clients of Clearstream can be bankers, investment managers, offshore companies, tax evaders, officials of secret services, the CEOs of multinationals -- or terrorists.
For example, the records list a Clearstream account belonging to Bahrain International Bank, which is suspected of moving Osama bin Laden's money.
Clearstream and another clearinghouse, Euroclear -- based in Brussels -- transfer titles in 150 million transactions each year, involving more than US$7 billion in assets. At the discretion of Clearstream, clients can open non-published accounts that do not figure in any printed document or record of international financial transactions. When law enforcers ask to see records, they don't exist.
These being the banks they can locate...
milo minderbinder